


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SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE
AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF

CARL SCHURZ

IN SIX VOLUMES



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SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE
AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF



CARL SCHURZ



SELECTED AND EDITED BY

FREDERIC BANCROFT

ON BEHALF OF
THE CARL SCHURZ MEMORIAL COMMITTEE

VOLUME VI.

JANUARY 1, 1899—APRIL 8, 1906

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS


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THE WRITINGS OF CARL SCHURZ

The Writings of Carl Schurz

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

NEW YORK, Jan. 1, 1899.

I send you herewith an advance copy of my speech to be delivered on January 4th, at Chicago, in the lion's den. You will think it very long and so it is—but not as long as my sound money speech in 1896 was, which had an exceptionally great run. This speech is to serve the same purpose, namely to be a sort of vade-mecum for speakers or writers on our side of the question who will find in it answers, or at least suggestions for answers, to every argument brought forward on the other side.

To answer this purpose the speech needs the widest possible circulation, not only in pamphlet form, but in newspapers, and not only by way of synopsis or extract, but *in full*.

.

THE ISSUE OF IMPERIALISM¹

By inviting me to address its faculty, its students and its friends upon so distinguished an occasion, the University of Chicago has done me an honor for which I am

¹ Convocation address delivered before the University of Chicago, Jan. 4, 1899.

profoundly grateful. I can prove that gratitude in no better way than by uttering with entire frankness my honest convictions on the great subject you have given me to discuss—a subject fraught with more momentous consequence than any ever submitted to the judgment of the American people since the foundation of our Constitutional Government.

It is proposed to embark this Republic in a course of imperialistic policy by permanently annexing to it certain islands taken, or partly taken, from Spain in the late war. The matter is near its decision, but not yet decided. The peace treaty made at Paris is not yet ratified by the Senate; but even if it were, the question whether those islands, although ceded by Spain, shall be permanently incorporated in the territory of the United States would still be open for final determination by Congress. As an open question, therefore, I shall discuss it.

If ever, it behooves the American people to think and act with calm deliberation, for the character and future of the Republic and the welfare of its people now living and yet to be born are in unprecedented jeopardy. To form a candid judgment of what this Republic has been, what it may become and what it ought to be, let us first recall to our minds its condition before the recent Spanish war.

Our Government was, in the words of Abraham Lincoln, the greatest American of his time and the most genuine type of true Americanism, "the Government of the people, by the people and for the people." It was the noblest ambition of all true Americans to carry this democratic government to the highest degree of perfection in justice, in probity, in assured peace, in the security of human rights, in progressive civilization; to solve the problem of popular self-government on the grandest scale, and thus to make this Republic the example and guiding-star of mankind.

We had invited the oppressed of all nations to find shelter here, and to enjoy with us the blessings of free institutions. They came by the millions. Some were not as welcome as others, but, under the assimilating force of American life in our temperate climate, which stimulates the working energies, nurses the spirit of orderly freedom and thus favors the growth of democracies, they became good Americans, most in the first generation, all in the following generations. And so with all the blood-crossings caused by the motley immigration, we became a substantially homogeneous people, united by common political beliefs and ideals, by common interests, laws and aspirations—in one word, a nation. Indeed, we were not without our difficulties and embarrassments, but only one of them, the race antagonism between the negroes and the whites, especially where the negroes live in mass, presents a problem which so far has baffled all efforts at practical solution in harmony with the spirit of our free institutions, and thus threatens complications of a grave character.

We gloried in the marvelous growth of our population, wealth, power and civilization, and in the incalculable richness of the resources of our country capable of harboring three times our present population, and of immeasurable further material development. Our commerce with the world abroad, although we had no colonies, and but a small navy, spread with unprecedented rapidity, capturing one foreign market after another, not only for the products of our farms, but also for many of those of our manufacturing industries, with prospects of indefinite extension.

Peace reigned within our borders, and there was not the faintest shadow of a danger of foreign attack. Our voice, whenever we chose to speak in the councils of nations, was listened to with respect, even the mightiest sea Power

on occasion yielding to us a deference far beyond its habit in its intercourse with others. We were considered ultimately invincible, if not invulnerable, in our continental stronghold. It was our boast, not that we possessed great and costly armies and navies, but that we did not need any. This exceptional blessing was our pride as it was the envy of the world. We looked down with pitying sympathy on other nations which submissively groaned under the burden of constantly increasing armaments, and we praised our good fortune for having saved us from so wretched a fate.

Such was our condition, such our beliefs and ideals, such our ambition and our pride, but a short year ago. Had the famous peace message of the Czar of Russia, with its protest against growing militarism and its plea for disarmament, reached us then, it would have been hailed with enthusiasm by every American as a triumph of our example. We might have claimed only that to our Republic, and not to the Russian monarch, belonged the place of leadership in so great an onward step in the progress of civilization.

Then came the Spanish war. A few vigorous blows laid the feeble enemy helpless at our feet. The whole scene seemed to have suddenly changed. According to the solemn proclamation of our Government, the war had been undertaken solely for the liberation of Cuba, as a war of humanity and not of conquest. But our easy victories had put conquest within our reach, and when our arms occupied foreign territory, a loud demand arose, that, pledge or no pledge to the contrary, the conquests should be kept, even the Philippines on the other side of the globe, and that as to Cuba herself, independence would be only a provisional formality. Why not? was the cry. Has not the career of the Republic almost from its very beginning been one of territorial expansion? Has

it not acquired Louisiana, Florida, Texas, the vast countries that came to us through the Mexican war and Alaska, and has it not digested them well? Were not those acquisitions much larger than those now in contemplation? If the Republic could digest the old, why not the new? What is the difference?

Only look with an unclouded eye, and you will soon discover differences enough warning you to beware. There are five of decisive importance.

(1.) All the former acquisitions were on this continent and, excepting Alaska, contiguous to our borders.

(2.) They were situated, not in the tropical, but in the temperate zone, where democratic institutions thrive, and where our people could migrate in mass.

(3.) They were but very thinly peopled—in fact, without any population that would have been in the way of new settlements.

(4.) They could be organized as territories in the usual manner, with the expectation that they would presently come into the Union as self-governing States with populations substantially homogeneous to our own.

(5.) They did not require a material increase of our Army and Navy, either for their subjection to our rule or for their defense against any probable foreign attack provoked by their being in our possession.

Acquisitions of that nature we might, since the slavery trouble has been allayed, make indefinitely without in any dangerous degree imperiling our great experiment of democratic institutions on the grandest scale; without putting the peace of the Republic in jeopardy, and without depriving us of the inestimable privilege of comparatively unarmed security on a compact continent which may, indeed, by an enterprising enemy, be scratched on its edges, but is, with a people like ours, virtually impregnable. Even of our far-away Alaska it can be said

that, although at present a possession of doubtful value, it is at least mainly on this continent, and may at some future time, when the inhabitants of the British possessions happily wish to unite with us, be within our uninterrupted boundaries.

Compare now with our old acquisitions as to all these important points those at present in view.

They are not continental, not contiguous to our present domain, but beyond seas, the Philippines many thousand miles distant from our coast. They are all situated in the tropics, where people of the Northern races, such as Anglo-Saxons, or generally speaking, people of Germanic blood, have never migrated in mass to stay; and they are more or less densely populated, parts of them as densely as Massachusetts—their populations consisting almost exclusively of races to whom the tropical climate is congenial—Spanish creoles mixed with negroes in the West Indies, and Malays, Tagals, Filipinos, Chinese, Japanese, Negritos and various more or less barbarous tribes in the Philippines.

When the question is asked whether we may hope to adapt those countries and populations to our system of government, the advocates of annexation answer cheerily, that when they belong to us, we shall soon “Americanize” them. This may mean that Americans in sufficiently large numbers will migrate there to determine the character of those populations so as to assimilate them to our own.

This is a delusion of the first magnitude. We shall, indeed, be able, if we go honestly about it, to accomplish several salutary things in those countries. But one thing we cannot do. We cannot strip the tropical climate of those qualities which have at all times deterred men of the Northern races, to which we belong, from migrating to those countries in mass, to make their homes there,

as they have migrated and are still migrating to countries in the temperate zone. This is not a mere theory, but a fact of universal experience.

It is true, you will find in the towns of tropical regions a sprinkling of persons of Anglo-Saxon or of other Northern origin—merchants, railroad builders, speculators, professional men and mechanics; also here and there an agriculturist. But their number is small, and most of them expect to go home again as soon as their money-making purpose is more or less accomplished.

Thus we observe now that business men with plenty of means are casting their eyes upon our "new possessions" to establish mercantile-houses there, or manufactories to be worked with native labor, and moneyed syndicates and "improvement companies" to exploit the resources of those countries, and speculators and promoters to take advantage of what may turn up—the franchise grabber, as reported, is already there—many having perfectly legitimate ends in view, others ends not so legitimate and all expecting to be more or less favored by the power of our Government; in short, the capitalist is thinking of going there, or sending his agents, his enterprises in most cases to be directed from these more congenial shores. But you will find that laboring men of the Northern races, as they have never done so before, so they will not now go there in mass to do the work of the country, agricultural or industrial, and to found there permanent homes; and this not merely because the rate of wages in such countries is, owing to native competition, usually low, but because they cannot thrive there under the climatic conditions.

But it is the working-masses, those laboring in agriculture and the industries, that everywhere form the bulk of the population; and these are the true constituency of democratic government. And as the Northern races

cannot do the work of the tropical zone, they cannot furnish such a constituency. It is an incontestable and very significant fact that the British, the best colonizers in history, have, indeed, established in tropical regions governments, and rather absolute ones, but they have never succeeded in establishing there democratic commonwealths of the Anglo-Saxon type, like those in America or Australia.

The scheme of Americanizing our "new possessions" in that sense is therefore absolutely hopeless. The immutable forces of nature are against it. Whatever we may do for their improvement, the people of the Spanish Antilles will remain in overwhelming numerical predominance—Spanish creoles and negroes, and the people of the Philippines, Filipinos, Malays, Tagals and so on—some of them quite clever in their way, but the vast majority utterly alien to us, not only in origin and language, but in habits, traditions, ways of thinking, principles, ambitions—in short, in most things that are of the greatest importance in human intercourse and especially in political coöperation. And under the influences of their tropical climate they would prove incapable of becoming assimilated to the Anglo-Saxon. They would, therefore, remain in the population of this Republic a hopelessly heterogeneous element—in some respects much more hopeless than the colored people now living among us.

What, then, shall we do with such populations? Shall we, according, not indeed to the letter, but to the evident spirit of our Constitution, organize those countries as territories with a view to their eventual admission as States? If they become States on an equal footing with the other States they will not only be permitted to govern themselves as to their home concerns, but they will take part in governing the whole Republic, in governing us,

by sending Senators and Representatives into our Congress to help make our laws, and by voting for President and Vice-President to give our National Government its Executive. The prospect of the consequences which would follow the admission of the Spanish creoles and the negroes of West India islands and of the Malays and Tagals of the Philippines to participation in the conduct of our Government is so alarming that you may well pause before taking the step.

But this may be avoided, it is said, by governing the new possessions as mere dependencies, or subject provinces. I will waive the Constitutional question and merely point out that this would be a most serious departure from the rule that governed our former acquisitions, which are so frequently quoted as precedents. It is useless to speak of the District of Columbia and Alaska as proof that we have done such things before and can do them again. Every candid mind will at once admit the vast difference between those cases and the *permanent* establishment of substantially arbitrary government over large territories with ten millions of inhabitants, and with a prospect of there being many more of the same kind, if we once launch out on a career of conquest. The question is not merely whether we *can* do such things, but whether, having the public good at heart, we *should* do them.

If we do adopt such a system, then we shall, for the first time since the abolition of slavery, again have two kinds of Americans: Americans of the first class, who enjoy the privilege of taking part in the Government in accordance with our old Constitutional principles, and Americans of the second class, who are to be ruled in a substantially arbitrary fashion by the Americans of the first class, through Congressional legislation and the action of the National Executive—not to speak of individual

"masters" arrogating to themselves powers beyond the law.

This will be a difference no better—nay, rather somewhat worse—than that which a century and a quarter ago still existed between Englishmen of the first and Englishmen of the second class, the first represented by King George and the British Parliament, and the second by the American colonists. This difference called forth that great pæan of human liberty, the American Declaration of Independence—a document which, I regret to say, seems, owing to the intoxication of conquest, to have lost much of its charm among some of our fellow-citizens. Its fundamental principle was that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." We are now told that we have never fully lived up to that principle, and that, therefore, in our new policy we may cast it aside altogether. But I say to you that, if we are true believers in democratic government, it is our duty to move in the direction towards the full realization of that principle and not in the direction away from it. If you tell me that we cannot govern the people of those new possessions in accordance with that principle, then I answer that this is a reason why this democracy should not attempt to govern them at all.

If we do, we shall transform the government of the people, for the people and by the people, for which Abraham Lincoln lived, into a government of one part of the people, the strong, over another part, the weak. Such an abandonment of a fundamental principle as a permanent policy may at first seem to bear only upon more or less distant dependencies, but it can hardly fail in its ultimate effects to disturb the rule of the same principle in the conduct of democratic government at home. And I warn the American people that a democracy cannot so deny its faith as to the vital conditions of its

being—it cannot long play the King over subject populations without creating in itself ways of thinking and habits of action most dangerous to its own vitality—most dangerous especially to those classes of society which are the least powerful in the assertion, and the most helpless in the defense of their rights. Let the poor and the men who earn their bread by the labor of their hands pause and consider well before they give their assent to a policy so deliberately forgetful of the equality of rights.

I do not mean to say, however, that all of our new acquisitions would be ruled as subject provinces. Some of them, the Philippines, would probably remain such, but some others would doubtless become States. In Porto Rico, for instance, politicians of lively ambition are already clamoring for the speedy organization of that island as a regular territory, soon to be admitted as a State of the Union. You may say that they will have long to wait. Be not so sure of that. Consult your own experience. Has not more than one territory, hardly fitted for statehood, been precipitated into the Union as a State when the majority party in Congress thought that, by doing so, its party strength could be augmented in the Senate and in the House and in the Electoral College? Have our parties become so unselfishly virtuous that this may not happen again? So we may see Porto Rico admitted before we have had time to rub our eyes.

You may say that little Porto Rico would not matter much. But can any clear-thinking man believe that, when we are once fairly started in the course of indiscriminate expansion we shall stop there? Will not the same reasons which induced us to take Porto Rico also be used to show that the two islands of San Domingo with Hayti, and of Cuba, which separate Porto Rico from our coast, would, if they were in foreign hands, be a danger to us, and that we *must* take them? Nothing could be more

plausible. Why, the necessity of annexing San Domingo is already freely discussed, and agencies to bring this about are actually at work. And as to Cuba, every expansionist will tell you that it is only a matter of time. And does any one believe that those islands, if annexed, will not become States of this Union? That would give us at least three, perhaps four, new States, with about 3,500,000 inhabitants, Spanish and French creoles and negroes, with six or eight Senators, and from fifteen to twenty Representatives in Congress and a corresponding number of votes in the Electoral College.

Nor are we likely to stop there. If we build and own the Nicaragua Canal, instead of neutralizing it, we shall easily persuade ourselves that our control of that canal will not be safe unless we own all the country down to it, so that it be not separated from our borders by any foreign, and possibly hostile, Power. Is this too adventurous an idea to become true? Why, it is not half as adventurous and extravagant as the idea of uniting to this Republic the Philippines, 9000 miles away. It is already proposed to acquire in some way strips of territory several miles wide on each side of that canal for its military protection. But that will certainly be found insufficient if foreign countries lie between. We must, therefore, have those countries. That means Mexico and various small Central American republics, with a population in all of about 14,000,000, mostly Spanish-Indian mixture—making at least fifteen States, entitled to thirty Senators and scores of Representatives and Presidential electors.

As to the character of the people whom those Senators, Members and Presidential electors are to represent, I will let an authority speak that may astonish you, considering his present position—the Hon. Whitelaw Reid, who said in a public address at the time when the annexation of San Domingo was under discussion:

The land greed of the Anglo-Saxon race is still at work. We have absorbed the best part of Mexico, but we have plenty of propagandists, mainly in the Army, and with influential voice near the head of the Government, clamorous for the rest. We have taken a foothold in the West Indies; it will be of God's mercy if we do not find the whole West Indian archipelago crowded upon us to tax an already overloaded digestion. What are we to do with the turbulent, treacherous, ill-conditioned population? They have shown no faculty for self-government hitherto; and are we to precipitate them in a mass into the already sufficiently degraded elements of our National suffrage? We are trying the powers of Anglo-Saxon self-governing digestion upon three millions of slaves; are the gastric juices of the body-politic equal to the addition of the Mexicans, the Santo Domingans, the Cubans, the "Conks" of the Bahamas, the Kanakas and the rest of the inferior mixed races of our outlying tropical and semi-tropical dependencies?

As Mr. Reid now advocates the annexation of Porto Rico and the Philippines, he must have changed his opinion, which he had a right to do. But I think he substantially spoke the truth then, and if he now wants the Philippines, his case clearly illustrates how far people will be carried by the expansion fever when it once fairly takes hold of them.

You may think that the introduction of more than thirty men in our Senate, over eighty in the lower house of our Congress and much over one hundred votes in our Electoral College, to speak and act for the mixture of Spanish, French and negro blood on the West India Islands, and for the Spanish and Indian mixture on the continent South of us—for people utterly alien and mostly incapable of assimilation to us in their tropical habitation—to make our laws and elect our Presidents, and incidentally to help us lift up the Philippines to a higher plane

of civilization—is too shocking a proposition to be entertained for a moment, and that our people will resist it to the bitter end. No, they will not resist it, if indiscriminate expansion has once become the settled policy of the Republic. They will be told, as they are told now, that we are in it and cannot get honorably out of it; that destiny, and Providence, and duty demand it; that it would be cowardly to shrink from our new responsibilities; that those populations cannot take care of themselves, and that it is our mission to let them have the blessing of our free institutions; that we must have new markets for our products; that those countries are rich in resources, and that there is plenty of money to be made by taking them; that the American people can whip anybody and do anything they set out to do; and that “Old Glory” should float over every land on which we can lay our hands.

Our people, having yielded to such cries once, will yield to them again. Conservative citizens will tell them that thus the homogeneousness of the people of the Republic, so essential to the working of our democratic institutions, will be irretrievably lost; that our race troubles, already dangerous, will be infinitely aggravated, and that the government of, by and for the people will be in imminent danger of fatal demoralization. They will be cried down as pusillanimous pessimists, who are no longer American patriots. The American people will be driven on and on by the force of events as Napoleon was when started on his career of limitless conquest. This is imperialism as now advocated. Do we wish to prevent its excesses? Then we must stop it at the beginning, before taking Porto Rico. If we take that island, not even to speak of the Philippines, we shall have placed ourselves on the inclined plane, and roll on and on, no longer masters of our own will, until we shall have reached

bottom. And where will that bottom be? Who knows?

Our old acquisitions did not require a material increase of our Army and Navy. What of the new? It is generally admitted that we need very considerable additions to our armaments on land and sea to restore and keep order on the islands taken from Spain, and then to establish our sovereignty there. This is a ticklish business. In the first place, Spain has never been in actual control and possession of a good many of the Philippine Islands, while on others the insurgent Filipinos had well-nigh destroyed the Spanish power when the treaty of Paris was made. The people of those islands will either peaceably submit to our rule or they will not. If they do not, and we must conquer them by force of arms, we shall at once have a war on our hands.

What kind of a war will that be? The Filipinos fought against Spain for their freedom and independence, and unless they abandon their recently proclaimed purpose for their freedom and independence, they will fight against us. To be sure, we promise them all sorts of good things if they will consent to become our subjects. But they may, and probably will, prefer independence to foreign rule, no matter what fair promises the foreign invader makes. For to the Filipinos the American is essentially a foreigner, more foreign in some respects than even the Spaniard was. Subjection to foreign rule is not to everybody's taste; and as to the question of their rights under the principles of international law, you need only read the protest against our treaty of Paris by their representative, Agoncillo, to admit that they make out a strong case. Now, if they resist, what shall we do? Kill them? Let soldiers marching under the Stars and Stripes shoot them down? Shoot them down because they stand up for their independence, just as the Cubans, who are no better than they, fought for their independence, to which we

solemnly declared them to be "of right" entitled? Look at this calmly if you can. The American volunteers, who rushed to arms by the hundreds of thousands to fight for Cuban independence, may not stomach this killing of Filipinos fighting for *their* independence. We shall have to rely upon the regulars, the professional soldiers, and we may need a good many of them. As to the best way to fill the ranks in the Philippines, General Merritt is reported to have spoken in a recent interview published in the New York papers, as follows:

To my mind the permanent force should consist of from 20,000 to 30,000 men. Of these, 15,000 should be American soldiers. The remainder of the troops might be recruited from the Spaniards and Filipinos. The latter have exhibited no desire to enlist thus far, but there are many Spaniards there who have expressed a wish to wear the blue. They were impressed with the good pay and treatment of our men, and I think they would make good American soldiers. They are brave and hardy, but have suffered from lack of discipline.

Of course, General Merritt spoke only as the professional soldier, who has to take care of the Army. But the idea of engaging the same Spaniards, who but recently fought us and the Filipinos at the same time, to do the killing of the same Filipinos for us, or at least to terrorize them into subjection, because we want to possess their land, and to do this under the Stars and Stripes—this idea is at first sight a little startling. It may make the Hessians of our Revolutionary war grin in their graves. If anybody had predicted such a possibility a year ago, every patriotic American would have felt an impulse to kick him down-stairs. However, this is imperialism. It bids us not to be squeamish. Indeed some of our fellow-citizens seem already to be full of its spirit. The Hon. Cyrus A. Sulloway, a Member of Congress from New

Hampshire, is reported to have said in a recent interview: "The Anglo-Saxon advances into the new regions with a Bible in one hand and a shotgun in the other. The inhabitants of those regions that he cannot convert with the aid of the Bible, and bring into his markets, he gets rid of with the shotgun. It is but another demonstration of the survival of the fittest." In other words, unless you worship as we command you, and give us a profitable trade, we shall have to shoot you down. The bloodiest of the old Spanish conquerors, four centuries ago, could not have spoken better. It has a strange sound in free America. Let us hope that the spread of this hideous brutality of sentiment will prove only a temporary epidemic, like the influenza, and will yield again when the intoxication of victory subsides and our heads become cool once more. If it does not, more shotguns will be needed than Mr. Sulloway may now anticipate.

If we take those new regions, we shall be well entangled in that contest for territorial aggrandizement which distracts other nations and drives them far beyond their original design. So it will be inevitably with us. We shall want new conquests to protect that which we already possess. The greed of speculators working upon our Government will push us from one point to another, and we shall have new conflicts on our hands, almost without knowing how we got into them. It has always been so under such circumstances, and always will be. This means more and more soldiers, ships and guns.

A singular delusion has taken hold of the minds of otherwise clear-headed men. It is that our new friendship with England will serve firmly to secure the world's peace. Nobody can hail that friendly feeling between the two nations more warmly than I do, and I fervidly hope it will last. But I am profoundly convinced that if this friendship results in the two countries setting out to grasp

“for the Anglo-Saxon,” as the phrase is, whatever of the earth may be attainable—if they hunt in couple, they will surely soon fall out about the game, and the first serious quarrel, or at least one of the first, we shall have, will be with Great Britain. And as family feuds are the bitterest that feud will be apt to become one of the most deplorable in its consequences.

No nation is, or ought to be, unselfish. England, in her friendly feeling toward us, is not inspired by mere sentimental benevolence. The anxious wish of many Englishmen that we should take the Philippines is not free from the consideration that, if we do so, we shall for a long time depend on British friendship to maintain our position on that field of rivalry, and that Britain will derive ample profit from our dependence on her. This was recently set forth with startling candor by the *London Saturday Review*, thus:

Let us be frank and say outright that we expect mutual gain in material interests from this *rapprochement*. The American Commissioners at Paris are making this bargain, whether they realize it or not, under the protecting naval strength of England, and we shall expect a material *quid pro quo* for this assistance. We expect the United States to deal generously with Canada in the matter of tariffs, and we expect to be remembered when the United States comes into possession of the Philippine Islands, and, above all, we expect her assistance on the day, which is quickly approaching, when the future of China comes up for settlement, for the young imperialist has entered upon a path where it will require a strong friend, and a lasting friendship between the two nations can be secured, not by frothy sentimentality on public platforms, but by reciprocal advantages in solid, material interests.

And the cable despatch from London bringing this utterance added:

"The foregoing opinion is certainly outspoken enough, but every American moving in business circles here knows this voices the expectations of the average Englishman."

This is plain. If Englishmen think so we have no fault to find with them. But it would be extremely foolish on our part to close our eyes to the fact. British friendship is a good thing to have, but, perhaps, not so good a thing to need. If we are wise we shall not put ourselves in a situation in which we shall need it. British statesmanship has sometimes shown great skill in making other nations fight its battles. This is very admirable from its point of view, but it is not so pleasant for the nations so used. I should be loath to see this Republic associated with Great Britain in apparently joint concerns as a junior partner with a minority interest, or the American Navy in the situation of a mere squadron of the British fleet. This would surely lead to trouble in the settling of accounts. Lord Salisbury was decidedly right when, at the last Lord Mayor's banquet he said that the appearance of the United States as a factor in Asiatic affairs was likely to conduce to the interests of Great Britain, but might "not conduce to the interest of peace." Whether he had eventual quarrels with this Republic in mind, I do not know. But it is certain that the expression of British sentiment I have just quoted shows us a pandora-box of such quarrels.

Ardently desiring the maintenance of the friendship between England and this Republic, I cannot but express the profound belief that this friendship will remain most secure if the two nations do not attempt to accomplish the same ends in the same way, but continue to follow the separate courses prescribed by their peculiar conditions and their history.

The history of England is that of a small island, inhabited by a vigorous, energetic and rapidly multiplying

race, with the sea for its given field of action. Nothing could be more natural than that, as the population pressed against its narrow boundaries, Englishmen should have swarmed all over the world, founding colonies and gradually building up an empire of possessions scattered over the globe. England now *must* have the most powerful fleet in the world, not only for the protection of her distant possessions but because if any other sea Power, or combination of sea Powers, could effectually blockade her coasts, her people, as they now are, might be starved in a few months. England must be the greatest sea Power in order to be a great Power at all.

The American people began their career as one of the colonial offshoots of the English stock. They found a great continent to occupy and to fill with democratic commonwealths. Our country is large enough for several times our present population. Our home resources are enormous, in great part not yet touched. We need not fear to be starved by the completest blockade of our coasts, for we have enough of everything and to spare. On the contrary, such a blockade might rather result in starving others that need our products. We are to-day one of the greatest Powers on earth, without having the most powerful fleet, and without stepping beyond our boundaries. We are sure to be by far the greatest Power of all, as our homogeneous, intelligent and patriotic population multiplies, and our resources are developed, without firing a gun or sacrificing a life for the sake of conquest—far more powerful than the British Empire with all its Hindoos, and than the Russian Empire with all its Mongols. We can exercise the most beneficent influences upon mankind, not by forcing our rule or our goods upon others that are weak by the force of bayonets and artillery, but through the moral power of our example, by proving how the greatest as well as the smallest nation can carry

on the government of the people by the people and for the people in justice, liberty, order and peace without large armies and navies.

Let this Republic and Great Britain each follow the course which its conditions and its history have assigned to it, and their ambitions will not clash, and their friendship be maintained for the good of all. And if our British cousins should ever get into very serious stress, American friendship may stand behind them; but then Britain would depend upon our friendship, which, as an American, I should prefer, and not America on British friendship, as our British friends, who so impatiently urge us to take the Philippines, would have it. But if we do take the Philippines, and thus entangle ourselves in the rivalries of Asiatic affairs, the future will be, as Lord Salisbury predicted, one of wars and rumors of wars, and the time will be forever past when we could look down with condescending pity on the nations of the old world groaning under militarism with all its burdens.

We are already told that we shall need a regular Army of at least 100,000 men, three-fourths of whom are to serve in our new "possessions." The question is whether this necessity is to be only temporary or permanent. Look at the cost. Last year the support of the Army proper required about \$23,000,000. It is computed that taking the increased costliness of the service in the tropics into account, the Army under the new dispensation will require about \$150,000,000; that is, \$127,000,000 a year more. It is also officially admitted that the possession of the Philippines would render indispensable a much larger increase of the Navy than would otherwise be necessary, costing untold millions for the building and equipment of ships, and untold millions every year for their maintenance and for the increased number of officers and men. What we shall have to spend for fortifications and the

like cannot now be computed. But there is a burden upon us which in like weight no other nation has to bear. To-day, thirty-three years after the civil war, we have a pension roll of very nearly one million names. And still they come. We paid to pensioners over \$145,000,000 last year, a sum larger than the annual cost of the whole military peace establishment of the German Empire, including its pension roll. Our recent Spanish war will, according to a moderate estimate, add at least \$20,000,000 to our annual pension payments. But if we send troops to the tropics and keep them there, we must look for a steady stream of pensioners from that quarter, for in the tropics soldiers are "used up" very fast, even if they have no campaigning to do.

But all such estimates are futile. There may, and probably will be, much campaigning to do to keep our new subjects in obedience, or even in conflicts with other Powers. And what military and naval expeditions will then cost, with our extravagant habits, and how the pension roll then will grow, we know to be incalculable. Moreover, we shall then be in the situation of those European Powers, the extent of whose armaments are determined, not by their own wishes, but by the armaments of their rivals. We, too, shall nervously watch reports from abroad telling us that this Power is augmenting the number of its warships, or that another is increasing its battalions, or strengthening its colonial garrisons in the neighborhood of our far-away possessions; and we shall have to follow suit. Not we ourselves, but our rivals and possible enemies will decide how large our armies and navies must be, and how much money we must spend for them. And all that money will have to come out of the pockets of our people, the poor as well as the rich. Our taxpaying capacity and willingness are indeed very great. But set your policy of imperialism in full swing, as the

acquisition of the Philippines will do, and the time will come, and come quickly, when every American farmer and workingman, when going to his toil, will, like his European brother, have "to carry a fully armed soldier on his back."

Our Government has agreed to appear in the "Peace-and-Disarmament Conference" called by the Russian Czar. What will our representative have to say when the Russian spokesman, as the Czar has done, truthfully describes the ever-growing evils of militarism, and the necessity of putting a stop to them in the interest of civilization and of the popular welfare? The American imperialist, whatever fine phrases he may employ, will have to say substantially this: "All you tell us about the ruinous effects of increasing armaments and the necessity of stopping them in the interest of civilization and the popular welfare is true. It was our own belief some time ago. But we Americans have recently changed our minds. You, gentlemen, say that the Powers you represent would disarm if they could and that general disarmament might be possible if one Power would resolutely begin to disarm. But we Americans are just beginning to arm. You say that this will put another difficulty in the way of general disarmament. But we Americans have, by way of liberating Cuba, won by conquest some islands in both hemispheres, to which we may wish to add, and this business will require larger armies and navies than we now have."

This is the voice of American imperialism. And thus our great and glorious Republic, which once boasted of marching in the vanguard of progressive civilization, will deliberately go to the rear, and make of itself a new obstacle to a reform, the success of which would do infinitely more for the general good of mankind than we could accomplish by a hundred victories of our arms on land or sea.

It would seem, therefore, that the new territorial acquisitions in view are after all very different from those we have made before. But something more is to be said. When the Cuban affair approached a crisis, President McKinley declared in his message that "forcible annexation cannot be thought of"; for "it would, by our code of morals, be criminal aggression." And in resolving upon the war against Spain, Congress, to commend that war to the public opinion of the world, declared with equal emphasis and solemnity that the war was, from a sense of duty and humanity, made specifically for the liberation of Cuba, and that Cuba "is, and of right ought to be free and independent." If these declarations were not sincere, they were base and disgraceful acts of hypocrisy. If they were sincere at the time, would they not be turned into such disgraceful acts of hypocrisy by subsequently turning the war, professedly made from motives of duty and humanity, into a war of conquest and self-aggrandizement? It is pretended that those virtuous promises referred to Cuba only. But if President McKinley had said that the forcible annexation of Cuba would be criminal aggression, but that the forcible annexation of anything else would be perfectly right, and if Congress had declared that as to Cuba the war would be one of mere duty, humanity and liberation, but that we would take by conquest whatever else we could lay our hands on, would not all mankind have broken out in a shout of scornful derision?


I ask in all candor, taking President McKinley at his word, will the forcible annexation of the Philippines by our code of morals not be criminal aggression—a self-confessed crime? I ask further, if the Cubans, as Congress declared, are *and of right ought to be* free and independent, can anybody tell me why the Porto Ricans and the Filipinos ought not *of right* to be free and independent? Can you sincerely recognize the right to freedom and

independence of one and refuse the same right to another in the same situation, and then take his land? Would not that be double-dealing of the most shameless sort?

We hear much of the respect of mankind for us having been greatly raised by our victories. Indeed, the valor of our soldiers and the brilliant achievements of our Navy have won deserved admiration. But do not deceive yourselves about the respect of mankind. Recently I found in the papers an account of the public opinion of Europe, written by a prominent English journalist. This is what he says:

The friends of America wring their hands in unaffected grief over the fall of the United States under the temptation of the lust of territorial expansion. Her enemies shoot out the lip and shriek in derision over what they regard as the unmistakable demonstration which the demand for the Philippines affords of American cupidity, American bad faith and American ambition. "We told you so," they exclaim. That is what the unctuous rectitude of the Anglo-Saxon always ends in. He always begins by calling Heaven to witness his unselfish desire to help his neighbors, but he always ends by stealing his spoons!

Atrocious, is it not? And yet, this is substantially what the true friends of America, and what her enemies in Europe, think—I mean those friends who had faith in the nobility of the American people, who loved our republican government and who hoped that the example set by our great democracy would be an inspiration to those struggling for liberty the world over; and I mean those enemies who hate republican government and who long to see the American people disgraced and humiliated. So they think; I know it from my own correspondence. Nothing has in our times discredited the name of republic in the civilized world as much as the Dreyfus outrage in



France and our conquest furor in America; and our conquest furor more, because from us the world hoped more.

No, do not deceive yourselves. If we turn that war which was so solemnly commended to the favor of mankind as a generous war of liberation and humanity into a victory for conquest and self-aggrandizement, we shall have thoroughly forfeited our moral credit with the world. Professions of unselfish virtue and benevolence, proclamations of noble humanitarian purposes coming from us will never, never be trusted again. Is this the position in which this great Republic of ours should stand among the family of nations? Our American self-respect should rise in indignant protest against it.

And now compare this picture, of the state of things which threatens us, with the picture I drew of our condition existing before the expansion fever seized us. Which will you choose?

What can there be to justify a policy fraught with such direful consequences? Let us pass the arguments of the advocates of such imperialism candidly in review.

The cry suddenly raised that this great country has become too small for us is too ridiculous to demand an answer, in view of the fact that our present population may be tripled and still have ample elbow-room, with resources to support many more. But we are told that our industries are gasping for breath; that we are suffering from over-production; that our products must have new outlets, and that we need colonies and dependencies the world over to give us more markets. More markets? Certainly. But do we, civilized beings, indulge in the absurd and barbarous notion that we must own the countries with which we wish to trade? Here are our official reports before us, telling us that of late years our export trade has grown enormously, not only of farm products, but of the products of our manufacturing

industries; in fact, that "our sales of manufactured goods have continued to extend with a facility and promptitude of results which have excited the serious concern of countries that, for generations, had not only controlled their home markets, but had practically monopolized certain lines of trade in other lands."

There is the British Right Hon. Charles T. Ritchie, President of the Board of Trade, telling a British Chamber of Commerce that "we [Great Britain] are being rapidly overhauled in exports by other nations, especially the United States and Germany," their exports fast advancing while British exports are declining. What? Great Britain, the greatest colonial Power in the world, losing in competition with two nations one of which had, so far, no colonies or dependencies at all, and the other none of any commercial importance? It means that, as proved by the United States and Germany, colonies are not necessary for the expansion of trade, and that, as proved by Great Britain, colonies do not protect a nation against a loss of trade. Our trade expands, without colonies or big navies, because we produce certain goods better and in proportion cheaper than other people do. British trade declines, in spite of immense dependencies and the strongest navy, because it does not successfully compete with us, in that respect. Trade follows, not the flag, but the best goods for the price. Expansion of export trade and new markets! We do not need foreign conquests to get them, for we have them, and are getting them more and more in rapidly increasing growth.

"But the Pacific Ocean," we are mysteriously told, "will be the great commercial battlefield of the future, and we must quickly use the present opportunity to secure our position on it. The visible presence of great power is necessary for us to get our share of the trade of China. Therefore we must have the Philippines." Well, the

China trade is worth having, although for a time out of sight the Atlantic Ocean will be an infinitely more important battlefield of commerce than the Pacific, and one European customer is worth more than twenty or thirty Asiatics. But does the trade of China really require that we should have the Philippines and a great display of power to get our share? Read the consular reports, and you will find that in many places in China our trade is rapidly gaining, while in some, British trade is declining, and this while Great Britain had on hand the greatest display of power imaginable and we had none. And in order to increase our trade there, our consuls advise us to improve our commercial methods, saying nothing of the necessity of establishing a base of naval operations, and of our appearing there with war-ships and heavy guns. Trade is developed, not by the biggest guns, but by the best merchants. But why do other nations prepare to fight for the Chinese trade? Other nations have done many foolish things which we have been, and I hope will remain wise enough not to imitate. If it should come to fighting for Chinese customers, the Powers engaged in that fight are not unlikely to find out that they pay too high a price for what can be gained, and that at last the peaceful neutral will have the best bargain. At any rate, to launch into all the embroilments of an imperialistic policy by annexing the Philippines in order to snatch something more of the Chinese trade would be for us the foolishlest game of all.

Generally speaking, nothing could be more irrational than all the talk about our losing commercial or other opportunities which "will never come back if we fail to grasp them now." Why, we are so rapidly growing in all the elements of power ahead of all other nations that not many decades hence, unless we demoralize ourselves by a reckless policy of adventure, not one of them will be able to resist our will if we choose to enforce it. This the

world knows, and is alarmed at the prospect. Those who are most alarmed may wish that we should give them now, by some rash enterprise, an occasion for dealing us a damaging blow while we are less irresistible.

"But we must have coaling-stations for our Navy!" Well, can we not get as many coaling-stations as we need, without owning populous countries behind them that would entangle us in dangerous political responsibilities and complications?

"But we must civilize those poor people!" Well, are we not ingenious and charitable enough to do much for their civilization without subjugating and ruling them by criminal aggression?

The rest of the pleas for imperialism consist mostly of those high-sounding catchwords of which a free people, when about to decide great questions, should be especially suspicious. We are admonished that it is time for us to become a "world-power." Well, we *are* a world-power now, and have been one for many years. What is a world-power? A power strong enough to make its voice listened to with deference by the world whenever it chooses to speak. Is it necessary for a world-power, in order to be such, to have its finger in every pie? Must we have the Philippines in order to become a world-power? To ask the question is to answer it.

The American flag, we are told, whenever once raised, must never be hauled down. Certainly, every patriotic citizen will always be ready, if need be, to fight and to die under his flag wherever it may wave in justice and for the best interests of the country. But I say to you, woe to the Republic if it should ever be without citizens patriotic and brave enough to defy the demagogues' cry and to haul down the flag wherever it may be raised not in justice and not for the best interests of the country. Such a republic would not last long.

But, they tell us, we have been living in a state of contemptible isolation which must be broken, so that we may feel and conduct ourselves "as a full-grown member of the family of nations." What is that so-called isolation? Is it commercial? Why, last year our foreign trade amounted to nearly two thousand million dollars, and is rapidly growing. Is that commercial isolation? Or are we politically isolated? Remember our history. Who was it that early in this century broke up the piracy of the Barbary States? Who was it that took a leading part in delivering the world's commerce of the Danish Sound dues? Who was it that first opened Japan to communication with the Western world? And what Power has in this century made more valuable contributions to international law than the United States? Do you call that contemptible isolation? It is true, we did not meddle much with foreign affairs that did not concern us. But if the circle of our interests widens and we wish to meddle more, must we needs have the Philippines in order to feel and conduct ourselves as a member of the family of nations?

We are told that, having grown so great and strong, we must at last cast off our childish reverence for the teachings of Washington's Farewell Address—those "nursery rhymes that were sung around the cradle of the Republic." I apprehend that many of those who now so flippantly scoff at the heritage the Father of his Country left us in his last words of admonition have never read that venerable document. I challenge those who have, to show me a single sentence of general import in it that would not as a wise rule of National conduct apply to the circumstances of to-day! What is it that has given to Washington's Farewell Address an authority that was revered by all until our recent victories made so many of us drunk with wild ambitions? Not only the prestige of Washington's name, great as that was and should ever remain. No, it was the

fact that under a respectful observance of those teachings this Republic has grown from the most modest beginnings into a Union spanning this vast continent; our people have multiplied from a handful to seventy-five millions; we have risen from poverty to a wealth the sum of which the imagination can hardly grasp; this American Nation has become one of the greatest and most powerful on earth, and continuing in the same course will surely become the greatest and most powerful of all. Not Washington's name alone gave his teachings their dignity and weight. It was the practical results of his policy that secured to it, until now, the intelligent approbation of the American people. And unless we have completely lost our senses, we shall never despise and reject as mere "nursery rhymes" the words of wisdom left us by the greatest of Americans, following which the American people have achieved a splendor of development without parallel in the history of mankind.

You may tell me that this is all very well, but that by the acts of our own Government we are now in this annexation business, and how can we get decently out of it? I answer that the difficulties of getting out of it may be great; but that they are infinitely less great than the difficulties we shall have to contend with if we stay in it.

Looking them in the face, let us first clear our minds of confused notions about our duties and responsibilities in the premises. That our victories have devolved upon us certain duties as to the people of the conquered islands, I readily admit. But are they the only duties we have to perform, or have they suddenly become paramount to all other duties? I deny it. I deny that the duties we owe to the Cubans and the Porto Ricans and the Filipinos and the Tagals of the Asiatic islands absolve us from our duties to the seventy-five millions of our own people and to their posterity. I deny that they oblige us to destroy the moral

credit of our own Republic by turning this loudly heralded war of liberation and humanity into a land-grabbing game and an act of criminal aggression. I deny that they compel us to aggravate our race troubles, to bring upon us the constant danger of war and to subject our people to the galling burden of increasing armaments. If we have rescued those unfortunate daughters of Spain, the colonies, from the tyranny of their cruel father, I deny that we are therefore in honor bound to marry any of the girls, or to take them all into our household, where they may disturb and demoralize our whole family. I deny that the liberation of those Spanish dependencies morally constrains us to do anything that would put our highest mission to solve the great problem of democratic government in jeopardy, or that would otherwise endanger the vital interests of the Republic. Whatever our duties to them may be, our duties to our own country and people stand first; and from this standpoint we have, as sane men and patriotic citizens, to regard our obligation to take care of the future of those islands and their people.

They fought for deliverance from Spanish oppression, and we helped them to obtain that deliverance. That deliverance they understood to mean independence. I repeat the question whether anybody can tell me why the declaration of Congress that the Cubans *of right ought to be* free and independent should not apply to all of them? Their independence, therefore, would be the natural and rightful outcome. This is the solution of the problem first to be taken in view. It is objected that they are not capable of independent government. They may answer that this is their affair and that they are at least entitled to a trial. I frankly admit that if they are given that trial, their conduct in governing themselves will be far from perfect. Well, the conduct of no people is perfect, not even our own. They may try to revenge themselves

upon their tories in their revolutionary war. But we, too, threw our tories into hideous dungeons during our Revolutionary war and persecuted and drove them away after its close. They may have bloody civil broils. But we, too, have had our civil war which cost hundreds of thousands of lives and devastated one-half of our land; and now we have in horrible abundance the killings by lynch law and our battles of Virden. They may have trouble with their wild tribes. So had we, and we treated our wild tribes in a manner not to be proud of. They may have corruption and rapacity in their Government, but Havana and Ponce may get municipal administration almost as good as New York has under Tammany rule; and Manila may have a city council not much less virtuous than that of Chicago.

I say these things not in a spirit of levity, well understanding the difference; but say them seriously to remind you that, when we speak of the government those islands should have, we cannot reasonably set up standards which are not reached even by the most civilized people, and which in those regions could not be reached, even if we ourselves conducted their government with our best available statesmanship. Our attention is in these days frequently called to the admirable and in many respects successful administrative machinery introduced by Great Britain in India. But it must not be forgotten that this machinery was evolved from a century of rapine, corruption, disastrous blunders, savage struggles and murderous revolts, and that even now many wise men in England gravely doubt in their hearts whether it was best for the country to undertake the conquest of India at all, and are troubled by gloomy forebodings of a calamitous catastrophe that may some day engulf that splendid fabric of Asiatic dominion.

No, we cannot expect that the Porto Ricans, the

Cubans and the Filipinos will maintain orderly governments in Anglo-Saxon fashion. But they may succeed in establishing a tolerable order of things in their fashion, as Mexico, after many decades of turbulent disorder, succeeded at last, under Porfirio Diaz, in having a strong and orderly government of her kind, not, indeed, such a government as we would tolerate in this Union, but a government answering Mexican character and interests, and respectable in its relations with the outside world.

This will become all the more possible if, without annexing and ruling those people, we simply put them on their feet, and then give them the benefit of that humanitarian spirit which, as we claim, led us into the war for the liberation of Cuba. To this end we should keep our troops on the islands until their people have constructed governments and organized forces of their own for the maintenance of order. Our military occupation should not be kept up as long as possible, but should be withdrawn as soon as possible.

The Philippines may, as Belgium and Switzerland are in Europe, be covered by a guarantee of neutrality on the part of the Powers most interested in that region—an agreement which the diplomacy of the United States should not find it difficult to obtain. This would secure them against foreign aggression. As to the independent republics of Porto Rico and Cuba, our Government might lend its good offices to unite them with San Domingo and Hayti in a confederacy of the Antilles, to give them a more respectable international standing. Stipulations should be agreed upon with them as to open ports and the freedom of business enterprise within their borders, affording all possible commercial facilities. Missionary effort in the largest sense, as to the development of popular education and of other civilizing agencies, as well as abundant charity in case of need, will on our part not be wanting, and all

this will help to mitigate their disorderly tendencies and to steady their governments.

Thus we shall be their best friends without being their foreign rulers. We shall have done our duty to them, to ourselves and to the world. However imperfect their governments may still remain, they will at least be their own, and they will not with their disorders and corruptions contaminate our institutions, the integrity of which is not only to ourselves, but to liberty-loving mankind, the most important concern of all. We may then await the result with generous patience—with the same patience with which for many years we witnessed the revolutionary disorders of Mexico on our very borders, without any thought of taking her government into our own hands.

Ask yourselves whether a policy like this will not raise the American people to a level of moral greatness never before attained! If this democracy, after all the intoxication of triumph in war, conscientiously remembers its professions and pledges, and soberly reflects on its duties to itself and others, and then deliberately resists the temptation of conquest, it will achieve the grandest triumph of the democratic idea that history knows of. It will give the government of, for and by the people a prestige it never before possessed. It will render the cause of civilization throughout the world a service without parallel. It will put its detractors to shame, and its voice will be heard in the council of nations with more sincere respect and more deference than ever. The American people, having given proof of their strength and also of their honesty and wisdom, will stand infinitely mightier before the world than any number of subjugated vassals could make them. Are not here our best interests moral and material? Is not this genuine glory? Is not this true patriotism?

I call upon all who so believe never to lose heart in the struggle for this great cause, whatever odds may seem to

be against us. Let there be no pusillanimous yielding while the final decision is still in the balance. Let us relax no effort in this, the greatest crisis the Republic has ever seen. Let us never cease to invoke the good sense, the honesty and the patriotic pride of the people. Let us raise high the flag of our country—not as an emblem of reckless adventure and greedy conquest, of betrayed professions and broken pledges, of criminal aggression and arbitrary rule over subject populations—but the old, the true flag, the flag of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln; the flag of the government of, for and by the people; the flag of National faith held sacred and of National honor unsullied; the flag of human rights and of good example to all nations; the flag of true civilization, peace and good-will to all men. Under it let us stand to the last, whatever betide.

And now, although much more might be said on this momentous subject, I must close. Before taking leave of you, Mr. President, teachers, students and friends of the University of Chicago, permit me to congratulate you on the growth and success of this great institution of learning. Accept my heartiest wishes that it may continue to prosper and flourish, sowing the good seed, and that the American youths who drink at its fountains may go forth into the world true devotees of science and truth, firm pillars of justice and right, and dauntless champions of the free institutions of government which they have inherited from their fathers, and should leave unimpaired in vigor and integrity to coming generations.

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

NEW YORK, Jan. 16, 1899.

This time I have to dictate my answer to your letter on account of the grippe, which, however, is gradually passing

away—at least I hope so, although nobody can tell what the treacherous monster may do.

I agree with you that we ought to have a meeting of some kindred spirits as soon as possible and I hope you will be here before long and let me know some time in advance!

The news from Washington, confirmed by Mr. Carnegie whom I saw yesterday, is that the imperialists there are in full retreat, and that they are looking out for all sorts of things to cover their discomfiture. They had advanced to the point where they could not go any further without shooting down Filipinos fighting for their independence. This idea called forth a growl from the country which made Mr. McKinley shiver. Moreover, there is reason for believing that the condition of our troops in the Philippines is very bad, and that the necessity of any campaigning there would bring upon us very disastrous consequences.

In short, "eventual independence" is the word now and the thing which we shall have really to fight in such tricks as the imperialists may use to extend and prolong our military occupation.

I think that Chandler's letter has to be read in that light. There will be no trouble at all about the Spanish captives as soon as we put ourselves with the Filipinos upon a footing of good faith and friendly coöperation. They will then, no doubt, do us any favor for the asking.

As to the intention of Germany to pounce upon the Philippine Islands as soon as our forces are withdrawn, nothing could be more absurd. I became firmly convinced of this by a conversation I had, immediately after his return from Europe, with the German Ambassador, Mr. von Holleben. He gave me the most ample proof, that the German Government did not only not intend to cross our purposes in any way, but that it was on the contrary bent upon doing its utmost to remain on friendly terms

with the United States. It seems to me the true policy is for the United States to secure an agreement of the Powers most interested in that region to put the Philippine Islands under the cover of a guarantee of neutrality, as Belgium and Switzerland are covered in Europe.

The only Power that might feel inclined to frustrate such a scheme might be Great Britain, who would like to force us to take the Philippines for good and thus become dependent in a sense, upon her protection.

I had a letter from Senator Hoar which indicates that their fight against the treaty will be for time and I think this is wise. We are evidently growing stronger every day. The irritated tone of the imperialistic press indicates that they feel defeat in their bones.

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FROM GUSTAV H. SCHWAB AND OTHERS

NEW YORK, Feb. 14, 1899.

Dear Sir: On behalf of a large number of your fellow-citizens who hold you in sincere affection and high esteem we desire to tender to you the tribute of a complimentary dinner on the seventieth anniversary of your birth, as a formal recognition of your personal qualities and of the great public services you have rendered to the land of your adoption.

If agreeable to you your friends will entertain you at dinner on Thursday, March 2d, at 6.30 o'clock P.M., at Delmonico's, Forty-fourth street and Fifth avenue.

TO HERBERT WELSH

NEW YORK, Feb. 25, 1899.

Private.

So they have pressed you into the service! I sympathize with you, as I trust you do with me.

What I did with regard to the public forests was simply

to arrest devastation, in which I partially succeeded, and for which I was lustily denounced, and to strive from year to year to obtain from Congress legislation for the protection of the forests, in which I largely failed. Something in that line has since been done—how effective it is, I do not know.

I made great efforts to draw the attention of Congress and of the public to the matter through my official reports. I think I was the first Secretary who did so, but I am not quite sure.

What is to come out of that horrible Philippine business? Who knows? I do not believe this would be a propitious moment for a concerted effort to bring the true nature of the case to the consideration of the people. But as events develop themselves, it will soon be our duty, I think, to cry aloud and spare not.

AT THREESCORE AND TEN *

MR. CHAIRMAN AND FRIENDS:—I stand here as a victim of misplaced confidence. When, some time ago, Mr. Schwab asked me whether I would accept an invitation to dine with some friends on or about my seventieth birthday, I gladly consented, expecting a quiet evening with a small circle of intimates. Gradually I learned that the matter was assuming formidable proportions; but then it was too late to retract. And now I find myself here in the presence of hundreds, and my whole biography is mercilessly thrown at me in public, while I have no fair opportunity for defending myself. I am accustomed to the discussion of public questions but not to the discussion of my personal concerns. Being, in a sense, called upon to do

* Speech at the banquet given in honor of his seventieth birthday, at Delmonico's, New York, March 2, 1899.

this, the situation is to me extremely embarrassing. If I accepted all this praise, it would be egotism; if I declined it, it would be an ungracious criticism of the partiality of my friends. I can, therefore, only thank you, all and each of you, for these honors, and all those who, from far and near, to-day have fairly overwhelmed me with their kindness; and that I do from the very bottom of my heart.

Some of the things I have heard to-night about myself can be said with safety of any man only when he is dead and gone, and the sum of his life has been judicially struck after a proper review of the evidence. But, although the first exuberance of youth may be behind me, I flatter myself with being still alive, wishing and hoping to live a little while longer, and to take more or less interest in the affairs of the living. Sweeping praise is, therefore, attended with some risk to those who utter it, for they do not know what may still be coming to make them sorry for what they have said.

Indeed, among the friends I see here there are many who now and then have—I will not say been angry with me, but who have seriously disagreed with me about the treatment of this or that public question. From the fact of their doing me the honor of being here, I may conclude—not, indeed, that they have changed their opinions, but that, holding the same opinions still, they have, in spite of those differences, some reason to believe me at least sincere in what I said and did. And I hope you will not think it too egotistical on my part when I say that in this belief they are not mistaken.

I have, doubtless, sometimes committed grave errors of observation or of judgment, but I may affirm that in my long public activity I have always sought to inform myself about the things I had to deal with, and that in my utterances on public interests I have never said any-

thing that I did not myself conscientiously believe to be true. If this is the reason of your being here, I am proud, very proud of it; and I may promise you that this shall be so to the last, and that, in this respect at least, you will have a fair chance of not becoming sorry for the honor you are doing me to-night.

My friends, who addressed you, have said much of what I have tried to do for our country. They have touched very lightly upon what that country has done for me. In speaking of this you must bear with me for indulging in some personal reminiscence.

The brilliant scene here before me recalls to my mind with great vividness the September day in 1852, when I landed upon these shores as an exile from my native land—an exile in consequence of my participation in the revolutionary attempts of that period to give the old Fatherland national unity and free institutions akin to those we here enjoy—an exile, without friends here, save some companions in misfortune, ignorant of the language of the country, a stranger to all the sights I saw and the sounds I heard. I well remember my first wanderings through the streets of New York, some of which were at the time decorated with the trappings of a Presidential campaign, then almost unintelligible to me. I remember my lonely musings on a bench in Union Square, the whirl of the noise and commotion near me only deepening the desolation of my feeling of forlornness; the future before me like a mysterious fog bank; my mind in a state of dismal vacuity, against which my naturally sanguine temperament could hardly bear up, and which nobody can well imagine, who has not passed through a similar plight. Still, I was firmly determined, that for better or worse, this should be my home, my country, for the rest of my life.

My knowledge of things American was very slight. I had indeed received some distinct and strong impressions.

The first dates back to my childhood, when I went to school in my native village in the Rhineland. One winter evening my father showed me in an illustrated work a portrait of George Washington, and read with me the short biography which accompanied it. He explained to me why he thought that George Washington was one of the noblest, wisest and greatest men that had ever lived. From that conversation I drew my first conception of what a true patriot was, and that conception I have never lost. From that time I read everything about George Washington that I could find, and my admiration of that great man deepened as I read on, and it is now deeper than ever. When later I read about the history and the institutions of the United States, and began to understand what a modern Republic was, I remember that two things greatly startled me. One was, that in a republic, the embodiment of human freedom, there should be human beings held in slavery; and the other was, that in a republic, where citizens were presumed to govern themselves intelligently, all the postmasters in the land were changed whenever a new President came in. This seemed to me so utterly absurd, that for a long time I absolutely refused to believe it, until finally I found it, and more of the same kind, to be actually true. I was eventually to learn more about it.

About four years after those melancholy cogitations on that bench in Union Square, I found myself as an active private in the ranks of that great host of anti-slavery men, who, obeying an overpowering moral impulse, strove to deliver the Republic of the baneful anachronism. Then came service on various fields on which I could join efforts for the advancement of principles and methods of good government and of sound lines of policy. There was here no danger of dungeons or exile for the frankest expression of opinion, or even for the

sharpest opposition to those in power, or to a political party—although I may admit that occasionally some excited politician, whom I had particularly displeased, would vociferously call upon me to “go home.” So, under the generous institutions of the Republic, all the opportunities of our public life were freely thrown open to me, and I received, one after another, some of the most honorable distinctions which the ambition of any American can crave.

I have, therefore, always felt myself bound by something more than a mere citizen's duty—or, rather, in addition to that—by a duty of gratitude, not to a person or a party, but to the Republic and the American people, to serve their interests according to the very best of my understanding and ability. And if, in doing this, I had to differ from esteemed friends, or to sever old party ties, I may say that I never did so with a light heart, but only because I thought I could not do otherwise, whatever the sacrifice.

The fact has been mentioned that I am an adopted citizen. Having been a voter for these forty-two years, and being, therefore, a much older voter than a majority of the native Americans now living, my naturalization may be considered complete. For nearly half a century I have felt myself as a thorough American. Under the Stars and Stripes my children were born, and under that flag I am to die and they are to live. But my faithful love for this Republic does not forbid me to look back upon the old Fatherland with reverential affection—upon that great nation whose valor has written so many of the heroic pages of history, and whose thought, like a far shining beacon light, has so brightly illumined the world. I am profoundly grateful to those kind friends in the land of my birth who, at this period of my life, have so warmly remembered me.

Nor can I fail to speak with pride of those American citizens of German blood, who hold their rank among the best of our people by their industry, their civic virtues, their conservative spirit and their self-sacrificing patriotism, which has drenched every American battlefield with Teutonic blood. It may well be said of them that, however warm their affection for their native land, they have never permitted that affection to interfere with their duties as American citizens, and, least of all, to seduce them into any design or desire to use their power in American politics for foreign ends. And of the services they are doing this Republic it will not be the least valuable that their presence on our soil helps to preserve that peace and friendship between the two nations, which, happily, has always existed to the benefit and honor of both and which, of late, such wicked attempts have been made to disturb without cause. May that peace and friendship endure forever.

And now a last word, which may be fittingly uttered on an occasion like this. I have reached the age which may speak from experience; and of the experiences of my long public activity I will give you the best.

If there is any one among us who has lost faith in democratic government—in what Abraham Lincoln called “Government of the People, for the People and by the People,”—I am not that man. Indeed, our democratic government has had its failures and will have more. Honest and earnest criticism of those failures—even, if need be, the most searching and merciless,—is a good citizen’s duty. So is the pointing out of threatening dangers. But criticism and the pointing out of danger must never have the object of discouraging wise and vigorous effort for improvement. If they do, they degenerate into that dreary pessimism which, whenever something goes wrong, cries out that everything is lost. If the pessimist, who

employs his criticism to prove democratic government a failure, would apply the same spirit and method of criticism to monarchical or aristocratic governments, he would easily prove them failures too, and, in some respects, failures of a worse kind. In fact, he would prove any and every form of government a failure, ending in the demonstration of the failure of the whole universe.

The truth is, taking general results, that you will look in vain for a people that have achieved as much of freedom, of progress, of well-being and happiness, as, in spite of their occasional failures, the American people have under their institutions of democratic government. Whoever has been much in contact with the masses of our population knows that a large majority of the American people throughout honestly and earnestly mean to do right; and also that, the wildest temporary excitements notwithstanding, they wish as earnestly to satisfy themselves as to what is right, and, therefore, welcome serious arguments and appeals to the highest order of motives. With such a people democratic government will be the more successful, the more the public opinion ruling it is enlightened and inspired by full and thorough discussion. The greatest danger threatening democratic institutions comes from those influences, whether consisting in an excessive party spirit, or whatever else, which tend to stifle or demoralize discussion, and to impair the opportunities of the people for considering and deciding public questions on their own merits. If those influences are effectively curbed, our democratic government will not fail to hold up the true ideals of the great American Republic and to move forward in their direction.

When I speak of ideals, I do not mean the vague dreams of a fantastic visionary. I mean the conceptions and teachings of such an idealist as George Washington was, whose lessons and admonitions, left to the American

people as his greatest legacy, stand as the soberest, the most practical, the wisest and at the same time, as, in the highest sense, the most idealistic utterance that ever came from an American statesman.

And now, to close the proceedings of the evening, for which I cannot thank you too much, and which, so long as I live, will be one of my proudest and most cherished memories, raise your glasses and drink to the sentiment I offer you:

Our country, the great Republic of the United States of America. May it ever prosper and flourish as the government of, for and by the people; as the home of free and happy generations, and as an example and guiding star to all mankind!

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

NEW YORK, March 11, 1899.

I should have thanked you for your letter of the 5th more promptly had I not all these days been literally pursued by kindness. It was exceedingly gratifying to me personally, but it interfered very much with my regular occupations, and especially with my correspondence.

What you say of the character and spirit of the banquet of March 2d is undoubtedly true. It was indeed a demonstration of the unrepresented. The only power to counteract the faults and evil tendencies of political organization in our political concerns consists in the influence which the unrepresented may still exercise upon public opinion; and that influence counts after all for a great deal.

I am, for instance, not at all without hope that persevering discussion may at last defeat the imperialistic policy. That policy would *certainly* be defeated if the

Democratic party could get rid of the silver nonsense. But even if that should not happen, the agitation in favor of a conservative policy may be made so strong as to frighten the Republican leaders out of their present conceits. At least, we should try. There is at any rate a fighting chance.

Of course, this does not touch the fundamental trouble so well pointed out by you in your banquet speech. But the influence upon public opinion which the unrepresented possess, may serve to prevent the worst results of that trouble.

Let me thank you once more for the kindness which prompted you to take so prominent and impressive a part in the demonstration of March 2d.

FROM JAMES BRYCE

Mar. 17, 1899.

I have just heard that you have been the recipient of an imposing mass of congratulations, good wishes and grateful acknowledgments for public service rendered; and that these manifestations of respect and indebtedness have proceeded both from your German brethren and from many of the most weighty and worthy native born American citizens. Will you let me have the pleasure of adding my congratulations on your birthday, and expressing to you my sincere admiration for the consistent courage, rectitude and dignity of your public career. You have been one of the few who have in politics thought always first of truth and of duty, who have never sacrificed your principles to your interests, who have always pointed out high ideals to your fellow-citizens while following them yourself.

Commending myself to your friendly recollection, and trusting that your brilliant gifts may long be available for the public good, I am always faithfully yours.

MILITARISM AND DEMOCRACY¹

The subject of "Militarism and Democracy," which has been assigned to me for discussion, is at the present moment of peculiar interest. We are apt to speak boastfully of the progressive civilization characterizing this age. While the very foundation of all civilization consists in the dispensation of justice by peaceable methods between nations as well as individuals, instead of the rule of brute force, it is a singular fact that at the close of this much-vaunted nineteenth century we behold the nations of the world vying with each other in increasing their armaments on land and sea, exhausting all the resources of inventive genius and spending the treasure produced by human labor with unprecedented lavishness to develop means of destruction for the defense of their possessions, or the satisfaction of national ambitions, or the settlement of international differences, on a scale never before known.

Thus the very advances in the sciences and the arts which constitute one part of our modern civilization are pressed into the service of efforts to perfect the engineering of death, devastation and oppression, which are to make brute force in our days more and more terrible and destructive, and to render the weak more and more helpless as against the strong. It looks as if the most civilized Powers, although constantly speaking of peace, were preparing for a gigantic killing-and-demolishing match such as the most barbarous ages have hardly ever witnessed, and this at the expense of incalculable sacrifice to their peoples.

Nothing could in this respect be more instructive and pathetic than the appeal in behalf of peace and disarmament.

¹ An address before the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences at Philadelphia, April 7, 1899.

Hearty thanks are given to the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences for generous consent to this reprint.

ment addressed last year by the Czar of Russia to all the Powers represented at his court. Of that appeal this is the principal part:

In the course of the last twenty years the longings for a general appeasement have grown especially pronounced in the consciences of civilized nations. The preservation of peace has been put forward as the object of international policy; it is in its name that great states have concluded between themselves powerful alliances; it is the better to guarantee peace that they have developed in proportions hitherto unprecedented their military forces and still continue to increase them without shrinking from any sacrifice.

All these efforts, nevertheless, have not yet been able to bring about the beneficent results of the desired pacification. The financial charges following an upward march strike at the public prosperity at its very source.

The intellectual and physical strength of the nations, labor and capital, are for the major part diverted from their natural application, and unproductively consumed. Hundreds of millions are devoted to acquiring terrible engines of destruction, which, though to-day regarded as the last word of science, are destined to-morrow to lose all value in consequence of some fresh discovery in the same field.

National culture, economic progress and the production of wealth are either paralyzed or checked in their development. Moreover, in proportion as the armaments of each Power increase, so do they less and less fulfil the object which the Governments have set before themselves.

The economic crises, due in great part to the system of armaments *à outrance*, and the continual danger which lies in this massing of war material, are transforming the armed peace of our days into a crushing burden, which the peoples have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears evident, then, that if this state of things were prolonged it would inevitably lead to the very cataclysm which it is desired to avert, and the horrors of which make every thinking man shudder in advance.

There has been much discussion as to the motives which may have impelled the Czar to make this appeal. Many of those who consider him sincere, call the manifesto a mere outburst of generous sentimentality which, although laudable in itself, loses sight of existing conditions and of the practical exigencies of the moment. If it really was mere generous sentimentality, it was sentimentality of that sort which in the history of mankind has not seldom served to give impulse and inspiration to great movements of progress in justice and humanity, overcoming with its optimism that dreary and pusillanimous wisdom which reasons that existing evils cannot be rectified simply because they are strongly intrenched in existing conditions. If it was that sentimentalism, it did honor to the Czar's heart, and, inasmuch as it attacks a terrible evil which eventually *must* be remedied, it did no discredit to the Czar's head.

Others have questioned the Czar's sincerity and good faith, suggesting that the peace manifesto was merely a diplomatic stratagem designed to dupe his competitors for territorial conquest. This is, in view of the solemnity of the Czar's words, so atrocious an imputation that only hardened cynicism will readily accept it. It is, however, all the more to be deplored that the Czar, at the time when the belief of the world in the sincerity of his benevolent purposes is so important, should himself endanger that belief by ruthlessly suppressing the constitutional rights and liberties of the good people of Finland, which he had solemnly sworn to maintain, and which his predecessors, even so stern a despot as Nicholas I., had faithfully respected. The performance of two acts so different in character by the same person may be explained on the hypothesis that in the one case the Czar, being sincerely alarmed by what he himself experienced of the evils and dangers of excessive armaments, could not resist the impulse of attacking them, and did so in good faith, while

ordinarily, in doing the business of an autocrat, he may be no better, and in some respects even worse, than others engaged in the same trade.

But however that may be, and whatever results the peace conference meeting in response to the Czar's appeal may immediately bring forth, the most important point is that the statements of fact contained in the Czar's manifesto are true. They are indeed not new. The same things have often been said before. But those who said them were promptly and derisively cried down as visionary dreamers who had no conception of the responsibilities involved in the management of the great business of the world. Now those things are authoritatively proclaimed by the most absolute monarch commanding the largest army on earth, and holding in his hand the destinies of one of the greatest empires—the man whose immediate responsibilities in the management of the great business of the world are not exceeded by those of any other human being.

While the so-called practical men of the age never cease to tell us that the greatest possible security of peace depends upon the greatest possible preparation for war, that autocrat and commander of millions of soldiers tells them that the nations which are draining their own vitality to preserve peace by their preparations for war are doing a thing which, if prolonged, "will inevitably lead to the very cataclysm which it is desired to avert, and the horrors of which make every thinking man shudder in advance." Thus it is no longer merely the idle and irresponsible dreamer but the practical potentate charged with the farthest-reaching powers and the highest responsibilities who warns the world that if the policy of increasing armaments, which we call militarism, be persisted in, it must produce ruinous mischief, and end in incalculable disaster and calamity.

The comparative weight with which militarism, that is, the system which makes the maintenance of great armaments one of the principal objects of the state, burdens different nations, depends upon their respective wealth, the length of the terms of military service, their administrative organization and the nature of their political institutions. Upon nations which are unable to bear heavy loads of taxation, or whose finances are in a precarious state, or which suffer from official incapacity or corruption in their administrative organization, or which withdraw their young men for long periods of time from productive employments without offering through the military service any valuable compensation by way of instruction or training, the burden of great standing armaments weighs of course more heavily than upon nations whose material resources are great, or which can easily raise ample revenues, or whose administrative machinery is honest and efficient, or whose terms of military service are short, or whose young men receive in that service at least some discipline, instruction and training calculated to increase their working capacity in productive pursuits, and thus to compensate in some measure for their temporary withdrawal from such occupations.

For the purposes of this discourse the workings of militarism in France are of especial interest, on account of the political institutions of that country.

In a monarchy a standing armed force is a thing congruous with the nature of the government, and it is the more so, the more the monarchy is of the absolute type. The standing army in such a monarchy may be said to be the enlarged bodyguard of the monarch. The monarch represents an authority not springing from the periodically expressed consent of the people, and relying for the maintenance of that authority, if occasion requires, upon

the employment of force, even against the popular will. An army is an organization of men subject to the command of a superior will, the origin or the purpose of which it is assumed to have no right to question. The standing army is in this sense, therefore, according to its nature and spirit an essentially monarchical institution.

But France is a republic. She calls herself a democratic republic. A democratic republic is, or should be, government by public opinion as expressed in legal form—public opinion as it issues from discussion in which all the people are free to participate, and the outcome of which they are to determine by their freely given suffrages. The army, inasmuch as it is in all things subject to the will of superior authority without discussion or question, must therefore be regarded as an incongruous element in a democracy. The authority to which it is subject may indeed be a government created by public opinion and supported by it. But as such a government may happen to become faithless to its origin, or fall out of accord with the public opinion of the time, the army, as an organized force subject to its will, may be used by it for ends and purposes adverse to the interests or the will of the people.

It is for reasons like this that the true democratic spirit has always been jealously opposed to the maintenance of large standing armies. It has always insisted that the organizations of armed forces that may be necessary for the enforcement of the laws and the keeping of order at home, or for the defense of the integrity or the honor of the state in foreign warfare, should remain as much as possible identified with the people themselves—should be, in fact, *of* the people in their origin, their interests, their sympathies, as well as in the character and aspirations of those commanding them; and that, if a standing army as a permanent institution be indeed indispensable for certain necessary objects, it should,

in point of numerical strength, be confined to the narrowest practicable limits.

That democratic spirit has therefore always demanded that the armed force should be composed principally of the militia, the citizen soldiery, or, in extraordinary emergencies, of volunteers called out from the ranks of the people, to serve as soldiers for certain well-defined and stated purposes, and then, those stated purposes being accomplished, to return to their civic pursuits. So it has hitherto been with us. In Switzerland, where the democratic spirit is much alive, but where on account of the geographical situation of the country a large and well-drilled force is thought necessary, they have organized the whole male population capable of bearing arms, in military bodies, some of which are called out for instruction and drill for a limited period every year, to be restored to civil life after the shortest possible interruption of their ordinary occupations, the only thing resembling a standing army being certain small staff corps which are kept in permanent service. All this rests upon the leading principle that the soldiers of a democracy as well as those commanding them should, while temporarily submitting to military discipline, remain in all essential respects active citizens without any interests, or sympathies or aspirations in any manner or degree different from those of the general citizenship.

France furnishes the example of a republic maintaining a large standing force, and the history of that country is peculiarly instructive as to the relations between standing armies and democracies. The first French Republic sprang from the great revolution of 1789. The most famous of French armies were organized under the inspiration of the revolutionary enthusiasms of that period. They were then to a large extent composed of volunteers who had rushed to arms to defend the ter-

ritory of the Republic, and then went forth to bring "liberty" to the world outside. Thus they won victory and glory and conquest. And then, having gone forth to fight for liberty, they proceeded, intoxicated with glory and conquest, to turn their victories for liberty to the advantage of a personal government animated with insatiable despotic ambitions. I am far from saying that the spirit of the army was the only cause for the downfall of the democratic Republic. But it is a matter of history that the army, which had been created for the service of democracy, was, by the glory and the conquests it achieved, transformed into a willing and most effective instrument of usurpation and tyranny at home and of oppression abroad. And it may be said that the Napoleonic system of government which was thus created was the beginning of that militarism with which Europe is now afflicted.

The second French Republic sprang from the revolution of 1848. It was the prestige of the name of Napoleon, the glamour of the Napoleonic legend of military glory, that made the election of Louis Napoleon to the Presidency of the Republic possible. Usurpation followed. I do not pretend that the spirit of the standing army alone caused the transformation of the second French Republic into the second French Empire. But it can certainly not be denied that the army again lent itself as a willing tool to the schemes of the conspirators who had planned the destruction of the Republic, and the erection of a monarchical government upon its ruins.

After the disastrous collapse of imperial rule in the Franco-German war, the third French Republic was proclaimed in 1870. It has now lasted well-nigh twenty-nine years. But the greatest dangers that have threatened its existence came from the position in it of the standing army. One of its chiefs, MacMahon, while

President of the Republic, was drawn into the intrigues of the monarchist parties; another, Boulanger, plotted revolution and usurpation, probably for his own benefit; and now, in these latter days, in consequence of the hideous Dreyfus affair, the administration of justice has, in the interest of the chiefs of the army, been subjected to a perversion calculated to undermine the very foundations of legal government, and, it is to be feared, ultimately to effect the total subversion of republican institutions. The domineering spirit of the army is such that it claims to be above discussion and criticism, assumes to dictate the decisions of judicial tribunals, and actually seeks to substitute for what in other countries is the crime of *lèse-majesté*, the crime of *lèse-armée*. At any rate, whatever the future may bring, it is no exaggeration to say that the attitude of the army in France has dealt the reputation of republican government a staggering blow, and that all this may turn out to be only a prelude to new usurpations.

It is idle to pretend that all the historical facts I have enumerated were owing only to the proverbial inconstancy of the French temperament; for it should not be forgotten that even in England, when the parliamentary forces during the so-called Great Rebellion of the seventeenth century had assumed the character of a standing army, that army, in spite of its origin, became in the hands of Oliver Cromwell a ready instrument for the transformation of the republic into a personal government essentially monarchical, and finally, under the leadership of Monk, served to bring about the restoration of the monarchy with all its forms and attributes by the return of the Stuarts. Thus we see that it was not a mere French peculiarity which made a strong standing army a danger to republican institutions in Europe, but that the large standing army has always played the same part in Euro-

pean republics, regardless of race. I need not go into the history of the republics of antiquity, modern instances being sufficiently instructive.

As I remarked, militarism on a great scale began in Europe with the French Revolution and attained a high degree of development under the first Napoleon. It declined somewhat under the influence of the reaction which was caused by the general state of exhaustion after the Napoleonic wars. It revived again after the revolutionary movements of 1848 when the new French Emperor sought to fortify his throne by warlike prestige, when Italy and Germany moved for the accomplishment and maintenance of national unity, when continental Powers, following the example of England, became ambitious of colonial expansion and when new inventions in the appliances of warfare stimulated the Powers in a course of nervous rivalry. It is thus that the deplorable conditions came about which are so pointedly set forth in the peace manifesto of the Russian Czar; that millions of young men at the period of their greatest vigor are withdrawn from productive pursuits; that "the intellectual and physical strength of the nations, labor and capital, are largely diverted from their natural application and unproductively employed" in gigantic preparations for possible conflicts of arms, and that the nations are burdened with very onerous taxes for the purpose of providing engines of destruction.

For the burdens European nations are thus bearing, the advocates or apologists of the system have a ready plea of justification. It is that the nation refusing to bear those burdens would soon be at the mercy of its ambitious and possibly hostile rivals. The Frenchman tells us that, aside from his desire to take revenge for the defeats suffered in the German war, France must strain every nerve in preparation for a possible conflict,

to be reasonably secure against German aggression or British encroachment. The German reasons that, the German Empire being wedged in between France and Russia, whose sentimental alliance may on occasion be turned to hostile purposes, the fatherland must be armed to the teeth according to the latest fashion, in order to maintain the integrity of the empire, and that it must also have a strong fleet to hold its own in the race for colonial power. The Russian insists that unless his country be provided with bigger armies and navies, British and possibly also German jealousy will become dangerous to its vital interests. The Englishman maintains that Britain must have a fleet superior to those of any probable combination against her, and also a strong fighting force on land to protect the safety of her isle and of her widespread possessions against the ill-will of other nations which would be likely to avail itself of any favorable opportunity to strike at her with effect.

And thus no sooner has one of those nations taken the slightest step to increase the numerical strength of its armaments or their efficiency in killing and destroying; no sooner has it begun to augment its battalions, or squadrons, or batteries; no sooner has it introduced a new model of musket or of cannon; no sooner has it built a warship upon a new plan promising to do better execution, than all the others with nervous anxiety will follow suit or even try to push a step farther ahead. And this process must be gone through again and again, whole armies must be newly armed, and whole fleets must be rebuilt, as the crack ships of yesterday have become little better than old iron to-day. And all this, no matter what burden be put upon the backs of the people, nor how the taxpayer may groan. In fact, those Governments claim that they are not permitted under these circumstances to adapt their policy concerning their armaments

to what may be their own wishes, or to what they might consider good for the welfare of their people. Their necessities in this respect are determined, not by themselves, but by the performances of their neighbors and rivals. And so the ruinous competition goes on and on without end in sight, the moloch of militarism being insatiable.

A striking example of this race of competition was recently furnished in England by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Goshen, when he asked the House of Commons to appropriate the enormous sum of £26,554,000 (\$132,770,000) for the British navy, saying that so startling an estimate had not originally been contemplated, but that it had been framed after a careful study of the programs of the other Powers; that the United States, Russia, France, Japan, Italy and Germany had under construction 685,000 tons of warships, and that England was compelled to shape her action accordingly. He prayed that, "if the Czar's hopes for disarmament were not realized, those who proposed to attack the country's expenditures would not attempt to dissuade the people from bearing the taxation necessary to carry on the duties of the empire."

In France the Minister of War not long ago dolefully intimated that he apprehended France had reached the end of her possibilities, not having men enough to match the increases of the much more populous German Empire. As a member of a republican government he might have said more. He might have added that a large standing army makes a monarchy more monarchical, but that it makes a democracy not more, but less democratic; that the more absolute a monarchy is, the more a large standing army will fit it, but that the more democratic a republic is, the less a large standing army will be suitable to it; that to a monarchy it may be a standing support, but that to a democracy it will be a standing danger.

So far the American people have been exempt from most of the evils springing from this system. From the foundation of the Government it has been the consistent policy of this Republic, following the true democratic instinct, to adapt its armaments to its own needs, without permitting itself to be drawn into the vortex of rivalry with other nations. As to the maintenance of peace and order at home, it has ordinarily depended upon the local police forces and the militia. It kept a small standing army stationed at a few military depots, a few coast defense fortifications or at posts in the Indian country. It kept a small navy just sufficient for an occasional showing of the flag in foreign waters and for doing its part of the police of the seas. Whenever an extraordinary emergency arose, such as a war with a foreign Power or an insurrection of formidable proportions at home, it organized armed forces on a larger scale by calling out volunteers who were enlisted in the service of the Republic, not as a regular standing army is, for doing whatever task might turn up, but for a well-defined, specific purpose, to be disbanded again as soon as that specific purpose was accomplished.

So it was held on the notable occasions of the war of 1812, of our war with Mexico and of our great civil war. And I venture to say that no nation ever presented to the world a grander, more characteristic and more inspiring spectacle than this Republic did when, after the close of the civil war, hundreds of thousands of men who had been organized in great armies, as soon as their task was done, quietly dropped their guns and as good citizens went home to devote themselves to the productive work of the country—the vast armies disappearing as by magic. It was a grand spectacle, I say, grander in its way than the most splendid victories those armies had achieved. That this Republic, against the misgivings entertained abroad

even by our friends, proved such a thing to be possible without the slightest difficulty, was one of the finest lessons ever taught by a great democracy to mankind.

Such was our normal policy during the period between the foundation of the Republic and our days. Times of war excepted, the Republic was, compared with other nations, substantially unarmed, and, considering the condition of our coast fortifications, substantially defenseless. And yet it cannot be said that, since the war of 1812, it was, in consequence of its unarmed state, at any time in serious danger of foreign aggression or of a serious denial of its rights by any foreign Power. Not as if all foreign nations had been our sworn friends, eager to keep us from harm in our innocence—for there were people enough in Europe, and even in America, who disliked us and would not have been sorry to see this Republic perish; nor as if in our intercourse with foreign nations we had been over-anxious to spare other people's feelings—for the tone of our diplomacy was not always a model of politeness. No, it was because in the main we took little interest in matters which did not concern us, and because every foreign Power understood that, considering our vast resources and the compactness and substantial impregnability of our great continental stronghold, a serious conflict with the United States would mean to our antagonist a test of endurance which no European Power could undergo without offering seductive opportunities to its rivals or enemies in the old world, and that therefore it was wise to avoid so hazardous an embroilment at almost any cost. This feeling became especially distinct in Europe after the unexpected display of strength the United States made in the civil war, and after the equally unexpected reconciliation between the North and the South so soon after the close of the conflict.

The American people were therefore perfectly right

in their sense of security while in an unarmed condition. There was really no danger to threaten us, unless we ourselves provoked it. Even the warning which we heard now and then among ourselves, that our foreign commerce would not be safe without being protected by a larger war fleet, was groundless. For it is a matter of history that even before those demonstrations of our strength in the civil war, when we had with our sailing ships a very large part of the carrying trade of the world, without any navy worth speaking of for its protection, our foreign commerce proved as safe as that of any other nation having ever so many guns afloat. In fact, ever since the war of 1812, we have not had a single difference with any European Power that could not be settled on fair terms without our having any ready armament to enforce our will. The proof of this is in the historical fact that they were so settled. It is a matter of speculation whether they would all have been settled so peaceably if we had possessed an armed force ready and itching for a fray.

Thus the policy of this Republic was in entire harmony with that democratic instinct which abhors large standing armaments, and our position among the nations of the world was singularly favorable to the maintenance of that policy. None of those anxieties arising from the possible hostility of powerful neighbors, which keep European nations in a heavily armed state, existed here. Absolutely nothing to alarm us. Neither was there any reason for apprehending that those happy conditions would change, unless we ourselves desired to change them. There has indeed, of late, been much talk about the necessity of enlarging the field of our foreign commerce, and of increased armaments and even of the acquisition of foreign territory to sustain our commercial interests in foreign quarters. But while that talk was going on,

our commerce was very extensively enlarging its foreign fields without big fleets and without colonies, by its own peaceful action. We simply produced, in our factories as well as on our farms, more things that other nations wanted, and we could offer them at prices with which other nations could not compete. This golden key of industrial progress and peaceful commercial methods opened to our trade many doors which seemed to be closed against it by all sorts of artificial obstructions; and this peaceful expansion of our foreign commerce went steadily on, while other nations that had an overabundance of battalions, batteries and warships vainly struggled to keep pace with it. These are facts, undenied and undeniable.

But what will happen to us, commercially, if other nations seek by force to monopolize certain fields of trade for themselves, and in the course of that effort come to blows with one another? Then a sober and circumspect calculation of the advantages to be gained, and of the price they would cost, will probably lead to the conclusion that in such a case a strong neutral Power would enjoy very favorable opportunities and in the end have the best of the bargain. And when I speak of a strong neutral Power, I do not mean a neutral Power so fully armed that it might at once successfully cope with any of the belligerents, but I mean a neutral Power strong enough in its resources and in its position to make each belligerent extremely anxious to abstain from anything that might drive it to the other side. Such a neutral Power this Republic was not, in its infant state, during the Napoleonic wars preceding our war of 1812, when both belligerents, France as well as England, thought they could kick and cuff this Republic with impunity; but such a strong neutral Power this Republic, with its seventy-five millions of people and its immense wealth,

would be now. No belligerent would dare to disregard its neutral rights; and at the end of the fight, the combatants well exhausted, it would probably be in a fair position to exercise a very powerful influence upon the terms of settlement.

Such a policy, harmonizing with our principles as well as our traditions, safe as well as advantageous, would not oblige us to keep up large and costly armaments; and it would at the same time teach our business men to rely for profit, not upon benefits to be gained for them by force of arms, subject to the fortunes of war, but upon their own sagacity in discovering opportunities, and their own energy in using them, which in the long run will prove to be after all the only sound basis of a nation's commerce under any circumstances.

There seems to be, then, in all these respects not only no necessity, but no valid reason for our turning away from the old democratic policy and embarking in that course the pursuit of which costs European nations so dearly, and which they justify only on the ground that the constantly threatening dangers of their situation actually force them to follow it. On the contrary there would seem to be overwhelming reason for doing everything to preserve our happy exemption from such dangers and necessities, as a blessing so exceptionally great that the American people could not be too grateful for it.

But we are told that there are certain populations in distant lands to whom it is our duty to carry the blessings of liberty and civilization, and that this may require larger armies and more warships. However laudable such a purpose may be, if sincere, it behooves us as sensible men soberly to consider the consequences of the attempt. I have already spoken of the armies of revolutionary France, that went forth to fight for general liberty, and that conquered for despotism. It cannot be denied

that those French armies brought to some of the peoples they overran certain beneficial reforms. But with those reforms they brought foreign rule, and most of the "liberated" peoples found foreign rule more hateful than they found the reforms beneficial; and they availed themselves of the first favorable opportunity to throw off the foreign rule of the "liberators" with great slaughter.

We may flatter ourselves that, as conquerors, we are animated with purposes much more unselfish, and we may wonder why not only in the Philippines, but even among the people of Porto Rico and of Cuba, our benevolent intentions should meet with so much sullen disfavor. The reason is simple. We bring to those populations the intended benefits in the shape of foreign rule; and of all inflictions foreign rule is to them the most odious, as under similar circumstances it would be to us. We have already seen in the Philippines the beginning—for it is a mere beginning—of the resistance to foreign rule by one of our "liberated" peoples—a bloody game far from exhilarating. We may expect by a vigorous application of our superior killing power to beat and disperse Aguinaldo's army; but it is by no means unlikely that more insurrections against foreign rule will follow. They may be suppressed, too, but the surviving spirit of them will oblige us to keep much stronger forces on the ground than we ever anticipated, in constant apprehension of further mischief. Our rule will continue to be foreign rule then with the smell of blood on it.

Nor is it by any means impossible that the vulnerable spots thus added to our dominions—a point of weakness we so far have never had—may encourage some jealous and unfriendly foreign Powers to take advantage of our embarrassments and to involve us in broils which so far we never had any reason to dread. Or the apparent necessity to protect what conquest we have made, by

further conquests, or the ardor of military or naval commanders a little too anxious to serve their country with their guns, may plunge us into the most hazardous complications. Of the chances to which we shall thus be exposed in many places, the utterly absurd Samoan affair furnishes an illustration. We may assume that the greatness of our resources will enable us to issue victorious from such conflicts too. But it will not be denied—in fact, it is already conceded—that persistence in such a course will oblige us very materially to enlarge our standing armaments, and subject us more and more to those burdens which what is called “militarism” is imposing upon the groaning nations of the old world. Patriotism as well as ordinary prudence demands us to consider what those burdens are likely to be.

In 1897 our standing Army consisted of 27,500 officers and men. The appropriations for the support of that Army amounted for that fiscal year to \$23,278,000, which sum did not include expenditures for fortifications. The average cost of each man in the Army was therefore about \$850. It is generally admitted that if we continue the so-called new policy, we shall need a standing Army of certainly not less than 100,000 men—probably more, perhaps a good many more. I do not pretend that the average annual cost of a soldier will under all circumstances rise or fall with the size of the Army. But it will not be questioned that such average cost will be much higher when the troops are used in distant places beyond seas, especially in tropical climates, where the soldiers have to endure very unfavorable sanitary conditions. Even if there be little or no active campaigning to be done, it is certainly a moderate assumption that the service of a large part of the Army beyond seas in tropical regions would raise the average cost of a soldier to \$1000 a year. This would make an Army of 100,000 men cost at least

\$100,000,000, or over \$76,000,000 more than our Army cost before the Spanish war. But if active campaigning is to be done, if the "mowing down" of "insurgents," fighting for their freedom and independence, lasts long and has to be carried on during the sickly season, the replenishing of the depleted ranks, the feeding of the troops, the maintenance of an effective hospital service, the restoration of destroyed war material, the transportation of reinforcements to the theater of operations, and of the wounded or sick back to the home country, and all the multifarious things incidental to warlike action even on a small scale, would cause expenditures beyond the possibility of accurate computation.

We are not a very economical people. We are apt to become lavish and wasteful upon the slightest provocation. Even a little war will cost us much. Whether the little war with Spain, which was practically over in three months, has cost us less or more than \$500,000,000 may still be a matter of doubt. I speak here only of the cost in money. The cost in blood and misery I leave you to think of.

That, if the new policy be persisted in, our naval establishment also will have to be much enlarged, is generally admitted. How much—who can tell? Certainly, *we* can *not* tell. For it will not depend upon us how many new battleships, and armored or unarmored cruisers, and light draft vessels, and torpedo boats, and destroyers we shall want. It will depend upon the naval armaments our rivals and possible enemies have on the field of competition. Until recently, when we were proud, not of possessing large armaments, but of not needing any, it has afforded us much occasion for compassionate amusement to observe the almost hysterical nervousness into which old world Governments were thrown when one of them began the building of new warships by which the

proportion of power on the seas might be disturbed. Already we begin to feel that nervousness in our bones, and we cannot tell how many and what kind of warships we shall be obliged to have in order to maintain what is so vauntingly called our new position among the Powers of the world.

Nor will any amount of new construction set the matter at rest for any certain time. We do not know when we shall have to rebuild the larger part of our fleet; for, as the Czar truthfully says in his manifesto, "the terrible engines of destruction which are to-day regarded as the last word of science, are destined to-morrow to lose all value by some new discovery in the same field." All forecasts as to the expenditures for naval purposes which the new policy will impose upon us in the course of time are, therefore, futile. But whatever they may be, the people will have to pay the bills.

Moreover, we have to bear a burden of which other nations know comparatively little. During the last fiscal year we paid over \$140,000,000 in pensions. More than one hundred years after the Revolutionary war, more than eighty years after the war of 1812—for we still have some widows of soldiers in those wars on our pension rolls—fifty years after the Mexican war, and thirty-three years after the civil war the number of pensioners was about one million. And still they come. It is estimated that the recent Spanish war will add \$20,000,000 to our annual pension expenditure. It will probably be much more. The pension attorneys and Members of Congress looking for the soldier-vote will take care of that. But if we continue the military occupation of tropical countries there will be a constant stream of new pensioners owing to tropical diseases; and if we have any active military operations in those tropical regions, that stream will be heavy beyond calculation. And it will be without any

end in sight. We must therefore look for a considerable increase of the pension charge for an incalculable period—the number of new pensioners over-balancing the number of those who in the natural course of things may be expected to drop out—that dropping out being notoriously very slow. Our annual pension expenditure now exceeds the whole cost of the great German army on the peace footing, its pension roll included. As our pension charge threatens to become, it may approach for a time the annual cost of the whole peace establishments of the empire of Germany and the kingdom of Italy combined.

Taking it all in all, assuming our standing Army not to exceed 100,000 men, but a large part of it to be engaged in the tropics, and our Navy to be gradually enlarged to the strength which it "must have" in order to enable this Republic to play the part of a colonial Power, we are sure to have, including our pension roll, an annual expenditure for army and navy purposes not only far exceeding that of any European Power, but not falling very much short of two-fifths of the expenses for the same purposes of all the six great Powers of Europe together—that is not far from \$400,000,000 a year. By honest and strenuous effort we have paid off the bulk of the heavy National debt left by the civil war, and we have been very proud of that achievement. We are now in the way of running up a new National debt, of which, if we go on with the new policy, nobody can foretell to what figures it will rise.

It may be said that the American people, owing to their large and ever-increasing numbers and to their extraordinary resources, will be much more capable than other nations of bearing such taxation, and therefore feel it less. That is true. But it is also true that it will yet be a painful burden upon the labor of the people, and contribute neither to their well-being nor to their contentment unless the burden, as well as the resulting benefit,

be equitably distributed. To justify heavy taxes for military purposes beyond absolute necessity we should, therefore, economically speaking, show two things: (1) that the benefit derived from the employment of the money raised by such taxation will exceed the value of the money thus taken out of the pockets of the people; and (2) that such benefit will accrue to the several taxpayers, or classes of taxpayers, in substantially just proportion to their respective contributions for the purpose in view.

Thus it would in our case be necessary to prove: (1) that if we increase our taxation so many hundred millions a year for the purpose of enlarging our standing armaments to the end of establishing and maintaining our rule in the West Indies and the Philippines, the profits from the expansion of our business enterprise accomplished thereby would exceed that amount—a matter about which, to say the least, there is extremely grave doubt; and (2) that such profits from whatever increase of business there may be will directly or indirectly redound in substantially just proportion to the people who pay the taxes—in other words that, while the taxes to sustain our foreign enterprises are levied upon the great mass of the people, the poor as well as the rich, they will redound really to the general benefit of the people, and not merely, or mainly, to the profit of a comparatively small number of capitalists who are able to take advantage, in a more or less speculative way, of the chances that may offer themselves in those distant regions. About this, too, there is exceeding grave doubt.

These are points which I have no time to elaborate here in detail; but I commend them for serious consideration to good citizens who are disposed to look before they leap; for they involve not only an economic question, but also one of justice.

Let me now pass to the institutional aspect of the case as it concerns this Republic in particular. I am far from predicting that the organization and maintenance and use of large armaments will speedily bring forth in this country the same consequences which they did produce in England in Cromwell's time, and in France at the periods of the first and the second French republics. With us the "man on horseback" is not in sight. There is no danger of monarchical usurpation by a victorious general—although it is well worthy of remembrance that even here in the United States of America, at the close of the Revolutionary war, at the very threshold of our history as a republic, a large part of the Revolutionary army, "turned by six years of war from militia into seasoned veterans," and full of that overbearing *esprit de corps* characteristic of standing armies, urged George Washington to make himself a dictator, a monarch; that, as one of his biographers expresses it, "it was as easy for Washington to have grasped supreme power then, as it would have been for Cæsar to have taken the crown from Antony upon the Lupercal"; and that it was only George Washington's patriotic loyalty and magnificent manhood that stamped out the plot. However, usurpation of so gross a character would now be rendered infinitely more difficult, not only by the republican spirit and habits of the people, but also by our federative organization dividing so large an expanse of country into a multitude of self-governing States.

But even in such a country and among such a people it is possible to demoralize the Constitutional system and to infuse a dangerous element of arbitrary power into the government without making it a monarchy in form and name. One of the most necessary conservative agencies in a democratic republic is general respect for constitutional principles, and faithful observance of

constitutional forms; and nothing is more apt to undermine that respect and to foster disregard of those forms than warlike excitements, which at the same time give to the armed forces an importance and a prestige which they otherwise would not possess.

No candid observer of current events will deny that even to-day the spirit of the new policy awakened by the victories and conquests achieved in the Spanish war, and by the occurrences in the Philippines, has moved even otherwise sober-minded persons to speak of the Constitutional limitations of governmental power with a levity which a year ago would have provoked serious alarm and stern rebuke. We are loudly told by the advocates of the new policy that the Constitution no longer fits our present conditions and aspirations as a great and active world Power, and should not be permitted to stand in our way. Those who say so forget that it is still our Constitution; that while it exists its provisions as interpreted by our highest judicial tribunal are binding upon our actions as well as upon our consciences; that they will be binding and must be observed until they are changed in the manner prescribed by the Constitution itself for its amendment; and that if any power not granted by the Constitution is exercised by the Government or any branch of it, on the ground that the Constitution ought to be changed in order to fit new conditions, or on any other ground, usurpation in the line of arbitrary government is already an accomplished fact. And if such usurpations be submitted to by the people, that acquiescence will become an incentive to further usurpations which may end in the complete wreck of Constitutional government.

Such usurpations are most apt to be acquiesced in when, in time of war, they appeal to popular feeling in the name of military necessity, or of the honor of the flag, or of National glory. In a democracy acting through

universal suffrage, and being the government of public opinion informed and inspired by discussion, every influence is unhealthy that prevents men from calm reasoning. And nothing is more calculated to do that than martial excitements which stir the blood. We are told that war will lift up people to a higher and nobler patriotic devotion, inspire them with a spirit of heroic self-sacrifice, and bring their finest impulses and qualities into action. This it will, in a large measure, if the people feel that the war is a necessary or a just one. But even then its effects upon the political as well as the moral sense are confusing. When the fortunes of war are unfavorable, almost everything that can restore them will be called legitimate, whether it be in harmony with sound principle or not. When the fortunes of war are favorable, the glory of victory goes far to justify, or at least to excuse, whatever may have been done to achieve that victory, or whatever may be done to secure or increase its fruits.

History shows that military glory is the most unwholesome food that democracies can feed upon. War withdraws, more than anything else, the popular attention from those problems and interests which are, in the long run, of the greatest consequence. It produces a strange moral and political color-blindness. It creates false ideals of patriotism and civic virtue.

Nobody is inclined to underestimate the value of military valor. But compared with military valor, we are apt to underestimate the value of other kinds of valor, which are equally great and no less, sometimes even more, useful to the community. I do not refer only to such heroism as that of the fireman, or the member of the life-saving service on the coast, who rescues human beings from the flames or from the watery grave at the most desperate risk of his own life, and whose deeds are all the more heroic as they are not inspired by the enthusiasm

of battle, and pale into insignificance by the side of any act of bravery done in killing enemies in the field. I speak also of that moral courage more important in a democracy, which defies the popular outcry in maintaining what it believes right, and in opposing what it thinks wrong.

Blood spilled for it on the battlefield is often taken to sanctify and to entitle to popular support any cause, however questionable. It is called treason to denounce such a cause, be it ever so bad. It is called patriotism to support it, however strongly conscience may revolt against it. Take for instance the man who honestly believes our war against the Filipinos to be unjust. If that man, faithfully obeying the voice of his conscience, frankly denounces that war, and thereby risks the public station he may occupy, or the friendship of his neighbors, and resolutely meets the clamor vilifying him as a craven recreant and an enemy to the Republic, he is, morally, surely no less a hero than the soldier who at the word of command and in the excitement of battle rushes against a hostile battery. You can no doubt find in our country an abundance of men who would stand bravely under a hailstorm of bullets. But many of them, if their consciences condemned the Filipino war ever so severely, would be loath to face the charge of want of patriotism assailing everybody who opposes it. This is no new story. War makes military heroes, but it makes also civic cowards. No wonder that war has always proved so dangerous to the vitality of democracies; for a democracy needs to keep alive above all things the civic virtues, which war so easily demoralizes.

You will have observed that I have treated the matter of militarism in the United States in intimate connection with our warlike enterprises, as if they were substantially the same thing. I have done so purposely. As I endeavored to set forth, the development of militarism in Euro-

pean states can be explained on the theory that each Power may think the largest possible armaments necessary for the protection of its safety among its neighbors, and for the preservation of peace. With us such a motive cannot exist. Not needing large armaments for our safety—for this Republic, if it maintained its old traditional policy, would be perfectly safe without them—we can need them only in the service of warlike adventure undertaken at our own pleasure, for whatever purpose. And here I may remark, by the way, that in my opinion, although such a course of warlike adventure may have begun with a desire to liberate and civilize certain foreign populations, it will be likely to develop itself, unless soon checked, into a downright and reckless policy of conquest with all the “criminal aggression” and savagery such a policy implies. At any rate, that policy of warlike adventure and militarism will, with us, go together as essentially identical. Without the policy of warlike adventure large standing armaments would, with us, have no excuse and would not be tolerated. If we continue that policy, militarism with its characteristic evils will be inevitable. If we wish to escape those evils and to protect this democracy against their dangerous effects, the policy of warlike adventure must be given up, for the two things are inseparable.

I have referred to the current events of the day only by way of illustration, without giving full voice to the feelings which they stir up in my heart, and the utterance of which might be somewhat warmer than what I have said. My theme being the relation of militarism to democracy in general, and to this great American democracy in particular, I may be permitted to express, in conclusion, my views of what our policy as a democracy should be in order to keep the vitality of the democratic Republic unimpaired.

We should, in the first place, restrict our standing armaments to the narrowest practicable limits; and those limits will be very narrow, if this democracy does not suffer itself to be carried away by the ambition of doing things which, as history has amply shown, a democracy cannot do without seriously endangering its vital principles and institutions. There is no doubt that a regular standing army is a more efficient fighting machine, especially at the beginning of a war, than citizen soldiery. But our experience has been that, in the peculiar position we occupy among the nations of the world, we need not have any war unless, without any compelling necessity, we choose to have it. It would be most unwise to shape our whole policy with a view to the constant imminence of war, there being no such imminence, unless we ourselves choose to create it. We should have as our main armed force, and as the natural armed force of a democratic republic, the citizen soldiery, to be called out for specific purposes in extraordinary emergencies, the efficiency of that citizen soldiery to be increased by the training of men to serve as officers, and by the organization of staff corps, upon a plan similar to that adopted in Switzerland. We should have a Navy strong enough to do our share in the police of the seas, but not a navy rivaling those of the great naval Powers, for, as our history has conclusively taught us, we shall not need it if we keep out of quarrels which do not concern us, and cultivate peace and good will with other nations—a disposition which the rest of the world will be glad to reciprocate. In this way we shall avoid the burdens and evil influences of militarism, and give even our pension roll at last a chance to decrease.

Following a policy essentially different from this we may have our fill of military glory and conquest, but with them other things which in the course of time will make the American people ruefully remember how free and

great and happy they once were with less military glory and with no outlying dominions and subject populations.

THE POLICY OF IMPERIALISM¹

More than eight months ago I had the honor of addressing the citizens of Chicago on the subject of American imperialism, meaning the policy of annexing to this Republic distant countries and alien populations that will not

¹ Address at the Anti-Imperialistic Conference in Chicago, Oct. 17, 1899. This conference adopted the following:

PLATFORM OF THE AMERICAN ANTI-IMPERIALIST LEAGUE

We hold that the policy known as imperialism is hostile to liberty and tends toward militarism, an evil from which it has been our glory to be free. We regret that it has become necessary in the land of Washington and Lincoln to reaffirm that all men, of whatever race or color, are entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We maintain that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. We insist that the subjugation of any people is "criminal aggression" and open disloyalty to the distinctive principles of our Government.

We earnestly condemn the policy of the present National Administration in the Philippines. It seeks to extinguish the spirit of 1776 in those islands. We deplore the sacrifice of our soldiers and sailors, whose bravery deserves admiration even in an unjust war. We denounce the slaughter of the Filipinos as a needless horror. We protest against the extension of American sovereignty by Spanish methods.

We demand the immediate cessation of the war against liberty, begun by Spain and continued by us. We urge that Congress be promptly convened to announce to the Filipinos our purpose to concede to them the independence for which they have so long fought and which of right is theirs.

The United States have always protested against the doctrine of international law which permits the subjugation of the weak by the strong. A self-governing state cannot accept sovereignty over an unwilling people. The United States cannot act upon the ancient heresy that might makes right.

Imperialists assume that with the destruction of self-government in the Philippines by American hands, all opposition here will cease. This is a grievous error. Much as we abhor the war of "criminal aggression" in the Philippines, greatly as we regret that the blood of the Filipinos is on American hands, we more deeply resent the betrayal of American institutions at

fit into our democratic system of government. I discussed at that time mainly the baneful effect that the pursuit of an imperialistic policy would produce upon our political institutions. After long silence, during which I have carefully reviewed my own opinions, as well as those of others in the light of the best information I could obtain, I shall now approach the same subject from another point of view.

We all know that the popular mind is much disturbed by the Philippine war, and that, however highly we admire the bravery of our soldiers, nobody professes to be proud of the war itself. There are few Americans who do not frankly admit their regret that this war should ever have happened. I think I risk nothing when I say that it is not merely the bungling conduct of military operations, but a serious trouble of conscience, that disturbs the American heart about this war, and that this trouble of conscience will not be allayed by a more successful military campaign, just as fifty years ago the trouble of conscience

home. The real firing line is not in the suburbs of Manila. The foe is of our own household. The attempt of 1861 was to divide the country. That of 1899 is to destroy its fundamental principles and noblest ideals.

Whether the ruthless slaughter of the Filipinos shall end next month or next year is but an incident in a contest that must go on until the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States are rescued from the hands of their betrayers. Those who dispute about standards of value while the foundation of the Republic is undermined will be listened to as little as those who would wrangle about the small economies of the household while the house is on fire. The training of a great people for a century, the aspiration for liberty of a vast immigration are forces that will hurl aside those who in the delirium of conquest seek to destroy the character of our institutions.

We deny that the obligation of all citizens to support their Government in times of grave National peril applies to the present situation. If an Administration may with impunity ignore the issues upon which it was chosen, deliberately create a condition of war anywhere on the face of the globe, debauch the civil service for spoils to promote the adventure, organize a truth-suppressing censorship and demand of all citizens a sus-

about slavery could not be allayed by any compromise.

Many people now, as the slavery compromisers did then, try to ease their minds by saying: "Well, we are in it, and now we must do the best we can." In spite of the obvious futility of this cry in some respects, I will accept it with the one proviso, that we make an honest effort to ascertain what really is *the best* we can do. To this end let us first clearly remember what has happened.

In April, 1898, we went to war with Spain for the avowed purpose of liberating the people of Cuba, who had long been struggling for freedom and independence. Our object in that war was clearly and emphatically proclaimed by a solemn resolution of Congress repudiating all intention of annexation on our part, and declaring that the Cuban people "are, and of right ought to be, free and independent." This solemn declaration was made to do justice to the spirit of the American people, who were indeed willing to wage a war of liberation, but would not have consented to a war of conquest. It was also to

pension of judgment and their unanimous support while it chooses to continue the fighting, representative government itself is imperiled.

We propose to contribute to the defeat of any person or party that stands for the forcible subjugation of any people. We shall oppose for reelection all who in the White House or in Congress betray American liberty in pursuit of un-American ends. We still hope that both of our great political parties will support and defend the Declaration of Independence in the closing campaign of the century.

We hold, with Abraham Lincoln, that "no man is good enough to govern another man without that other's consent. When the white man governs himself, that is self-government, but when he governs himself and also governs another man, that is more than self-government—that is despotism." "Our reliance is in the love of liberty which God has planted in us. Our defense is in the spirit which prizes liberty as the heritage of all men in all lands. Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves, and under a just God cannot long retain it."

We cordially invite the coöperation of all men and women who remain loyal to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States.

propitiate the opinion of mankind for our action. President McKinley also declared with equal solemnity that annexation by force could not be thought of, because, according to our code of morals, it would be "criminal aggression."

Can it justly be pretended that these declarations referred only to the island of Cuba? What would the American people, what would the world, have said if Congress had resolved that the Cuban people were indeed rightfully entitled to freedom and independence, but that as to the people of other Spanish colonies we recognized no such right; and if President McKinley had declared that the forcible annexation of Cuba would be criminal, but that the forcible annexation of other Spanish colonies would be a righteous act? A general outburst of protest from our own people, and of derision and contempt from the whole world, would have been the answer. No, there can be no cavil—that war was proclaimed to all mankind to be a war of liberation, and not of conquest, and even now our very imperialists are still boasting that the war was prompted by the most unselfish and generous purposes, and that those insult us who do not believe it.

In the course of that war Commodore Dewey, by a brilliant feat of arms, destroyed the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila. This did not change the heralded character of the war—certainly not in Dewey's own opinion. The Filipinos, constituting the strongest and foremost tribe of the population of the archipelago, had long been fighting for freedom and independence, just as the Cubans had. The great mass of the other islanders sympathized with them. They fought for the same cause as the Cubans, and they fought against the same enemy—the same enemy against whom we were waging our war of humanity and liberation. They had the same title to freedom and independence which we recognized as "of

right" in the Cubans—nay, more; for, as Admiral Dewey telegraphed to our Government, "they are far superior in their intelligence, and more capable of self-government, than the natives of Cuba." The Admiral adds: "I am familiar with both races, and further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this opinion."

Indeed, the mendacious stories spread by our imperialists, which represent those people as barbarians, their doings as mere "savagery" and their chiefs as no better than "cut-throats," have been refuted by such a mass of authoritative testimony, coming in part from men who are themselves imperialists, that their authors should hide their heads in shame; for surely it is not the part of really brave men to calumniate their victims before sacrificing them. We need not praise the Filipinos as in every way the equals of the "embattled farmers" of Lexington and Concord, and Aguinaldo as the peer of Washington; but there is an overwhelming abundance of testimony—some of it unwilling—that the Filipinos are fully the equals, and even the superiors, of the Cubans and the Mexicans. As to Aguinaldo, Admiral Dewey is credited with saying that he is controlled by men abler than himself. The same could be said of more than one of our Presidents. Moreover, it would prove that those are greatly mistaken who predict that the Filipino uprising would collapse were Aguinaldo captured or killed. The old slander that Aguinaldo had sold out the revolutionary movement for a bribe of \$400,000 has been so thoroughly exploded by the best authority that it requires uncommon audacity to repeat it. (See 55th Cong., 3d session, *Senate Doc. 62*, Part 1, page 421.)

Now let us see what has happened. Two months before the beginning of our Spanish war, our Consul at Manila reported to the State Department: "Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists, batties are of

almost daily occurrence. The crown forces (Spanish) have not been able to dislodge a rebel army within ten miles of Manila. A republic is organized here as in Cuba." When, two months later, our war of liberation and humanity began, Commodore Dewey was at Hong Kong with his ships. He received orders to attack and destroy the Spanish fleet in those waters. It was then that our Consul-General at Singapore informed our State Department that he had conferred with General Aguinaldo, then at Singapore, as to the coöperation of the Philippine insurgents, and that he had telegraphed to Commodore Dewey that Aguinaldo was willing to come to Hong Kong to arrange with Dewey for "general coöperation, if desired"; whereupon Dewey promptly answered: "Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible." The meeting was had. Dewey sailed to Manila to destroy the Spanish fleet, and Aguinaldo was taken to the seat of war on a vessel of the United States. His forces received a supply of arms through Commodore Dewey, and did faithfully and effectively coöperate with our forces against the Spaniards, so effectively, indeed, that soon afterwards by their efforts the Spaniards had lost the whole country, except a few garrisons in which they were practically blockaded.

Now, what were the relations between the Philippine insurgents and this Republic? There is some dispute as to certain agreements, including a promise of Philippine independence, said to have been made between Aguinaldo and our Consul-General at Singapore before Aguinaldo proceeded to coöperate with Dewey. But I lay no stress upon this point. I will let only the record of facts speak. Of these facts the first, of highest importance, is that Aguinaldo was "desired," that is, invited, by officers of the United States to coöperate with our forces. The second is that the Filipino Junta in Hong Kong immediately after these conferences appealed to their countrymen

to receive the American fleet, about to sail for Manila, as friends, by a proclamation which had these words: "Compatriots, divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach. The Americans, not from any mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity, have considered it opportune to extend their protecting mantle to our beloved country. Where you see the American flag flying, assemble in mass. They are our redeemers." With this faith his followers gave Aguinaldo a rapturous greeting upon his arrival at Cavité, where he proclaimed his government and organized his army under Dewey's eyes.

The arrival of our land forces did not at first change these relations. Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, commanding, wrote to Aguinaldo, July 4th, as follows:

General, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands. For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people coöperate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces, etc.

Aguinaldo responded cordially, and an extended correspondence followed, special services being asked for by the party of the first part, being rendered by the second and duly acknowledged by the first. All this went on pleasantly until the capture of Manila, in which Aguinaldo effectively coöperated by fighting the Spaniards outside, taking many prisoners from them, and hemming them in. The services they rendered by taking thousands of Spanish prisoners, by harassing the Spaniards in the trenches and by completely blockading Manila on the land side, were amply testified to by our own officers. Aguinaldo was also active on the sea. He had ships

which our commanders permitted to pass in and out of Manila Bay, under the flag of the Philippine Republic, on their expeditions against other provinces.

Now, whether there was or not any formal compact of alliance signed and sealed, no candid man who has studied the official documents will deny that in point of fact the Filipinos, having been desired and invited to do so, were, before the capture of Manila, acting, and were practically recognized, as our allies, and that as such they did effective service, which we accepted and profited by. This is an indisputable fact, proved by the record.

It is an equally indisputable fact that during that period the Filipino government constantly and publicly, so that nobody could plead ignorance of it or misunderstand it, informed the world that their object was the achievement of national independence, and that they believed the Americans had come in good faith to help them accomplish that end, as in the case of Cuba. It was weeks after various proclamations and other public utterances of Aguinaldo to that effect that the correspondence between him and General Anderson, which I have quoted, took place, and that the useful services of the Filipinos as our practical allies were accepted. It is, further, an indisputable fact that during this period our Government did not inform the Filipinos that their fond expectations as to our recognition of their independence were mistaken. Our Secretary of State did, indeed, on June 16th write to Mr. Pratt, our Consul-General at Singapore, that our Government knew the Philippine insurgents, not indeed as patriots struggling for liberty, and who, like the Cubans, "are and of right ought to be free and independent," but merely as "discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain," who, if we occupied their country in consequence of the war, would have to yield us due "obedience." And other officers of our Government were

instructed not to make any promises to the Filipinos as to the future. But the Filipinos themselves were not so informed. They were left to believe that, while fighting in coöperation with the American forces, they were fighting for their own independence. They could not imagine that the Government of the great American Republic, while boasting of having gone to war with Spain under the banner of liberation and humanity in behalf of Cuba, was capable of secretly plotting to turn that war into one for the conquest and subjugation of the Philippines. Thus the Filipinos went faithfully and bravely on doing for us the service of allies, of brothers in arms, far from dreaming that the same troops with whom they had been asked to coöperate would soon be employed by the great apostle of liberation and humanity to slaughter them for no other reason than that they, the Filipinos, continued to stand up for their own freedom and independence.

But just that was to happen. As soon as Manila was taken and we had no further use for our Filipino allies, they were ordered to fall back and back from the city and its suburbs. Our military commanders treated the Filipinos' country as if it were our own. When Aguinaldo sent one of his aides-de-camp to General Merritt with a request for an interview, General Merritt was "too busy." When our peace negotiations with Spain began, and representatives of the Filipinos asked for audience to solicit consideration of the rights and wishes of their people, the doors were slammed in their faces, in Washington as well as in Paris. And behind those doors the scheme was hatched to deprive the Philippine Islanders of independence from foreign rule, and to make them the subjects of another foreign ruler; and that foreign ruler their late ally, this great Republic which had grandly proclaimed to the world that its war against Spain was not a war of conquest, but a war of liberation and humanity.

Behind those doors which were tightly closed to the people of the Philippines, a treaty was made with Spain, by the direction of President McKinley, which provided for the cession of the Philippine Islands by Spain to the United States for a consideration of \$20,000,000. It has been said that this sum was not purchase-money, but a compensation for improvements made by Spain, or a *solatium* to sweeten the pill of cession, or what not. But, stripped of all cloudy verbiage, it was really purchase-money, the sale being made by Spain under duress. Thus Spain sold, and the United States bought, what was called the sovereignty of Spain over the Philippine Islands and their people.

Now look at the circumstances under which that "cession" was made. Spain had lost the possession of the country, except a few isolated and helpless little garrisons, most of which were effectively blockaded by the Filipinos. The American forces occupied Cavité and the harbor and city of Manila, and nothing more. The bulk of the country was occupied and possessed by the people thereof, over whom Spain had, in point of fact, ceased to exercise any sovereignty, the Spanish power having been driven out or destroyed by the Filipino insurrection, while the United States had not acquired, beyond Cavité and Manila, any authority of whatever name by military occupation, nor by recognition on the part of the people. Aguinaldo's army surrounded Manila on the land side, and his government claimed organized control over fifteen provinces. That government was established at Malolos not far from Manila; and a very respectable government, it was. According to Mr. Barrett, our late Minister in Siam, himself an ardent imperialist, who had seen it, it had a well-organized Executive, divided into several departments, ably conducted, and a popular Assembly, a Congress, which would favorably compare with the Par-

liament of Japan—an infinitely better government than the insurrectionary government of Cuba ever was.

It is said that Aguinaldo's government was in operation among only a part of the people of the islands. This is true. But it is also certain that it was recognized and supported by an immeasurably larger part of the people than Spanish sovereignty, which had practically ceased to exist, and than American rule, which was confined to a harbor and a city, and which was carried on by the exercise of military force under what was substantially martial law over a people that constituted about one-twentieth of the whole population of the islands. Thus, having brought but a very small fraction of the country and its people under our military control, we bought by that treaty the sovereignty over the whole from a Power which had practically lost that sovereignty, and therefore did no longer possess it; and we contemptuously disdained to consult the existing native government, which actually did control a large part of the country and people, and which had been our ally in the war with Spain. The sovereignty we thus acquired may well be defined as Abraham Lincoln once defined the "popular sovereignty" of Senator Douglas's doctrine—as being like a soup made by boiling the shadow of the breastbone of a pigeon that had been starved to death.

No wonder that treaty found opposition in the Senate. Virulent abuse was heaped upon the "statesman who would oppose the ratification of a peace treaty." A peace treaty? This was no peace treaty at all. It was a treaty with half a dozen bloody wars in its belly. It was, in the first place, an open and brutal declaration of war against our allies, the Filipinos, who struggled for freedom and independence from foreign rule. Every man not totally blind could see that. For such a treaty the true friends of peace could, of course, not vote.

But more. Even before that treaty had been assented to by the Senate, that is, even before that ghastly shadow of our Philippine sovereignty had obtained any legal sanction, President McKinley assumed of his own motion the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands by his famous "benevolent assimilation" order of December 21, 1898, through which our military commander at Manila was directed forthwith to extend the military government of the United States over the whole archipelago, and by which the Filipinos were notified that, if they refused to submit, they would be compelled by force of arms. Having bravely fought for their freedom and independence from one foreign rule, they did refuse to submit to another foreign rule, and then the slaughter of our late allies began—the slaughter by American arms of a once friendly and confiding people. And this slaughter has been going on ever since.

This is a grim story. Two years ago the prediction of such a possibility would have been regarded as a hideous nightmare, as the offspring of a diseased imagination. But to-day it is a true tale—a plain recital of facts taken from the official records. These things have actually been done in these last two years by and under the Administration of William McKinley. This is our Philippine war as it stands. Is it a wonder that the American people should be troubled in their consciences? But let us not be too swift in our judgment on the conduct of those in power over us. Let us hear what they have to say in defense of it.

It is pretended that we had a right to the possession of the Philippines, and that self-respect demanded us to enforce that right. What kind of right was it? The right of conquest? Had we really acquired that country by armed conquest, which, as President McKinley has told us, is, according to the American code of morals, "crim-

inal aggression"? But if we had thrown aside our code of morals, we had then not conquered more than the bay and city of Manila. The rest of the country was controlled, if by anybody, by the Filipinos. Or was it the right of possession by treaty? I have already shown that the President ordered the enforcement of our sovereignty over the archipelago before the treaty had by ratification gained legal effect, and also that, in making that treaty, we had bought something called sovereignty which Spain had ceased to possess and could therefore not sell and deliver. But let me bring the matter home to you by a familiar example.

Imagine that in our revolutionary times, France, being at war with England, had brought to this country a fleet and an army, and had, without any definite compact to that effect, coöperated as an ally with our revolutionary forces, permitting all the while the Americans to believe that she did this without any mercenary motive, and that, in case of victory, the American colonies would be free and independent. Imagine then that, after the British surrendered at Yorktown, the King of France had extorted from the British King a treaty ceding, for a consideration of \$20,000,000, the sovereignty over the American colonies to France, and that thereupon the King of France had coolly notified the Continental Congress and General Washington that they had to give up their idea of National independence, and to surrender unconditionally to the sovereignty of France, wherefor the French King promised them "benevolent assimilation." Imagine, further, that upon the protest of the Americans that Great Britain, having lost everything in the colonies except New York City and a few other little posts, had no sovereignty to cede, the French King answered that he had bought the Americans at \$5 a head, and that if they refused to submit he would give them benevolent assimilation in the

shape of bullets. Can there be any doubt that the Continental Congress and General Washington would have retorted that, no matter what the French King might have bought, Great Britain had no sovereignty left to sell; that least of all would the Americans permit themselves to be sold; that the French, in so treating their American allies after such high-sounding professions of friendship and generosity, were a lot of mean, treacherous, contemptible hypocrites, and that the Americans would rather die than submit to such wolves in sheep's clothing? And will any patriotic American now deny that, whatever quibbles of international law about possible cessions of a lost sovereignty might be invented, such conduct of the French would have been simply a shame and that the Americans of that time would have eternally disgraced themselves if they had failed to resist unto death? How, then, can the same patriotic American demand that the Filipinos should surrender and accept American sovereignty under circumstances exactly parallel? And that parallel will not be shaken by any learned international law technicalities, which do not touch the moral element of the subject.

It is also pretended that, whatever our rights, the Filipinos were the original aggressors in the pending fight, and that our troops found themselves compelled to defend their flag against assault. What are the facts? One evening early in February last some Filipino soldiers entered the American lines without, however, attacking anybody. An American sentry fired, killing one of the Filipinos. Then a desultory firing began at the outposts. It spread until it assumed the proportions of an extensive engagement in which a large number of Filipinos were killed. It is a well-established fact that this engagement could not have been a premeditated affair on the part of the Filipinos, as many of their officers, including Aguinaldo's

private secretary, were at the time in the theaters and cafés of Manila. It is further well known that the next day Aguinaldo sent an officer, General Torres, under a flag of truce to General Otis to declare that the fighting had not been authorized by Aguinaldo, but had begun accidentally; that Aguinaldo wished to have it stopped, and proposed to that end the establishment of a neutral zone between the two armies, such as might be agreeable to General Otis; whereupon General Otis curtly answered that the fighting, having once begun, must go on to the grim end. Who was it that really wanted the fight?

But far more important than all this is the fact that President McKinley's "benevolent assimilation" order, which even before the ratification of the treaty demanded that the Philippine Islanders should unconditionally surrender to American sovereignty, in default whereof our military forces would compel them, was really the President's declaration of war against the Filipinos insisting upon independence, however you may quibble about it. When an armed man enters my house under some questionable pretext, and tells me that I must yield to him unconditional control of the premises or he will knock me down—who is the aggressor, no matter who strikes the first blow? No case of aggression can be clearer, shuffle and prevaricate as you will.

Let us recapitulate. We go to war with Spain in behalf of an oppressed colony of hers. We solemnly proclaim this to be a war—not of conquest—God forbid!—but of liberation and humanity. We invade the Spanish colony of the Philippines, destroy the Spanish fleet, and invite the coöperation of the Filipino insurgents against Spain. We accept their effective aid as allies, all the while permitting them to believe that, in case of victory, they will be free and independent. By active fighting they get control of a large part of the interior country, from which

Spain is virtually ousted. When we have captured Manila and have no further use for our Filipino allies, our President directs that, behind their backs, a treaty be made with Spain transferring their country to us; and even before that treaty is ratified, he tells them that, in place of the Spaniards, they must accept us as their masters, and that if they do not, they will be compelled by force of arms. They refuse, and we shoot them down; and, as President McKinley said at Pittsburgh, we shall continue to shoot them down "without useless parley."

I have recited these things in studiously sober and dry matter-of-fact language, without oratorical ornament or appeal. I ask you now what epithet can you find justly to characterize such a course? Happily, you need not search for one, for President McKinley himself has furnished the best when, in a virtuous moment, he said that annexation by force should not be thought of, for, according to the American code of morals, it would be "criminal aggression." Yes, "criminal" is the word. Have you ever heard of any aggression more clearly criminal than this? And in this case there is an element of peculiarly repulsive meanness and treachery. I pity the American who can behold this spectacle without the profoundest shame, contrition and resentment. Is it a wonder, I repeat, that the American people, in whose name this has been done, should be troubled in their consciences?

To justify, or rather to excuse, such things, nothing but a plea of the extremest necessity will avail. Did such a necessity exist? In a sort of helpless way the defenders of this policy ask: "What else could the President have done under the circumstances?" This question is simply childish. If he thought he could not order Commodore Dewey away from Manila after the execution of the order to destroy the Spanish fleet, he could have told the people of the Philippine Islands that this was, on our part, a war

not of conquest, but of liberation and humanity; that we sympathized with their desire for freedom and independence, and that we would treat them as we had specifically promised to treat the Cuban people in furthering the establishment of an independent government. And this task would have been much easier than in the case of Cuba, since, according to Admiral Dewey's repeatedly emphatic testimony, the Filipinos were much better fitted for such a government.

Our ingenious Postmaster-General has told us that the President could not have done that because he had no warrant for it, since he did not know whether the American people would wish to keep the Philippine Islands. But what warrant, then, had the President for putting before the Filipinos, by his "benevolent assimilation order," the alternative of submission to our sovereignty or war? Had he any assurance that the American people would do that? If such was his dream, there may be a rude awakening in store for him. But I say that for assenting to the aspiration of the Filipinos to freedom and independence he would have had the fullest possible warrant in the spirit of our institutions and in the resolution of Congress stamping our war against Spain as a war of liberation and humanity. And such a course would surely have been approved by the American people, except perhaps some Jingo-bent upon wild adventure, and some syndicates of speculators unscrupulous in their greed of gain.

There are also some who, with the mysterious mien of a superior sense of responsibility, tell us that the President could not have acted otherwise, because Dewey's victory devolved upon us some grave international or other obligations which would have been disregarded had the President failed to claim sovereignty over the Philippines. What? Did not the destruction of Cervera's fleet and the taking of Santiago devolve the same obligations upon

us with regard to Cuba? And who has ever asserted that therefore Cuba must be put under our sovereignty? And did ever anybody pretend that our victories in Mexico fifty years ago imposed upon us international or other obligations which compelled us to assume sovereignty over the Mexican Republic after we had conquered it much more than we have conquered the Philippines? Does not, in the light of history, this obligation-dodge appear as a hollow mockery?

An equally helpless plea is it, that the President could not treat with Aguinaldo and his followers because they did not represent the whole population of the islands. But having an established government and an army of some 25,000 or 30,000 men, and in that army men from various tribes, they represented at least something. They represented at least a large part of the population and a strong nucleus of a national organization. And, as we have to confess that in the Philippines there is no active opposition to the Filipino government except that which we ourselves manage to excite, it may be assumed that they represent the sympathy of practically the whole people.

But, pray, what do we represent there? At first, while the islanders confided in us as their liberators, we represented their hope for freedom and independence. Since we have betrayed that hope and have begun to slaughter them, we represent, as a brute force bent upon subjugating them, only their bitter hatred and detestation. We have managed to turn virtually that whole people, who at first greeted us with childlike trust as their beloved deliverers, into deadly enemies. For it is a notorious fact that those we regard as *amigos* to-day will to-morrow stand in the ranks of our foes. We have not a true friend left among the islanders unless it be some speculators and the Sultan of Sulu with his harem and his slaves, whose support we

have bought with a stipend like that which the Republic in its feeble infancy paid to the pirates of the Barbary States. And even his friendship will hardly last long. Yes, it is a terrible fact that in one year we have made them hate us more, perhaps, than they hated even their Spanish oppressors, who were at least less foreign to them, and that the manner in which we are treating them has caused many, if not most, of the Filipinos to wish that they had patiently suffered Spanish tyranny rather than be "liberated" by us.

Thus it appears that we who represent in the Philippines no popular element at all, but are unpopular in the extreme, cannot enter into relations with an established government for the pretended reason that it does not represent *all* the people, while it does represent a very important part of them, and would probably soon represent them all if we did not constantly throw obstacles in its way—aye, if we did not seek to extinguish it in blood. Was there ever a false pretense more glaring?

But the ghastliest argument of all in defense of the President's course is that he had to extend American sovereignty over the whole archipelago even before the ratification of the treaty, and that he was, and is now, obliged to shoot down the Filipinos, to the end of "restoring order" and "preventing anarchy" in the islands. We are to understand that if our strong armed hand did not restrain them from doing as they pleased—that is, if they were left free and independent—they would quickly begin to cut one another's or other people's throats, and to ravish and destroy one another's or other people's property. We may reasonably assume that if this were sure to be the upshot of their being left free and independent, they would have shown some such tendency where they have actually held sway under their own revolutionary government.

Now for the facts. We have the reports of two naval officers and of two members of the signal corps who travelled extensively behind Aguinaldo's lines through the country controlled by his government. And what did they find? Quiet and orderly rural or municipal communities, in all appearance well organized and governed, full of enthusiasm for their liberty and independence, which they thought secured by the expulsion of the Spaniards, and for their leader Aguinaldo, and at the time—it was before President McKinley had ordered the subjugation of the islands—also for the Americans, whom, with childlike confidence, they still believed friendly to their freedom from all foreign rule. We may be sure that if any anarchical disturbances had happened among them, our imperialists would have eagerly made report. But there has been nothing at all equivalent to such things of our own as the famous "battle of Virden" in Illinois, or the race troubles in our own States, or the numerous lynchings we have witnessed with shame and alarm in various parts of our Republic. The only rumors of so-called "anarchy" have come through a British consul on the island of Borneo, who writes that bloody broils are occurring in some of the southernmost regions of the Philippine archipelago, and that the Americans are wanted there. But the Americans are engaged in killing orderly Filipinos—Filipino soldiers of just that Filipino government which, on its part, would probably soon restore order in the troubled places, if it had not to defend itself against the "criminal aggression" of the Americans.

The imperialists wish us to believe that in the Philippines there is bloody disorder wherever our troops are *not*. In fact, after the Filipinos had expelled the Spaniards from the interior of their country, bloody disorders began there only when our troops appeared. Here is an example. In December last the city of Iloilo, the

second city in commercial importance in the Philippines, was evacuated by the Spaniards and occupied by the Filipinos. General M. P. Miller of our Army was sent in command of an expedition to take possession of it. As he has publicly stated, when he appeared with his ships and soldiers before the city he "received a letter from the business people of Iloilo, principally foreigners, stating that good order was being maintained, life and property being protected, and requesting him not to attack at present." But soon afterwards he received peremptory orders to attack, and did so; and then the killing and the burning of houses and other work of devastation began. Can it be said that our troops had to go there to "restore order" and prevent bloodshed and devastation? No, order and safety existed there, and it was only with our troops that the bloodshed and devastation came which otherwise might not have occurred.

I am far from meaning to picture the Philippine Islanders as paragons of virtue and gentle conduct. But I challenge the imperialists to show me any instances of bloody disturbance or other savagery among them sufficient to create any necessity for our armed interference to "restore order" or to "save them from anarchy." I ask and demand an answer: Is it not true that, even if there has been such a disorderly tendency, it would have required a long time for it to kill one-tenth as many human beings as we have killed and to cause one-tenth as much devastation as we have caused by our assaults upon them? Is it not true that, instead of being obliged to "restore order," we have carried riot and death and desolation into peaceful communities whose only offense was not that they did not maintain order and safety among themselves, but that they refused to accept us as their rulers? And here is the rub.

In the vocabulary of our imperialists "order" means,

above all, submission to their will. Any other kind of order, be it ever so peaceful and safe, must be suppressed with a bloody hand. This "order" is the kind that has been demanded by the despot since the world had a history. Its language has already become dangerously familiar to us—a familiarity which cannot cease too soon.

From all these points of view, therefore, the Philippine war was as unnecessary as it is unjust. A wanton, wicked and abominable war—so it is called by untold thousands of American citizens, and so it is at heart felt to be, I have no doubt, by an immense majority of the American people. Aye, as such it is cursed by many of our very soldiers whom our Government orders to shoot down innocent people. And who will deny that this war would certainly have been avoided had the President remained true to the National pledge that the war against Spain should be a war of liberation and humanity and not of conquest? Can there be any doubt that, if the assurance had honestly been given and carried out, we might have had, for the mere asking, all the coaling-stations, and facilities for commercial and industrial enterprise, and freedom for the establishment of schools and churches we might reasonably desire? And what have we now? After eight months of slaughter and devastation, squandered treasure and shame, an indefinite prospect of more and more slaughter, devastation, squandered treasure and shame.

But, we are asked, since we have to deal with a situation not as it might have been, but as it is, what do we propose to do now? We may fairly turn about and say, since not we, but you, have got the country into this frightful mess, what have you to propose? Well, and what is the answer? "No useless parley! More soldiers! More guns! More blood! More devastation! Kill, kill,

kill! And when we have killed enough, so that further resistance stops, then we shall see." Translated from smooth phrase into plain English, this is the program. Let us examine it with candor and coolness.

What is the ultimate purpose of this policy? To be perfectly fair, I will assume that the true spirit of American imperialism is represented not by the extremists who want to subjugate the Philippine Islanders at any cost and then exploit the islands to the best advantage of the conquerors, but by the more humane persons who say that we must establish our sovereignty over them to make them happy, to prepare them for self-government, and even recognize their right to complete independence as soon as they show themselves fit for it.

Let me ask these well-meaning citizens a simple question. If you think that the American people may ultimately consent to the independence of those islanders as a matter of right and good policy, why do you insist upon killing them now? You answer: Because they refuse to recognize our sovereignty. Why do they so refuse? Because they think themselves entitled to independence, and are willing to fight and die for it. But if you insist upon continuing to shoot them down for this reason, does not that mean that you want to kill them for demanding the identical thing which you yourself think that you may ultimately find it just and proper to grant them? Would not every drop of blood shed in such a guilty sport cry to Heaven? For you must not forget that establishing our sovereignty in the Philippines means the going on with the work of slaughter and devastation to the grim end, and nobody can tell where that end will be. To kill men in a just war and in obedience to imperative necessity is one thing. To kill men for demanding what you yourself may ultimately have to approve, is another. How can such killing adopted as a policy be countenanced by a

man of conscience and humane feelings? And yet, such killing without useless parley is the policy proposed to us.

We are told that we must trust President McKinley and his advisers to bring us out "all right." I should be glad to be able to do so; but I cannot forget that they have got us in all wrong. And here we have to consider a point of immense importance, which I solemnly urge upon the attention of the American people.

It is one of the fundamental principles of our system of democratic government that only the Congress has the power to declare war. What does this signify? That a declaration of war, the initiation of an armed conflict between this Nation and some other Power—the most solemn and responsible act a nation can perform, involving as it does the lives and fortunes of an uncounted number of human beings—shall not be at the discretion of the Executive branch of the Government, but shall depend upon the authority of the legislative representatives of the people—in other words, that, as much as the machinery of government may make such a thing possible, the deliberate will of the people Constitutionally expressed shall determine the awful question of peace or war.

It is true there may be circumstances of foreign aggression or similar emergencies to precipitate an armed conflict without there being a possibility of consulting the popular will beforehand. But, such exceptional cases notwithstanding, the Constitutional principle remains that the question of peace or war is essentially one which the popular will is to decide, and that no possibility should be lost to secure upon it the expression of the popular will through its legislative organs. Whenever such a possibility is wilfully withheld or neglected, and a war has been brought upon the country without every available means being employed thus to consult the popular will upon

that question, the spirit of the Constitution is flagrantly violated in one of its most essential principles.

We are now engaged in a war with the Filipinos. You may quibble about it as you will, call it by whatever name you will—it *is* a war; and a war of conquest on our part at that—a war of barefaced, cynical conquest. Now, I ask any fairminded man whether the President, before beginning that war, or while carrying it on, has ever taken any proper steps to get from the Congress, the representatives of the people, any proper authority for making that war. He issued his famous “benevolent assimilation” order, directing the Army to bring the whole Philippine archipelago as promptly as possible under the military government of the United States, on December 21, 1898, while Congress was in session, and before the treaty with Spain, transferring her shadowy sovereignty over the islands, had acquired any force of law by the assent of the Senate. That was substantially a declaration of war against the Filipinos asserting their independence. He took this step of his own motion. To be sure, he has constantly been telling us that “the whole subject is with Congress,” and that “Congress shall direct.” But when did he, while Congress was in session, lay a full statement before that body and ask its direction? Why did he not, before he proclaimed that the slaughter must go on without useless parley, call Congress together to consult the popular will in Constitutional form? Why, even in these days, while “swinging around the circle,” the President and his Secretaries are speaking of the principal thing, the permanent annexation of the Philippines, not as a question still to be determined, but as a thing done—concluded by the Executive, implying that Congress will have simply to regulate the details.

Now you may bring ever so many arguments to show that the President had *technically* a right to act as he did,

and your reasoning may be ever so plausible—yet the great fact remains that the President did not seek and obtain authority from Congress as to the war to be made, and the policy to be pursued, and that he acted upon his own motion. And this autocratic conduct is vastly aggravated by the other fact that in this democratic Republic, the government of which should be that of an intelligent and well-informed public opinion, a censorship of news has been instituted, which is purposely and systematically seeking to keep the American people in ignorance of the true state of things at the seat of war, and by all sorts of deceitful tricks to deprive them of the knowledge required for the formation of a correct judgment. And this censorship was practised not only in Manila, but directly by the Administration in Washington. Here is a specimen performance revealed by a member of Congress in a public speech; the War Department gave out a despatch from Manila, as follows: "Volunteers willing to remain." The Congressman went to the War Department and asked for the original, which read: "Volunteers unwilling to reënlist, but willing to remain until transports arrive." You will admit that such distortion of official news is a downright swindle upon the people. Does not this give strong color to the charge of the war correspondents that the news is systematically and confessedly so doctored by the officials that it may "help the Administration"?

Those are, therefore, by no means wrong who call this "the President's war." And a war so brought about and so conducted the American people are asked to approve and encourage, simply because "we are in it"—that is, because the President of his own motion has got us into it. Have you considered what this means?

Every man of public experience knows how powerful and seductive precedent is as an argument in the interpre-

tation of laws and of constitutional provisions, or in justification of governmental practices. When a thing, no matter how questionable, has once been done by the government, and approved, or even acquiesced in, by the people, that act will surely be used as a justification of its being done again. In nothing is the authority of precedent more dangerous than in defending usurpations of governmental power. And it is remarkable how prone the public mind is, especially under the influence of party spirit, to accept precedent as a warrant for such usurpations, which, judged upon their own merits, would be sternly condemned. And every such precedent is apt to bring forth a worse one. It is in this way that the most indispensable bulwarks of free government, and of public peace and security, may be undermined. To meet such dangers the American people should, if ever, remember the old saying that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."

I am not here as a partisan, but as an American citizen anxious for the future of the Republic. And I cannot too earnestly admonish the American people, if they value the fundamental principles of their government, and their own security and that of their children, for a moment to throw aside all partisan bias and soberly to consider what kind of a precedent they would set, if they consented to, and by consenting approved, the President's management of the Philippine business merely because "we are in it." We cannot expect all our future Presidents to be models of public virtue and wisdom, as George Washington was. Imagine now in the Presidential office a man well-meaning but, it may be, short-sighted and pliable, and under the influence of so-called "friends" who are greedy and reckless speculators, and who would not scruple to push him into warlike complications in order to get great opportunities for profit; or a man of that inordinate ambition

which intoxicates the mind and befogs the conscience; or a man of extreme partisan spirit, who honestly believes the victory of his party to be necessary for the salvation of the universe, and may think that a foreign broil would serve the chances of his party; or a man of an uncontrollable combativeness of temperament which might run away with his sense of responsibility—and that we shall have such men in the Presidential chair is by no means unlikely with our loose way of selecting candidates for the Presidency. Imagine, then, a future President belonging to either of these classes to have before him the precedent of Mr. McKinley's management of the Philippine business, sanctioned by the approval or only the acquiescence of the people, and to feel himself permitted—nay, even encouraged—to say to himself that, as this precedent shows, he may plunge the country into warlike conflicts of his own motion, without asking leave of Congress, with only some legal technicalities to cover his usurpation, or, even without such, and that he may, by a machinery of deception called a war-censorship, keep the people in the dark about what is going on; and that into however bad a mess he may have got the country, he may count upon the people, as soon as a drop of blood has been shed, to uphold the usurpation and to cry down everybody who opposes it as a "traitor," and all this because "we are in it"! Can you conceive a more baneful precedent, a more prolific source of danger to the peace and security of the country? Can any sane man deny that it will be all the more prolific of evil if in this way we drift into a foreign policy full of temptation for dangerous adventure?

I say, therefore, that, if we have the future of the Republic at heart, we must not only not uphold the Administration in its course, because "we are in it," but just because we are in it, have been got into it in such a way, the American people should stamp the Administration's

proceedings with a verdict of disapproval so clear and emphatic, and "get out of it" in such a fashion, that this will be a solemn warning to future Presidents instead of a seductive precedent.

What, then, to accomplish this end is to be done? Of course, we, as we are here, can only advise. But by calling forth expressions of the popular will by various means of public demonstration, and, if need be, at the polls, we can make that advice so strong that those in power will hardly disregard it. We have often been taunted with having no positive policy to propose. But such a policy has more than once been proposed and I can only repeat it.

In the first place, let it be well understood that those are egregiously mistaken who think that if by a strong military effort the Philippine war be stopped, everything will be right and no more question about it. No, the American trouble of conscience will not be appeased, and the question will be as big and virulent as ever, unless the close of the war be promptly followed by an assurance to the islanders of their freedom and independence, which assurance, if given now, would surely end the war without more fighting.

We propose, therefore, that it be given now. Let there be at once an armistice between our forces and the Filipinos. Let the Philippine Islanders at the same time be told that the American people will be glad to see them establish an independent government, and to aid them in that task as far as may be necessary; that, if the different tribes composing the population of the Philippines are disposed, as at least most of them, if not all, are likely to be, to attach themselves in some way to the government already existing under the Presidency of Aguinaldo, we shall cheerfully accept that solution of the question, and even, if required, lend our good offices to bring it about; and that meanwhile we shall deem it our duty to protect

them against interference from other foreign Powers—in other words, that with regard to them we mean honestly to live up to the righteous principles with the profession of which we commended to the world our Spanish war.

And then let us have in the Philippines, to carry out this program, not a small politician, nor a meddlesome martinet, but a statesman of large mind and genuine sympathy who will not merely deal in sanctimonious cant and oily promises with a string to them, but who will prove *by his acts* that he and we are honest; who will keep in mind that their government is not merely to suit us, but to suit them; that it should not be measured by standards which we ourselves have not been able to reach, but be a government of their own, adapted to their own conditions and notions—whether it be a true republic, like ours, or better, or a dictatorship like that of Porfirio Diaz, in Mexico, or an oligarchy like the one maintained by us in Hawaii, or even something like the boss rule we are tolerating in New York and Pennsylvania.

Those who talk so much about “fitting a people for self-government” often forget that no people were ever made “fit” for self-government by being kept in the leading-strings of a foreign Power. You learn to walk by doing your own crawling and stumbling. Self-government is learned only by exercising it upon one’s own responsibility. Of course there will be mistakes, and troubles and disorders. We have had and now have these, too—at the beginning our persecution of the Tories, our flounderings before the Constitution was formed, our Shays’s rebellion, our whisky war and various failures and disturbances—among them a civil war that cost us a loss of life and treasure horrible to think of, and the murder of two Presidents. But who will say that on account of these things some foreign Power should have kept the American people in leading-strings to teach them

to govern themselves? If the Philippine Islanders do as well as the Mexicans, who have worked their way, since we let them alone after our war of 1847, through many disorders, to an orderly government, who will have a right to find fault with the result? Those who seek to impose upon them an unreasonable standard of excellence in self-government do not seriously wish to let them govern themselves at all. You may take it as a general rule that he who wants to reign over others is solemnly convinced that they are quite unable to govern themselves.

Now, what objection is there to the policy dictated by our fundamental principles and our good faith? I hear the angry cry: "What? Surrender to Aguinaldo? Will not the world ridicule and despise us for such a confession of our incompetency to deal with so feeble a foe? What will become of our prestige?" No, we shall not surrender to Aguinaldo. In giving up a criminal aggression, we shall surrender only to our own consciences, to our own sense of right and justice, to our own understanding of our own true interests and to the vital principles of our own Republic. Nobody will laugh at us whose good opinion we have reason to cherish. There will, of course, be an outcry of disappointment in England. But from whom will it come? From such men as James Bryce or John Morley or any one of those true friends of this Republic who understand and admire and wish to perpetuate and spread the fundamental principles of its vitality? No, not from them. But the outcry will come from those in England who long to see us entangled in complications apt to make this American Republic dependent upon British aid and thus subservient to British interests. They, indeed, will be quite angry. But the less we mind their displeasure as well as their flattery, the better for the safety as well as the honor of our country.

The true friends of this Republic in England, and,

indeed, all over the world, who are now grieving to see us go astray, will rejoice, and their hearts will be uplifted with new confidence in our honesty, in our wisdom and in the virtue of democratic institutions when they behold the American people throwing aside all the puerilities of false pride, and returning to the path of their true duty. The world knows how strong we are. It knows full well that if the American people chose to put forth their strength, they could quickly overcome a foe infinitely more powerful than the Filipinos, and that, if we, possessing the strength of the giant, do not use the giant's strength against this feeble foe, it is from the noblest of motives—our love of liberty, our sense of justice and our respect for the rights of others—the respect of the strong for the rights of the weak. The moral prestige which, in fact, we have lost, will be restored, while our prestige of physical prowess and power will certainly not be lessened by showing that we have not only soldiers, guns, ships and money, but also a conscience.

Therefore, the cry is childish, that, unless we take and keep the Philippines, some other Power will promptly grab them. Many a time this cry has been raised to stampede the American people into a policy of annexation—in the San Domingo case, twenty-eight years ago, and more recently in the case of Hawaii—and in neither case was there the slightest danger—not that there were no foreign Powers that would have liked to have those islands, but because they could not have taken them without the risk of grave consequences. Now the old bugbear must do service again. Why should not American diplomacy set about to secure the consent of the Powers most nearly concerned to an agreement to make the Philippine Islands neutral territory, as Belgium and Switzerland are in Europe? Because some of those Powers would like to have the Philippines themselves? Well, are there not

among the European Powers some that would like to have Belgium or Switzerland? Certainly; and just because there are several watching each other, the neutrality of those two countries is guaranteed. But even if such an agreement could not be obtained, we may be sure that there is no foreign Power that would lightly risk a serious quarrel with the United States, if this Republic, for the protection of the Philippine Islanders in their effort to build up an independent government, said to the world: "Hands off!" So much for those who think that somebody else might be wicked enough to grab the Philippine Islands, and that, therefore, we must be wicked enough to do the grabbing ourselves.

There are some American citizens who take of this question a purely commercial view. I declare I am ardently in favor of the greatest possible expansion of our trade, and I am happy to say that, according to official statistics, our foreign commerce, in spite of all hindrances raised against it, is now expanding tremendously, owing to the simple rule that the nation offering the best goods at proportionately the lowest prices will have the markets. It will have them without armies, without war fleets, without bloody conquests, without colonies. I confess I am not in sympathy with those, if there be such men among us, who would sacrifice our National honor and the high ideals of the Republic, and who would inflict upon our people the burdens and the demoralizing influences of militarism for a mere matter of dollars and cents. They are among the most dangerous enemies of the public welfare. But as to the annexation of the Philippines, I will, for argument's sake, adopt even their point of view for a moment and ask: Will it pay?

Now, it may well be that the annexation of the Philippines would pay a speculative syndicate of wealthy capitalists, without at the same time paying the American

people at large. As to people of our race, tropical countries like the Philippines may be fields of profit for rich men who can hire others to work for them, but not for those who have to work for themselves. Taking a general view of the Philippines as a commercial market for us, I need not again argue against the barbarous notion that in order to have a profitable trade with a country we must own it. If that were true, we should never have had any foreign commerce at all. Neither need I prove that it is very bad policy, when you wish to build up a profitable trade, to ruin your customer first, as you would ruin the Philippines by a protracted war. It is equally needless to show to any well-informed person that the profits of the trade with the islands themselves can never amount to the cost of making and maintaining the conquest of the Philippines.

But there is another point of real importance. Many imperialists admit that our trade with the Philippines themselves will not nearly be worth its cost; but they say that we must have the Philippines as a foothold, a sort of power station, for the expansion of our trade on the Asiatic continent, especially in China. Admitting this, for argument's sake, I ask what kind of a foothold we should really need. Coaling-stations and docks for our fleet, and facilities for the establishment of commercial houses and depots. That is all. And now I ask further, whether we could not easily have had these things if we had, instead of making war upon the Filipinos, favored the independence of the islands. Everybody knows that we could. We might have those things now for the mere asking, if we stopped the war and came to a friendly understanding with the Filipinos to-morrow.

But now suppose we fight on and subjugate the Filipinos and annex the islands—what then? We shall then have of coaling-stations and commercial facilities no more than

we would have had in the other case; but the islanders will hate us as their bloody oppressors, and be our bitter and revengeful enemies for generations to come. You may say that this will be of no commercial importance. Let us see. It is by no means impossible, nor even improbable, that, if we are once in the way of extending our commerce with guns behind it, we may get into hot trouble with one or more of our competitors for that Asiatic trade. What then? Then our enemies need only land some Filipino refugees whom we have driven out of their country, and some cargoes of guns and ammunition on the islands, and we shall soon—all the more if we depend on native troops—have a fire in our rear which will oblige us to fight the whole old fight over again. The present subjugation of the Philippines will, therefore, not only not be a help to the expansion of our Asiatic trade, but rather a constant danger and a clog to our feet.

And here a word by the way. A year ago I predicted in an article published in the *Century Magazine*,¹ that if we turned our war of liberation into a war of conquest, our American sister republics south of us would become distrustful of our intentions with regard to them, and soon begin to form combinations against us, eventually even with European Powers. The newspapers have of late been alive with vague rumors of that sort, so much so that a prominent journal of imperialistic tendency has found it necessary most earnestly to admonish the President, in his next message, to give to the republics south of us the strongest possible assurances of our friendship and good faith. Suppose he does—who will believe him after we have turned our loudly heralded war of liberation into a land-grabbing game—a “criminal aggression”? Nobody will have the slightest trust in our words, be they ever so fair. Drop your conquests, and no assurances of good

¹ See *ante*, Vol. v., p. 502.

faith will be required. Keep your conquests, and no such assurances will avail. Our southern neighbors, no less than the Filipinos, will then inevitably distrust our professions, fear our greed and become our secret or open enemies. And who can be foolish enough to believe that this will strengthen our power and help our commerce?

It is useless to say that the subjugated Philippine Islanders will become our friends if we give them good government. However good that government may be, it will, to them, be foreign rule, and foreign rule especially hateful when begun by broken faith, cemented by streams of innocent blood and erected upon the ruins of devastated homes. The American will be and remain to them more a foreigner, an unsympathetic foreigner, than the Spaniard ever was. Let us indulge in no delusion about this. People of our race are but too much inclined to have little tenderness for the rights of what we regard as inferior races, especially those of darker skin. It is of ominous significance that to so many of our soldiers the Filipinos were only "niggers," and that they likened their fights against them to the "shooting of rabbits." And how much good government have we to give them? Are you not aware that our first imperialistic Administration is also the first that, since the enactment of the civil service law, has widened the gates again for a new foray of spoils politics in the public service? What assurance have we that the Philippines, far away from public observation, will not be simply a pasture for needy politicians and for speculating syndicates to grow fat on, without much scruple as to the rights of the despised "natives"? Has it not been so with the British in India, although the British monarchy is much better fitted for imperial rule than our democratic Republic can ever be? True, in the course of time the government of India has been much improved, but it required more than a century of slaughter, rob-

bery, devastation, disastrous blundering, insurrection and renewed bloody subjugation to evolve what there is of good government in India now. And have the populations of India ever become the friends of England? Does not England at heart tremble to-day lest some hostile foreign Power come close enough to throw a firebrand into that fearful mass of explosives?

I ask you, therefore, in all soberness, leaving all higher considerations of justice, morality and principle aside, whether, from a mere business point of view, the killing policy of subjugation is not a colossal, stupid blunder, and whether it would not have been, and would now be, infinitely more sensible to win the confidence and cultivate the friendship of the islanders by recognizing them as of right entitled to their freedom and independence, as we have recognized the Cubans, and thus to obtain from their friendship and gratitude, for the mere asking, all the coaling-stations and commercial facilities we require, instead of getting those things by fighting at an immense cost of blood and treasure, with a probability of having to fight for them again? I put this question to every business man who is not a fool or a reckless speculator. Can there be any doubt of the answer?

A word now on a special point: There are some very estimable men among us who think that even if we concede to the islanders their independence, we should at least keep the city of Manila. I think differently, not from a mere impulse of generosity, but from an entirely practical point of view. Manila is the traditional, if not the natural capital of the archipelago. To recognize the independence of the Philippine Islanders, and at the same time to keep from them Manila, would mean as much as to recognize the independence of Cuba and to keep Havana. It would mean to withhold from the islanders their metropolis, that in which they naturally take the greatest pride, that

which they legitimately most desire to have, and which, if withheld from them, they would most ardently wish to get back. The withholding of Manila would inevitably leave a sting in their hearts which would never cease to rankle, and might, under critical circumstances, give us as much trouble as the withholding of independence itself. If we wish them to be our friends, we should not do things by halves, but enable them to be our friends without reserve. And I maintain that, commercially as well as politically speaking, the true friendship of the Philippine Islanders will, as to our position in the East, be worth far more to us than the possession of Manila. We can certainly find other points which will give us similar commercial as well as naval advantages without exciting any hostile feeling.

Although I have by no means exhausted this vast subject, discussing only a few phases of it, I have said enough, I think, to show that this policy of conquest is, from the point of view of public morals, in truth "criminal aggression"—made doubly criminal by the treacherous character of it; and that from the point of view of material interest it is a blunder—a criminal blunder, and a blundering crime. I have addressed myself to your reason by sober argument, without any appeal to prejudice or passion. Might we not ask our opponents to answer these arguments, if they can, with equally sober reasoning, instead of merely assailing us with their wild cries of "treason" and "lack of patriotism," and what not? Or do they really feel their cause to be so weak that they depend for its support on their assortment of inarticulate shouts and nebulous phrases?

Here are our "manifest destiny" men who tell us that, whether it be right or not, we must take and keep the Philippines because "destiny" so wills it. We have heard this cry of manifest destiny before, especially when, a

half century ago, the slave-power demanded the annexation of Cuba and Central America to strengthen the slave-power. The cry of destiny is most vociferously put forward by those who want to do a wicked thing and to shift the responsibility. The destiny of a free people lies in its intelligent will and its moral strength. When it pleads destiny, it pleads "the baby act." Nay, worse; the cry of destiny is apt to be the refuge of evil intent and of moral cowardice.

Here are our "burden" men, who piously turn up their eyes and tell us, with a melancholy sigh, that all this conquest business may be very irksome, but that a mysterious Providence has put it as a "burden" upon us, which, however sorrowfully, we must bear; that this burden consists in our duty to take care of the poor people of the Philippines; and that in order to take proper care of them we must exercise sovereignty over them; and that if they refuse to accept our sovereignty, we must—alas! alas!—kill them, which makes the burden very solemn and sad.

But cheer up, brethren! We may avoid that mournful way of taking care of them by killing them, if we simply recognize their right to take care of themselves, and gently aid them in doing so. Besides, you may be as much mistaken about the decrees of Providence as before our civil war the Southern Methodist bishops were who solemnly insisted that Providence willed the negroes to remain in slavery.

Next there are our "flag" men, who insist that we must kill the Filipinos fighting for their independence to protect the honor of the stars and stripes. I agree that the honor of our flag sorely needs protection. We have to protect it against desecration by those who are making it an emblem of that hypocrisy which seeks to cover a war of conquest and subjugation with a cloak of humanity and religion; an

emblem of that greed which would treat a matter involving our National honor, the integrity of our institutions and the peace and character of the Republic as a mere question of dollars and cents; an emblem of that vulgar lust of war and conquest which recklessly tramples upon right and justice and all our higher ideals; an emblem of the imperialistic ambitions which mock the noblest part of our history and stamp the greatest National heroes of our past as hypocrites or fools. These are the dangers threatening the honor of our flag, against which it needs protection, and that protection we are striving to give it.

Now, a last word to those of our fellow-citizens who feel and recognize as we do that the Philippine war of subjugation is wrong and cruel, and that we ought to recognize the independence of those people, but who insist that, having begun that war, we must continue it until the submission of the Filipinos is complete. I detest, but I can understand, the Jingo whose moral sense is obscured by intoxicating dreams of wild adventure and conquest, and to whom bloodshed and devastation have become a reckless sport. I detest even more, but still I can understand, the cruel logic of those to whom everything is a matter of dollars and cents and whose greed of gain will walk coolly over slaughtered populations. But I must confess I cannot understand the reasoning of those who have moral sense enough to recognize that this war is criminal aggression—who must say to themselves that every drop of blood shed in it by friend or foe is blood wantonly and wickedly shed, and that every act of devastation is barbarous cruelty inflicted upon an innocent people—but who still maintain that we must go on killing, and devastating, and driving our brave soldiers into a fight which they themselves are cursing, because we have once begun it. This I cannot understand. Do they not consider that in such a war, which they themselves con-

demn as wanton and iniquitous, the more complete our success, the greater will be our disgrace?

What do they fear for the Republic if, before having fully consummated this criminal aggression, we stop to give a people struggling for their freedom what is due them? Will this Republic be less powerful? It will be as strong as ever, nay, stronger, for it will have saved the resources of its power from useless squandering and transformed vindictive enemies into friends. Will it be less respected? Nay, more, for it will have demonstrated its honesty at the sacrifice of false pride. Is this the first time that a powerful nation desisted from the subjugation of a weaker adversary? Have we not the example of England before us, who, after a seven-year war against the American colonists, recognized their independence? Indeed, the example of England teaches us a double lesson. England did not, by recognizing American independence, lose her position in the world and her chances of future greatness; on the contrary, she grew in strength. And secondly, England would have retained, or won anew, the friendship of the Americans, if she had recognized American independence more promptly, before appearing to have been forced to do so by humiliating defeats. Will our friends who are for Philippine independence, but also for continuing to kill those who fight for it, take these two lessons to heart?

Some of them say that we have here to fulfill some of the disagreeable duties of patriotism. Patriotism! Who were the true patriots of England at the time of the American Revolution—King George and Lord North, who insisted upon subjugation; or Lord Chatham and Edmund Burke, who stood up for American rights and American liberty?

Who were the true patriots of France when, recently, that ghastly farce of a military trial was enacted to sacri-

fice an innocent man for the honor of the French army and the prestige of the French Republic—who were the true French patriots, those who insisted that the hideous crime of an unjust condemnation must be persisted in, or those who bravely defied the cry of “traitor!” and struggled to undo the wrong, and thus to restore the French Republic to the path of justice and to the esteem of the world? Who are the true patriots in America to-day—those who drag our Republic, once so proud of its high principles and ideals, through the mire of broken pledges, vulgar ambitions and vanities and criminal aggressions—those who do violence to their own moral sense by insisting that, like the Dreyfus iniquity, a criminal course once begun must be persisted in, or those who, fearless of the demagogue clamor, strive to make the flag of the Republic once more what it once was—the flag of justice, liberty and true civilization, and to lift up the American people among the nations of the earth to the proud position of *the* people that have a conscience and obey it?

The country has these days highly and deservedly honored Admiral Dewey as a National hero. Who are his true friends—those who would desecrate Dewey’s splendid achievement at Manila by making it the starting-point of criminal aggression, and thus the opening of a most disgraceful and inevitably disastrous chapter of American history, to be remembered with sorrow, or those who strive so to shape the results of that brilliant feat of arms that it may stand in history not as a part of a treacherous conquest, but as a true victory of American good faith in an honest war of liberation and humanity—to be proud of for all time, as Dewey himself no doubt meant it to be?

I know the imperialists will say that I have been pleading here for Aguinaldo and his Filipinos against our Republic. No—not for the Filipinos merely, although

as one of those who have grown gray in the struggle for free and honest government, I would never be ashamed to plead for the cause of freedom and independence, even when its banner is carried by dusky and feeble hands. But I am pleading for more. I am pleading for the cause of American honor and self-respect, American interests, American democracy—aye, for the cause of the American people against an administration of our public affairs which has wantonly plunged this country into an iniquitous war; which has disgraced the Republic by a scandalous breach of faith to a people struggling for their freedom whom we had used as allies; which has been systematically seeking to deceive and mislead the public mind by the manufacture of false news; which has struck at the very foundation of our Constitutional government by an Executive usurpation of the war-power; which makes sport of the great principles and high ideals that have been and should ever remain the guiding star of our course; and which, unless stopped in time, will transform this government of the people, for the people and by the people into an imperial government cynically calling itself republican—a government in which the noisy worship of arrogant might will drown the voice of right; which will impose upon the people a burdensome and demoralizing militarism, and which will be driven into a policy of wild and rapacious adventure by the unscrupulous greed of the exploiter—a policy always fatal to democracy.

I plead the cause of the American people against all this, and I here declare my profound conviction that if this administration of our affairs were submitted for judgment to a popular vote on a clear issue, it would be condemned by an overwhelming majority.

I confidently trust that the American people will prove themselves too clear-headed not to appreciate the vital

difference between the expansion of the Republic and its free institutions over contiguous territory and kindred populations, which we all gladly welcome if accomplished peaceably and honorably—and imperialism which reaches out for distant lands to be ruled as subject provinces; too intelligent not to perceive that our very first step on the road of imperialism has been a betrayal of the fundamental principles of democracy, followed by disaster and disgrace; too enlightened not to understand that a monarchy may do such things and still remain a strong monarchy, while a democracy cannot do them and still remain a democracy; too wise not to detect the false pride or the dangerous ambitions or the selfish schemes which so often hide themselves under that deceptive cry of mock patriotism: "Our country, right or wrong!" They will not fail to recognize that our dignity, our free institutions and the peace and welfare of this and coming generations of Americans will be secure only as we cling to the watchword of *true* patriotism: "Our country—when right to be kept right; when wrong to be put right."

FROM GOLDWIN SMITH

"THE GRANGE," TORONTO, Oct. 20, 1899.

I have just read your most admirable speech.¹ If reason could prevail over the war fever, you would conquer. But I too well remember the Crimean war, into which we were plunged by the machinations of the intriguers for their personal objects and the popular madness which followed. Men who had taken part in making that war lived to repent it, and of its fruits absolutely nothing now remains but the Crimean graves.

The junction of American with British jingoism is a sinister feature of the situation. Who would have expected to see the

¹ Doubtless the speech of Oct. 17, 1899.

American Republic acting as bottle-holders to the monarchy of George III. in an attack on the independence of a republic? Chamberlain, whose calamitous approbation your Government has earned by its sycophancy, is the deadliest enemy to your expansion on this continent which is the natural and legitimate field of your ambition.

Kruger may have put himself in the wrong by his boorish declaration of war; though it is hard to see why, being convinced, and rightly convinced, that Chamberlain meant mischief, he should have felt himself bound to wait for the enemy's reserves. But by putting himself in the wrong he does not put Chamberlain in the right, or make it reasonable for us to sympathize with the strong in rapacious aggressions on the weak.

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

NEW YORK, NOV. 5, 1899.

Your letter of the 3d reached me yesterday. I admit that the alternative before us is dreadful. My opinion of Bryan and that crowd is probably no better than yours. My opinion of McKinley, Hanna and their crowd is, I apprehend, not as good as yours. At any rate, if a cruel fate should force me to choose between McKinley and the imperialistic policy, and Bryan as the anti-imperialist candidate, I should consider it my duty—a horrible duty—to swallow all my personal disgust and to defeat—or, at least, try to defeat—imperialism at any cost. I do not see how I could act otherwise. And I consider it good policy that those who think as I do, should announce their determination beforehand, for the reason that it might have a sobering effect upon the Republican politicians in Congress.

At the Chicago Conference of Anti-Imperialists there were men from about thirty States. All of them, but a very few, perhaps half a dozen, had voted for McKinley. Not one of them is going to do so again. I met a club of

sound-money Democrats in Chicago, and I was told that they were all of the same mind.

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CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN 1899¹

The centennial anniversary of the death of George Washington, which we observe to-day, cannot but be full of solemn admonition to every American. It has always seemed to me that the greatest historic value of Washington's career to the American people consisted not so much in the battles he fought and in the fortitude with which he upheld the cause of his country during the darkest days of the Revolutionary war, as in the fact that as the first President of the United States he set up, at the very beginning of our republican government, a standard of wisdom, public virtue and patriotism which has been, and will always remain, to his successors in the Presidency as well as to all men in public power, the surest guide as to the principles to be followed, the motives to be obeyed and the public ends to be pursued. His wisdom was so unfailing that during the past century of our history this Republic achieved its best successes as it walked in the path of his precepts, and it suffered its failures as it strayed away from that path. His sense of public duty—the duty of serving the true interests of his country as he understood them—was so genuine, strong and courageous, that no adverse current of opinion, no fear of personal unpopularity, could shake it. He was not without party feeling, but party was never anything more to him than a mere instrumentality for serving the public good. Nothing could have been farther

¹ Address delivered before the Civil Service Reform League, Indianapolis, Dec. 14, 1899.

from his purpose than to make the public service a pasture for personal favorites or an engine for party warfare. He was the very embodiment of the principle that public office is a public trust; and it is one of the greatest inspirations of our work that we are conscious of endeavoring to make the public service what he designed it to be. And from his lofty example we should learn that steadfastness of purpose which shrinks from no duty however arduous or unpleasing. Let us contemplate that which confronts us to-day.

The National Civil Service Reform League was founded to discuss the subject of civil service reform to the end of winning for it the support of public opinion; to promote the enactment of reform legislation by Congress, by the State legislatures and by municipal governments, and finally to watch the enforcement of civil service laws and to keep the public truthfully informed thereon. For the performance of these duties it is essential that the League should be a non-partisan body; and I may truly affirm that it has faithfully and conscientiously maintained its non-partisan character. There have always been among its members Republicans, Democrats and Independents, differing in their views as to other matters of public interest, while agreeing as to the specific purposes of the League. Since the enactment of the National civil service law, the League has had to observe and criticize the conduct of five National Administrations, three of which were Republican and two Democratic. However widely we may, during this period, have differed among ourselves as to the tariff, or imperialism, or the relative merits of parties or party leaders, we have always been of one mind as to the duty of praising in the conduct of each Administration concerning the public service what was to be praised, or of criticizing that which may have called for censure—praising or blaming in a

spirit of perfect impartiality, and endeavoring to find and to tell the plain truth without the slightest bias of favor or of ill-will.

The faithful performance of the unpleasant part of this duty has occasionally drawn upon us, now from Democrats and then from Republicans, the charge that we were chronic fault-finders—never satisfied, always discontented, sometimes even with what was done by officials who had themselves been classed among the civil service reformers. Those who make this charge do not consider that it is the first duty of this League to hold up the true standard of civil service reform, and to be dissatisfied and to find fault with everything that does not come up to that standard. If it failed to do this, it would not be true to the reason of its being. It would be as flagrantly guilty of dereliction of duty as a policeman refusing to repress a breach of the peace that happened before his eyes, or to give warning to the occupant of a house, the street door of which he found open during the night.

I find myself impelled to make these remarks by the unfortunate circumstance that we are now confronted by the duty of discussing the attitude of the present National Administration with regard to civil service reform under especially critical circumstances. As to its relations with President McKinley, we all know that this League accepted his early promises with warm demonstrations of confidence, and greeted with expressions of grateful approval every one of his words or acts that looked like a fulfilment of those pledges. It was profuse in its commendation of his order of July 27, 1897, concerning removals, although that order contained also the exemption from the competitive system of a much larger number of positions than it added to the classified service; and for a long time the League carefully abstained from

public utterance of its misgivings as to the tendency of certain acts of the Administration in order to avoid every possible injustice to the President's intentions. It lost no opportunity for respectfully inviting the President's consideration to such violations of the law and the rules as came to our notice, appealing to him for such extensions of the merit system as the public interest seemed to demand, especially cautioning him against the issuing of the recent civil service order of May 29, 1899, while that order was only in contemplation, submitting to him urgent arguments against it and predicting what the inevitable consequences would be. Thus the League has done its full duty to the President. And I may add that if, upon mature reconsideration, the President should remedy the evils now to be complained of, the League would again be as happy to praise as it is now reluctant to blame.

In the meantime, however, we cannot shirk our duty of telling with entire candor the truth about this deplorable business, as we understand it. I frankly confess that on account of my position of antagonism to other policies of the Administration, the performance of my part of that duty is an especially unwelcome task to me. I should gladly have left it to some one else, had that been possible. I can now only say that I shall conscientiously follow the rule of strictly impartial judgment as the League has so far always observed it; and if I err at all, it will be in the way of moderation of statement and charitableness of interference.

The most conspicuous and important event of the last year was the President's civil service order of May 29th. There can be no doubt, for every observing man has witnessed the symptoms of it, that this order has given an unprecedented impulse of encouragement to the reactionary forces working against civil service

reform. The spoils politicians and their following hailed it with a shout of triumph. Many of them expressed the confident hope that now the beginning of the end of civil service reform had come. The general expression of public opinion through the press, even through not a few papers otherwise strongly favorable to the Administration, was a decided disapproval of the act.

This order, however, does not stand as an isolated fact. It appears rather as the outgrowth, perhaps as the culmination, of a general tendency that has in an alarming degree manifested itself under the present Administration outside of the classified service as well as within it.

Ever since the introduction of the spoils element in the Federal service, Members of Congress, Senators as well as Representatives, have sought to usurp the Constitutional function of the Executive in the making of appointments to office, and this has been one of the principal sources of demoralization in our political life. Every Administration, without distinction of party, has yielded more or less to that arrogation of Members of Congress, thus fostering the dangerous abuse. But—and here I am stating only a fact so notorious that nobody will dispute it—never have the President's Constitutional power and responsibility in selecting persons for Presidential appointments been so systematically surrendered to Senators and Congressional delegations as during the last three years; and never has that surrender so conspicuously served as an official recognition and as a practical support of boss rule in our politics.

As an illustrating instance we may regard the changes that have been made in consular positions. For a long time the commercial community has by all sorts of demonstrations and appeals endeavored to induce the Government to take that branch of the service out of politics. The Administrations preceding this have been

sadly delinquent in satisfying this wise and patriotic demand—a fact which this League from time to time brought to the public notice by unsparing criticism. But a beginning of reform was at least made by the last Administration, which might have been developed into something valuable. Not only has this beginning, instead of being so developed, been turned into a burlesque, but there have been, during the last three years, more changes of a political character in the consular service than during any corresponding period in the recent past.

There has always been since the enactment of the civil service law a certain disinclination on the part of some officers to comply with the law and the rules as well as with the Executive orders issued under it, and in some instances distinct violations of the law and the rules, or acts of disobedience to Executive orders have gone unpunished. But under former Administrations some offenders at least were duly disciplined so as to let public servants know that they could not with the expectation of entire impunity treat the civil service law with contempt. Now page upon page of the reports of the Civil Service Commission has, during this Administration, been filled with recitals of such contempt, some of a most defiant nature, and again and again has this League appealed to the President for the due correction of such lawless conduct, and yet in not a single instance has the offending officer been removed. On the contrary, a great many of such offenses, committed before the order of May 29th was issued, have been formally condoned by that order.

The platform of the party in power contained the solemn pledge that the civil service law should not only “be thoroughly and honestly enforced” but also “extended wherever practicable.” Not a single new branch of the service has by this Administration been brought

under the merit system. On the contrary, a very large number of clerical appointments were under the war emergency acts made in Washington alone without examination, and in the face of the fact that the Civil Service Commission stood prepared to furnish from its eligible lists of examined candidates all of the extra force that might be needed.

The notorious wastefulness in the taking of the last census and the many imperfections of that work had, confessedly, in a large measure been owing to the organization of the census force on the political spoils plan. The enlightened public opinion of the country was therefore united in demanding that the taking of the census of 1900 should be organized on the basis of the merit system wherever practicable. But there are under the Census Director appointed by this Administration, 2500 clerks to be employed, and they, as well as the rest of the force, are to be appointed on the direct nomination by Congressmen. What kind of material is furnished by such nominations appears from a recent complaint of the Census Director reported in the press: "They cannot spell and they cannot do ordinary arithmetic. Fifty per cent. fail, and they fail because they cannot divide 100,000 by 4038; that is they cannot get a correct result." And such men are urged for appointment by political influence. They would never have dared to apply under a competitive system. The pass examinations instituted by the Director will, as they always do, serve, not to secure the selection of the fittest persons but only to eliminate the most incapable. This is common experience.

It is true, the war emergency appointments, as well as those in the Census office, were excepted from the operation of the civil service rules by the legislative action of Congress. But it is also true that in neither case the Executive made the slightest attempt, either

by official recommendation to Congress or otherwise, to bring about the "extension" of the civil service law over those employments, in accordance with the pledge of the Republican platform. On the contrary, whatever intervention there was by Administration officials, went distinctly in the opposite direction.

It was under such circumstances that the President issued his civil service order of May 29th. That order withdrew from the civil service rules thousands of positions—a much larger number than preceding rumors had led us to apprehend. By extending the facilities of arbitrary transfer from lower to higher positions, by making possible, and thus encouraging, party reprisals on a great scale with each change of Administration through ex-parte reëxaminations of removals for cause without limit of time, by enlarging the power of making temporary employments permanent, and even by materially weakening the President's order of July 27, 1897, concerning removals, which at the time we praised so highly, it has opened new opportunities for circumventing the civil service law. I need not go into detail, for the matter has been well elucidated by the interesting public correspondence between the Secretary of the Treasury and Mr. McAneny, the secretary of the League, which took place some time ago, as well as by various special reports submitted at this meeting of the League.

But the significance of the President's order is not determined by the number and individual importance of the places excluded from the competitive system. It consists still more in the circumstance that the solemn pledge of the party in power "that the civil service law shall be thoroughly and honestly enforced and extended wherever practicable," and the President's own pledge never to take a "backward step upon this question," were distinctly broken. It consists in the fact

that, while since the enactment of the civil service law, every President made valuable additions to the area of the merit system, now for the first time, by President McKinley's order of May 29th, the area of the merit system has been substantially curtailed. While the action of every other President was in the forward direction, characteristic of an advancing movement, President McKinley's order was the first distinctly backward step, indicative of a generally receding tendency.

I am aware the originators and the defenders of the order claim that it not only was not designed to be a backward step, but that it was only better to regulate the reformed service, and to insure the permanency of the progress hitherto made. I shall not question the sincerity of this claim, but only consider its justice and pertinence. To judge correctly the ultimate consequences which such an act will be apt to draw after it, the reasons given for it are of the greatest moment. For if those reasons were held to be good as to the cases now in question, they will also be held to be good in the future as to cases of a similar nature. In this respect nothing could be more instructive than the public defense made of the several provisions of the President's order by the Secretary of the Treasury, who stepped forward as the main champion of the act and may well be regarded as the Administration spokesman.

Here is an illustration furnished by him. The President's order takes the "shipping commissioners" from under the competitive rule, and confides their appointment to the so-called discretion of the appointing power. I choose this example for first discussion because the exemption is in this case comparatively unimportant as to the number of positions concerned, and the reason given for it seems especially plausible. That reason, in the language of the Administration spokesman, is that the

duties of that office are "quasi-judicial in their character, and it is needless to point to the fact that an examination will not point out the presence of the judicial temperament." This has a fair sound. But is it a good reason for excepting positions of that kind from the competitive test? That an examination will not surely "point out the presence of the judicial temperament" may be admitted. But may not an examination demonstrate other capabilities required for the discharge of the duties in question, among them a knowledge of the things with which the judicial temperament will in that office have to deal? The Administration spokesman was, perhaps, not aware that in the British India services those who wish to be judges in India and who need at least as much of the judicial temperament as our shipping commissioners, have to go through the examination mill, and that this is considered as one of the peculiar virtues of that system. He may also have forgotten that a shipping commissioner appointed upon competitive examination will, during his term of probation, have an opportunity for showing whether he has or has not the necessary judicial temperament, that, if he has not, he may be dropped, and that, as to this matter, the shipping commissioners might, therefore, safely have remained in the classified service.

But let us go further. Since they have been taken out of the classified service for such a reason, who is there to test the "judicial temperament" of the candidates? The Secretary of the Treasury himself cannot do it, being occupied with too many other duties. Has he, then, any experts on "judicial temperament" at his elbow to do it for him? He himself would smile at the suggestion, for he knows as well as we all do, that as soon as such places are withdrawn from the protection of the merit system, spoils politics reach out for them, and they are, in nine cases out of ten, demanded by—and I regret

to say, yielded to—such eminent authorities on “judicial temperament” and on other qualifications for official usefulness as Boss Platt in New York, and Boss Quay in Pennsylvania. Nobody, however, believes, I think, that when such potentates make their selections, the “judicial temperament” or other qualifications of the candidates for the *public* service have nearly as much weight with them as a promise of efficient service to the party machine.

I shall not deny that in this way now and then a man may be put in such an office who has a “judicial temperament” as well as other virtues. But considering that he has really been selected for other reasons, this must be considered a happy accident, which surely should not be regarded as justifying the withdrawal of such offices from the merit system. Such a good officer has hardly got warm in his place when a change of Administration occurs and another high authority on judicial temperament demands and gets that place for his man—one that is only a good party worker but has no judicial temperament at all. The fact remains that, when persons are put into office for reasons other than their fitness for the duties to be performed, the aggregate result will inevitably be a demoralized, wasteful and inefficient service.

But this is not even the worst aspect of the exemption of the shipping commissioners from the merit system. This is one of the cases in which the reasons given for an act are more injurious than the act itself. It may be that the President, exposed to a severe pressure from the spoils hunters in his own party, thought that he could appease their greed by giving them something and that then the pressure would stop. This will turn out to be a miscalculation. The giving of something to the spoils hunters has never satisfied but always sharpened their appetite. They will be encouraged to demand more

when those in power show a yielding disposition, and especially when reasons are pointed out to them why they may demand more.

Look from this point of view at the example under discussion. I repeat, the exemption of the shipping commissioners is, as to their small number, comparatively unimportant. But when the Administration tells us that they had to be exempted because the required judicial temperament cannot be demonstrated by examination, the case becomes one of far reaching consequence. There is a very large number of positions now under the civil service rules, the duties of which are more or less quasi-judicial, such as the examiners in the Patent Office, and many division chiefs and high grade clerks in various departments who have to prepare the decision of cases. Now if the shipping commissioners must be exempted from the rules because their judicial temperament cannot be demonstrated by examination, although examination may demonstrate other required qualifications, why should not the other places I have named, be exempted for the same reason, thus to be placed within the reach of spoils politics?

But the question is a still larger one. Everybody knows that there is hardly an employment under the Government for the perfect discharge of the duties of which this or that quality of character or mental habit is not desirable, that cannot be demonstrated by examination, while other and perhaps more important qualifications can be so demonstrated. Now, what would become of the whole merit system if we were to admit, as the Administration virtually does, that because some qualifications cannot be demonstrated, the ascertainment by examination of other requirements must be abandoned, and the selection of all those places must therefore be yielded to the party magnates as heretofore? The

Administration will, no doubt, sincerely say that they did not mean it so. But can they deny that by the futile reasons given for the exemption from the civil service rules of the places mentioned, they have given the spoils politicians a very strong encouragement to demand the exemption of a great many more—and an argument sure to turn up some day?

Here is another example. In his first defense of the President's order, the Administration spokesman said, among other things: "The exceptions in the Alaskan service have been made necessary by the great distance from Washington and the time consumed in making certifications and appointments under civil service regulations." Again, the number of Government places in Alaska is small, and in that respect the exception is unimportant. But if, as the Administration tells us, "the exemptions in the Alaskan service have been *made necessary* by the great distance from Washington," will not, according to the same authority, the exemption from the civil service rules of the colonial service in the Philippines, if we are to have that, on account of the greater distance be still more "necessary"? Is not this extremely cold comfort to those of our fellow-citizens who are in favor of a colonial policy, but who justly believe that such a policy will inevitably result in disaster and disgrace unless carried on under the strictest kind of a civil service system? Has not thus the Administration furnished a very specious argument to the politicians who will insist upon making the colonies, if there be such, pastures of spoils politics? And did not the Administration do this in the face of the fact that, in spite of much greater distance from the seat of imperial government, England is carrying on in India a most elaborate and exacting civil service system to which that part of the British Empire owes nearly all it has of good government?

Still another example—the deputy internal revenue collectors, of whom there are a good many, and who are officers of great importance, as they have to collect more than half of the National revenue. They were put under the civil service rules by President Cleveland. The spokesman of the present Administration has defended their exemption on various grounds—in the first place, because the law vests the appointment of these deputies in the collectors, and they were, therefore, “according to the highest legal opinion the Treasury Department could get, illegally classified.” Let us examine this. Sec. 3148 of the U. S. Revised Statutes provides: “Each collector shall be authorized to appoint by an instrument in writing, under his hand, as many deputies as he may think proper, to be compensated by him for their services; to revoke any such appointment, giving notice thereof as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall prescribe; and to require and accept bonds or other securities from such deputies, etc.” The question is whether this statute precludes the subjection of the deputy internal revenue collectors to the civil service rules. The Administration contends on the authority of “the highest legal opinion the Treasury Department could get,” that it does. What was that “highest legal opinion” attainable? I am informed that it was not that of the Supreme Court, nor that of any U. S. Court, nor even that of the Attorney-General, but simply the opinion of Mr. O’Connell, the Solicitor of the Treasury, and that he gave that opinion not even in writing, but orally in an offhand way. If this information is correct, then the Administration must admit that it is easily satisfied as to the legal merits of a very important matter; for, on the other side, declaring that those positions could be legally classified, there stood President Cleveland, who made the order classifying them, and who is far from being considered a mean lawyer, and

also Mr. Conrad, a former Solicitor-General of the United States, and Mr. Charles J. Bonaparte, a lawyer of high standing in Maryland, and Mr. Moorfield Storey, a former President of the American Bar Association, whose opinions the Administration might have read in the report of the Civil Service Commission for 1896-7. The Commission itself submitted a strong argument sustaining the legality of the classification.

Now I ask in all candor, what will the merit system in the public service come to if, when a solicitor of some Department says that in his view the classification of a certain numerous force of the service is illegal, that declaration is at once accepted as "the highest legal opinion the Department can get," and the President thereupon actually exempts that branch of the service from the rules?

If we take as valid such reasons for curtailing the classified service, how long shall we be able to resist the spoils politicians showing us that there are other and far more numerous classes of places, the appointment to which is by statute vested in certain officers, and which, therefore, must be excluded from the merit system? They may even point out to us a statute providing that "each head of a Department is authorized to employ in his Department such number of clerks of the several classes recognized by law, and such other employees, and at such rates of compensation respectively as may be appropriated for by Congress from year to year," and they may thereupon argue that, the law thus vesting the appointment of clerks and other employees in the heads of Departments, no interference by civil service rules with the discretionary power of the heads of Departments in making such appointments can be legal. And I should not at all wonder if one or more Department solicitors could be found to deliver as their opinion that,

although the language of one statute may be a little more elaborate or stronger than that of the other, their legal intent and effect is the same. Such a legal doctrine, applied to all Departments, would, of course, sweep away at one swoop the whole merit system, root and branch; and the Secretary of the Treasury, as a friend of civil service reform, would have to find his consolation in thinking that this was "the highest legal opinion the Department could get."

As another reason for exempting the deputy internal revenue collectors, the Administration tells us that the Civil Service Commission recommended it. So it did, after having long and strenuously argued that those officers should *not* be exempted. Why did the Commission at last recommend the exemption? It gave its reason in a letter of May 8, 1899, addressed to the President, in these words:

The fact that the Internal Revenue bureau continued to claim and exercise the right of collectors to appoint deputies without compliance with the civil service act and rules, notwithstanding the arguments of the Commission to the contrary, was the principal reason for the Commission's recommendation to the President on June 1, 1898, that these positions be included in the list of positions excepted from the requirement of examination.

What a state of things this reveals! Here was the Civil Service Commission faithfully fighting for the enforcement of the law as it stood; on the other side a branch of the Government persistently and defiantly violating that law, until the Commission, feeling itself utterly powerless against the Government, at last threw up its hands in despair saying: "Well, rather than have the law openly and continually violated under the eyes of the Government, let the law be modified to suit the



violators." And then that so-called "recommendation" of the Commission is paraded by the Administration as justifying the President's order of May 29th!

Consider what a precedent this will be! It teaches the spoilsmen in the public service that they need only find some pretext for rebelling against the civil service law, and that if they carry on that rebellion with sufficient boldness and persistency, they will have good ground for hoping that, for the very reason of their bold and persistent lawlessness, the Government will complacently revoke the part of the law or of the rules that displeases them. A precedent more demoralizing to the discipline of the service and subversive of the merit system can hardly be imagined.

I am not unmindful of what the Administration spokesman has said about the peculiar fiduciary relations existing between the collectors of Internal Revenue and their deputies, about the responsibility of the collectors for the acts of their subordinates, about the personal confidence which should prevail between them and so on. Now, that certain superior officers bear more or less responsibility for the conduct of their subordinates, that there are certain subordinate positions of a more confidential character than others and that therefore the superior officers must in such cases have the discretionary power to select their subordinates without being troubled by any civil service rules, is one of the well-worn stock arguments of the enemies of civil service reform. There are few positions above the lowest clerkships to which this argument may not be more or less applied, and to which the spoils politicians do not actually apply it.

Against this permit me a recital of personal experience. When, years ago, I became Secretary of the Interior, I thought it best not to take a single person with me into the Department, not even a private and

confidential secretary. That private secretary I selected from among the force already in the Department. I soon found a man of excellent capacity, entire trustworthiness and good manners, who at the same time had the important advantage of being already acquainted with Departmental affairs. So much for that peculiarly "confidential" position. Now, when looking at the papers put before me for my signature—papers of importance which I could not possibly study in detail—I felt myself as to the discharge of very grave responsibilities,—much graver than those of an internal revenue collector—to an appalling extent at the mercy of my subordinates. At the same time I was set upon by Senators and Representatives and other political magnates, who urgently asked me to fill existing vacancies, or vacancies to be made by removals, with men whom they recommended to me for appointment. Most of them demanded places for their favorites for reasons which had nothing to do with the public interest. Some told me that in my responsible position I must have subordinates whom I could trust, and they were ready to furnish me just such men. I heard them all and concluded that the public interest would be best served if the vacant places in my Department—fiduciary as well as others—were filled on the principles of the merit system, and I attempted the introduction of that system in the Department—imperfectly of course, as I had no appropriation for the purpose, and only an improvised and constantly changing machinery, depending on clerks whose time was temporarily not fully employed, or who were willing to work after office hours. I carried this on for four years against the bitterest opposition of the patronage-mongers high and low, and I learned thus from actual practice on that field of very complicated duties and heavy responsibilities quite thoroughly to appreciate the practical value of the merit system in the conduct of

the service, and also the true nature of the difficulties standing in the way of a full development of that system.

Now, when in discussing this matter anybody indulges in solemn hints about mysterious things which the official mind has to deal with, but which the unofficial mind cannot understand, he cannot make any impression upon me. I am familiar with the augur's wink and with the smiles that follow it. It is equally useless to talk to me about fiduciary or confidential positions which should be filled only at the free discretion of the appointing officer; for I know from abundant experience that in an overwhelming majority of cases that free discretion is a myth and that the fiduciary appointments are dictated by political influence; and I know also that in a well-regulated civil service with merit appointment, merit promotion and merit tenure all those so-called extraordinary qualifications for certain positions can easily be secured without exposing any of the places to the chance of becoming the prey of spoils politics.

In fact, after four years of service, I left the Interior Department with the firm conviction that the positions in it, and no doubt in all the other Departments, would, taking the general average, be vastly better filled and that the work would be much more efficiently and economically done—in one word, that the public interest would be much better served, if the whole force in and under those Departments, without any exception worth mentioning, were subjected to the civil service rules, including even, if that were possible, the commissioners and assistant commissioners of the different bureaus, and in each Department at least one permanent under-secretary. And the same four years of official experience convinced me that there is only one real difficulty obstructing the full development of the merit system in our public service—and that is the pressure of political in-

fluence for patronage, and the lack of resisting power among appointing officers to stand firm against that pressure. Take away that one difficulty, and all your troubles about needed "extraordinary qualifications" that cannot be demonstrated by examination, and about "fiduciary positions," and about distances making the application of the merit system impracticable, and so on, will at once vanish into nothing. And it is the most baneful feature of the President's order of May 29th that it so seriously increases that difficulty by strengthening the belief of the spoils hunters and patronage-mongers that neither the pledge of a great party to "enforce the civil service law honestly and thoroughly, and to extend it wherever practicable," nor a President's solemn promise that there shall be "no backward step," will hold out against the pressure of political influence if that pressure be only persevering and defiant.

You must pardon me for once more referring to my personal experience. Having served six years in the United States Senate, where, at the beginning at least—I was soon cured—I thought I had to do some patronage business myself, and where I learned pretty thoroughly how that business is usually done by Members of Congress—and having been four years at the head of a great Government Department where I learned still more, and having been for seventeen years a more or less active member of an association considering it its especial duty to study the means by which the merit system may be established, perfected, sustained and extended, and also the means by which its enemies seek to demoralize, to cripple and finally to destroy it, I may, perhaps, without undue assumption pretend to some practical knowledge of the subject. And that knowledge fully warrants me in saying that if I were in a position of power and desired to undermine the merit system in the public service with

a view to its final overthrow, but without proclaiming myself its enemy, the things contained in the President's order of May 29th, together with the reasons given to justify them, would suggest themselves to me as among the most effective shifts to bring about that end.

In saying this I candidly disclaim the intention of insinuating that such was the purpose of the President, or that of his official defender in this case, the Secretary of the Treasury. On the contrary, I honestly believe that they would gladly have carried out the pledge of the Republican platform "honestly and thoroughly to enforce the civil service law and to extend it wherever practicable," could they have done so without encountering the fierce antagonism of the so-called "practical politicians" within their own party. I further believe that in trying to appease that antagonism they would have liked to abstain from anything that might seriously injure the merit system, but that they relied upon subordinates to get suitable amendments to the civil service rules and were misled by the advice of those subordinates farther than they had originally intended to go; and that finally when the thing was done, and met with very severe criticism, not only on the part of this League but of public sentiment generally, they tried to justify their step, as men who suddenly find themselves in a false position often do, by giving all sorts of reasons for their act—reasons probably also suggested by their ingenious subordinates—which made the effects of their act and their own situation even much worse than they otherwise would have been.

This is my candid belief; and that belief is not in the slightest degree shaken by the statement made by the Secretary of the Treasury in his public defense, that several of the exemptions were never demanded of him by any politicians. No wonder, for the politicians knew

where they could put in their work much more effectively below. The real motive power was in any case the greed of politicians for patronage and their pressure upon the Administration. Those who believe this as I do, can render the Administration as well as the cause of reform no better service than by laying bare the true nature and tendency of what has been done, and by expressing at the same time the hope that after a sober and careful reëxamination of the matter the President may see his way clear for retracing his step. After such a reëxamination he will hardly fail to recognize the fact that his order of May 29th, with the reasons given for it, has been the most hurtful blow civil service reform has ever received since the enactment of the law, as the reception that order has met with from friend and foe must have convinced him that the people generally regard it as such, and that subsequent excuses and explanations have not altered that judgment.

Neither can he close his eyes to the fact that, encouraged by the general backsliding tendency under his Administration that culminated in the order of May 29th, some of the most conspicuous abuses of the spoils system which under his immediate predecessors had become much restricted, are now developing new vitality. It is too notorious to be denied that persons in the Federal service have become much more forward again in what is called "pernicious partisan activity" than they were for many years. During several Administrations, for instance, the business community of New York had been accustomed to see the great customhouse of that port "out of politics," the collector of customs devoting himself to his official duties without taking any active part in party movements. But now the collector is a prominent figure again in party caucuses and other gatherings, and occasionally he finds it even proper to cheer his audiences with exhilarating remarks about the actual or prospective relaxation of the

civil service rules by Executive action. Thus the great customhouse of New York is out of politics no longer; and the same may be said of other large or small Government establishments.

The contemptuously sportive view of the civil service law which at present is taken here and there has, of course, been very much encouraged by an opinion delivered by the Comptroller of the Treasury, Mr. R. J. Tracewell, as to whether persons shown to have been appointed in violation of the civil service rules should, nevertheless, be paid their salaries. The question having been referred to him by the Secretary of the Treasury, Comptroller Tracewell decided that inasmuch as the President has, under the law, made the civil service rules, if not directly then at least by his approval, he could also suspend them or sanction their suspension by his agents or subordinate officers; and that if the rules were thus suspended in individual cases by the appointment of persons in violation of them, the Comptroller has no choice but to accept the certificate of appointment as conclusive and to sanction the payment of the salaries of the persons so appointed. This decision looks like a huge jest at the expense of the civil service law; and we might conclude that it was intended as such when we read the following sentence which forms part of that important document: "If this ruling has a tendency to muddy the stream of civil service reform, which should always flow pure and clean from its fountain throughout its course, I can only answer that it would be as futile for me to attempt with my limited jurisdiction to purify this stream as it would be to bail the ocean of its waters with a pint cup." Mr. R. J. Tracewell, who owes his appointment as Comptroller not to a civil service examination, but to the so-called free discretion of the President, has, it may be said by the way, furnished by this elegant

sneer at civil service reform, in a judicial decision, a fine illustration of that "judicial temperament" which, according to the Secretary of the Treasury, every officer exercising quasi-judicial functions must possess, and to secure which civil service examinations must be discarded and the appointing power must be left to make its choice with untrammelled freedom. I have only to add that this decision has been accepted by the Administration as final, that the persons appointed in proven violation of the civil service rules are regularly paid their salaries, that in this respect there is no trouble in the way of further illegal appointments and that Mr. Tracewell has, after this performance, not been disturbed in his important position of Comptroller where he continues to enjoy ample opportunity for giving his rare judicial temperament full play.

It is also a matter of notoriety that the levying of assessments upon persons in the Federal service has again assumed very formidable dimensions. This abuse, it is true, has to some extent existed all the while. But this year the public mind was rather seriously startled by the unusually defiant boldness with which the Republican State committee of Ohio, the President's own State, put the Federal service all over the country under contribution to its party campaign fund, instructing, with rare cynicism, the public servants how the penal clauses of the law against assessments could be circumvented. This truly remarkable proceeding went on without the slightest mark of disapproval on the part of those charged with the execution of the law, until at last the Civil Service Commission remonstrated against it, the immediate result of which remonstrance was, according to the press reports, that the Republican State committee of Ohio rushed out another call admonishing the Federal officeholders to be quick in paying up. In this way an unusually large amount of money was obtained from the public servants.

This is not surprising, for, as everybody acquainted with placeholders knows, the member of the classified service feels himself no longer secure in his tenure if he merely does his duty faithfully and efficiently, but he is troubled again by a sense of danger unless he win the favor of the party potentates by rendering such political service as may be exacted of him. That this danger really exists I will not assert. But the feeling of apprehension, created by the things I have been describing, very extensively does exist, and it cannot fail to produce demoralizing effects most hurtful to the service.

An effort is being made to bring to justice those who have violated the law by the levying of assessments in the case mentioned as well as in another case, on the ground of an opinion recently rendered by ex-Senator Edmunds, who was the chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate which reported the statute in question; and it is hoped that a salutary example will be made of the guilty persons. This, if successfully carried through, would indeed serve to prevent the repetition of such glaring excesses in the same line. But much more drastic measures on the part of the Administration, to demonstrate its earnestness as to the maintenance of the merit system, will be required to cure that deterioration of the atmosphere in the public service which has been brought about by the multiplication of places filled by political influence as well as by the impunity with which in so many conspicuous cases the rules have been circumvented and the spirit of the law has been openly defied—an impunity which but too easily is taken for approval.

In this respect, I must confess, the paragraphs in the President's message referring to the civil service, fail to afford much comfort, for they may be summed up in the one sentence—that everything is now in satisfactory

condition. We can only hope that the cheerful optimism betrayed by this utterance will not prevent the President from considering worthy of notice the investigations made by this League and the resulting reports upon the happenings in various branches of the service. Those reports, containing not mere theories or inferences, but facts, may serve to open his eyes to many things of which, it must be assumed, he was not aware, or which, at least, he may not have seen in their true character when he wrote his message, but a thorough appreciation of which may induce him to apply the appropriate remedies and to retrieve the grievous missteps we have now to deplore.

The picture of the retrograde tendencies in the Federal service which my duty to tell the plain truth has compelled me to draw, is relieved by some facts of a more encouraging nature. In the State of New York a distinct advance as to the maintenance as well as the further extension of the merit system has been achieved by the enactment of a new civil service law. That law not only sweeps away the contrivances by which the late State Administration sought to "take the starch out of civil service," but it places the merit system throughout on the firm basis of well-ordered regulations, securing to it a practical machinery, and provides for the extension of its operation over the counties, in which it had formerly not been in force. Even in the City of New York, where the sinister genius of Tammany Hall devotes itself with the accustomed zest and skill to the task of circumventing the civil service law, and where the local Civil Service Reform Association coöperating with the State authorities has to fight over every foot of ground, many valuable successes have been scored—at least in crossing iniquitous schemes and in making the ways of the transgressor duly hard. Also on the other side of the

continent, in San Francisco, distinct progress has been recorded by the adoption of a city charter providing for the introduction of the merit system in the municipal service.

But the fact in which the friend of civil service reform may find the most cheering assurance of the triumph of his cause in the future, consists in the striking evidences of the growth of that cause in the favor of public opinion. The time is not far behind us when civil service reform was superciliously sniffed at as a whimsical notion of some dreamy theorists not to be taken seriously. Even when after the first attempt at the practical introduction of the merit system in the Federal service President Grant dropped it again in consequence of the refusal of Congress to make any appropriation for its support, the people generally accepted the event with cool indifference. There were indeed expressions of regret, but they came only from a comparatively small number of citizens who had become especially interested in the subject. But when, six months ago, President McKinley's order curtailing the area of the merit system appeared, the manifestations of popular disapproval were far more general and earnest than the originators of the measure had expected and than the friends of the merit system had dared to hope. Not even party spirit, usually so potent in such cases, was proof against the popular feeling of disappointment, not a few journals otherwise staunch partisans of the Administrations, giving voice to that feeling with remarkable emphasis.

The reason is simple. In President Grant's time civil service reform still appeared in this country as a new and strange scheme, running in the teeth of the political notions and habits of half a century, and clouded over by the uncertainties of a doubtful experiment. Now it is a stranger no longer. The people have made its acquaint-

tance by actual observation. They know that it is not an idle fancy, but an eminently sober and practical conception; that its aim is to remedy real evils and to produce a real good, by delivering our political life of fatally demoralizing influences, and by giving the Republic efficient, economical and honest service. They know that it pursues this aim by methods which every intelligent business man standing at the head of a large establishment and exposed to constant and promiscuous pressure for employment would adopt for himself as eminently businesslike. In one word, they know that civil service reform as embodied in the merit system is simply the application to the public service of the plainest principles of common-sense and common honesty. Even its enemies are at heart recognizing its virtues.

This has become so widely understood by people of all classes in all parts of the country, that the propagation of correct knowledge of the objects and the means of civil service reform is becoming from day to day an easier task to the advocates of the merit system. Their foremost duty is now to baffle the efforts of the opposing forces, which, seeing the futility of attacking civil service reform on its general merits, strive to cripple or pervert it in the detail of its operation. Those forces consist of the small politicians who covet the offices for their personal advantage, the political leaders who seek to control the offices as party spoil in order to hold together and increase their following, and the unsteady statesmen in power who, while professing, often not without sincerity, to be "also" in favor of civil service reform, have indeed courage enough to assert their professed principles against their party enemies, but not firmness enough to maintain them against their party friends. The combination of these forces is an old one. It is expert in its business, and it will never do to underestimate its strength.

How formidable it may become, we have in these days again had occasion for observing.

But however powerful, it is far from being invincible. We cannot forget that against the same old combination the civil service reform movement has won all its successes, one after another, during periods of time when it was far less intelligently and vigorously supported by the public opinion of the country than it is to-day. While its friends have recently suffered a grievous disappointment, they have no reason for being discouraged. To retrieve the lost ground and to advance their cause further toward the final consummation, they have only to follow their old course with militant courage and constancy; to watch with keen vigilance the happenings in the public concerns; to gauge every measure taken by those in power by the true standard, recognizing gladly every step forward, and permitting nothing to pass that is not genuine; to aid the authorities whenever possible with information and candid counsel; to expose to the public eye the abuses they discover, the correction of which is refused;—in one word, to tell the people the truth without favor and without fear. A resolute and persevering appeal to public opinion, to the good sense and patriotism of such a people as ours, will not be in vain. So good a cause, supported by dauntless devotion, can never fail.

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF WASHINGTON AND LINCOLN¹

It is not mere light-minded hero-worship that moves the American people to celebrate the anniversary of Washington's birth as a National holiday. Preëminent among the monumental figures of the world's history stand the founders of nations; and preëminent among them stands he

¹ An address delivered at the Philadelphia Anti-Imperialistic Conference, Feb. 22, 1900.

whose virtue, fortitude and wisdom are honored by all mankind without a dissenting voice. It may well be said that, however men may differ in their judgment of other heroes, George Washington's character has long ceased to be a subject of debate, the verdict which places him in the first rank among the great citizens in history being universally concordant and final. And when we honor his name we celebrate what is noblest and best and most glorious in our National being.

It is not my purpose to undertake here an elaborate review of his principles, his policies and his achievements. I shall only recall to your memory some of the ideal inspirations of his mind which are of special interest as they bear upon the most important problems of our day—and first his reverential appreciation of the extraordinary favors he thought to have been bestowed by Providence upon the American people.

In his first inaugural address he said: "No people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible hand which conducts the affairs of men more than the people of the United States. Every step by which they have advanced to the character of an independent nation seems to have been distinguished by some token of providential agency." This sentiment, profoundly cherished by him, frequently appears in his writings with remarkable fervor of utterance. And well might he entertain it. I will point out what may well be called three exceptional blessings of Providence vouchsafed to the American people, the first of which Washington witnessed and profoundly valued.

Look back upon the time when our country first rose into view. Europe was in the throes of the bloody and destructive struggles following the Reformation. The efforts for religious freedom seemed rather to hamper than to promote the efforts for the political enfranchisement of peoples. On the European continent modern absolutism

issued from the confusion. Even in England, where a certain measure of political freedom had been won by long contests, and where at last the crown was overthrown by the great rebellion, the Commonwealth quickly degenerated into a military absolutism, which in its turn had to yield to the restoration of the royal power. And when a new revolution resulted in firmly establishing constitutional government, still that government remained preponderantly aristocratic, and the Church continued to be united with the State.

While these troubles were afflicting the peoples of Europe who were painfully staggering under the inherited burdens and shackles of feudal institutions and privileges and customs and traditions, heaped upon them by past centuries, the soil now occupied by this great Republic was opened to the best aspirations of a new era. The Englishmen, Germans, Dutch, Frenchmen, Swedes, Celts who sought their fortunes here, found a free field for their activities. No matter whether they came in search of an asylum for their religious beliefs, or in quest of wealth or adventure—no matter whether kings still claimed this new world as theirs, and whether aristocrats or great proprietaries tried to preserve something like feudal authority—all pretensions adverse to political freedom speedily vanished in this atmosphere. Here that freedom had not to struggle through any established institutions or customs inherited from the past. Here the seed of democracy planted itself in virgin soil, to grow and bear fruit without hindrance. Here was, therefore, the natural birthplace of that great charter of human rights and human liberty, the Declaration of Independence, pointing out the goal to be reached, and destined to serve as a guiding star to all mankind. If here the momentous problem of government of, for and by the people is not to be solved, where in the world can it be?

This greatest of all opportunities was the providential favor Washington recognized; and he did not fail to point out the awful responsibility arising from it when he said: "The preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered as deeply, perhaps as finally, staked on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American people." And the manner in which he thought that this our great opportunity should be turned to the benefit of mankind, he forcibly indicated by expressing, in his Farewell Address, his ardent wish

that the happiness of these States, under the auspices of liberty, may be made so complete, by so careful a preservation and so prudent a use of this blessing, as will acquire to them the glory of recommending it to the applause, the affection and the adoption of every nation which is as yet a stranger to it.

And further:

Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all; religion and morality enjoin this conduct, and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened and, at no distant day, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too-novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.

Thus did Washington view the first providential favor bestowed upon this people, and also our duty to spread this blessing among the nations, not by the force of arms, but by the moral power of example.

The second was no less extraordinary, although Washington himself would have been too modest to avow it. It consisted in the fact that the first President of this Republic furnished in himself, by his character, the principles he followed, the motives that inspired him and the

wisdom of his policies, the most perfect model of a republican chief magistrate in the history of the world—a President to whose teachings and example all his successors—indeed, all those wielding public power in this Republic—could with the utmost confidence look for safest guidance. Surely, no other nation has ever been so signally blessed.

The third unique providential favor enjoyed by the American people consists, owing to their geographical situation, in their happy exemption from those embarrassments and dangers by which other nations, being in constant touch with powerful, jealous and possibly hostile neighbors, feel themselves obliged to keep up vast, burdensome and constantly increasing armaments on land and sea. For more than three-quarters of a century—a war of our own making and the period of our civil conflict excepted—the American people have enjoyed the inestimable boon of a substantially unarmed peace in perfect security. Until recently we valued this priceless privilege so heartily and proudly that we looked down with pitying superiority upon the nations of the old world, seeing them grievously burdened with their monstrous military and naval establishments; and we watched with an almost disdainful smile their incessant efforts to increase those burdens in their nervous anxiety lest some rival might get an advantage; until at last one of their mightiest rulers truthfully confessed that the ruinous competition could not much longer go on without fatal consequences. And we were the only great nation on earth securely free from these drag weights and worries.

This is no mere fancy picture. The history of a century bears it out. Excepting the period of our civil war, we had, compared with other great Powers, neither army nor navy. And yet our rights and our honor were safe all over the globe. The greatest sea-power on earth yielded to us far more deference than to any other nation. Why

all this? While a hostile Power wishing to attack us would have had the advantage of greater readiness, it could not strike at a vital point in our continental stronghold. It would have had to count upon a discouragingly long struggle against immense resources and an incalculable staying-power on our side, and during that struggle it would have offered dangerous opportunities to its jealous rivals in the old world. Moreover, it was thought that our Monroe doctrine, looking to the primacy of this Republic in this hemisphere, would keep us from unnecessary meddling with old-world affairs.

Therefore, we could not have a war unless we kicked some foreign nation into it. Even all our wishes concerning Cuba would probably have been conceded by Spain without firing a gun, if we had only waited. In one word, it was the first precept of European statesmanship to remain on good terms with this Republic at almost any cost. And therefore it was that we were secure in the enjoyment of the inestimable blessing of unarmed peace, with the fullest liberty to devote all our social energies to the development of our immense material resources and of our mental and moral capabilities; to the solution of the great problem of popular government given in our charge; and to our glorious mission to promote the cause of liberty and civilization among mankind by the peaceable moral force of our example.

These were the extraordinary providential favors bestowed upon the American people, part of which Washington witnessed, part of which he foresaw and the duties and responsibilities flowing from which he felt so deeply.

What have we done with these blessings? While the conduct of the American democracy has indeed not reached the ideal which was in Washington's mind, and while for this reason it has had its failures, and those failures have had to be dearly paid for, yet remaining until recently sub-

stantially true to the most essential principles upon which it was founded, and especially to Washington's precepts concerning its intercourse with the outside world, the Republic has achieved a measure of development in wealth, greatness and power that has in a like space of time never been equaled by any nation in history.

But now we are told that we have come to a turning-point; that the very power we have won in walking that providential path obliges us to strike out in a different direction; that we must no longer content ourselves with making this vast continent the home of a free, peaceable and happy people, with an honest endeavor to solve on this virgin soil the momentous problem of popular self-government, and with advancing the cause of liberty and civilization among mankind by the moral force of our example, but that we must give up the priceless privilege of unarmed peace; that we must have big fleets and armies in order to play a new part in the affairs of the world; that we must become conquerors to spread our commerce and have far-away possessions and rule foreign peoples as our subjects—no matter what the original design of our Republic and the fundamental principles of our democracy may have been. And when the advocates of this new course are hard pressed in argument, they always resort, as their last refuge, to the plea that Providence has precipitated us into this new course, and that it is vain to resist.

Nobody can be less disposed than I am to pose as a mouthpiece of Providence. But I do maintain that when we speak of something having been so ordained by Providence that no human being could be held responsible for it, we can only mean that the will of man one way or the other could not play a determining part in it. In this sense it may be said that geographic, climatic and other such conditions, which made the building up of a great

democracy on this American soil so natural, were providential; that the rising up of an ideal leader at the beginning of our government was providential; that the peculiar situation of this Republic among the Powers of the earth, enabling it to build up that great democracy in the new world, untroubled by the jealousies and quarrels of other nations, was providential. But can it be maintained that in the same sense the conquest of the Philippines was providential, and that President McKinley was right when he said in Boston, February 16, 1899: "The Philippines were intrusted to our hands by the providence of God; it is a trust we have not sought"? Look at the facts.

Some time before our war with Spain broke out, its possible contingencies were attentively considered by the Administration. Commodore Dewey, commanding our Asiatic squadron, informed himself about the state of the Spanish power in those regions, and weeks before the declaration of war, on March 31, 1898, he reported to our Government that he could destroy the Spanish fleet and reduce the defenses of Manila in a single day, and added: "There is every reason to believe that, with Manila taken, or even blockaded, the rest of the islands would fall either to the insurgents or ourselves."

Dewey was instructed to make his squadron ready for battle, and then, when war was declared, to seek the Spanish fleet and destroy it. All this was done, not by any mysterious dispensation, but by order of the Navy Department. When Spain, after a series of defeats, got ready for peace, the Secretary of the Navy telegraphed to Dewey as follows:

Washington, August 13, 1898: The President desires to receive from you any important information you may have of the Philippines; the desirability of the several islands; the

character of their population; coal and other mineral deposits; their harbor and commercial advantages, and in a naval and commercial sense, which would be the most advantageous, etc.

Thus, it appears that the President was then not yet quite certain how far it would be profitable to us that Providence should impose that "unsought" trust upon us. When he had received information which made him think it would be profitable to have the whole archipelago intrusted to us, he instructed our Peace Commissioners at Paris to insist that Spain should cede us the whole. And after a long and arduous wrestle with the representatives of Spain, as described in Senate document no. 62, our Commissioners at last succeeded in extorting from them the cession of what sovereignty Spain had over all those islands, and they agreed that the United States should pay \$20,000,000 therefor.

Thus the record shows most conclusively that the conquest of the Philippines was not thrust upon the Administration by a mysterious and overruling power, but that it was deliberately planned with a cool calculation of profit, and that if the business so far has not been as successful as expected, it proves only that the calculation was not quite correct. And when now President McKinley tries to make the American people accept his interpretation that the Philippines were simply "intrusted to our hands by the providence of God," and that "it is a trust we have not sought," he has, to say the least, taken liberties with Providence which he may answer for. With the same right Napoleon invading Spain and making one of his brothers king of that country, and Maximilian, made Emperor of Mexico by the bayonets of French invaders, might have piously turned up their eyes, saying that the providence of God had intrusted those countries to their hands, and that it was a trust they had not sought.

Coming from their mouths Mr. McKinley himself would have called such words hypocritical cant, if not blasphemy.

Let us now see in what manner the policy for which the President makes divine Providence responsible was carried out. We made war upon Spain, as our Congress solemnly declared to the American people and to all mankind, for the purpose of liberating the Cuban people from Spanish oppression, declaring that they were, and of right ought to be, free and independent. It was a grand spectacle—a great nation voluntarily undergoing the burdens and horrors of war merely to secure to a foreign population that freedom and independence they were painfully struggling for. It was a purpose so noble in its unselfishness that many persons abroad would not believe in its sincerity, but charged us with some secret selfish design of conquest. At this we were extremely angry.

Then came Dewey's victory in Manila Bay, and with it the temptation testing our sincerity. Dewey invited the chief of the Filipino insurgents, Aguinaldo, to join him and encouraged and aided him with arms and ammunition to organize the revolutionary movement against Spain on a great scale. Aguinaldo did so; he formed an army of about 30,000 men, set up a civil government which, according to the testimony of the imperialist agitator Barrett, who had seen it, compared in its Congress favorably with the Parliament of Japan, and had well constructed and active executive departments, and an internal administration working admirably, as described by gentlemen belonging to the Navy, and vouched for by Admiral Dewey—an army, a civil government and an internal administration infinitely superior to anything of the kind the insurgent Cubans ever had.

The Filipino army went to work fighting the Spaniards most successfully, taking many thousands of them prisoners. In fact, it virtually did the only fighting against the

Spaniards on the Philippine Islands between the time of Dewey's victory on May 1, 1898, and the time of the surrender of Manila on August 12th, and that fighting redounded to the benefit of our forces; for the Filipino army cleared the interior of the country of Spanish troops and cooped up the Spanish garrison of Manila, effectually blockading that city on the land side, while our ships and the American troops that had meanwhile assembled, blockaded it on the sea side, so that the Spaniards in Manila could neither get reinforcements nor withdraw into the interior.

While these services were being rendered by the Filipinos, and their effective coöperation sought and accepted by us, the Filipinos acted as our allies against a common foe. And then when we had taken Manila and assembled a large land force there—did we remember that we had gone to war against Spain with the solemn proclamation that this should be a war of liberation, and not of conquest, and that our Filipino allies were fairly entitled to the full benefit of that pledge? No, not that. President McKinley entered into peace negotiations with the common enemy, Spain—negotiations from which our allies, the Filipinos, who urgently asked to be heard, were carefully shut out, and through his Peace Commissioners President McKinley concluded, behind the backs of our allies, a treaty with Spain, the common enemy, by which he recognized, not that the Philippine Islanders were, and of right ought to be, free and independent, like the Cubans, but that Spain, even after having been actually ousted from that country, was still the rightful sovereign of the Philippine Islanders, so that she could sell them; and he bought them and their country for the sum of \$20,000,000. It was in this singular way that, as President McKinley wishes to have us believe, "the providence of God intrusted to our hands the Philippines—a trust we have not sought."

Thus, in the first place, he contrived to turn the much-vaunted unselfish war of liberation into a vulgar land-grabbing game, and to strip the American people of the unique glory of a most generous act, grand in its unselfishness. Does he think such a breach of faith can be pleasing to the sight of an all-righteous Providence? Or does he imagine he can deceive an omniscient God by the wily plea that the pledge of an unselfish generosity applied only to the western hemisphere, and that the liberating of one people gave us a right to subjugate another?

But more than this. Recognizing the fact that Dewey invited Aguinaldo to the Philippines to help him in his operations by organizing the insurrection against the Spaniards; that the Filipinos did do effectual service as our allies, being permitted to believe that they were fighting for their own independence; that we left them undisturbed in that belief until we had sufficient troops on the spot to need their aid no longer, and until Manila was taken, and that then behind their backs we bought them from defeated Spain to subjugate them as our own subjects, every fairminded man will agree that this was an act of downright perfidy. Does President McKinley think that so treacherous a use of power by the strong to despoil the feeble of their rights can be looked upon with favor by an all-just God?

The excuses given by the President and by his spokesmen for this faithless deed are worthy of the deed itself. They show how far the moral sense of men may be debased by the defense of a bad cause. I have read with care the famous "preliminary report" made by the Philippine Commission "at the request of the President" just before the last November elections; and I must confess that some passages of it have filled me with painful astonishment. That report, for instance, in order to justify what has been done, asserts "that no alliance of any kind was

entered into with Aguinaldo, nor was any promise of independence made to him then or at any other time." I was sorry to see such a statement signed by gentlemen of high standing. Was it worthy of such men to forget that while there was no alliance in form, signed, sealed and delivered, there was coöperation amounting to an alliance in fact, and that this carried with it moral obligations of a class which no man of honor will disregard?

Let us hear the "preliminary report" itself. After having recited how Aguinaldo was brought to the scene of operations on a United States ship at the desire of Dewey "for the purpose of strengthening the United States forces and weakening those of the enemy," the report goes on:

Shortly afterwards the Filipinos began to attack the Spanish. Their numbers were rapidly augmented by the militia who had been given arms by Spain, all of whom revolted and joined the insurgents. Great Filipino successes followed, many Spaniards were taken prisoners, and while the Spanish troops now quietly remained at Manila, the Filipino forces made themselves masters of the entire island, except that city.

Well, according to this very statement of the Commission, did not the Filipinos do for us the business of allies, and very effectively, too? I venture to say that at the time they were regarded as our allies by everybody except those who had already then in their minds the scheme of turning the war of liberation into a land-grabbing game.

But they were also virtually recognized as our allies by our very commanders in a manner which the Commissioners in their preliminary report did not see fit to mention. I do not refer here merely to the often-quoted correspondence between General Anderson and Aguinaldo, in which our General greeted the Filipinos with assurances of friendship and requests for coöperation and assistance

in terms usually addressed by one ally to another. Nor do I refer only to the fact that armed vessels of the Filipinos, flying the flag of the Filipino republic, were plying to and fro and going out on expeditions against various Spanish posts, under the very eyes of our Admiral.

But here is still something more. On July 13, 1898, Admiral Dewey sent the following despatch to the Secretary of the Navy:

Aguinaldo informed me his troops had taken all of Subig Bay except Isla Grande, which they were prevented from taking by the German man-of-war *Irene*. On July 7th sent the *Raleigh* and the *Concord* there; they took the island and about 1300 men with arms and ammunition; no resistance.

Now what became of those 1300 Spanish prisoners? They were turned over to the Filipinos. Only recently those prisoners taken in Subig Bay have been liberated from their captivity in Filipino hands, and it was reported that some of them intended to make a claim against the United States for damages on the plea that before capitulating they had been promised by our Navy officers that they would be permitted to surrender to the American, and not to the Filipino forces, and that they had been turned over to the Filipinos in violation of that promise. No denial has been made of this story, except as to the giving of that pledge.

Now, what did it mean, this turning over by American forces to the Filipinos of Spanish prisoners of war captured in a joint enterprise? What else could it mean than that, whether there was any formal compact of alliance duly signed or not, Aguinaldo with his army was practically recognized as a belligerent ally of good standing? But for this would not the prisoners taken from the common enemy have necessarily been kept under the control of the American forces? Had the Filipinos been considered a

mere half-barbarian band accidentally helping us, and of no substantial right in the premises, how could such a turning over of prisoners to them have been justified?

But let us hear Admiral Dewey himself. In a recent letter answering an inquiry from Senator Lodge as to what pledges were given to Aguinaldo, the Admiral says: "I never treated him as an ally, except to make use of him and the natives to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards." Precisely so. We "used" them practically as allies against the common enemy, profiting from their coöperation as allies. And then, having so used them, we refused them the recognition morally due to an ally. Does not the Admiral "give away" the whole case?

Again, when our Peace Commissioners sat at Paris, the testimony of Rear-Admiral Bradford was taken, and Senator Frye asked him:

Suppose the United States in the progress of that war found the leader of the present Philippine rebellion an exile from his country in Hong Kong, and sent for him and brought him to the islands in an American ship, and then furnished him 4000 or 5000 stands of arms and allowed him to purchase as many more stands of arms in Hong Kong, and accepted his aid in conquering Luzon, what kind of a nation, in the eyes of the world, would we appear to be to surrender Aguinaldo and his insurgents to Spain to be dealt with as they please?

To which Admiral Bradford answered: "We become responsible for all he has done; he is our ally; and we are bound to protect him." Senator Frye forgot to ask the further question, what kind of a nation we would be in the eyes of the world if we bought our allies like a drove of sheep from Spain, the defeated common enemy, to treat them, not as they, but as we, please.

After all this, what fairminded man will deny that to all intents and purposes the Filipinos were our allies; that

they were fairly entitled at our hands to every consideration due from one ally to another; and that when our Administration refused them audience at the peace negotiations which were to decide their fate, and then behind their backs bought them like a herd of cattle from the defeated common enemy, it did a thing so mean in its disloyalty that it is no wonder its sponsors shrink from looking it in the face, but nervously strive to hide its hideousness from their own eyes by covering it up with all sorts of pretexts and sophistries? But, truly, what a pitiable sight is that presented by the respectable signers of the "preliminary report," who argue that because no formal compact of alliance was made—that is, because the Filipinos with their generous confidence in our good faith trusted American honor so imprudently that they neglected to put every stipulation in black and white before going with us into a common fight against the common enemy—they have lost all moral right to be respected and treated by us as allies! Shame, where is thy blush?

The contention of the Commissioners that "no promise of independence was ever made" to the Filipinos is of the same moral grade. Again there is, I admit, no instrument in writing signed by an American in authority. Neither do I care whether our consuls or Admiral Dewey made a formal promise of independence to the Filipinos. That is not the question. The question is whether we gave the Filipinos any reason for believing that, after defeating the common enemy, this Republic would recognize their independence, and whether they were permitted so to believe while they were fighting against the common enemy.

On July 22, 1898, General Anderson reported to the Secretary of War: "Aguinaldo declares dictatorship and martial law all over the islands. The people expect independence." What reason had they to expect that this Republic would recognize their independence? The

best in the world—a reason, too, most honorable to them as well as to the American people. They knew that, when beginning the war against Spain, we had loudly disclaimed all idea of conquest and had declared the Cubans of right entitled to their independence. They knew that in all things which in our eyes gave the Cubans their right and title to independence, the people of the Philippines held the same, if not a superior, title. They would have considered it an insult to the great and magnanimous American Republic to entertain on their part even the slightest suspicion that our professions of unselfish purpose were a mere humbug, and that while liberating one people we were capable of scheming the subjugation of another because we coveted their land. In one word, as ever so many of their proclamations showed, they expected their independence because they believed the American people to be an honest people, and the American Government to be an honest government. And in this belief they acted as our allies against the common enemy.

We permitted them to entertain that belief while so acting. It is true, in Washington the scheme was meanwhile hatched to rob them of their fairly earned independence. Was the Administration at least honest enough then to inform them that their expectation of independence might be disappointed? It was not. Indeed, the Administration did secretly instruct our consuls and commanders not to make any promises to the Filipinos that might embarrass the execution of the treacherous scheme. But the Filipinos themselves were left in their happy confidence so long as their service as our allies was of any value to us. I say, therefore, although there was no written engagement promising them their independence, our solemn proclamation at the beginning of the war that this would be a war of liberation, and not of conquest, and our permitting them to expect their independence accord-

ingly while we accepted their aid as our allies, constituted a promise so complete and morally so binding that it is difficult to understand how any honest man can so forget himself as to question it.

And thus when the Spaniards were thoroughly defeated everywhere, and Manila was taken, and our Filipino allies were of no further practical use to us, the Administration instructed our Peace Commissioners in Paris to obtain from Spain the cession of her sovereignty over the Philippines, not to the people of those islands, but to the United States. Now I shall show, I trust, to the satisfaction of every candid mind, that this proceeding involved on our part the grossest betrayal of our own professed principles, and one of the most glaring self-stultifications ever committed by any Government. When we made war upon Spain for the liberation of Cuba, we could not, and did not, deny that Spain, historically, possessed the sovereignty of Cuba. But we maintained that Spain by her tyrannical and oppressive misgovernment had morally forfeited that sovereignty; that she had ceased to possess it as a matter of right, and that, although the Spanish forces were still in actual occupation of the principal cities and harbors, and of a very large portion of the interior of the island, the people of Cuba, having risen up against Spanish misrule, had won the right of sovereignty for themselves. We therefore solemnly declared in that famous resolution of Congress, not merely that Spain must be driven out of Cuba, but that the people of Cuba "of right ought to be and are free and independent"—that is, that the sovereignty of Spain over Cuba was no longer valid, but of right ought to be possessed, and actually was possessed, by the Cuban people themselves.

How does this bear upon the case of the Philippines? It is a fact, not questioned by anybody, that Spanish sovereignty was historically no better founded in the

Philippines than in Cuba; that Spanish misrule was fully as grievous in the Philippines as in Cuba; that the people of the Philippines had risen against the misrule as the Cubans had; that the case of the Philippines was, therefore, identical with that of Cuba—with this difference, that the Filipinos had achieved much greater military successes, and organized a far better and stronger native government than the Cubans ever had; so that, in the Philippines, the Spaniards had not only, as they had in Cuba, forfeited the moral title to sovereignty, but had actually lost also the exercise and possession of it. The right of the Filipinos to sovereignty over their country was, therefore, according to our own professed principles, even stronger than that of the Cubans.

The Spanish title to sovereignty over the Philippines was thus utterly discredited by ourselves. By word and act we had, in the parallel case of Cuba, maintained that the Spanish title had rightfully passed to the people of the country. And yet that Spanish title so utterly discredited by ourselves we then recognized again as valid, in order to enable Spain to sell our Filipino allies to us. And we bought that title, although we knew full well that Spain had actually lost it all, and could not deliver anything of it; but we bought the sham, in order to steal the substance from the Philippine Islanders, to whom, by our own doctrine, it rightfully belonged. This is the farcical and contemptible predicament in which the action of the Administration has placed the great American Republic.

I am well aware that astute lawyers may find some quirk or quibble to persuade people who wish to be so persuaded that under the law of nations Spain had still a technical title to a sovereignty which she had morally forfeited and practically lost and could not deliver, and that this she could sell, and we could buy. But will such a technicality satisfy our consciences and protect our honor? Most of

us have learned by experience to distinguish between the class of men who in their dealings with their neighbors are governed by an innate moral sense of right and who will never condescend to take an unfair advantage even when the law permits them to do so with impunity—and another class consisting of persons claiming to be respectable, but to whom the question of moral right is of no concern, and who do not scruple at any moral wrong for their own benefit, taking care only not to run foul of the penal code. The first class we call “gentlemen,” and we respect and trust them. The second class we do not—at least, we ought not to—call gentlemen, for we feel like carefully guarding our pockets when we meet them. Let there be no illusion about this. He who uses the technicalities of the law to take a wrongful advantage of his neighbor may keep clear of the penitentiary, but he is not an honest man.

And now I soberly ask you, does not the purchase of that Spanish sovereignty put the American people plainly into that category? How pitiaibly the Administration itself has been at sea as to the origin of our title to sovereignty! On December 21, 1898, in his famous “benevolent assimilation” order, which, in fact, was his declaration of war against the Filipinos, President McKinley said:

The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain on the 10th instant, and as the result of the victories of American arms, the future control, disposition and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. In fulfillment of the right of sovereignty thus acquired,

he ordered immediate military occupation.

That this was not a truthful statement of the case—that is, that we had then acquired no rights by the treaty, which at that time, not yet having been ratified, was of no force; and that we had not acquired the Philippines by conquest, for which we are still fighting—everybody will admit. Why, even the President himself admitted it, for several months later he said in a speech at Pittsburgh:

Until the treaty of peace was ratified [which it was only seven weeks after the issue of the order before quoted], we had no authority beyond Manila city, bay and harbor. Spain was in full possession of the remainder of the archipelago.

This was correct as to the extent of our authority, but it was again strikingly erroneous as to the status of Spain; for, as everybody knows, Spain was not only not “in full possession of the remainder of the archipelago,” but she was not in possession of any part of it. The so-called remainder of the archipelago was possessed, if by anybody, by the people thereof—a notorious fact of which the President of this Republic was strangely unmindful.

At last Mr. Day, late Secretary of State, and chairman of the commission that made the peace treaty, comes to the rescue, and declares in a public letter that we have acquired the Philippines not by conquest—for, says he, “the United States has never undertaken, so far as I know, to wrest from a foreign country lands or possessions simply by right of conquest”—but by purchase, paying \$20,000,000 for them. But he does not say in his letter what everybody knows, that we bought something from Spain which Spain no longer owned, and did not and could not deliver, as we are painfully aware, inasmuch as we have ever since been engaged in killing our late Filipino allies, who defend the rightful title belonging to the people. And finally comes the President, who coolly

observes in his message that the Philippine Islands "belong to us by every title of law and equity."

"Law and equity" forsooth! Consider it from the ethical standpoint, which to honest men is the only true one. What is our position in truth? That of a powerful and rich man who, artfully abusing the confidence of poor and feeble people, robs them of their dues by legal jugglery and force, and then blandly tells his victims that Providence has so ordered it for their good, putting upon him a trust which he has not sought.

And to enforce such a title of sovereignty resting, not upon anything akin to moral right, but at best upon a shrewd legal technicality which in private life every gentleman would despise, we have proceeded to kill thousands upon thousands of men and devastated the homes of thousands upon thousands of innocent people who had never done us any harm and whose only offense consisted in having confidently expected that the generous and liberty-loving Americans would be true to their professed principles, and who, being grievously disappointed in this, still wished to be free and independent. What defense in the world can there be of such an outrage? Aside from shifting the responsibility on Providence, the excuse is brought forth that our soldiers were attacked and had to "defend" the American flag.

Defend the American flag? Let us see. There are certain facts admitted by all. The first shot was not fired by a Filipino, but by an American soldier, killing a Filipino who had not attacked him, but had simply crossed the American line. Some shots were fired in return, and then the firing spread and developed into an extended engagement which evidently was not planned by the Filipinos. Aguinaldo promptly disavowed the collision, and made a fair proposition to stop it. It would thus have been stopped had our commander agreed; but he insisted

upon continuing the fight. General Otis says in his report: "The engagement was one strictly defensive on the part of the insurgents and of vigorous attack by our forces." The only excuse given for his action is that the Filipinos would have wanted to fight if they had been ready, and that they had become "abusive," and "insulting," and "defiant"—terms often freely applied by some Anglo-Saxons to people of other, especially darker, races who presume to think that they have some rights. Thus the plain fact is that our men actually began the slaughter, and that our commander refused to stop it when he might have done so with honor.

But more important is the other fact, also set forth in General Otis's report, that the President had directly provoked a collision with the Filipinos by his notorious order of December 21, 1898—a document so inflammatory in its character that General Otis found it necessary to suppress it and to substitute a proclamation of his own—a scheme which failed, as the President's order became public through a subordinate commander. General Otis knew that the President's order would be taken by the Filipinos as a declaration of war, which in fact it was. No criticism of the President's action can place the responsibility for the Filipino war more conclusively upon the President than this part of General Otis's report. And when, after all this, we hear the President say, as last summer he did say in his speech at Pittsburgh, "the first blow was struck by the insurgents"; and at Fargo, "then it was that the insurgent leader made an attack upon our men, and then our boys let loose"; and in his message, "An attack, evidently prepared in advance, was made all along the American lines"—when we hear him say to the people such things, in the face of such facts, we fairly hold our breath and bow our heads.

After all this we must not be surprised that the im-

perialists are so anxious to make the American people believe that there would have been no fight in the Philippines had there been no speeches made in the United States against the policy of conquest and subjugation, and that the authors of such speeches are therefore traitors giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Has it been forgotten that the Filipinos have more than once risen against Spanish tyranny long before we took any interest in those islands and their people? Does not this show them capable of rising without any such outside encouragement?

But we are told that to rise against the Americans is quite a different thing; that a majority of the Filipinos really are fond of us, and hail American sovereignty as the satisfaction of a long-felt want; and that there are only a few mischievous leaders whose "sinister ambition," as the President calls their desire for freedom and independence, has stirred up disorder, and who would soon have desisted had not the speeches of American anti-imperialists encouraged them. I hardly could trust my eyes when I read in the President's annual message this amazing statement: "I had every reason to believe, and I still believe, that this transfer of sovereignty was in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the great mass of the Filipino people." And this in the face of the fact that we need there for the enforcement of that sovereignty the largest Army this Republic has ever had in active field service, except during our civil war—an Army twice or three times as large as any we had in the Revolutionary war, or in the War of 1812, or in the Mexican war, or in Cuba in the late war—an Army ten times as large as that which is thought necessary to keep order in Cuba now.

Why do we need so tremendous a force? To beat the Filipino army which as our Secretary of War told us, in a speech at Chicago, represented almost too infinitesimally small a portion of the Filipino people to be mathematically

expressed by way of percentage? Or do we need it, as others tell us, to protect the "good Americans" among the Filipino people against the so-called "rebels"? But if, as the President says, "this transfer of sovereignty was in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the great mass of the Filipino people," why do we not put arms into the hands of the great mass to enable it to tackle that small rebellious minority and hand it over to the police? Why not? The reason is simple: Because, as everybody knows, there is too much reason to fear that this great mass of "good Americans" would, upon occasion, turn out to be good Filipinos and eventually use those arms against us.

A few months ago I said in a public address: "We have not a true friend left among the islanders, unless it be some speculators and the Sultan of Sulu; we have managed to turn virtually the whole population into deadly enemies." This statement was hotly impugned by Professor Worcester in a published paper in which he actually named three prominent Filipinos who, he says, are not speculators, but our fast friends; and he adds that "we have many another honest and able American friend among the leading men of the archipelago." With the same assurance, the same Professor Worcester had told us of the splendid success of the local government established under American auspices on the island of Negros, and about the enthusiasm with which the native people had received it. But shortly afterwards came the news of the "treason" of some of the principal native officers, whose "benevolent assimilation" and devotion to the American liberators had been praised so highly. And we have had similar experiences in other places. I doubt whether even Professor Worcester's three elect are quite safe.

Certainly, we may here and there find a Filipino who for some reason attaches his fortune to ours. Napoleon

found some such men in Spain in 1809. The Emperor Maximilian found even a larger number in Mexico. But did that make the great mass of the Spanish people Napoleon's friends, or the Mexican people the friends of the French and the Austrian invaders? By the steady pressure of force we can compel obedience, but not friendship and fidelity. Nor will mere "good government" prove a remedy; for the best government will always be unpopular, if it is foreign government—especially when the imposition of foreign sovereignty has been accomplished by treacherous breaches of faith and bloody terrorism. Sincere acceptance of rule by a foreign race—a race so utterly foreign as ours is to theirs, so foreign in origin, customs, habits, traditions, ways of thinking, and a race withal so imperious, so grasping and so disdainful of all other races it considers inferior—sincere acceptance of such a rule by the great mass of a people is impossible. It is against human nature.

British rule in India has in part been recognized as beneficial. But in spite of some theatrical demonstrations of loyalty we hear of, Great Britain would not to-day with any confidence leave the maintenance of the Indian Empire to the fidelity of the native population. The British heart secretly trembles at the thought of what would come if a torch were thrown into that mass of Indian combustibles. As to the Philippine Islands, our government, whatever otherwise its quality, will always be essentially government by garrison. Those who carried on their struggle for freedom will always remain the heroes of the people, and whatever banquet we as foreign rulers may spread to them, the shade of their betrayed and murdered independence will, like Banquo's ghost, always claim the first seat at the board. If President McKinley really believes that "the transfer of sovereignty was in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the great mass of

the Filipino people," it shows only how hopelessly blind he is to the true nature of the problem.

No, the Filipino people needed no impulse from the outside to encourage their resistance to subjugation by foreign arms. If they had needed such encouragement, they would have first had it from President McKinley himself when he told the world—it was before the snake of imperialistic ambition had bitten his heart—that "annexation by force could not be thought of, because, according to the American code of morals, it would be **CRIMINAL AGGRESSION.**" Nothing truer and nothing severer has been said by anybody in condemnation of his present policy. That, while the fight was going on, the Filipinos were pleased to hear of men in this country opposing their subjugation, was natural enough—just as natural as was the comfort the revolutionary American colonists took in the utterances of Chatham and Burke. But would the American colonists have ceased to struggle if Burke and Chatham had been silent?

And besides, what does it mean that no American citizen should permit himself to denounce a public wrong or to advocate the principles upon which this Republic is founded, lest people who feel themselves betrayed and oppressed find comfort in his words? If the Administration has led us into policies which cannot bear discussion in the light of the Declaration of Independence, of the Constitution of the United States and of the teachings of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, must we bury the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and Washington's and Lincoln's teachings out of sight so that they may not interfere with the ambitions and schemes of our rulers? Is it not rather high time to bury such policies so that the great American Republic may dare to be itself again?

No, the shrewd trick of representing those who labored

to prevent and to stop the Filipino war as responsible for that war will not succeed with an intelligent people. Is there a sane man in the world who believes that there would have been any Filipino war had the President remained true to the solemn pledge that the war against Spain would be a war of liberation, and not of conquest—and mindful of his own affirmation that annexation by force could not be thought of because it would be criminal aggression? Would there have been a Filipino war if the President had inspired the Filipino people with the hope that their rights would be respected as we had promised to respect those of the Cubans, instead of treating our allies as if they were mere interlopers in their own country, who could be bought and sold like dumb animals, and then flinging in their faces that outrageous “benevolent assimilation” order, so insulting and inflammatory a provocation that General Otis, foreseeing with alarm the certain consequences of its issue, anxiously but ineffectually sought to conceal it?

No, there can be no question as to the responsibility for this disgraceful conflict, and all the blood spilled in it. Those who had the power to prevent or stop it by being simply faithful to the principles the American people have hitherto so proudly professed—they will be held forever answerable for this wanton and wicked war by impartial history, and no sanctimonious cant, no cunning sophistry, can disguise their guilt, or save them from that awful judgment.

I am aware that an arraignment like this puts our imperialists very much out of temper, and they impatiently exclaim: “Why say such things while you know that the case is finally settled and your criminations serve only to smirch the good name of the country?” I have this to answer:

First, what I have spoken is the truth. I challenge any

defender of the Administration policy to disprove the correctness of a single one of my statements of fact, or of the conclusions drawn.

Secondly, those have smirched the good name of the country who have done and are doing these nefarious things, not those who denounce them. Nay, the repute of the country would be still more smirched if we permitted the world to believe that such things could be done in the Republic of Washington and Lincoln with the general approval of the people, even without calling forth a voice of protest.

Thirdly, the case is not finally settled, and it will not be finally settled until it be settled aright. A most unscrupulous and crafty "confidence game" has been worked upon the American people. When after Dewey's victory more troops were sent to the Philippines than the war against the Spaniards seemed to require, we were told that criticism was unpatriotic, because the President was best informed, and must be trusted. When the peace negotiations came and it was rumored that the Administration would demand the cession of the Philippines to the United States, we were admonished to hush all unfavorable discussion because it would encourage the Spaniard to obstreperousness in the peace negotiations. When the peace treaty with that cession in it was before the Senate, we were warned that no patriot would oppose the ratification of a treaty of peace, and as to the final disposition of the Philippines, that would rest with Congress. And all the while the President repeated over and over that Congress would have to speak the decisive word. But now, when Congress is to take up the great question, we are told that the whole case is settled, and that any attempt to shake or even to criticize that settlement will be useless and unpatriotic.

Oh, no, gentlemen, this will not do. This artful dodge

has been played long enough, and too long. The President's attempt, while constantly speaking of Congress as the ultimate arbiter, to anticipate the action of Congress, and thus to force its hand by accomplished facts, has advanced to a dangerous stage, but it has, after all, not quite succeeded; and if that spirit of liberty which gave birth to this Republic still lives, it will never succeed. Unless I am much mistaken, the people are still sovereign in this country, and they will not permit any President to purloin that sovereignty from them by a sleight of hand. The people will still have to pronounce the final verdict, and I trust they will do so after a conscientious consideration, not of the mere question of profit, but, what is infinitely more important, of the moral merits of the case. It is, therefore, not only the right, but the duty of every good citizen to form an honest opinion on this momentous subject and to speak out without fear or favor.

The people will find, if they have not found it already, that a great wrong has been done in their name, which, unless it be undone, so far as it can be, will cover them with eternal disgrace. I challenge any one of the President's defenders to point out in the whole history of the world a single act of perfidy committed by a republican government more infamous than that which has been committed by this Administration against our confiding Filipino allies. Show me a single one! You will search for it in vain in all the annals of mankind.

This is strong language, you may say. So it seems. But it is time to call things by their right names, and I am weighing my words. Have the courage to look the facts once more in the face:

We invite the coöperation of the insurgent Filipinos against the common enemy, the Spaniards. As our allies, the Filipinos do valiant and effective service. While we accept and profit from their aid as our allies, we knowingly

permit them to believe that they are fighting for their own independence, and that we are fighting for their independence, too, having solemnly proclaimed to the world that our war against Spain, the common enemy, was to be a war of liberation, and not of conquest. When we have no further use for our Filipino allies, we begin peace negotiations with the common enemy from which our Filipino allies are sternly excluded, and behind their backs we purchase from the common enemy his title of sovereignty over them—a title utterly discredited by ourselves—so that from subjects of Spanish foreign rule they may become subjects of American foreign rule. And when then our late allies insist upon being free and refuse to be bought from the defeated enemy like a herd of cattle, we slaughter them by thousands.

Look at this and consider it soberly. What have you to say? Is “infamy” too strong a word for it? I wish I could find a more scorching one to brand it as it deserves. Why, if anybody did anything like this in private life it would be a queer kind of gentlemen that would admit him to their company. And this is what has been done in the name of the great American Republic—the Republic born of the Declaration of Independence, the Republic of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. Again, I say, Shame, where is thy blush?

And what do we hear in justification of this? Some clergymen tell us that this is one of the ways of spreading abroad Christianity and virtue and superior civilization. Would not these holy men do well to consider what effect the teachings involved in the justification of so criminal an outrage may have upon the Christianity, virtue and superior civilization of their flocks at home?

Then we are told that those islands are rich, and will be a foothold for our Chinese trade, and that therefore we must have them. Indeed, in the soundful sophomoration

of the young Senator from Indiana, recently delivered in the Senate, a picture of the wealth of the Philippine Islands was unrolled gorgeous enough to make the mouth of the most virtuous pirate water. He looked down with the loftiest pity upon every one who would be so blind as not to lay hold of that wealth if he had a chance; and to make sure that our chance should be fully used, he proposed a system of government for the Philippines so absolutely despotic—a despotism so entirely undiluted with any American idea of human rights—that it would more than satisfy the sternest Russian autocrat. No more brutal appeal to sordid greed, no appeal so utterly hostile to the vital principles of our free institutions, expressed in the most high-sounding verbiage of American patriotism, has ever been addressed to our people. If this be the spirit animating the youth of America, then the great American Republic will soon cease to be an encouragement to the progress of political liberty and become a warning example to all the world.

And this is the spirit of imperialism. I am well aware that some imperialists have protested against the cynicism with which others have appealed to sordid motives, and that the Commission has framed a plan to give the Philippine Islanders a share in their government under American sovereignty. But who will deny that if the motive of pecuniary profit were taken out of the imperialist movement, that movement would lose its vital impulse and speedily collapse? When Colonel Denby, the most influential of the Philippine Commissioners, some time ago publicly declared that we wanted the Philippines for our own profit, and not for their good, and that if we found their possession unprofitable we would drop them and let the Filipinos cut each other's throats if they liked—when he said that, was he not only a little more brutally candid than most of his friends? And can any sane man doubt

that, whatever plans of imperial government may be devised, the rule of our race over another which we consider inferior will always be essentially arbitrary and consistently beneficent only when selfish interest permits it?

Listen to the wail of misery and despair coming from the Porto Ricans who were promised liberty and happiness under the American flag! Do not now powerful interests demand a policy which means to them poverty and oppression? Now, was there ever a sound reason why we should have wanted that possession, unless it were to get a naval station which we might easily have had on some other little island without much population? May we not well ask whether it would not be much better for our own comfort, as well as for the Porto Ricans, to let them go free and help them form a confederation of the Antilles with Cuba, Hayti and San Domingo?

And can you be blind to the effects which the tendencies of imperialism are already exercising among ourselves upon the popular mind? Do you not hear the scoffing levity with which the Declaration of Independence and the high ideals of liberty and human rights which so long have been sacred to our people, are made sport of; how the teachings of Washington and Lincoln are derided as antiquated nursery rhymes, and how the Constitution, when it stands in the way of grasping schemes, is lightly brushed aside with the flippant word, that constitutions are made for men and not men for constitutions?

It cannot be repeated too often that there are things which may be done by monarchical or aristocratic governments without making them less strong as monarchies or aristocracies, but which cannot be done by a democracy based upon universal suffrage, without fatally demoralizing it as a democracy; and that one of those things is the arbitrary ruling of foreign populations as subjects. By

the way, England is sometimes quoted as an example and called a democracy. This is a mistake. England is not a democracy, but a monarchy with democratic tendencies, but very powerful and tenacious aristocratic traditions.

What a democracy, based upon universal suffrage, like ours needs most to insure its stability is an element of conservative poise in itself. This can be furnished only by popular faith in the principles underlying the democratic institutions; by popular reverence for high ideals and traditions; by popular respect for constitutional forms and restraints. Take away these conservative and ennobling influences, and the only motive forces left in such a democracy will be greed and passion. I can hardly imagine any kind of government more repellent than a democracy that has ceased to believe in anything, and in which all ambitions are directed towards a selfish use of power.

And in this direction the policy of imperialism is evidently driving us. Have you considered what this means? What will it lead to if our people accept the teaching that all our traditional creeds about liberty and the rights of men are mere sentimental rubbish; that the most solemn professions and pledges may be repudiated if they stand in the way of our ambition; that even such base treachery as has been committed against our late Filipino allies will be justifiable if it profits us; that only old fogies in their dotage talk about legal principles and constitutional restrictions when they obstruct the gratification of our desires; and that might need not be too scrupulous about right? Many of our rich men have become imperialists, believing that the possession of the Philippines, in whatever way acquired, will offer favorable chances of gain to speculative capitalists. Have they thought of it that the doctrine of might, not needing to be scrupulous about right, may be applied not only to the unscrupulous might

of arms and not only to the unscrupulous might of wealth, but also, in a democracy, to the might of numbers becoming unscrupulous? And this is the tendency of imperialism in this democratic republic.

I am by no means blind to the commercial side of the question. I desire the greatest possible commercial expansion, honorably accomplished. And more than once have I argued that all the commercial advantages and naval facilities we can reasonably desire in the Philippines, we might easily have had from the Philippine Islanders if we had faithfully respected their title to independence; and that those advantages would be much more secure with the Filipinos free and friendly than with the Filipinos subjugated and hostile. This argument has never been answered. It never will be. How criminally wanton is it to seek those commercial advantages needlessly at the price of crying injustice to others and fatal demoralization among ourselves—a price we should never pay for anything!

But now I am asked, admitting all this to be true: What can we do, after having gone so far? The case is simple. Indeed, we cannot wake up the dead whose innocent blood has been spilled. We cannot altogether expunge the disgraceful page of history that has been written. But the American people can rise up and declare that the great wrong attempted by misguided men in power in the name of the Republic shall not be consummated; that as we solemnly promised at the beginning of our Spanish war, that war shall stand in history as a war of liberation, and not of conquest; that our Government shall recognize the Philippine Islands as free and independent, and that if the present Congress and Executive will not do so, the people will elect a Congress and an Executive who will.

But what will become of the Philippine Islanders if unfit for independent government? Of course, every man

who either himself wishes to keep the Philippines, or who serves the Administration, strenuously insists that the islanders are utterly unable to govern themselves. It is always so. He who seeks to make another man his subject, always maintains that the other is incapable of being a freeman. Thus, as a last resort, the agitators for imperialism are now all busily engaged in abusing the Filipinos and their leader. But here we have Admiral Dewey's emphatic and repeated official statement: "In my opinion, these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races." Has this weighty declaration been invalidated by the subservient talk of others who thought likewise until the desire of the Administration that the Philippine people should not be held capable of independent government became public? Let our Government take the position that the Philippines are to be independent, and Admiral Dewey's original opinion will be promptly and generally accepted as the correct one.

And what of the danger that, if we recognize the independence of the Philippines, some other Power will at once rush in to clutch them? Does any sane man believe that there will be such a danger if this great Republic forbids it? And why should not American diplomacy succeed in bringing the Powers most nearly concerned to an agreement to declare the Philippines neutral territory as Belgium and Switzerland are in Europe? I have often asked this question, and it has never been answered. The President says in his message: "We fling them a golden apple of discord, among the rival Powers, no one of which could permit another to seize them unquestioned." Precisely. No one of them permitting another to seize them, it will be easily feasible to make them all agree to their neutrality, so that none of them shall have them.

These are phantom dangers. Neither have we a right to say that the Philippine people must be held to be incapable of independent government if they cannot form an ideal republic, in which liberty and peace and order and honesty will reign in unclouded sunshine. They may easily be as orderly as Kentucky and as honestly governed as the city of New York. What if they have their troubles and turmoils? They may be like some South American republics, or develop into something like the orderly dictatorship in Mexico. Do we question the title of those countries to their independence? Let us not indeed "scuttle away" from the Philippines, like baffled thieves, but assist and protect them until they stand upon their own feet; and if this is done in perfect good faith, difficulties now deemed ever so formidable will vanish like morning mist.

Besides, it is not the most important question how perfect their government will be. More important is it that their government should be their own, and more important still that the American people should not become unfaithful to the fundamental principles of their democracy; that they should not lose their high ideals of liberty, right and justice, and that they should wash from the escutcheon of the Republic the foul blot with which the great perfidy to our late allies has defiled it.

I entreat you soberly to contemplate the alternative now before us. If we permit the great wrong attempted by the Administration to be consummated, our moral credit with the world will be gone forever. Having started in our Spanish war with the solemn proclamation that this would be a war of liberation and not of conquest, and then having turned that war into one of land-grabbing and self-confessed "criminal aggression," nobody will ever again believe in any profession of virtue or generosity we may put forth. It will be hooted down the world over

as sheer hypocrisy disguising greedy schemes. We shall be guilty of the meanest as well as, in its consequences, the most dangerous iniquity a nation can commit—the betrayal of an ally. There is nothing so perfidious that thenceforth we shall not be thought capable of, and other nations will prudently take care not to make common cause with us for anything upon a mere assurance of good faith on our part. This is the “glory” we shall have won. Our sister republics in this hemisphere have looked upon the United States as their natural protector, and they were our natural friends. Since we have dishonored our professions of disinterested motive, they will always suspect us of a design to stretch out our rapacious hands also against them. Already they speak of this Republic no longer as their strong and trusty friend, but as the “*peligro del Norte*,” the “danger in the North.” And they will do this so long as we hold any of our conquests. In constant fear of our greed and perfidy, they will, in case of critical complications, be inclined to coalesce even with old-world Powers against us, and we shall have secret or open enemies instead of trustful friends at our very doors. We shall have the Philippines with a population bitterly hating us, and, in case of trouble with some foreign Power, eager to kindle a fire in our rear. We shall, instead of enjoying the inestimable blessing of exemption from the burdens of militarism, be obliged to keep up large and costly armaments to hold down our discontented subjects and to provide for our own security. And more. We shall have a bad conscience. We shall have betrayed the fundamental principles of our democracy, robbed the American people of their high ideals and beliefs, and thus destroyed the conservative element without which a democracy based on universal suffrage cannot long endure.

And all this to gain some commercial advantage and naval facilities which we might have had just as fully, and

much more securely, had we kept good faith with ourselves, with our allies and with the world.

Now contemplate the other side of the alternative. If the American people, even after the monstrous aberrations of their Government, repudiate the policy of criminal aggression and renounce their conquests; if they declare that their profession of unselfish motive and generous purpose in the Spanish war was sincere, and must be maintained at any cost—what then? They will forever put to shame the detractors of the American democracy. They will show that, although the powers of their Government may some time be put to base uses by men of misguided ambition, the American people are honest, and can be counted upon to resist even the strongest of temptations, the intoxication of victory, and to submit even to the mortifying ordeal of a confession of wrong done in their name, in order that right, justice and liberty may prevail. Such an attitude will secure to the American people the confidence of mankind as it has never been enjoyed by any nation in the world's history, and with it the fruits of that confidence. Our democratic institutions will issue from the trial with a luster they never had before. By so splendid a proof of good faith this Republic will achieve a position of unexampled moral grandeur and influence. It will naturally become the trusted umpire between contending states, a peaceable arbiter of the world's quarrels. It will not only be a great world-power by its strength, but the greatest of all existing world-powers by its moral prestige.

It may be asked whether this is not an ideal picture. Well, this is the idealism cherished by George Washington, the soberest and most practical of men. This is what he wished and hoped the Republic of the United States, which he loved so much, would become.

But is there any chance of its accomplishment? Are

not present circumstances rather discouraging? So they appear. But we old anti-slavery men have in our days seen darker situations than this. I remember the period after the compromise of 1850 which was accepted by both political parties as a finality never to be disturbed. The popular conscience concerning slavery seemed absolutely dead. Those who still spoke against slavery were on all sides, by commercialism and by the politician, denounced as bad citizens, incendiaries, traitors to their country. A prediction of a speedy anti-slavery triumph would have sounded like the freak of a madman. But the conscience of the American people was not dead. A new condition soon illumined the question as with a flood of new light. The popular conscience suddenly rose up in its might and did not rest until slavery was wiped out.

Let the imperialists not delude themselves. If the present Congress fails to undo the great wrong that has been done, appeal will be taken to the people. And it will be kept there, and, if need be, renewed year in and year out. It will give you no rest, as the slavery question gave us no rest, until finally settled aright. And—take heed!—the longer the right settlement is delayed, the greater will be its cost. You may call the upholders of the Declaration of Independence and of the Constitution, the followers of Washington's and Lincoln's teachings, "traitors" or "bores"—no matter, they will not give up the belief that the American people are an honest people, and, like the anti-slavery men, they will not cease to appeal to the popular conscience, fully confident that the time will come when on Washington's Birthday we may feel that we are again worthy of him, and that his great monition has not been in vain:

Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all; religion and morality enjoin this

conduct; and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened and, at no distant day, a great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.

FROM WILLIAM JAMES¹

CARQUEIRANNE, FRANCE, March 16, 1900.

I came near sending letters of "bravo" to both you and Mr. Cockran after your Chicago speeches last summer [autumn], but I did n't; but now comes the *Nation* with a brief account of your Philadelphia address, which stirs my heart to overflowing. Thank God that you exist in this crisis! We shall of course be beaten; but your warning that we shall never abandon the fight, no matter how many generations of agitators it takes, is the right kind of talk for McKinley and the people to hear. The instincts of adventure and of mastery, and the pride of not receding, are of course in the way of every honest solution, but in the long run the higher conscience prevails even over these passionate forces. You can go to your grave with the sense of having been, with these speeches of yours, a pivot round which the future is bound to turn. What a rôle our country was born with—what a silver spoon in its mouth, and how it has chucked it away! I think the Administration talk, Dewey's talk, about never having committed ourselves in any way to Aguinaldo—he has, forsooth, no writing in our hand, can call no witness to any promise—is the most incredible, unbelievable, piece of sneak-thief turpitude that any nation ever practised. "Yankee trick," indeed—after this that old sarcastic designation should be embroidered on "Old Glory" and introduced into the Constitution as our chief claim—to conceit.

The Republican party is fattened to kill. Were I at home I should vote for Bryan with both hands. There might in the next following election be a chance for the organizing of a

¹ The philosopher and Harvard professor.

new party. But what a rotten political machinery we have, which makes it possible for two such men as Cleveland and Reid [Thomas B. Reed?] to be now sulking in their tents!

Bless you, Carl Schurz!

Your admiring fellow-citizen.

TO ERVING WINSLOW

16 EAST 64TH ST., NEW YORK, March 28, 1900.

Confidential.

It seems we are looking at the third-ticket question from different points of view.

A third ticket composed of Republicans would in the campaign of 1900 help to defeat McKinley in the same way in which the Palmer ticket helped to defeat Bryan in 1896.

The Palmer ticket enlisted in the campaign of 1896 a great many Democrats and Mugwumps who would not support McKinley directly. It made it easy for many persons to render active service in the campaign who would otherwise not have done so. A considerable number of such persons started out with the intention of voting for Palmer, but at the last moment concluded that it would be more effective to vote for McKinley directly; and they did so after having served in the campaign under the auspices of Palmer. This accounts for the small number of votes Palmer received.

According to this experience I see good reason for believing that a third ticket composed of old Republicans would, in the coming campaign, not strengthen McKinley, but weaken him, for the agitation conducted under its auspices would be conducted directly against the policy represented by him. It would make it easier for many persons of influence who dislike the Democratic candidate as much as the original Palmer men disliked McKinley,

to take an active and useful part in the anti-imperialist crusade. It would also open to the anti-imperialist speakers a great many ears which otherwise would be closed to them. I am, therefore, inclined to think that the nomination of such a ticket would tell, on the whole, heavily against McKinley, as the nomination of the Palmer ticket told heavily against Bryan in 1896.

As to the influence likely to be exercised upon the new President by anti-imperialists not belonging to his party, I doubt whether the nomination of a third ticket would under such circumstances make any difference.

DR. ABRAM JACOBI^{*}

About a year ago I passed through an ordeal very like that which my friend, Dr. Jacobi, is enjoying now. I know, therefore, from personal experience what it implies. To find one's self congratulated upon having arrived at an age, which, according to correct notions, marks the terminus of human vitality; to have it complimentarily announced that one is now classed among the ancients, whose right to claim a place on the stage of the present active generation may be considered open to question; to feel one's self still pretty young and capable of activity as well as enjoyment,—as I am sure Dr. Jacobi and I do,—and then to remember that you younger men may smile at us for indulging in such an amiable illusion, while you comfort us with the patronizing remark that we are remarkably well preserved—all this is an entertainment of not altogether unmixed hilarity. And then, also, to be pelted with merciless exposure of all one's virtues and accomplishments and endeavors and achievements—

^{*} Response to the toast, "The Citizen," at a complimentary dinner at Delmonico's, New York City, May 5, 1900, tendered to Dr. Jacobi on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of his birth.

compliments which modesty shrinks from accepting and which politeness to kind friends forbids to decline—well, one appreciates it very highly and with sincere gratitude, to be sure, but it is an experience, to say the least, of complex sensations.

I therefore offer to my friend Jacobi the sincere and profound sympathy of one who knows. I well understand that troubled gaze of his which he fixes abstractedly upon the table-cloth before him or upon the chandeliers above him, while the floods of eulogy are beating relentlessly upon his devoted head. I understand the peculiar dread with which, no doubt, he has seen me get upon my feet—me, a person that has been acquainted with him for fully fifty years—and who, as he is well aware, knows more about him than any one else here present. Still, in one respect he need have no fear. I shall not reveal about him any obnoxious secrets. Do not understand me as meaning that I could if I would. No, I would not if I could, being mindful of the proprieties of the occasion. I am going to tell the simple truth; and that he will have to bear as a brave man with becoming fortitude.

Yes, of Dr. Jacobi's friends assembled here, I am, no doubt, the oldest, probably the oldest in years, and certainly the oldest in friendship—for that friendship can look back upon just a half century of uninterrupted, and, I may add, unclouded duration. It was in the year 1850, in the German University town of Bonn-on-the-Rhine, that we first met. He was then still a student of medicine in regular standing. I was already an exile, but had secretly come back to Germany, engaged in a somewhat adventurous enterprise connected with the revolutionary movements of that period—an enterprise which made it necessary to conceal my whereabouts from those in power, with whom my relations were at the time, to speak within bounds, somewhat strained. I had the best reasons for

desiring to avoid persons whose ill-will or indiscretion might have brought me into touch with the constituted authorities. It was then that a "mutual friend" introduced Jacobi and me to each other during a dark night in an out-of-the-way little garden house, having described him to me as a young man who could be absolutely depended upon in every respect and under all circumstances. And as the man who can be depended upon in every respect and under all circumstances, I have known and loved him ever since; and if we could live together another half century, I should be ready to vouch for him in that sense every day of the year and every hour of the day.

At the period of which I have been speaking our intercourse was very short. We travelled together a day or so—he going to Schleswig-Holstein where, as a budding physician, he expected to do service in the capacity of a volunteer surgeon in the war then going on, and I to the field of my operations. Several years later we met again in the city of New York. He had in the meantime suffered in our native country long imprisonment for his active and self-sacrificing desire to make the people free and happy; and then he sought and found a new home in this great Republic in which, if the people do not create or maintain conditions to make them free and happy, it is their own fault.

I have been asked to speak of Dr. Jacobi as a citizen, and I may say that the manner in which he got into jail in the old country—for I have to admit the fact that he did serve two years in state prisons, whatever you may at the first blush think of it—indicated at that early day very clearly what kind of a citizen he would make in this Republic. He was one of the young men of that period who had conceived certain ideals of right, justice, honor, liberty, popular government—but which they cherished and believed in with the fullest sincerity, and for which they

were ready to work and to suffer, and, if necessary, to die. Theirs was a devotion, too, wholly free from self-seeking ambition—a devotion which found all its aims and aspirations and rewards within itself.

Of that class of young men he was one, struggling with poverty and no end of other discouragements in his laborious effort to become a good physician. He knew well that political activity could not possibly help him in reaching that end, but might rather become a serious obstacle in his path. Neither had he any craving to see his name in the newspapers, or to strike an attitude before the public. But moved by a simple sense of duty to his fellow-men, he associated himself, and unostentatiously coöperated with others in advocating and propagating the principles which formed his political creed. His convictions might have been honestly modified or changed by super-study, or larger experience, but they would not yield an inch to the reductions of fortunes, or to the frowns or favors of power. And as nothing could prevail upon him to renounce or even equivocate about the faith he honestly held, he went to jail for it, suffering his martyrdom with that inflexible and, at the same time, modest fortitude which is the touchstone of true manhood. Thus to have served a term in prison was with him a mark of fidelity to his conception of his duty as a citizen.

And that has been the type of his citizenship ever since. To be sure, the danger of being clapped into jail for the assertion or propagation of one's opinions is not very great in this Republic—at least, not yet. But we often hear it said—and, I fear, not without reason—that in our democracy as well as in others, public opinion—a term which is not seldom used to dignify a widespread prejudice, or an unreasoning craze—exercises a tyrannical sway, and that there are many people whose dread of becoming unpopular, or of incurring the displeasure of the influential elements of

society, yield obedience to that power as readily as if it were a monarch with soldiers and jailers at his heels. Indeed, the moral courage of conviction against adverse currents is the most necessary, but, I apprehend, not the most general of civic virtues.

Those who know our friend here as well as I do will agree with me that he possesses that civic virtue in a rare degree, and may emphatically be called a man never afraid, a man of that grim independence which is bent upon thinking right and doing right, no matter what others may think or do. There has hardly been an earnest effort for the enforcement of correct principles of government, or for the vindication of justice and right, or against evil practices or demoralizing tendencies in our public concerns, since Dr. Jacobi became a citizen of this Republic, that he did not vigorously support in his effective, although quiet and unpretentious way, no matter whether other people liked it or not, or what it might cost him. I need not go into detail and tell of his services as a member of the famous Committee of Seventy, or as a co-worker with the Chamber of Commerce in cholera times, and in various other ways which, although equally, if not even more meritorious, have never come to public notice. Moreover, he was not only animated with a warm enthusiasm for high ideals and the accomplishment of important public objects, but also with that healthy righteous wrath which abhors and attacks not only sin in the abstract, but the sinner in the concrete—a wrath far more wholesome to a democracy like ours than that facile and pliable tolerance which holds that sin is bad, to be sure, but that to disturb a sinner of respectable position would be to indulge in ungenteel personalities.

As in the realm of science he has always been the personification of scientific conscience, so in the realm of civic duty he has always been the personification of civic

conscience, not one of those optimists who always comfort themselves with the belief that everything, however bad, will come right without a struggle; nor one of those pessimists who, whenever anything goes wrong, give up everything as lost, and whine that further effort is useless—but a sturdy patriot who, whatever discouragements there be, never despairs of the Republic, and remains ever ready to do his best and to sacrifice without counting, and to stand in the breach.

In him we see one of the adopted citizens whose peculiar patriotism is not always quite understood and appreciated by our native friends. It may strike some of you as somewhat audacious when I say that the adopted citizen may in a certain sense be a more jealously patriotic American than the native. And yet it is true. The adopted citizen usually preserves a certain sentimental and reverential attachment to the country of his birth. But just because of this many of them are especially anxious to see the country of their adoption, by its virtues and the high character of its achievements, justify their separation from their native land, and enable them to point with just pride to the choice they have made. They may for this very reason, when they see the character of their adopted country put in jeopardy, or its good name in the family of nations endangered, resent this and stand up for the cause of right and of integrity and of honor in their adopted country, with an intensity of feeling even greater than that which ordinarily animates the native.

Neither is it always a mere necessity or an interest that keeps the adopted citizen here. Full of attractions and of opportunity though this country may be, it may happen that material interest or legitimate ambition suggests a return to the native land; and of fidelity to the adopted country, with which such temptations are sometimes resisted, Dr. Jacobi has furnished a striking example.

Any man of science would consider it a high honor to be called to a professor's chair in one of the great universities of Germany. But when, some years ago, Dr. Jacobi received an intimation that such a position in the greatest of them all was open to him, he subdued the pride he might have felt in appearing in the same country, in which he had adorned a political prisoner's cell, now crowned with high distinction, and he promptly resolved that, having cast his lot with this Republic, here he would stay. Surely his title to American citizenship, and to the name of a patriotic American could not be more complete.

I feel now that I ought to stop, out of regard for his feelings; for if I were to say all that I know of him as his old and intimate friend, I might too severely shock his modesty, as he shocked mine on a similar occasion a year ago. But, after all, I find no fault with him for that; for there can hardly be a more wholesome and comfortable institution among men than a firmly established, well regulated, honest and steadfast mutual admiration society. And if by this time you have concluded that my friend Dr. Jacobi and myself have formed such a club of two, and find no end of satisfaction and pleasure in it, I shall not demur. I might even reveal some of the secret details of the comforts of our companionship, and say that frequently, when we had written something for publication or in print, or for delivery in speech, we read it to one another before it came out. You will admit that a friendship which has for many years endured like this can endure anything. To be sure, the ordeal was mitigated by the fact that we not only did not bore one another in that way, but we rather enjoyed it; for we always, reciprocally, found our productions quite excellent, whatever others might think of them. I trust my friend will pardon me for taking unusual liberties with him in such public revelations of private intercourse, for these are

liberties which without offense may be taken by an older man with one so much younger.

To conclude, for fifty years I have loved him and been proud of him as a man of science of whom I know how learned, how conscientious, how indefatigable, how helpful and how justly renowned he is; as a citizen of whom I know how patriotic, how courageous, how unselfish and how public spirited he is; and as a friend whose nobility of heart only those can cherish and esteem as it deserves who know him best. And I can hardly describe how profoundly happy I am to be permitted to take part in this tribute which so many of the best men of the country are here assembled to pay to such genuine, sterling and eminent worth.

TO EDWIN BURRITT SMITH

BOLTON LANDING, LAKE GEORGE, N. Y.,
July 8, 1900.

I received your letter of the 5th with the call for the "Liberty Congress" [at Indianapolis], last night. I think the call is well expressed as it stands.

To judge from what I read in the papers and in my correspondence, and from what I hear in conversation, the action of the Democratic Convention has produced the worst possible impression. The fight about the free-coinage plank in the Committee and the subsequent adoption of it has pushed the silver question into the foreground again and given it much more prominence than it would have had, if the resolution had not been discussed at all. I think if the election were to take place within a week, McKinley would have an overwhelming success. Friends of mine right here, who had reconciled themselves to the support of Bryan on the ground that imperialism could not be defeated in any other way, are now as profoundly disgusted with the Democrats as they were in 1896. I have

no doubt that this feeling is widespread among people who otherwise agree with us on the matter of imperialism.

When I spoke to you about the possible necessity of a third ticket, it was in anticipation of such a state of things. I would now ask you to consider whether it will not be our best policy at the Liberty Congress to strike out boldly for a new party. There is a very widespread feeling that the people have permitted themselves long enough, and too long, to be forced by two rotten old party carcasses to choose between two evils. Is it not possible that this sentiment would give a strong and hearty response to a trumpet call for emancipation from this disgraceful serfdom, and that a new organization so created might not only attract the Republican anti-imperialists from the support of McKinley, but also become strong enough to live? Please think of this, consult about it with your friends in Chicago and inform me of your conclusions. The developments of the campaign may indeed put a new face on things before we meet on August 15th. But at present the situation looks desperate. If it does not improve through the action of other causes, a bold step and a striking appeal such as I have suggested may redeem it.

I enclose a short list of names to whom invitations might be addressed.

TO EDWIN BURRITT SMITH

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y.,
Aug. 7, 1900.

Your letter of the 4th inst. reached me yesterday. Accept my sincere thanks for your words of sympathy. You knew my boy well enough to appreciate how hard the blow was.¹

¹ His son Herbert, the youngest of his four children, born in March, 1876, had died when travelling in England.

I am sorry to say I do not think I shall be able to be at Indianapolis. Let me tell you confidentially that I do not feel myself in a condition fit for appearance in public, or to undergo any strain. I need a little time to build myself up again for the work I shall have to do in the campaign. I think I shall remain in seclusion until after Herbert's burial. This will take place soon after the return of my son Carl from Europe. We expect him Thursday or Friday next week, just the time set for the Indianapolis meeting. I trust my non-appearance there will not be misunderstood by anybody under the circumstances.

Now, as to the "suggestions" for the action of the Liberty Congress. I think they are on the whole judicious, unless you can unite—or substantially unite—the Congress upon the nomination of a third ticket. This, I think, would be the wisest course, for the present as well as for the future—for the present because it would, in my opinion, prevent a great many voters from drifting to McKinley and give us an absolutely aggressive position in the campaign, a thing of which the Administration party is most afraid, as its newspapers show;—for the future, because it will, after the election, furnish a nucleus for a permanent organization which has long been needed—no matter how many or how few votes the third ticket may get. As to the platform, the recent Plaza Hotel meeting presided over by Mr. Osborne furnished a good synopsis.

If it is thought that the Liberty Congress can be substantially united on a third nomination, then it might be practicable to have the members of the meeting of August 14th come into the Liberty Congress. However, the practicability of this will depend upon circumstances, a correct judgment of which can be formed only on the spot.

I know, Mr. Boutwell and Mr. Erving Winslow are

strongly opposed to the third-ticket plan. Mr. Winslow is writing very vivacious letters against it in which he says that most anti-imperialists are determined to vote for Bryan directly. It seems Mr. Winslow will not understand that the third ticket will not prevent any one who wants to vote for Bryan from doing so, while it will be apt to keep a great many people who will not vote for Bryan, from drifting over to McKinley.

Mr. Boutwell thinks that the anti-imperialists will have more influence with Bryan, in case of his election, if he were supported directly without the intervention of a third ticket. As to that influence he would perhaps think differently had he had the experience that some of us have had.

But if the Liberty Congress cannot be substantially united upon an independent nomination, the course suggested by you would seem to me on the whole a wise one—except the advice to vote in case of stress for the *Prohibition* candidate, for very obvious reasons.

Mr. Osborne was here yesterday. He thought that Thomas B. Reed would be the best independent nomination—just as I think. But if he declined to accept, which is almost sure, John B. Henderson for President and Senator Chaffee for Vice-President would be suitable. I think so, too. I shall confer with Henderson very soon.

It seems to me of very great importance that we should have a National Committee and as many local committees as possible under whose auspices we can conduct our campaign.

TO MOORFIELD STOREY

BOLTON LANDING, LAKE GEORGE, N. Y.,
Aug. 11, 1900.

Your letter has just reached me. Bryan's speech is indeed excellent, but we must not forget that he will

publish also a "letter of acceptance" in which, as he has announced, he will discuss "*all* the issues." As to imperialism, he cannot do better than he has done in his speech. As to the other issues he can do, and is not unlikely to do, a great deal of mischief. My opinion as to the desirability of an independent nomination remains the same.

[J. B.] Henderson was here last Thursday and spent a whole day with me. As to the policy of nominating a third ticket, we were quite in accord *after having read Bryan's speech*. I regret to say that owing to the state of his health, which forbids any exertion or excitement, he will probably not be at Indianapolis and will not accept the independent nomination. We went over the list of available men and came to the conclusion that, unless Reed consents to serve, which is improbable, General William Birney of Washington might answer. He is the son of Mr. Birney who was the conscience candidate in the old anti-slavery times, an historical association which might be regarded as of some significance; and Henderson, who knows him well, vouches for him as a man of ability and high character and a good speaker. I have written to Burritt Smith and to Osborne about this.

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I say this^{*} as one who, I need not tell you, wants McKinley defeated as much as anybody. I say it also as an old campaigner who has had a good deal to do with the "doubtful vote" and who thinks that this is the best way to bring about what we wish to accomplish. Our friends should consider that there is a vast difference between a Gold-Democratic third ticket and a third ticket headed by an old Republican and appealing to Republican voters.

Of course, I do not want to dictate. Nor do I wish my

^{*} His reasons for desiring a third ticket. See letter of Aug. 7, 1900.

name to be quoted in the public discussions of the Convention. But if you think it will be of any use in private consultation to communicate *in a confidential* way to others what I have written to you, you are, as we understand one another, at perfect liberty to do so.

I am extremely sorry that I cannot be at Indianapolis. . . .

P. S. Let me add, that as I have written Burritt Smith, the choice between different courses of action which he has submitted to me and will no doubt submit to you, seems to me on the whole judicious, unless the Liberty Congress can be *substantially* united in making an independent nomination, which would seem to me the best course. Otherwise the Osborne people should be encouraged to make that nomination. Nor, if Birney's name is taken into consideration, should a first refusal on his part be at once taken as final. As you will remember, General Palmer in 1896 at last, in spite of his reluctance, permitted himself to be pressed into service.

TO LYMAN J. GAGE¹

BOLTON LANDING, LAKE GEORGE, N. Y.,
Sept. 1, 1900.

The newspapers of August 26th published an interview with you in which you were quoted as saying that

there is no doubt Mr. Bryan (if elected President) could order his Secretary of the Treasury to make payment in silver of all the public debt payable in coin, and for all current disbursements of the Government as well, which amount to from \$1,500,000 to \$1,750,000 per day; and that he would give such an order, too, is very certain, if he is in the same mind that he was in 1896.

¹ An open letter to the Secretary of the Treasury.

You went on to say that although Mr. Bryan "would have great difficulty in doing that at once," owing to the small silver resources of the Government, yet he might accomplish it in time, as the mere announcement of such a purpose "would stop the inflow of gold or at least very largely diminish payments in gold and correspondingly increase payments into the Treasury of silver and silver certificates"; that this would practically put the Government on a silver basis, ruin its credit and bring incalculable disaster upon the business interests of the country.

Having for a great many years taken a deep and somewhat active interest in the establishment of a sound monetary system in the United States, I may without impropriety publicly address to you a few remarks in reply to your public statement. I emphatically deny, Mr. Secretary, that the danger set forth by you in your interviews really exists, and that any President will be able to do what you say might be done, unless the Republican party in control of the Government in both its Legislative and Executive branches prove itself utterly dishonest in its professed purpose to maintain the gold standard.

This denial is not based upon the reasoning of those of your critics who seek to show by figures that a President, desiring ever so much to put the country upon a silver basis, would lack the means for doing so. On the contrary, for argument's sake, I will accept all you say on that point. But you omit to mention a fact of decisive importance.

If the Executive, as you say, possesses the discretion of "paying silver in settlement of all interest on the public debt not specifically payable in gold, and of making its daily disbursements to its creditors in silver," it is owing to a flaw in the currency law passed at the last session of Congress—a law which, as the spokesman of the Republican party promised, was to put the gold standard upon an

impregnable basis. It was suggested at the time by some of its critics that this law was purposely so manipulated by Republican politicians in the Senate as to leave the possibility of the subversion of the gold standard by Executive action open in order to enable the Republicans in the present Presidential campaign to say that the election of a Republican President was absolutely necessary to save the gold standard and to prevent dreadful economic disaster. Whether any such scheme entered into that legislation, I do not assume to determine. Certain it is, however, that this feature of the law is now so used, and that you, Mr. Secretary, actually do so use it for the evident purpose of alarming the business community and the possessing classes generally.

I hardly need to say to you that the spreading of false alarms of this kind is a very questionable and responsible thing for anybody, and especially for a Secretary of the Treasury. And I call your prediction of the possibilities specified by you and of the disasters sure to follow a false alarm for a very simple reason. Whoever may be elected President on November 6th, there will be another session of Congress before he will take office on March 4, 1901. The Republicans will have strong majorities in both houses of that Congress. The Executive, too, will be in their hands. They will, therefore, be able to make such laws as they please. They will thus have full power and ample opportunity before the inauguration of the next President to pass any legislation required to make it utterly impossible for any President to break down the gold standard in the way you, Mr. Secretary, describe in your interview. A simple enactment in two or three lines substantially providing that it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to pay in gold or silver, at the option of the creditor, all kinds of indebtedness of the United States now payable in coin, may be sufficient.

And if there should be another flaw in the present law dangerous to the gold standard in any other way, you, Mr. Secretary, able financier as you are, will surely detect it, and find a legislative remedy and have it ready in the shape of a well-matured bill to be submitted to Congress at the opening of the session. In short, the Republicans, controlling both the Legislative and the Executive branches of the Government, will, next winter, have ample power and opportunity to do what they ought to have done at the last session—to put the currency law in such a shape that the gold standard cannot possibly be shaken by Executive action, no matter who may occupy the Presidential chair—and thus remove, to that extent at least, the basis of our monetary system from the changeful game of party politics.

Do you see any reason for doubting that Congress at its next session will do this? It is quite evident that, if there is any substance at all in your predictions of disaster, the Republicans in Congress cannot refuse to do it without proving that the professed solicitude of the Republican party for the maintenance of the gold standard is arrant hypocrisy. But if there be any wavering, I am convinced public opinion will, in case of necessity, compel them to take the necessary steps.

You will thus have to admit, Mr. Secretary, that when you sounded your note of alarm, you had overlooked the most important fact that you and your party friends, that is, the Republican majority in Congress, led by the Administration of which you form so influential a part, will be able easily and promptly to remedy the defects of the law which you have described as a source of terrible danger, and therefore your note of alarm was, to say the least, a mistaken one. It may suggest itself to you as a matter worthy of grave consideration whether you should not retract what you have said, in fairness to the business

community, which should not be unnecessarily disquieted, especially not by those in authority. I am sure many of your fellow-citizens are anxious to know what you may have to say on this aspect of the situation.

TO LYMAN J. GAGE¹

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y., Sept. 10, 1900.

Sir: The object of my open letter of September 1st was, by offering a means of escape from the dangers pointed out by you, to call public attention to the fact that the present campaign is by no means a repetition of that of 1896, and that the money question now has no right to stand in the way of a fair consideration of other important questions on their own merits. I thank you for the courtesy of your answer, but I must regret that, instead of favorably receiving my well-meant suggestion, it only shows to what lengths partisan zeal will go in the attempt to frighten the people into the belief that only Mr. McKinley's reelection can save them from general ruin, and that no objection to him in any other respect must have any weight with them.

To help on the alarm, you quote from a speech made by me in 1896, showing what disastrous consequences I predicted would be brought on by the election of Mr. Bryan. I believed at the time, and I believe now, that those consequences would have followed had Mr. Bryan been elected then, after a campaign turning wholly upon the financial issue, with no existing law seriously to hamper him, and with majorities in both houses of Congress prospectively at his back. But you know as well as I do that circumstances have essentially changed, and that there is an immense difference between a President so

¹ An open letter to the Secretary of the Treasury.

elected and free to act and a President elected after a campaign run on other issues, with adverse majorities in Congress, and bound hand and foot by a law such as now exists, or as you and your friends in power may still make it. Is it quite ingenuous, is it not doing violence to truth, to quote words uttered under one set of circumstances as applicable to a set of circumstances so essentially different?

To my suggestion that, if the present law is defective, the Republican Congress and Administration would before the inauguration of the next President have ample power and opportunity to prevent the Executive action, with its disastrous consequences, which you so luridly depict, you object that Congress would "probably" find it difficult to use that power owing to possible obstructive tactics of the minority. Whatever those who insist upon the necessity of Mr. McKinley's reelection for the preservation of the gold standard may say, my parliamentary experience teaches me that if you, as Secretary of the Treasury, prepare a simple measure of remedial legislation and have it introduced in Congress on the first day of the session, and the majority presses it with a sincere determination to use all legitimate means to overcome obstructive tactics, the three months of the session will be more than sufficient to put through such a bill.

There will be no trouble about this if the Republican majority is willing to do it. Or do you suspect that it might not be willing, even if such action appeared necessary to save the gold standard? If not willing then the Republicans would be saying to the American people substantially this:

We are the men to maintain the gold standard. Therefore, you must keep us in office and permit us to do whatever else we please, however obnoxious it may be to you. For, if you vote us out, we shall let the gold standard go to perdition even

while able to save it. We have you by the throat and mean to hold you so.

If this be really the spirit of the Republicans in power the people will soon conclude that they are a public danger and a nuisance and ought to be got rid of at any cost. You certainly cannot wish your party to stand in such a light.

I repeat, therefore, that the Republican majority in Congress not only can, but, if only for its own moral salvation, *will* do this thing in case of necessity, and you, Mr. Secretary, then relieved of your partisan campaign service, will, as a good citizen, be one of the first to urge it to be done, if you sincerely think the currency law to be as defective as in your recent threat of disaster you represent it to be.

But do you really think that it is so defective and that the dangers you predicted owing to that defectiveness really threaten? In your letter you say that, since I had accepted "for argument's sake" your statements on these points, "there is no particular difference between us as to what Mr. Bryan, as President, could do under the law or in spite of the law as it now is." You must pardon me for observing, Mr. Secretary, that when you tell the public that I agree with you on those points, you strain the truth rather violently. Accepting a statement "for argument's sake" means that we admit it only as a basis for reasoning, while we may really hold an entirely opposite opinion. And in this case I have, indeed, strong authorities for differing from you, and, curiously enough, among these authorities you, Mr. Secretary, occupy a very prominent place. About July 15th you gave out an interview on the identical points here in question, which has recently been republished, and which stands in strange contrast to the alarm blast sounded a month later. It is worth while to place the two utterances side by side:

Mr. Gage, August 25th.

There is no doubt Mr. Bryan could order his Secretary of the Treasury to make payment in silver of all the public debt payable in coin, and for all current disbursements of the Government as well, which amount to from \$1,500,000 to \$1,750,000 per day.

That he would give such an order, too, is very certain, if he is in the same mind that he was in 1896. . . . He would have great difficulty in doing that at once. The Treasury of the Government at present is very firmly established on a gold standard. Including the reserve of \$150,000,000 held against the legal-tender notes, the Government owns and controls over \$200,000,000 in gold coin and bullion, while it owns and controls only about \$16,000,000 in silver, the rest of the silver being out in circulation among the people, either in the form of silver certificates or silver coin.

But the announcement by the Treasury Department of its purpose to pay silver in settlement of all interest on the public debt not specifically payable in gold, and to

Mr. Gage, July 15th.

I am satisfied that the new law establishes the gold standard beyond assault, unless it is deliberately violated.

. . . It is quite true that the legal-tender quality has not been taken away from the silver and paper money of the United States. It would have been a remarkable and disquieting thing to do. . . . What difference would it make to me if I held some bonds and Mr. Bryan should direct his Secretary of the Treasury to sort out some of his limited stock of silver dollars for the purpose of redeeming the bonds? Would I not immediately deposit the silver in my bank and draw checks against it just as I would if the Secretary had exercised the more rational policy of paying me with a sub-Treasury check? I believe that silver will never drop below par in gold. The crux of the proposition is that adequate measures have been taken by the new law to prevent such a contingency.

. . . It is wholly immaterial whether some Secretary of the Treasury pursues the infantile policy of paying silver dollars upon these bonds

make its daily disbursements to its creditors in silver, would stop the inflow of gold, or at least very largely diminish payments in gold and correspondingly increase payments into the Treasury of silver and silver certificates.

It therefore might be anticipated that, with a good deal of perverse ingenuity, the time would come at no distant day when all the revenues of the Government would be paid to it in silver dollars or silver certificates, and all disbursements made by it will be made in silver dollars or silver certificates.

There would thus be established a circuit of silver out of the Treasury into the hands of the people, from the people into the banks, from the banks into the customhouse and into the hands of the collectors of internal revenue.

The Government then would be practically on a silver basis, would it not?

That would no doubt be accomplished, and the Government, properly speaking, would be on a silver basis.

How would this affect the credit of the Government?

Most disastrously, I have no doubt.

instead of checks, when, as I have shown, all money of the United States is convertible into gold. These are the distinct provisions of the new law, and they cannot fail to maintain the gold standard except by the deliberate violation of the duty imposed by the law upon the Secretary of the Treasury. In the event of Mr. Bryan's election, I think the gold standard would be resolutely maintained so long as the law remained on the statute-book.

You concluded the interview of July 15th by saying that the law might indeed be subjected "to a severe strain from the November day that Mr. Bryan's election were made known until the Treasury was turned over to him on March 4th," and that the present Administration would probably have to "use to the uttermost the powers conferred by the new law to maintain the gold standard," owing to possible apprehensions that might be created among the business community, which, however, does not impugn your previous statements as to the safety of the gold standard under the law as it stands.

Thus it is Mr. Gage who brings against himself the charge of spreading "false alarms." In the one column we hear you as the financier and the conscientious public officer who feels it to be his duty not to excite but to allay unnecessary disquietude. If it be suggested that Mr. Bryan, if elected, might announce his purpose to pay interest on bonds, and the current expenses of the Government in silver, and thereby gradually bring us on the silver basis, the conscientious public officer answers:

Do not excite yourself about this. Even if Mr. Bryan were ever so much so inclined, he would under the law not be able to accomplish this mischief. And if there be a flurry of apprehension in the case of Mr. Bryan's election, always remember that the gold standard will find protection under the law anyhow. Be not unnecessarily frightened, but go quietly about your business.

In the other column we hear the partisan, who, in order to terrify the public for the benefit of his candidate, decries all manner of deviltry and trouble that may happen under the law; who, when a way to strengthen the law is pointed out to him, as I did point it out, lightly puts that aside as impracticable; and who—an almost unheard of thing even in our political warfare—suggests that the possible suc-

cessors of the present President and the present Secretary of the Treasury may intend deliberately to violate the law by the exercise of "perverse ingenuity"—all this to put the people into a panicky mood, and thus to drive them to Mr. McKinley as their only savior from a vague sort of disaster.

Of the same color is the prediction that the sound-money majority in Congress may be wiped out, and that then the gold-standard law will be repealed. You know, Mr. Secretary, that this is no more likely to happen than a heavy snowstorm in July in the latitude of Washington. It is admitted that there will be a sound-money majority in the Senate for at least two years longer. And if in two years the gold standard should appear to be in the slightest danger, is it not absolutely certain that then the same forces that carried the election of 1896 would be on hand to elect a sound-money House of Representatives? There can be no doubt of this.

No candid person can have watched recent political developments without concluding that even a Democratic House of Representatives, elected under the influence of the present public sentiment, would always have sound-money Democrats enough in it to prevent a subversion of the gold standard. You need only observe the present condition of the Democratic party to become convinced that the silver movement has lost its vitality, and that the talk about silver now is a mere rattling with dry bones, kept up on one side to have an appearance of consistency, and on the other to frighten people into forgetting all other questions and voting for Mr. McKinley. And this, Mr. Secretary, is the task you are now performing. It is an attempt so to terrorize the American people with a threat of business disaster that they may be deterred from considering any other question, and from casting a vote which would amount to a condemnation of Mr. McKin-

ley's imperialistic policy. I, for one, refuse to be so terrorized. I am certainly as anxious to maintain the gold standard as you are. I say this as one who, during more than a quarter of a century, has made the advocacy of a sound monetary system one of the principal parts of his public activity; who looks back upon that feature of his work with especial satisfaction, and who, if he has somewhat, however little, contributed to the accomplishment of good results, would not lightly expose those results to jeopardy. But I am convinced that the battle for sound money is substantially won, and that whatever apparent danger to the gold standard may still arise, it must and can be overcome without the people subjecting themselves to a moral thralldom keeping them from independent and conscientious action upon other public questions of equal, and even superior, importance. And I may assure you, Mr. Secretary, that there are such questions with regard to which many American citizens have very strong convictions of duty.

FOR TRUTH, JUSTICE AND LIBERTY¹

When forty-three years ago, after five years' residence in the country, I became a citizen of this Republic, I took an oath to support the Constitution of the United States. I understood that oath to mean that I would remain faithful to those principles of free government which are laid down in the Declaration of Independence and form the vital spirit of the fundamental law of our democracy. I was happy to feel that my sworn duty as an American citizen was in perfect harmony with my own cherished ideals of civil liberty, right and justice, and I have endeavored to keep my oath to the best of my knowledge and

¹ Address delivered at Cooper Union, New York City, Sept. 28, 1900, in opposition to the reelection of President McKinley.

ability. Determined to keep it loyally to the end of my days, I stand here now to defend those principles against an attack even more crafty and dangerous than that which in times gone by was made upon them by the power of domestic slavery, and which was beaten back by the election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency. I mean the attack now made by the policy of imperialism as carried on by the present Administration.

Let me say at the start that I consider the manner in which the imperialistic policy is being commended by some persons to popular approval, the hugest confidence game ever practiced upon a free people. In my whole long life I have never known of such systematic use of distortion of history, hypocritical cant, garbling of documents and false pretense. I am here to speak a word for truth and justice; and in doing so I shall call things by their right names. You will pardon me if those names are not always of the mildest. For I must confess, when I witnessed some of the means employed to lure this great Republic from the path of righteousness, high principle and glorious destiny, my old blood boiled with indignation.

The partisans of the Administration object to the word "imperialism," calling it a mere bugbear having no real existence. They pretend that in extending our sway over Porto Rico and the Philippines we merely continue that sort of territorial expansion which has been practiced by this Republic from its beginning. This is a mere juggle with words amounting to a downright falsification of history.

The truth is that until two years ago this Republic did indeed add to its territory, but never without the intention and well founded expectation that the acquired soil would be occupied by a population of our own or at least homogeneous with our own, and that it would in course of time be formed into regular States of this Union under our

Constitution. It was therefore not mere expansion of our territorial domain to be perpetually ruled by our arbitrary will, but it was essentially an intended, and in the course of time practical, extension of our Constitutional system in entire accord with the fundamental principles of our democracy.

The only apparent exception to this rule was the annexation of Alaska—but that, too, only apparent, not real; for Alaska may be inhabited by a population of our own; and when the development of that territory has sufficiently progressed and its population becomes numerous enough, its claim to full Constitutional statehood will, no doubt, be readily recognized.

Some imperialists pretend that the purchase of Louisiana by Jefferson and the legislation connected with it furnish a precedent fully covering the principles of Mr. McKinley's policy with regard to Porto Rico and the Philippines. This I emphatically deny. Whatever that temporary legislation may have been, is there anybody brazen enough to assert—and this is the essential, the true point—that it was the spirit and intent of Jefferson's act and of the legislation referring to it, to hold the acquired territory perpetually as a vassal dependency outside of our Constitutional system subject to arbitrary rule by the President or Congress? Does anybody dare to deny that it was the understood intent and expectation that the territory of Louisiana would be filled by people substantially our own who would form out of it American States clothed with the full measure of Constitutional rights? Whoever denies this or equivocates about it, only seeks to falsify history, to slander Thomas Jefferson and to deceive the American people.

Nay, so little did the American people, until recently, mean to expand our territory without purposing correspondingly to extend our Constitutional system that, when

San Domingo was offered to us, the offer was rejected by an overwhelming public opinion, mainly because it was believed that that tropical country and its present and prospective inhabitants were not fit to come under our Constitution, while they could not be permanently governed outside of it.

"Expansion," then, in the historical and truly American sense, means the extension of our Constitutional system together with the extension of our territorial area. In this sense we are all expansionists, provided the expansion be honorably effected. And if in the course of events our northern neighbors, a people like our own and practiced in self-government, should express a wish to join this Union—a consummation which our present policy of imperialistic adventure is apt rather to put off than to bring on—we all would welcome them with heart and hand.

But when we annex to this Republic foreign territory, especially territory in the tropics which, owing to climatic conditions, can never be settled by our own or homogeneous people, with the intent and expectation that such territory shall never come into our Constitutional system, but shall as to the civil, political and economic status permanently depend upon the will of our central Government in which they are to have no determining share, those countries thus being vassal provinces, and their people subject populations, that is not mere expansion, in the historic American sense, but that is imperialism. And when such countries are annexed and such populations are subjected by force of arms—by what President McKinley has very properly called "criminal aggression"—it is imperialism in its worst form. Whoever calls this imperialism a mere bugbear is either grossly deceived or a gross deceiver.

Will anybody deny that this applies to our rule over

our so-called dependencies? It is over and over again admitted, by the Porto Rico legislation as well as by the pronouncements of the imperialist spokesmen. It helps the imperialists nothing to say that they intend to give the subject populations as much self-government as may be good for them. For who is to decide how much self-government will be good for them? Not they themselves; not the Constitution, but our arbitrary will. We may give it and we may take it away. This is arbitrary rule, another name for despotism. Nor does it help the imperialists to say that we shall treat our subjects benevolently. A benevolent act is an act of grace, not a recognition of right. Benevolence to others not seldom comes into conflict with benevolence to one's self, and then the result is apt to be very uncertain. However benevolent the intentions of the imperialists may be, the benevolence of their acts is so far painfully felt by its victims. Look at the Philippine Islands, which are flooded with blood and tears. Look at poor Porto Rico, where our soldiers were received with transports of joy and hope, and where, according to trustworthy reports, a large majority of the inhabitants would now in their misery thank God for delivering them from their American liberators and for returning them to the rule of Spain.

Some extra-smart people shout at us: "You talk of imperialism! Nonsense! Where is your Emperor?" Why, what intelligent person does not know that it does not require a personal monarch to make an imperial government? Rome had an imperial government in her Senate long before Cæsar crossed the Rubicon. It may be the rule of a Republic over another people, arbitrary and irresponsible to the governed, and it will be an imperial government in its essence, however you may disguise the fact.

Indeed, disguising the character of imperialism is

cultivated as a fine art by its devotees. President McKinley himself recently furnished an example of this, bold enough to make us gasp. In the speech responding to the announcement of his nomination he said: "To the party of Lincoln has come another supreme opportunity which it has bravely met in the liberation of ten millions of the human race from the yoke of imperialism." There is poetic genius in this sentence.

The "party of Lincoln"? It was Lincoln who said:

Those arguments that are made, that the inferior race are to be treated with as much allowance as they are capable of enjoying; that as much is to be done for them as their condition will allow—what are those arguments? They are the arguments that kings have made for the enslaving of the people in all ages of the world. You will find that all the arguments of kingcraft were always of this class; they always bestrode the necks of the people—not that they wanted to do it, but because the people were better off for being ridden. Turn it whatever way you will, whether it comes from the mouth of a king, as an excuse for enslaving the people of his country, or from the mouths of men of one race as a reason for enslaving the men of another race, it is all the same serpent.

It was Lincoln who said: "Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not themselves, and under a just God cannot long retain it."

The party of Lincoln! If men advocating the arbitrary rule of one people over another on the old despot's plea that such rule is good for the subject, had come to Abraham Lincoln saying that they were his party, it would have required all his good nature to keep him from lifting up his big foot to kick them downstairs.

And what shall we say of President McKinley's assertion that his party has "bravely liberated ten millions of the human race from the yoke of imperialism"? In the

face of the fact that thousands upon thousands of Filipinos have been killed in their struggle against American imperialism, and that our Porto Rican subjects are loudly groaning under the same American imperialism, to say that Mr. McKinley's party has bravely saved those people from the yoke of imperialism is truly a great feat. We may well ask when Mr. McKinley pronounced that sentence, what he may have thought of the intelligence of his countrymen.

Having thus fixed in our minds what imperialism is, let us now see what the pursuit of the imperialistic policy has already done for—or rather with us. It has at once involved us in a war of conquest, of “criminal aggression,” to subjugate a people fighting for their freedom and independence. I am aware that President McKinley in his recent letter of acceptance denies that the war against the Filipinos was a war of conquest. He devotes nearly 10,000 words to the task of persuading us that it is only a war of duty and humanity, and that all that has been done was done “not for aggrandizement, nor for pride of might, nor for trade or commerce, nor for exploitation, but for humanity and civilization.” These are words of unctuous sweetness.

Now listen to this plain tale. When Spain was ready for peace, the Secretary of the Navy telegraphed to Admiral Dewey as follows: “Washington, Aug. 13, 1898: The President desires to receive from you any important information you may have of the Philippines; the desirability of the several islands; the character of their population; coal and other mineral deposits; their harbor and commercial advantages; and in a naval and commercial sense, which would be the most advantageous.” There was nothing about “humanity and civilization” in this. President McKinley was then much more interested to know about “coal and other mineral deposits, and harbor

and commercial advantages." And Dewey, who had previously informed the President that upon close acquaintance he believed the Filipinos far better fitted for self-government than the Cubans, then reported that in a naval and commercial sense, Luzon was the most desirable island, but that there were others worth having. And then President McKinley concluded to take them all.

But, aside from that, how low an opinion of the intelligence of his countrymen must he have to dare to tell them that "not for our aggrandizement, not for trade or commerce, not for exploitation" we are trying to subjugate the Filipinos, while at this very day every nook and corner of the land is fairly ringing with the appeals of the President's spokesmen to coarsest greed of wealth and the most vainglorious pride of might, describing in absurdly gorgeous colors the riches somebody might get on those islands, and the magnificent position as a great world-power their possession will give us!

No, from whatever side we may look at it, this Filipino war was from the beginning, and is, a barefaced, cynical war of conquest in the word's truest sense. How was this war brought about? Here again the President's presentation of the case in his letter of acceptance must be confronted with indisputable historical facts. When Dewey had destroyed the Spanish fleet he brought to Manila Bay on a United States vessel Aguinaldo, the chief of the Filipino insurgents against Spain, whom he had invited to come. Why had Dewey invited that chief? Because, as he telegraphed to the Navy Department, that chief "may render assistance that will be valuable." Under Dewey's eyes and with his aid in the way of arms and ammunition Aguinaldo organized a large army, and he set up a well organized civil government, of which Dewey was duly notified. Who were these Filipinos with Aguinaldo at their head? They were a people

in insurrection against Spanish misrule, just as the Cubans were—only that they were much stronger and far more successful in the field and had a far better organized and more efficient civil government. And what did they do? They valiantly fought against the Spaniards, whom Dewey designated to them as the “common enemy,” defeating them in many engagements and taking many thousands of them prisoners, until the interior of the country was well cleared of the common enemy and the main body of the Spaniards was cooped up in Manila, blockaded by our forces on the sea side and tightly hemmed in by the Filipinos on the land side, so that they could neither receive reinforcements nor escape into the interior. The Spanish commander mentioned this fact as one of the main reasons for the bloodless surrender of Manila. The high value of the services rendered by the Filipino army was officially testified to by several of our most respectable officers.

Now, when the time came for determining the future of the Philippines in the peace treaty with the “common enemy,” our President, having nothing but justice and humanity and civilization in his mind, of course promptly invited the Filipinos, who had rendered such good service against the “common enemy,” to acquaint him with their views and wishes? Any just and benevolent man would have been eager to do this. Alas, our President did not think of it. But when the Filipinos asked to be heard, he at least kindly gave them audience? No, not even that. He coldly turned his back upon them. And then, behind doors tightly shut against our Filipino allies, the President, through his Peace Commission, bargained with the defeated “common enemy,” from whom the Filipinos had wrested the interior of their native land, for the transfer of the Philippine Islanders at \$2 a head from Spanish foreign rule to American foreign rule. And he did this

while he knew that Spain had not only morally forfeited her sovereignty over the Philippines by her misrule, as we had held in the case of Cuba, to the inhabitants of the country, but that Spain had actually lost that sovereignty in the war carried on in great part by the Filipinos, and could not deliver it. Nobody can deny this. It is history.

What? Such a thing was done by the President of this great American Republic, the child of the Declaration of Independence, the champion of liberty and justice in the world, the guiding star of liberty-loving mankind? In the name of this Republic he bought a people like a herd of cattle from a defeated "common enemy," against whom by the side of our flag those people had victoriously fought for their freedom and independence? Yes, he did that very thing, without even listening to them, and he now asks the American people to declare by their solemn votes that it was well done, and that they approve it.

American citizens, I appeal to you in all soberness—what would you have said three years ago, before the imperialistic poison had corrupted your blood—what would you have said if anybody had predicted such a thing as possible? There is not a man among you who would not have declared such a prophet fit for the madhouse.

And how do the President's defenders excuse this atrocity? By saying that we owe the Filipinos no moral consideration that should have kept us from doing it. This excuse is almost, nay fully as mean as the original misdeed itself. The Filipinos were in fact our allies in the war against Spain. They had been called by Dewey to our assistance to do military work, which at the time with the forces we had we could not have done ourselves. They were not a mere little band of barbaric auxiliaries to hover about the flanks of the enemy. They had an

army of 20,000 to 30,000 men, and a well organized civil government effectively ruling a large part of the population and recognized by well-nigh the whole of it. They rendered important service in the field. They corresponded with our commanders on an independent footing. Nay, they were practically recognized by our commanders as allies even to the extent of having thousands of Spanish prisoners, partly taken by our forces, turned over to them. Can practical recognition as allies go further? If they were not our allies, what were they?

The imperialist answer is, that they were not our allies because we never officially called them so; and that therefore we owed them no moral obligation as such. Are those who use such an argument men of self-respect? Are we a nation of gentlemen, and will not every gentleman be ashamed to repudiate a moral obligation upon a mere technicality? What man of honor will deny that if they did us service such as is done by allies, and if we, as we did in the case of the Spanish prisoners, imposed upon them trusts such as are imposed only upon allies, they actually were our allies and fully entitled to respect as such?

But why was their official recognition as allies refused them? Because they claimed their independence. And why should they not claim their independence? Might they not just as rightfully claim their independence as the Cubans claimed theirs? Why not? And here the President's defenders have a curious answer: Because the President thought his officers never promised it to them. As if people in their position had a just claim to their independence only if the President promised it to them! But was their independence really never promised to them? Let us see.

I do not speak of verbal promises said to have been made to them. But they rendered us services as our

allies in the war. We accepted those services and profited by them. We knew that while they rendered the services which we accepted, they confidently believed that in fighting side by side with us they were fighting for their own independence. I am aware it is asserted that the Filipinos never told our Government that they wanted or expected to be independent. But here is the record: On July 15, 1898, Aguinaldo, as chief of the Philippine Republic, officially informed Admiral Dewey that "the revolution having taken possession of the various provinces of the archipelago, the revolutionary Government had found it necessary to adopt the form and organization best suited to the popular will"; and he requested the Admiral to transmit to his Government in Washington the provisional constitution of the Philippine Republic, together with his message as President, and a decree in which the following sentences occur: "In the face of the whole world I have proclaimed that the aspiration of my whole life is your independence, because I am convinced that it is also your constant longing, since independence means for us the recovery of lost liberty and admission to the concert of civilized nations." And in another document: "They [the people of the Philippines] are fighting for their independence, firmly convinced that the time has come when they can and must govern themselves." And on July 17, 1898, Admiral Dewey, at Aguinaldo's request, officially forwarded these documents to the Administration in Washington. President McKinley must have forgotten this when he wrote his letter of acceptance. He must also have forgotten that already in June, 1898, the Philippine Republic was formally proclaimed, and that vessels flying its flag were sailing to and fro under the very eyes of our war fleet. At any rate, he fails to mention these facts.

But the President does say that we "never promised"

them independence. Oh, Mr. President, what constitutes a promise in the conscience of an honest man? We invited their coöperation against the common enemy. We accepted the service they rendered and profited from it. We knew that in fighting by our side they thought they were fighting for their own independence. We knew more. We knew that the Filipinos would not have rendered the service from which we profited, had they believed that we would deny them their independence. But then our Government was at least honorable enough, before accepting and profiting from their service, frankly to tell them as any honest man would have done, that they were mistaken in their belief? Oh no, our Government did not honestly tell them so. It left them in their confiding belief and accepted from them what advantage it could get. Do you want proof? As a fair specimen take what General Anderson, who for a time commanded our troops there, tells us in a magazine article signed by him:

A few days thereafter (July 1, 1898) he, Aguinaldo, made an official call with cabinet, staff and a band of music. He asked if we, the North Americans, as he called us, intended to hold the Philippines as dependencies. I said I could not answer that, but that in one hundred and twenty years we had established no colonies. He then made this remarkable statement: "I have studied attentively the Constitution of the United States, and I find in it no authority for colonies, and I have no fear." It may seem [adds General Anderson] that my answer was somewhat evasive; but I was at the time contracting with the Filipinos for horses, carts, fuel and forage.

Can any American having respect for the character of his country hear such a tale without feeling a blush of shame tingle in his cheeks?

When you invite some other person to coöperate with you in a common enterprise; when that other person upon

your invitation does so and renders effective service from which you profit; when you know that the other person in rendering that service believes himself entitled to a certain thing and expects that thing in case of common success; when he tells you that he expects this thing so that you will understand it; when you know that the other person would not render that service if he believed that the thing expected would not be forthcoming; when knowing all this you continue to accept the service in coöperation, leaving the other person in his belief—where is the honest man in the world that would not consider your conduct as a promise morally as binding as if it had been written down and signed, sealed and delivered? And what would you call a man who sought to sneak out of such a moral obligation on the miserable plea that it had not been formally written down and signed and sealed and delivered? What you would call him I leave to your sense of honor; you would certainly regard him as a person obtaining valuables under false pretenses, unfit for the company of gentlemen.

And that is the attitude in which President McKinley has placed this great Republic. Are you Americans proud of your country? Here stands the poor Filipino before you able to say to you: "You have cheated me!" And you must cast down your proud eyes, for you cannot answer Nay. This is one of the things the President's imperialistic policy has done with us.

But the poor Filipino may say something more. He may say: "In order to carry through your cheat you are now slaughtering us." And again we cannot answer Nay. I am aware that the President in his letter of acceptance, trying to revive a long-exploded story, tells us that the Filipinos began the fight—the lamb ferociously assailing the lion. Everybody knows that the first shot was fired by an American soldier, killing a Filipino who crossed the

line on territory which ought not to have been occupied by the Americans, and that General Otis officially reported: "The engagement was one strictly defensive on the part of the insurgents, and of vigorous attack by our forces." This is one of the things which the President also forgot.

But the question of the first shot is not the main one. The main question is who was responsible for the condition of things which made that bloody conflict inevitable? And I maintain that President McKinley was responsible. It was he who by his famous "benevolent assimilation" order of December 21, 1898, officially informed the Philippine Islanders that they would not be permitted to be independent; that the United States were prepared to impose upon them American foreign rule instead of Spanish foreign rule, and that our Army would, if they refused to submit, subject them to that American foreign rule by force of arms. It was an open and rude declaration of war against the Filipinos standing up for their freedom and independence.

Is it not amazing that in order to make the Filipinos appear as a wantonly attacking party, Mr. McKinley should go so far as to say in his letter of acceptance: "The insurgents did not wait for the action of Congress—before the treaty was ratified by the Senate, they attacked the American Army"? How groundless the assertion is that the Filipinos were the first assailants, I have already shown. But who was it that really "did not wait for the action of Congress"? Who was it that took the decisive step "before the treaty was ratified by the Senate"? Not the Filipinos, but President McKinley himself; for it was he who six weeks before the ratification of the treaty by the Senate, without the slightest legal authority and by a barefaced usurpation of power, issued that order which was a declaration of war and a direct

provocation of hostilities and thus precipitated that abominable conflict.

And here we have also a specimen of the candor with which Mr. McKinley in his letter of acceptance tells his countrymen what has happened. Of that fateful order he quotes only one paragraph, full of assurances of his sweet and benevolent intentions as to the welfare of the islanders; but there he stops. He does not tell his confiding countrymen that in other paragraphs he assumed, in pursuance of the treaty concluded, full sovereignty over the whole Philippine archipelago whether the inhabitants liked it or not, and that "the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands became immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor and bay of Manila, is to be extended with all possible despatch to the whole of the ceded territory."

Here we have a most extraordinary performance. President McKinley pretends to give in his letter of acceptance to his countrymen a truthful, candid and complete account of what has happened; and out of the account of one of the most important transactions he leaves out the most important part. Is that good faith?

And what a transaction it was! In the first place, the order was issued six weeks before the treaty of peace was confirmed—that is, six weeks before the United States acquired even a technical title of sovereignty over the islands. The assumption of that sovereignty by the President of his own motion and the order to the Army to enforce it constituted therefore one of the clearest, most barefaced usurpations of power that can be imagined—a usurpation of power striking so flagrantly at the very foundation of Constitutional Government that, if it passes into a ruling precedent, we may well tremble for

the safety of our free institutions. There were times when a President daring to do such a thing would hardly have escaped impeachment.

In the second place, that order was such an insult to the Filipino people, our late allies, so direct a provocation of immediate and violent trouble, that General Otis, fearful of its effect, found himself compelled to assume a most extraordinary responsibility for a military officer—the responsibility of suppressing a proclamation of his chief, and of substituting one of his own. But in spite of the General's precautions, the President's order, his direct declaration of war against the Filipinos standing for freedom and independence, did become public, and soon the bloody conflict was on. And now Mr. McKinley blandly tells his countrymen that the disturbance was all owing to the pestilent Filipinos fiercely assailing a most benevolent and considerate ruler. And in pursuance of his order our Army under President McKinley's direction proceeded to destroy in blood a well-ordered native government, to carry desolation into peaceful and orderly communities recognizing and obeying that government and to kill by the thousands innocent people who had never harmed us, who, on the contrary, had effectively fought as our allies by the side of the Stars and Stripes against the common enemy, and whose only sin was that they wanted to be free and independent, while we coveted their land. And we still go on killing.

I have again and again challenged the imperialists to show me in the whole history of the world a single act of perfidy committed by any republic more infamous than that committed by Mr. McKinley's Administration against our Filipino allies, and I have received no answer but a sickly sneer. Not one of the imperialists has been able to point out in the history of any republic a single act surpassing in treacherous villainy this thing done in the

name of the great Republic sprung from the Declaration of Independence—the Republic of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. Where is the American having the honor of his country truly at heart who will not hang his head in shame and contrite humiliation at this deep disgrace?

And now mark the ingenious reasons President McKinley gives in his letter of acceptance for doing this awful deed. With the air of saying something conclusive, he asks whether his opponents

would not have sent Dewey's fleet to Manila to destroy the Spanish sea-power; and whether they would have withdrawn Dewey's squadron after the destruction of the Spanish fleet; and if so, whither they would have directed it to sail? Where could it have gone? What port in the Orient was opened to it? Do you condemn the expedition under General Merritt to strengthen Dewey in the distant ocean and assist in our triumph over Spain? Was it not our highest duty to strike Spain at every vulnerable point? And was it not our duty to protect the lives and property of those who came within our control by the fortunes of war?

Admitting all this for argument's sake—although there is much to be said about what Dewey might have done—will the President assert that because Dewey could not use some other Oriental port for his convenience, or because Merritt with the land force had to assist in our triumph over Spain, or because it was our duty to protect the lives and property of those who came within our control by the fortunes of war, we had to betray our allies, to destroy the government they had created for themselves, to subjugate them to foreign rule under our sovereignty and to shoot them down because they insisted upon free and independent government like the Cubans, having under the principles proclaimed by ourselves the same right to freedom and independence that the Cubans

had? Is it not evident to the plainest understanding that all the objects mentioned by President McKinley might have easily been attained—indeed, in some respects more easily—if we, according to the fundamental principles upon which our own Republic is based, had recognized that right?

And why did not President McKinley recognize that right of the Philippine Islanders? Because, as he said in his instruction to his Peace Commissioners reported in his letter of acceptance, "We must either hold the Philippine Islands or turn them back to Spain." What? Did no other alternative present itself to his mind? Did it never occur to the President of the American Republic, sprung from the Declaration of Independence, that there was another alternative which should at the very start have suggested itself to a Republican President as the most natural—namely, to let them, according to our own precedent and that of Cuba, have an independent government of their own? Why should it not, just as in the case of Cuba? Can anybody tell?

Indeed, the spectacle of an American President who, when he had to deal with a people striving for freedom and independence and had so successfully thrown off the Spanish yoke, jumped at the conclusion that there was nothing else to do than either to return them to Spanish foreign rule or to subject them to American foreign rule—foreign rule at all events—but that the freedom and independence they had fought for could not at all be thought of—and this after a war we had with proud profession begun for the liberation of the oppressed—the spectacle presented by such an American President would only three years ago have excited the indignation of the whole American people. Who will gainsay this?

In the third place, President McKinley, in his letter of acceptance, has much to say of mysterious "responsi-

bilities" for all sorts of things, and to all sorts of people, which our victory over Spain in the Philippines devolved upon us, and that those "responsibilities" inspired his sense of duty to adopt the course he did. I will not inquire here what kind of responsibilities under the rules of international law such a victory as ours creates for the victor. I will only ask this simple question: Did our victory at Manila create for us responsibilities essentially different from those which were created for us by our victory at Santiago in Cuba? Nobody will pretend that it did. But nobody finds that our Cuban responsibilities make it impossible for us to tolerate and recognize the independence of Cuba. Can anybody tell me why our Philippine responsibilities, which are essentially the same, should oblige us, in law or in morals, to subjugate the Philippines to our sovereignty and to flood those islands with the blood of people who ask for nothing but what we recognize as the right of the Cubans? Is not therefore this solemn responsibility talk as an excuse for our policy of "criminal aggression" the shallowest of false pretenses?

Such are the reasons put forth by Mr. McKinley in his letter of acceptance to justify that betrayal of our Filipino allies which—I deliberately repeat it—has, as an act of cold-blooded, cruel and disgraceful treachery, no parallel in the history of republics.

This is the character of the Filipino war, in which the President wantonly involved us—I say "wantonly," for there is no candid man living who will not admit that had the President instructed our Peace Commissioners to embody in the peace treaty the same provisions with regard to the Philippines as to Cuba, and had he treated the Filipinos accordingly, not a gun would have been fired, and not a drop of blood would have been shed as no blood has been shed in Cuba since her liberation.

And what a war it is, this war carried on to subjugate

or kill our Filipino allies! A war without glory, without enthusiasm, a war for which even those who defend it, have nothing but regret and shamefaced apology. And that war has caused us to keep on foreign soil, under the most noxious climatic influences, breeding disease and death, and under conditions in the most repulsive degree demoralizing, an army more than three times as large as any we had in active field service in the Revolutionary war, in the war of 1812, in the Mexican war or in active operations on the island of Cuba—in short, in any of our wars except our great civil conflict. That war has now lasted more than eighteen months, and no end in sight. The cry is still for more soldiers—100,000 of them, good military authorities say, five times as many as we ever had actively employed in any of our foreign wars; a war costing our taxpayers many scores of millions a year, gradually to mount into the hundreds, besides thousands of American lives and the wreck of the mental and physical as well as the moral health of many more thousands—a war which, the more successful it is, the more it will be demoralizing, disgraceful and dangerous to the American people.

Let me impress it upon your mind. The more successful we are in making the Filipinos our subjects by force of arms, the more will our triumph corrupt our morals, tarnish our honor and undermine our free institutions of government. It is a war not merely against the Filipinos but a war against our own Republic—a war against the principles, the ideals, the beliefs and the conservative influences which hold this democracy together; a war against ourselves as a free people. Never was there a truer word spoken than that of James Russell Lowell—a wise man—when he said that this Republic would endure only so long as it faithfully adhered to the principles of those who had founded it. What he meant was

that, if our people ever ceased to respect and to believe in the high ideals of right, justice and liberty, set up by the Fathers of the Republic and expressed in the Declaration of Independence, our democracy would lose the element of conservative poise necessary for its stability, and the Republic, while perhaps remaining a Republic in name, would not remain one in essence. Without popular reverence for those ideals, without popular belief in those high principles to appeal to, a democracy will inevitably be ruled by greed and selfish ambition, and the powers of the government will be more and more grasped and used to serve the ignoblest impulses and passions of human nature. A democracy working through universal suffrage ruled by such influences and believing in nothing is apt to become the worst government that can be conceived. And nothing can in this respect be more dangerous in its effects upon a democracy like ours than a policy of conquest and of arbitrary rule over vassal provinces and subject populations such as we have now begun.

Imagine what it will lead to if our people are constantly taught, as they now are, that there is a rich country in our grasp which we must have, there being lots of money to be made in it; that the means by which we get it may indeed be somewhat queer, but we must not be foolishly sentimental about that; that we are a masterful race and the inhabitants of that country are a poor lot, and that the strong must not be too squeamish about the rights of the weak; that the Declaration of Independence, with its talk about human equality and "consent of the governed," and all that, is a mere glittering generality and antiquated rubbish; that we have outgrown the Constitution and must not let it stand in the way of quest of wealth; that we have power and must use that power for our profit, it matters little how. Is not this the real gist of the arguments for the imperialistic policy with which the country

is resounding to-day, and do we not all know that if the motive of the greed of power and money were taken out of the imperialistic movement, it would speedily collapse?

Now let the popular mind in this democracy be well saturated with such teachings which shatter all our traditional principles and popular beliefs and ideals of right and justice and liberty—that is, the whole moral basis of our democracy, and substitute for all this the doctrine that might is right—and what will be the consequence? A demoralization of public sentiment more than ever fatal to public justice and eventually to public order and peace; unscrupulous struggles for the possession of power to be used in the exploitation of opportunities without regard to the rights of the defeated—that is, alternating despotisms.

It is often said that an imperialistic policy has long been carried on in England without producing such effects in a very dangerous degree, and that England is a democracy too. This is a grave error. England is not a democracy like ours. England is a monarchy with democratic tendencies, but with very powerful aristocratic institutions and traditions. There is a world of difference between it and a democracy working through universal suffrage. And I cannot repeat too often that a monarchy or an aristocracy can do many things and remain a strong monarchy or aristocracy, which a democracy cannot do and remain a true democracy; and one of those things is to rule other people with substantially arbitrary power. The vital principle of a democracy is self-government of the people. It cannot rule another people without denying the very reason of its being.

It is amazing with what lightness of mind our imperialists scoff at the most fundamental principle of democracy, which is that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." They flippantly talk

as if they had disposed of the whole matter when they show that in some instances in our history the consent of the governed has not been formally asked or obtained. Will they please tell me from what source government does derive its just powers if not from the consent of the governed? From divine right? That is absolutism. From the possession of the strongest fist? That is government by force. From the possession of the greatest wealth, the longest purse? That is plutocracy. From the privilege of birth? That is aristocracy. There remains, then, only the consent of the governed, meaning, as the authors of the Declaration of Independence no doubt intended it to mean, that the people, expressing the will of the majority in a manner prescribed by constitutions or laws made by themselves, shall have the decisive word as to what kind of government they are to have, who is to constitute that government and what that government is to do—a government organically springing from, and responsible to, the governed—or, as Lincoln expressed it, a government of, for and by the people.

That this ideal has not in every respect been realized, we certainly have to admit. But it is also certain that every step toward its realization is a step toward the perfection of democratic government and that every step away from that ideal is a step toward the subversion of democracy. And, surely, no greater and more fateful backward step away from the true principles of democracy has been taken in our times than the new imperialistic policy of the greatest of republics which involves the imposition of its arbitrary rule, foreign rule, by bloody force upon a distant and unwilling people. And still more ominous and deplorable is the fact that this backward step is advocated by the same party which, within our own memory, fought its greatest battle and achieved

its most glorious triumph in vindication of the same fundamental principles of the Republic, which it now tramples upon intoxicated with the lust of wealth and power—one of the most glaring apostasies that history tells us of.

And what have we gained by this apostasy? Not wealth. For all that wonderful material development we can boast of has not been achieved under the new policy, but under the old. The tremendous growth of our population, of our industries, of our commerce, the conquest of foreign markets one after another by our export trade, all this was accomplished while the country still observed the precepts of Washington's Farewell Address, while our "strenuous life" was devoted, not to the killing of men, the sinking of ships and the destruction of towns, but to the employment of the genius and the energies of our people in the pursuits of peace. It was accomplished before we conceived the barbarous notion that we must own the countries we are to trade with. Indeed, since we started on our career of conquest, we have increased only our expenditures by scores upon scores of millions to be paid by our taxpayers, not our foreign commerce on the whole. And as to the countries which were touched by our fleets and armies, only our trade with Cuba has respectably grown; and Cuba is of those countries the only one which we do not pretend to own. The rest of our commercial gain is in the uncertain chances of the future in which we can see only one thing distinctly—and that is that it will surely take the better part of a century to repay to us through the profits of any possible trade with the Philippines anything like the enormous sums which the Filipino war has already cost us. And nothing can on the other hand be more certain—a fact which I have repeatedly, but in vain, challenged the imperialists to deny—than that, if we had treated or did

now treat, the Philippine Islanders as we have promised to treat the Cubans, we would have received from them peaceably, gladly, for the mere asking, all the coaling-stations, all the commercial facilities, all the footholds for our Oriental trade, which we might fairly have desired, and which our sovereignty over the archipelago could ever give us, but then imperiled by the hatred of the subjugated people.

What, then, have we gained? We are told that we have gained a grand position as a world-power. But did we not have a grand position as a world-power, especially since our civil war demonstrated the solidity of this Union—so grand indeed that the strongest and haughtiest sea-power in the world paid more deference to this Republic than to any of its neighbors, even while we had no Army or Navy large enough to count? What more have we now? There are in the outside world two kinds of public opinion concerning this Republic. One is the opinion of those who hate democracy, and who have always wished that this Republic should, and always predicted that it would, break down as a democracy, and become, instead of an encouraging model, a warning example to other peoples striving for free institutions of government. These men are quite satisfied with our recent course. Since we have destroyed the reputation of this Republic as a steadfast friend of peace and as a faithful champion of human rights and justice and liberty in our dealings with other people, these men respect us for our strength and perhaps dread us for our grasping unscrupulousness, but as a seductive example of free institutions and as a missionary and propagator of liberal ideas they fear this Republic no longer. They hail it as a great Power which is in its moral character and influence no better than the rest of them. Have we reason to be proud of that?

There is another kind of public opinion about us abroad.

Ask the men who, themselves believers in liberty and free government, loved this Republic for the principles it held high, for the example with which it encouraged the progress of liberal institutions the world over—ask your James Bryces, your John Morleys and a host of others in all civilized countries, our true friends—ask them what they think and feel about us since it is our loud boast that we have become a great world-power, not by the example of our virtues, but by the warships we can set afloat and the battalions we can put into the field to fight and to subjugate foreign lands and make the world afraid! Their disappointment is most painful and discouraging. To them, our true friends, we are now not nearly as great a world-power as we had been before. Are we proud of that?

Or is their judgment unjust? Consider what has happened. When we started out on the Spanish war, Congress ostentatiously proclaimed that this was not to be a war of conquest but of liberation and humanity. President McKinley solemnly declared that annexation by force could not be thought of because according to our code of morals it would be "criminal aggression." The temptation of victory had hardly presented itself when the war of liberation and humanity was turned into a greedy land-grabbing game and when "criminal aggression" was resorted to in its bloodiest form. Who will after this cynical breach of faith believe any profession of virtuous purpose on our part again? Our detractors the world over point their fingers at us and say with a smile of triumph: "We told you so." Our moral credit with the world is thoroughly ruined; and that is the kind of great world-power imperialism has made of the proud American Republic. Where is our self-respect?

Let us now review in a few words what imperialism has so far really made of us. It has perverted the solemnly

proclaimed war of liberation and humanity into a war of land-grabbing conquest, criminal aggression and subjugation, thus destroying the belief of mankind in the sincerity of our virtuous profession, branding us as a nation of hypocrites and destroying our moral credit with the world. It has seduced us to commit the meanest misdeed a nation can commit—the crafty betrayal of an ally and the wanton slaughter of innocent people. It has made our former friends in the conquered countries hate us with an undying hatred. It has involved us in an unnecessary, wicked and abominable war that has already cost us thousands of American lives and nearly two hundred millions of money, and will cost incalculably more. It has made our President commit a flagrant usurpation of power which, if condoned and permitted to stand as a ruling precedent, will become most dangerous to our free institutions. It has put to contempt and ridicule the fundamental principles of our democracy and is undermining the popular belief in our old ideals of right, justice and liberty, which alone furnish the conservative element indispensable to a democracy working through universal suffrage. It has taught our people that might makes right, and other like lessons, which, unless sternly rebuked, will utterly demoralize public sentiment and transform the political life of our democracy into wild, unscrupulous and, eventually, anarchistic struggles of selfish passions and greedy interests.

It has done something more which is alarmingly characteristic of its tendencies. In this Republic, which should be governed by an intelligent and well-informed public opinion, it has introduced one of the most insidious practices of despotic governments—a censorship of news. That censorship has largely falsified and still more largely concealed from the knowledge of the people the information to which the people are entitled as citizens called

upon to act with intelligent judgment upon their own affairs. This practice of secrecy in the conduct of our Government has gone so far that, for two years, one of the most fateful periods in our history, our people have not been permitted to see, a few items excepted, the most important diplomatic correspondence and the directions to Government agents entrusted with most momentous business. We are now witnessing the strange, the unprecedented, spectacle of the President, as a candidate for reelection, in his letter of acceptance, a partisan campaign paper, drawing upon hidden stores of official knowledge and publishing detached pieces of documents as they may be advantageous to his and his party's interest. He has no reason to complain of the widespread suspicion that, if all those documents were published entire, they might bring unwelcome light—for, as I have shown, his "benevolent assimilation" order, that usurping declaration of war against the Filipinos, standing up for freedom and independence, the whole of which happens to be known, appears in his letter of acceptance in a garbled condition, misleadingly omitting the most important parts. Here we have, I repeat, an attempt at secret government, one of the worst practices of unadulterated despotism. You deny the influence of imperialism on the character of our Government? Here you have an instance.

These are some of the known things imperialism has already done for us. What may be still in store you may conjecture. And what benefit have we to show for it? A shadowy prospect of commercial profit, which, so far as it depends upon our sovereign rule over the dependencies, will redound only to the benefit of a favored few at the heavy expense of the taxpayers; but which so far as the generally useful expansion of our foreign commerce is concerned, might have been, and might still be, fully

obtained without any criminal aggression, without the atrocities of the Filipino war, simply by treating those people as we have promised to treat the Cubans.

And what is the excuse for this policy of wickedness and blunder? That it was the President's duty to act as he did. Let us see. We will charge him with no undue personal responsibilities. But Senator Lodge, in his speech presenting the nomination, said to him: "The peace you had to make alone. Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines, you had to assume alone the responsibility of taking them all from Spain." Well, then. Was it President McKinley's duty to pervert the war of liberation and humanity which had been so solemnly proclaimed by Congress into a war of conquest, land-grabbing and "criminal aggression"? Was it his duty to betray the Filipinos by using them as serviceable allies, then brutally excluding them from the peace negotiations, and then buying them like a flock of sheep from the defeated "common enemy"? Was it his duty to issue his "benevolent assimilation" order weeks before the ratification of the peace treaty by which, committing a flagrant usurpation of power, he declared war against the Filipinos, and thus provoked that bloody and disgraceful conflict? His duty, indeed! A truly republican President, a President after the pattern of Washington and Lincoln, would unerringly have felt it to be his first duty to remain faithful to the fundamental principles of the Republic; to set his face like flint against any influence demanding their violation; to respect the resolutions put forth by Congress as a morally binding direction to make the Spanish war in truth a war of liberation and humanity, and not a war of selfish aggrandizement; and to treat all the populations with which that war brought us into contact, with that justice and good faith with which we wish to be treated ourselves.

This was his real duty, and any deviation from it was an arbitrary, autocratic and unprincipled violation not only of the true republican policy, but of the pledge of unselfish purpose which Congress had so emphatically given to the world. Had he faithfully performed his real duty, he would then have had the almost unanimous acclaim of the American people, and he would also have infinitely better served than by what he has done not only the stability of our democracy and our National honor, but the commercial interests and the material welfare of the country.

What is now, in view of all this, to be done to repair the terrible wrongs that have been committed—the wrongs done to the Porto Ricans by denying them their just rights, and to the Philippine Islanders by basely betraying them and subjugating them with a bloody hand; the wrong done to our own people by violating the vital conservative principles of our Republic and by smirching the National honor, and the wrong done to all mankind by setting a bad example which discourages the belief in the salutary efficacy of democratic institutions? Those who have got the Republic into this frightful and pitiable situation ask with a triumphant smile: “Well, how will you now get out of it?” Common-sense suggests the answer. First let us turn out of power those who got us into it and put into power men who wish to get us out of it. But is it really possible to get out of it? Yes, a thousand times yes! To get out of it will be not only far more honorable, but also far easier and far less costly than to stay in it. Let the American people declare that the slaughter of those demanding freedom and independence must cease; that we will have no vassal provinces or subject populations; that our Government shall in good faith aid them in setting up an independent government of their own and meantime assure them of our protection

against foreign aggression—in one word that they shall be treated simply as we have promised to treat the people of Cuba. Let this be declared and done. This can be done if we will it. Where there is a will there is a way. Let not the will be wanting.

What is there to be said against this? The Administration party pretend that they substantially propose the same thing that is proposed by their opponents—to give the islanders a stable government. But cannot every child see the vital difference between securing to them a stable government under foreign rule, which they are fighting against, and a stable government under their own sovereignty, which they are fighting for?

It is said that "in spite of their mental gifts and domestic virtues," as Mr. Schurman remarks, they are unfit for independent self-government. This is an afterthought brought forward since the Administration resolved that they should not be independent. Before that it was believed, with Admiral Dewey, that the Filipinos were far better fitted for self-government than the Cubans. But now we are told that they are not a people because they are divided into a great many tribes speaking different languages. Do those who say this remember how many independent states actually exist in the world containing different nationalities that speak different languages? Take the example of Mexico. In 1847, when, after our victorious invasion we had that country in our power, some advocates of annexation made the same argument, that the Mexicans were unfitted for independent existence on account of their tribal differences and antagonisms, there being any number of different languages spoken (indeed, more than in the Philippines), and a vast majority of the people being utterly illiterate and ignorant. Well, we left to the Mexicans their independent government, which, to be sure, was for a period

turbulent and disorderly, but has in the course of time become, although by no means ideal, yet peaceable and well regulated, and now occupies a very respectable position in the family of nations. There is as much intelligence and education in the Philippines as in Mexico, if not more. The fact is that, before we attacked them, the Filipinos had the beginnings of a well-organized and effective government of their own, testified to and likened to that of Japan by so ardent an imperialist as Mr. Barrett, late United States Minister to Siam; and that government was recognized and obeyed by a very large part of the people, who lived under it in a peaceable and orderly manner, as testified to by two very respectable navy men, vouched for by Admiral Dewey, who had travelled hundreds of miles through their country. That independent native government we drowned in blood. Had we permitted it to live, the Philippine Islanders would probably have a stable, respectable and efficient independent government now.

It is said that a majority of the Philippine Islanders are now willing to submit to American sovereignty. If true, this would mean that the spirit of a people fighting for freedom had actually been broken by bloody force under the American flag. But is it true? Have we not heard the same story for a year? And has it not been our experience that the Filipinos who were regarded, and even appointed to office, as good American Filipinos one day, were found to be coöperating with Aguinaldo the next, and that all the sweet tales told about their having changed their minds turned out to be flimsy fables? And if you think of all that has happened, can it be otherwise?

It is said that if we withdraw our forces from the Philippines, the Filipinos would at once drop into anarchy, loot their cities and cut one another's throats. What evidence is there to support this slanderous assumption? None.

They have carried on their war humanely, far more humanely than some European troops have carried on their war in China. They have, perhaps a few cases excepted, treated their prisoners kindly. They have had opportunities for looting their cities. What did they do? The Spaniards surrendered to them Iloilo, the second city of the archipelago in commercial importance. General M. P. Miller of our Army was sent before that city to take it. As he himself has publicly stated he "received a letter from the business people of Iloilo, principally foreigners, stating that good order was being maintained, life and property being protected, and requesting him not to attack at present." But soon he did attack to "restore order," and to prevent anarchy; and it was our Army that brought bloodshed and devastation into that community. It sounds almost like a ghastly jest that we should have killed 30,000 of those people for the purpose of preventing them from killing each other. No "anarchy" in the Philippines would shed one-half as much blood as we have already shed. It may be true that the guerilla warfare has brought forth some cruel excesses. All guerilla warfare does. But who caused that irregular guerilla warfare? We did by breaking up their government and regular army.

It is said that if we left the Philippines independent, some foreign power would instantly seize them. In an excess of extraordinary silliness a New York paper charged me with opposing the annexation of those islands in the interest of Germany. Whether the Emperor of Germany did not at one time wish to acquire the Philippines, I do not know. But if we offered him the Philippines to-day with our compliments, he would doubtless ask: "How large an army do you have to employ to subjugate that country?" The answer would be: "At present 60,000 men; we may need 100,000." The Emperor would

smilingly reply: "Thank you. Offer this job to some one who is as foolish as you have been." He would probably be too polite to say so, but he would doubtless think so. Since the stubborn fight of the Filipinos for independence a sensible government would be about as eager to grab that archipelago as a prudent dog would be to grab a porcupine. And all the less if in addition to all this our great Republic tells the world: "Hands off!"

It is said that this sort of protectorate would involve us in enormous responsibilities which it would require a tremendous Army and Navy to sustain. President McKinley is quite pathetic on this point. Why, he seems not to be aware that under the Monroe doctrine we have for more than half a century exercised just that sort of protectorate over our Southern neighbors, simply letting the old world Powers know that while we are not responsible for any internal troubles, or any international obligations of those neighbors, and foreign Powers may enforce such obligations by all proper means, we insist that in doing so they must stop short of infringing on our neighbors' territorial integrity or independence. Has that sort of protectorate ever burdened us with heavy and complicated responsibilities requiring an enormous Army or Navy? And why should the application of the same rule to the Philippines be more burdensome? It is a childish pretense.

It is said that we cannot honorably put Aguinaldo in unrestrained power and turn over to his tender mercies those who have befriended the Americans. And this point, too, Mr. McKinley argues with moving eloquence. But who is there proposing that we should put Aguinaldo and his Tagalogs in unrestrained power, when aiding the islanders in setting up an independent government? Nobody. Do we put Gomez or Cisneros in unrestrained power when aiding the Cubans to construct their inde-

pendent government? We are endeavoring to put the people of Cuba in power, not any particular person. And is there anybody proposing to do anything else in the case of the Philippines? Why does Mr. McKinley find it necessary to conjure up such scarecrows for the purpose of frightening the unwary?

It is said that before all things we must "establish order." What kind of order are we seeking to establish? It is our sovereignty, our arbitrary rule under the name of order, for which we have already killed more human beings than the bloody Spaniards ever killed there in all the insurrections of this century. It is the kind of "order" that Louis Napoleon established in Paris when he shot down those who resisted him in destroying the constitution of the French Republic, and in transforming the Republic into an empire. The speediest and surest way to establish order is to give full assurance to the Philippine Islanders that their right to independence will be recognized. There is no reason for doubting that the fighting will quickly cease and that the Filipinos and our troops will then heartily coöperate in quelling disturbances, if, indeed, any should arise, and that the same conditions of peace and order would prevail there which we now, under the same assurance, witness in Cuba.

Lastly, it is said that if we voluntarily give up the subjugation of the Philippines we shall lose our prestige in the world. Ah, yes! We shall indeed lose our prestige with the land-robbers; our prestige with the oppressors of weak peoples; our prestige with the swashbucklers who are constantly spoiling for a fight; our prestige with the scoffers at democratic institutions; our prestige with the devotees of despotic rule. Yes, with them our prestige will be irretrievably gone. We shall even be in danger of being regarded the world over as an honest people; as a just, generous, noble and liberty-loving people; as a

people of such moral greatness that, in spite of the intoxicating seductiveness of victory, it may be counted on always to listen to its conscience, and to overcome all false pride in repairing a wrong done, and in vindicating its high principles; a people so truthful that its word will always be believed; a people so upright that the Powers of the world will feel instinctively inclined to trust it as the safest general arbiter in the peaceful adjustment of their differences. Here are the two kinds of prestige, one of which we may lose, and the other of which we may win. Americans, proud of your country, which will be your choice?

I have addressed this appeal to you hoping that you will give it candid consideration. Throughout my whole public life I have held it to be my duty to tell my hearers the truth as I understood it, without fear or favor, and I have done so now. It is needless to say that I have not gone into this contest with a light heart. Four years ago I took, with many others who were not partisans, an earnest and active part in the struggle for sound money. It was that cause that commanded my efforts, not the candidate. In fact, I differed with Mr. McKinley's platform and party on several important subjects. I simply regarded them as the lesser evil then; but their conduct of public affairs has been such that I am conscientiously bound to regard and to oppose the cause they at present represent as by far the greater evil now.

As to the money question, my convictions have, of course, not changed in the least. But while the money question was the paramount issue four years ago, we never admitted that it must remain the paramount question always; or that, however important sound money is to the economic interests, as well as to the character of the Nation, there may not be other things of even more vital moment; or that a party representing sound money

may do things ever so obnoxious to good morals or good policy and still rightfully exact our support under all circumstances. In my correspondence with Secretary Gage I have shown, I think, that the dangers to our present monetary system are by no means as threatening now, as zealous partisanship represents them, and that we may freely act upon the question of imperialism without serious peril to our standard of value. I candidly believe so. But I frankly declare that even if the dangers so luridly depicted by the imperialists really existed, my position in the present crisis would be the same.

He would not have been counted a good American patriot who, at the time of the American revolution, had abandoned the cause of liberty and independence on account of the disastrous viciousness of the continental money, or who, during our civil war, had given up the cause of liberty and union because its defense brought on the dangerous issue of irredeemable paper dollars, or other economic perils; or who, at either of those periods had forsaken either of those causes for the reason that the men in position of leadership might hold obnoxious opinions or be inclined to do unwelcome things with regard to other matters. It is still remembered in how little esteem John Adams held the members of the Continental Congress, but how firmly he nevertheless, as a patriot, stood for the cause of his country.

And now a sober, candid and conscientious consideration of the circumstances before us should convince you, as it has profoundly convinced me, that the present crisis is fully as momentous as the revolution which created the Republic, and as the civil war which held it together and purged it of slavery. For now we find ourselves confronted by a powerful attempt, advancing under seductive guises, to fasten upon the country a policy essentially putting in peril the best fruits of the great struggles of the

past; a policy cynically disdainful of the fact that it was the Declaration of Independence, with its proclamation of high principles, that made this Republic a really great and beneficent power in the world; a policy which at the very start broke the moral force of our Republic by mean treachery to its lofty professions; a policy which, beginning with criminal aggression, will need more and more criminal aggression for its sustenance; a policy which, living upon unjust rule by force abroad, will inevitably tend to unjust rule by force at home; a policy which, making sport of the vital principles of our organic law, cannot but run into more and more despotic usurpations; a policy which, utterly demoralizing this democracy working through universal suffrage by the destruction of its ideal beliefs and aspirations, will leave to our children, instead of a free, happy and peaceably powerful commonwealth, a mere sham Republic tossed and torn by wild passions and rapacious ambitions, and bound to sink in disorder, disaster and disgrace. To check this policy in its growth, if possible without delay, I believe to be the very first duty of the American citizen. Whatever it may cost to check it now, that cost will be far less than the cost will become if that policy be permitted to continue.

I cannot agree with some esteemed friends who think that the struggle against imperialism should now be suspended and that those in power should be kept there in order to avoid other troublesome risks. I do, indeed, not believe that, if now baffled, the efforts against imperialism will cease. They certainly will not, as the efforts against slavery, however often baffled, did not cease until their final triumph came through a tremendous crisis which perhaps might have been avoided had they succeeded earlier. But our efforts should not now be suspended, for weighty reasons.

One is this: There is but too much ground for believing

that the party in power is largely controlled by strong and grasping interests trying to exploit the Government for their profit, and inclined to make the American flag, in the characteristic phrase of the famous Cecil Rhodes, "A first-class commercial asset." Such interests have not yet thrown large financial means into our "dependencies" for speculative venture. But if our present rulers be continued in power, speculative moneyed syndicates—extensive settlement of those tropical countries by Americans being out of the question—will be much encouraged to go there relying upon their influence with the Government for the furtherance of their operations. As soon as their money is largely engaged there we shall witness attempts by them to control the Government in its different branches, in comparison with which the influence exercised by railroad and other corporations over State legislatures, which we know from observation, will pale into insignificance. The efforts to break the imperialistic policy will then have to meet a power, the resources and skill of which will immensely increase the difficulties to be overcome.

Another reason is this: We are engaged in the awful business of killing people because they continue to fight for their freedom and independence. This has cost us so far 2732 brave American soldiers, killed in the field or by disease, and 2374 wounded, in the hospitals; in all, 5106 men. They deserve our profound sympathy, especially as they have been sacrificed in such a cause. But we read also such terrible stories as that of more than eighty Filipinos having been indiscriminately shot down because two of our soldiers had been killed in a shop near by, or that of a whole wedding party having been put to death because there were one or two "insurgents" among them. Several similar stories have not been contradicted. Let us hope they may be. But you may remember the reports

in the papers, constantly recurring for many months, of fights in the Philippines in which one or two American soldiers were killed and a few wounded, while the number of Filipinos killed amounted to 100 or 150 or 200, and some villages or towns burned down. The aggregate of the Filipinos killed is computed largely to overrun 30,000, not counting the wounded. Now, no one having the slightest knowledge of war, even guerilla warfare, can fail to understand what all this means. It means the gradual extermination of the weaker party—that weaker party fighting for freedom and independence. This is horrible—doubly horrible considering the way it began. And this, my countrymen, is done under the flag of the great American Republic. I ask you solemnly, can we as a civilized nation postpone the stopping of this dreadful and wanton bloodshed when the American people have the means of stopping it by an act of justice in their hands?

Fellow-citizens, I have given to this matter many days and nights of anxious thought, much troubled by the perplexing alternative before us in the impending election. The more I think of it, the more does every drop of my blood revolt at the monstrous wrong we have done and continue to do; and the more clearly does my reason tell me that the policy of imperialism has brought upon our Republic the greatest peril to the integrity of its free institutions, its peace, its honor and its true greatness, that has ever befallen it; that conscientiously I can never, never consent to uphold that policy by helping to keep in power those who wantonly originated it and are now carrying it on; and that as an honest man and an American patriot I am in duty bound to contribute my humble aid to whatever gives us an assurance, or even only a reasonable hope, of its overthrow. That duty calls on us all aloud. Let us, then, come what may, stand together

with a good conscience and unflinching courage for Truth, Justice and Liberty.

TO EDWARD M. SHEPARD

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y., Oct. 7, 1900.

Many thanks for your kind letter of October 2d about my speech. I am afraid your Republican friend who found my argument unanswerable, but who nevertheless will vote for McKinley to head off Bryan, expressed the feeling of a large multitude.

Mr. Louis Ehrich of Colorado Springs writes me:

In July I endeavored to get Mr. Bryan to make a public declaration to the effect that, if elected, he would take advantage of no loopholes in the present currency law in order to further his financial views; that he desired legislation on this subject only as the result of the conversion of the opinions of the American people, and that until such conversion of sentiment had been unmistakably declared, he would in no wise interfere with the present money standard. At that time Mr. Bryan objected to making such a declaration, principally because he thought it would look like truckling to the Gold Democrats for their votes. I am at the present time again endeavoring to have him make such a public statement. Senator Jones agrees with me in its advisability and so do many others. My own belief is that it would secure many doubtful votes, and that in addition it would greatly help to prevent a panic in the case of Bryan's election.

I fully agree with Mr. Ehrich. In fact, I believe that *just such an explicit statement* is the only thing that can prevent McKinley's reelection. And I do not see why Mr. Bryan should not make it, as it would really only be a declaration—a declaration proper under any circumstances—that he will faithfully execute in letter and spirit the law as it stands.

My private opinion is that, if the election were to take place to-morrow, McKinley would be reëlected by a strong majority. Such a declaration, just as Mr. Ehrich proposes it, and the issue of imperialism resolutely advanced to the foreground again—which Mr. Bryan has strangely neglected—may prevent such a result; but I believe nothing else can.

I see by the papers that you are to preside at the great Bryan meeting in New York. You are thus in a position which may make Mr. Bryan listen to you perhaps more than he otherwise would. And I would entreat you to use your influence as strongly as possible in the direction indicated. It would, however, be much better if Mr. Bryan made such a declaration before coming to New York.

FROM CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

BOSTON, Oct. 20, 1900.

It is now three weeks since you framed the incisive indictment of the McKinley Administration and of "imperialism," contained in your New York address before the Cooper Union. The canvass has since then developed, and the tide now appears to be setting strongly toward President McKinley's reëlection. The whole tone of discussion shows, however, that the great body of those thus drifting do not favor imperialism, nor are they disposed to condone the many and grievous shortcomings of the Administration in other respects. It is with them a question of the "paramount issue," and the choice of evils in dealing with it.

A large number of voters believe, as I myself believe, that serious financial complications may well arise within the next four years not dissimilar to those experienced during the second Cleveland Administration. We apprehend that should such occur it will be in spite of any legislation upon the statute-book, and in that contingency it would be in the power of Mr. Bryan, resolved, as he declares himself to be, to bring the

country if possible to a bimetallic 16-to-1 basis, to accomplish great mischief in a misguided effort to that end, even though he might fail in the attempt.

Time and custom are in our belief more essential to the firm establishment of the gold basis than further statutory enactments. It is not yet rooted, and with the possibilities of the future before us we are most reluctant to see Mr. Bryan, with his well-known views and tenacious disposition, installed in the Presidential chair. However much we may sympathize in the views respecting imperialism you so strongly set forth, we therefore find ourselves as a choice of evils either compelled to vote once more for President McKinley or to stand idle while others elect him.

There is, however, one probable outcome of the present canvass as to which you and we are in perfect unison. It is now obvious—so obvious, indeed, as hardly to be even denied—that the weak point in the Republican line of battle is the control of the next House of Representatives. A very slight if well-directed effort might well cause a House to be elected controlled by an opposition majority. This, even with a reëlected Administration, would, I submit, bring about every practical result the opponents of imperialism have in view.

On the other hand, were Mr. Bryan elected with a small majority in his favor in the House of Representatives—and he could hope for no more—those who feel as I do have not the slightest faith that any thing would be done looking to the abandonment of the policy of the Administration so far as the Philippines are concerned. We have every reason to believe that a large portion of the Democratic party in New York City, in the South and in the mining States, from which Mr. Bryan's chief support must come, are at heart ardent expansionists, and as respects dependencies would abandon nothing.

It would be in the power of this section to check Mr. Bryan exactly as seven years ago Senator Gorman, at the head of a similar Democratic faction, checked and set at naught the efforts of President Cleveland on the tariff issue. Even should Mr. Bryan be elected it therefore seems to us almost inevitable

that nothing will be done to undo what has now been partially accomplished.

But should President McKinley be reëlected, with an opposition majority in the House of Representatives, that opposition majority could most assuredly be counted upon to act as an opposition majority always does act, in direct hostility to the Administration. Imperialism would then become a party issue.

Moreover, it appears to me, as it does to many others, that, in case of the reëlection of President McKinley, an opposition House of Representatives would, from almost every point of view, be a National safeguard. It would place a most salutary check on the proposed permanent increase of the Army; it would put a shipping subsidy bill out of the question; it would exercise a close and critical supervision over every act of the Administration; it would bring to light the misdeeds and abuses incident to the system of dependencies now carefully hidden from notice; it would at once consolidate and educate an opposition; finally, it would make it impossible for the Administration even for a moment to assert that its policy during the last four years had been approved by the country.

On the other hand, the defeat of Mr. Bryan will close the silver debate. His party this year most reluctantly accepted the issue of "16-to-1," and the overthrow at the polls of its exponent would finally extinguish that heresy, making of it a laughing stock.

So far as the free-coinage-of-silver question, therefore, is concerned, the election of an opposition House would involve no danger. By unanimous consent, that question would be relegated to the graveyard of issues dead beyond thought of resurrection.

I think it not unreasonable to say that, where one man, who would at any time have voted for the reëlection of President McKinley, could now be induced to vote for Mr. Bryan, at least ten men would see the advantage to be found in an opposition House of Representatives, and could be induced to act accordingly. Large numbers of voters, who will not go to the length of voting for all that "Bryanism" includes and

implies, are very desirous of indicating in some effective way their dissent from "McKinleyism." No way of so doing is equally effective with that now pointed out. It does not seem to me too late for you to exert your great influence toward bringing this result about. An effective thrust at the open joint in the armor of imperialism would prove mortal.

Under these circumstances, I now write in hopes that some course may suggest itself to you, even at this late stage of the canvass, through which the desired turn can be given to men's thoughts and votes. In political as in military strategy it is an elementary principle to concentrate attack on the weak point in the enemy's line.

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

NEW YORK, Oct. 25, 1900.

You are certainly right in believing that we are "in perfect unison" as to the desirability of the election of a House of Representatives in opposition to the Republican Administration should Mr. McKinley be reëlected President; and I sincerely hope every possible effort may be made to that end. But while joining you in the expression of that hope, I cannot share your opinion that the election of an opposition House of Representatives alone would, "with a Republican Administration, bring about every practical result the opponents of imperialism have in view."

As you are aware, the "criminal aggression" policy of the present Administration was originated and has been carried forward by the Executive. Congress only accepts, directly or indirectly, what the Executive presents to it as pretended "accomplished facts." That the President might have had more trouble in pursuing his policy had there been an opposition majority in the House is doubtless true. But we know from experience that a parliamentary opposition cannot always be depended upon sturdily

to maintain its convictions of duty when brought face to face with a situation of a warlike character, and we know also from experience that an Executive not overscrupulous in the choice of means has more than once succeeded, by the employment of its resources of influence, in breaking an opposition not very strong in numbers.

I regret, therefore, not to be able to agree with you in thinking that a small Democratic majority in the House would be more constant in its opposition to imperialism with an imperialist, than with an anti-imperialist, in the Presidency, and that thus the election of an opposition House with a Republican Administration would "bring about every practical result the opponents of imperialism have in view."

You will admit that what you predict as probable to happen in case of Mr. McKinley's defeat is more or less conjectural, as all such predictions are. But we know what has happened, and we can, each one of us for himself, form an opinion as to whether we should do anything apt to be construed as an approval of it, and as an encouragement of a continuance of the same policy. It is indeed said that the reelection of Mr. McKinley cannot be rightly understood as a popular approval of his so-called Philippine policy, because it will be well known that many voters supported him on other grounds, while they strongly condemned that policy.

However that may be, nothing is more certain than that Mr. McKinley's reelection will—wrongfully, to be sure—be represented as a popular verdict and will be so accepted by a large part of the American people. The first man so to take it will be Mr. McKinley himself. Remember the election of 1896. It was well known that the money question, not the tariff question was the paramount issue of that campaign, and that hundreds of thousands of citizens who then supported him were

strongly opposed to his policy of high protection. But the first thing Mr. McKinley's party claimed was that his election was a popular indorsement of his high protective policy, and the first thing Mr. McKinley did was to call an extra session of Congress, not for the purpose of giving the country a sound-money law, but for the purpose of constructing the highest protective tariff we had ever known.

In the same way Mr. McKinley, if reëlected, will claim, and the bulk of his adherents, especially the most reckless and unscrupulous of them, will also claim, that his reelection was a clear popular indorsement of all he had done and an encouragement to go on in the same direction. To that apparent approval and real encouragement I, for my part, can never conscientiously contribute.

I have laboriously and carefully studied what has happened in all its details and bearings, and that study has profoundly convinced me that the story of our "criminal aggression" upon the Philippines is a story of deceit, false pretense, brutal treachery to friends, unconstitutional assumption of power, downright betrayal of the fundamental principles of our democracy, wanton sacrifice of our soldiers in a wicked war, cruel slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent people, and that of horrible blood-guiltiness, without a parallel in the history of republics, and that such a policy is bound to bring upon this Republic evils infinitely more disgraceful and disastrous in their effects than anything that has been predicted as likely to result from Mr. McKinley's defeat. This is my honest conviction. I, for one, cannot, therefore, conscientiously cast a vote of constructive approval and of real encouragement of that policy, and I can only advise others not to do so.

I repeat, however, that I cheerfully join you in admonishing anti-imperialists who take a different view con-

cerning the Presidency to help in securing at least an opposition House of Representatives. While an anti-imperialist majority in that body will, in my humble opinion, with a Republican Administration, not be able to "bring about every practical result the opponents of imperialism have in view," it may find opportunity for rendering valuable service.

FROM CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

BOSTON, Oct. 29, 1900.

Returning from a hurried journey to Wisconsin, I find on my table your letter of the 25th inst., in reply to mine of the 20th. Taken together, the two letters seem to set forth very clearly the attitude of that large number of voters who four years ago elected President McKinley, and who now are dissatisfied with the result of so doing. You, in your reply, forcibly indicate the course the more extreme of this class propose to pursue at the polls a week from to-morrow; while I, in my letter of the 20th, endeavor to point out a method to go with you all lengths in opposition, yet think we see a way to securing much. For this reason I shall avail myself of your permission to publish the correspondence.

I think you greatly underestimate the consequences of the election of an opposition House of Representatives at this juncture. The common-sense of the country would, I am convinced, accept such a result as equivalent to a vote of want of confidence in an Administration which, under existing conditions, could not safely be displaced. Thus the act could hardly fail to be productive of far-reaching effects; nor do I think an Administration so continued in office would find it the easy matter you suggest to manipulate such a House so as to make it further the policy it was, when chosen, pledged to oppose.

However this may be, one thing is clear—a large proportion of the dissatisfied element of 1896 cannot reconcile themselves to a transfer of the National Government from those now in

control to those Mr. Bryan represents, nor will they contribute to that end. It is useless to tell us that Mr. Platt is as bad as Mr. Croker, or that Senator Hanna is little if any better than Governor Altgeld. We want improvement, not a mere change; and we will not aid in bringing about a political overturn which does not even profess to do more than substitute a confessed evil for a, by us, admitted failure. We "prefer to bear the ills we have," etc.

There is a homely adage to the effect that half a loaf is better than no bread. That half loaf we see a fair chance of securing by pursuing the course I have outlined. In this you concur, merely expressing distrust as to the relative size of the portion of the loaf thus secured to that not secured. Even should the portion we hope to secure prove of no more value than you suggest, our regret at losing the other portion will still be very considerably alleviated by the reflection that it contains a singular collection of most unsavory political plums, scarcely less unpalatable to you than to us.

We can work together, therefore, up to the point where those who feel as I feel stop. With us, that point is the election of an opposition House of Representatives. For educational purposes alone, aside from all others, we desire to bring about a condition of unstable political equilibrium during the next few years, and give the country time in which to reflect.

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

NEW YORK, Nov. 5, 1900.

Thanks for your letter of Oct. 13th [30th] with enclosures. I hope the correspondence may have done some good.

Now on the eve of the election let me say to you that for a considerable time I have not expected Mr. Bryan to succeed. The Kansas City Convention gave my hopes the first shock. Still, if after his splendid Indianapolis speech against imperialism Bryan had retired into silence, resting his case on that speech, he might have had a chance.

But when he then went into the field and indulged in all sorts of loose talk which sounded far more dangerous than it really was, thus bringing various other things, especially the money question, into the foreground, I became more and more confirmed in the belief that he would not be elected.

I should then for various reasons have preferred to stay out of the campaign and to remain at my summer home in absolute quietness, had I not thought that the campaign offered a better opportunity for bringing to the attention of the people the facts and arguments against imperialism than we had had before or might have afterwards. The situation reminded me somewhat of that of 1872 when I had to make up my mind as to whether I should go into the campaign for Greeley. I was, of course, extremely disgusted with Greeley's nomination. There could be no doubt as to his defeat in the election. But I concluded to go into the campaign for him because the Liberal Republican movement was intended to be a means for reconciling the North and the South. It accomplished much in that direction. It would have missed that object if those who had originated that movement had abandoned it on account of mere dissatisfaction with the candidate. I therefore went actively into that campaign, and I am not sorry for it in the retrospect.

But when saying that for a long time I have had no hope of Bryan's election and that in spite of this feeling I took part in the campaign for educational purposes, I do not mean to suggest any change of opinion on my part as to whether Bryan's election would not on the whole have been better for the country than McKinley's. I still believe so, and I do this after a very dispassionate consideration of all the objectionable features of Bryan's character and surroundings.

We may talk that over at leisure when we meet again. . . .

TO LOUIS R. EHRICH

16 EAST 64TH ST., NEW YORK, NOV. 13, 1900.

Bryan's fine Indianapolis speech would, perhaps, have given him a chance if he had rested his case upon it and then retired into dignified silence. When he again launched out in his campaign of small talks, all hope was gone. I could notice in my own surroundings that almost every one of his speeches lost him votes. During the last two weeks before the election all the voters that were still in doubt went to McKinley with a rush. Here in New York there was a sort of hysterical frenzy. I suppose the same condition of atmosphere existed in other places. You have no idea what pressure was brought upon me even by our personal friends who "could not understand it" that under the circumstances I would not "come out for McKinley before it was too late."

Of course we shall not give up the fight. But it seems to me that just now those anti-imperialists who voted for McKinley under protest have the floor. Some of them talk of making a public demonstration of their dissatisfaction with the imperialistic policy of the President by signing a paper to that effect. Movements of this kind should be encouraged as much as possible.

I hear from Edwin Burritt Smith that the Anti-Imperialistic Executive Committee will call a confidential conference of the leaders to meet some time in December in this city. I hope you will be present.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY¹

The many signs of popular approval, if not of genuine popularity, which have accompanied Mr. McKinley's

¹ A fragment, supposed to have been written in the winter of 1900-1901.

public career, are well apt to stagger the assurance of anyone that had formed a low estimate of that gentleman's character or abilities. I frankly confess that more than once I have felt myself compelled by his "successes" coolly and carefully to reëxamine my own opinions concerning him, in order to discover whether I had not permitted myself to be carried away by hasty and superficial impressions in drawing my conclusions, and whether his admirers were not after all right. But in doing so I always ran against certain indisputable facts and certain personal experiences which irresistibly brought me back to my original judgment.

Before Mr. McKinley's election to the Presidency I had with him only a "speaking acquaintance." Our meetings were few and unimportant, leaving the impression that he was a man of kindly disposition, good-nature and agreeable manners. But his public career could hardly fail to cause serious misgivings. I do not mean his attitude as an extreme protectionist. That might have been a matter of sincere conviction—although he frequently, in his utterances, showed that, even from the protectionist's point of view, he did not understand his case. But it was mainly his treatment of the silver question which drove the impartial observer to the conclusion that Mr. McKinley had no true convictions of his own, but advocated this and that, not because he believed that it was right but that it was popular with his constituents and advantageous to his party. Even in the National campaign of 1896 which, in spite of his own wishes, turned entirely upon the money question, it was smilingly remarked among Mr. McKinley's near friends, that, as to his personal feelings, he "was in favor of as much sound money as he thought a majority of the voters would stand." It is well known how nervous he was, in that campaign, about the word "gold." It was considered an event of importance

when the appointed leader of the gold-standard movement in that campaign at last mustered courage enough to pronounce that word.

Early in the Presidential campaign of 1896, I was asked by a representative of the Republican National Committee to make some speeches for Mr. McKinley. Mr. Hobart, the Republican candidate for the Vice-Presidency, wrote to me personally in his behalf. While, of course, I did not hesitate to give my services to the sound-money cause, which was the foremost issue, I preferred to do so under the auspices of the National Sound Money League, a non-partisan organization, which had its headquarters at Chicago and was managed with great energy and judgment by Mr. Edwin Burritt Smith. It required not a little self-abnegation on the part of a tariff-reformer and an old and uncompromising sound-money man, as I was, to support for the Presidency, even indirectly, the putative father of the monstrous McKinley-tariff and one of those politicians who only recently had exhausted his whole art of plausible speech to mislead and demoralize the Republican party with regard to the matter of silver coinage. But the direct issue between sound and unsound money demanded the sacrifice of feeling, and I went "on the stump" advocating the sound-money cause as such to the best of my ability, without, however, mentioning Mr. McKinley's name in any of my speeches. While I was convinced that his election would substantially extinguish the free-silver-coinage movement, I was profoundly distrustful as to what Mr. McKinley's course in office would be. This distrust, however, touched rather his lack of conviction as to the financial question than anything else. Could I have foreseen what his foreign policy would be, I should certainly never have supported him.

Shortly after Mr. McKinley's election a rumor arose that the new President would be asked, or that he was

disposed, to send me as Ambassador to St. Petersburg. Although some extreme partisan papers violently protested against such a place being given to a man that recognized no party obligation, the rumor gained such strength that it was believed by many and even passed into the European press as a matter of fact. How and where that rumor originated, I have never been able to discover. In all probability Mr. McKinley never thought of any such arrangement. Certain it is that I never thought of it and should not have accepted the place, had it been offered to me, not only because I was not in the least inclined to enter the public service again in an official capacity, but also because I had contributed my efforts to the sound-money cause, and incidentally to the election of Mr. McKinley, as a free gift for which I could not take anything looking like a partisan reward; and finally because I could not have held an office of that kind under an Administration the main object of whose economic policy was certain to be a protective tariff of the extreme kind. I must, therefore, recognize the good taste of Mr. McKinley in not making to me any such offer, but in confining himself to a mark of courtesy and kind feeling which was entirely fitting the circumstances but which resulted in a curious and, as it turned out, a startling and highly significant experience.

A few weeks after Mr. McKinley's inauguration as President he visited the city of New York to take part in the ceremonies of the dedication of General Grant's tomb. I received a note from his private secretary informing me that President McKinley wished to see me in order to talk over with me the political situation; would I not call upon him at such an hour in the Windsor Hotel? Of course, I respectfully and gladly obeyed the invitation. We sat together fully an hour and a half, smoking cigars and talking. Our friendly conversation ranged over the

whole field of politics. We agreed to disagree on the question of the tariff. As to the money question he said that he would employ the whole influence of his office to secure the best kind of currency legislation. He assured me that he was a convinced civil service reformer and that in this respect he hoped his Administration would leave nothing to desire. Then he asked me: "How do you like my foreign appointments?" The part of our conversation which then followed has remained very clearly and firmly fixed in my mind, for very soon afterwards I had peculiar reason for remembering it.

Responding to Mr. McKinley's question I said that I thought his foreign appointments would on the whole be considered as comparing favorably with those of his predecessors, and I complimented him especially upon the ideal selection of Mr. Andrew D. White for the embassy at Berlin. "But," said I, "there is one appointment foreshadowed in the newspapers which, if made, may give you a good deal of trouble. It is reported that you are likely to send young Mr. Sewall of Maine as Minister to the Hawaiian Islands. Is he not connected with that coterie in Maine which some years ago instigated the revolution at Honolulu and precipitated the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands upon us? If he is, you will have to look for a repetition of such intrigues and of the same trouble in consequence."

"Oh," said Mr. McKinley, "I have thought of that, too, and have taken my precautions. I have had Mr. Sewall come to the White House and told him that there was a strong pressure from New England in favor of his appointment to the Hawaiian mission; that I had not concluded yet to appoint him, but, if I did, I wanted him distinctly to understand that I did not want any of that scheming for annexation, and that, if he went one hair's breadth beyond the instructions given him by the State

Department, he would be instantly recalled." Then I reached my hand over to President McKinley and said: "Permit me to take your hand on this. This is the best thing you have told me yet—that your Administration will not countenance anything of that kind." He shook my hand vigorously and, with that hearty chest-swelling emphasis peculiar to him, he replied: "Ah, you may be sure there will be no jingo nonsense under my Administration. You need not borrow any trouble on that account."

So we parted. I left him, on the whole, in a well satisfied mind. While, as to the tariff, we had reason to be prepared for the worst, the declarations he had made with regard to all other important questions were so explicit and unequivocal that we might hope for the best; and in the reports I gave to my friends about my conversation with the new President, I never failed to lay particular stress upon the assurance that no foreign adventure was thought of and that a strictly conservative policy was certain.

It is difficult to imagine my amazement when, a few weeks after this conversation had taken place, President McKinley sent to the Senate a treaty concluded with the Hawaiian Government providing for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. It was like a thunderclap from a clear sky. The matter had been arranged in entire secrecy. There had not been the slightest popular demand for such a treaty. No discussion in political circles or in the newspapers had foreshadowed the event. I wrote to some old friends in Washington inquiring whether they knew how this astounding change of the President's mind, if change of mind it was, had come about. Not one of them seemed able to furnish any explanation of the strange contrast of what President McKinley had said to me and what

he had done officially. But something equally curious happened shortly afterwards.

During the following week I had occasion to address a letter to President McKinley concerning the Civil Service Commission. The President's private secretary replied that in the President's opinion such matters were much more easily arranged by personal conversation than by correspondence. Would I not come to Washington to have a talk with the President? Any day I might choose would be agreeable to him. Accordingly I went to Washington on July 1st. The President's private secretary met me at the Arlington Hotel, on my arrival, to inform me that the President wished me to dine with him that evening and that he had invited the whole Cabinet, as well as some of the assistant secretaries with whom I was acquainted. I duly expressed my gratitude for the honor. The dinner was very pleasant, but the conversation did not turn upon affairs of importance. When the company had left and we were alone, President McKinley listened kindly to what I had to say about the Civil Service Commission and promised to take it into favorable consideration, repeating substantially the protestations of his fidelity and zeal as a civil service reformer which he had made at our former interview.

This matter being disposed of, I said: "Mr. President, will you permit me a word about the Hawaiian business?" "Oh, certainly," he replied. "There seems to be some difficulty in getting the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate for the treaty. But if we fail there, we can annex the Hawaiian Islands by joint resolution, as we annexed Texas. That will require only a majority in the two houses of Congress, which we can easily get." I hardly knew what to say to this without appearing impolite. But I could not help observing: "That is not what I am after, Mr. President. Do you not recall the conversation

we had about this matter at the Windsor Hotel in New York not long ago?" This remark seemed to be unexpected to him and to embarrass him a little. After a few moments' hesitation he said: "Yes, yes, I remember now. You are opposed to that annexation, are n't you?" "Indeed I am," I replied, "as you seemed to be opposed to it at that time." And then I proceeded to state in as few words as possible my reasons for that opposition. When I stopped there were again a few moments of somewhat uncomfortable silence, whereupon he said: "Well, there is no possibility that the Senate will ratify the treaty at this session (the extra session of 1897), and during the summer the people will have time to think about it, and when Congress gets together again in December we may have a tangible expression of public opinion about the matter." After this there was evidently nothing more to be said and I rose to take my leave. But the President invited me politely to come upstairs to see Mrs. McKinley and the young ladies who were with her, an invitation which, of course, I respectfully accepted. After a quarter of an hour of pleasant chat I departed, leaving the White House, I must confess, with a heart heavy with evil forebodings.

How a man, who had been so long in public life that he must be supposed to have definite opinions if not fixed convictions about so important a matter as the annexation of distant islands to this Republic, came to reverse his position in so short a period, I have never been able to ascertain. As I said, my friends in Washington could give me no clue. The supposition that, as in other instances, Mr. McKinley "had his ear to the ground" to discover the current of public sentiment and then to follow it, will hardly hold good in this case; for there was at the time no public sentiment favorable to the annexation of Hawaii. Indeed, when by the presentation of the treaty

to the Senate the discussion of the subject in the press was started, the scheme found so little favor that the prospect of obtaining for it a two-thirds vote in the Senate seemed to grow darker and darker. It is not too much to say that its failure in Congress would have been well-nigh certain, had not the unreasoning excitement caused by the Spanish war helped it through. Mr. McKinley's sudden change of attitude can, therefore, not be explained upon the theory of popular pressure. How, then, could it be explained? About the time of Mr. McKinley's second nomination for the Presidency I mentioned the occurrences here related in conversation with a friend of mine, a gentleman of high character and social position, who from time to time had business with the Government in Washington and a large acquaintance there. He told me that he could solve the enigma. "I had no idea," he observed, "what kind of people could exercise an influence with Mr. McKinley; the conversion of the President in favor of the annexation of Hawaii had been brought about by a gang of sugar speculators in pursuit of profit. The President had, of course, no pecuniary interest in the scheme; he probably had no idea of what those persons were after, but they had made him believe that the annexation was a good thing for his party and his Administration." Whether my friend was right or not, I do not know. He may have been mistaken. But he evidently believed what he said.

However this may have been, it will not be found unnatural after all this that I should not attach to Mr. McKinley's official or unofficial utterances so much credence as many others do. When in the course of events he solemnly declared that "annexation by force could not be thought of because according to the American code of morals, it would be criminal aggression," and then inaugurated a barefaced war of conquest; when he

proclaimed it to be our "plain duty" to grant to Porto Rico free trade with the United States, and then used the influence of the Executive office to put through Congress a tariff upon our commerce with that island; when he again and again asseverated his devotion to civil service reform and then dealt the merit system the most vicious blow it had ever received, and so on, and so on—I was, like many others, very much grieved, but I was not greatly surprised.

TO EDWIN BURRITT SMITH

NEW YORK, Jan. 17, 1901.

Thanks for your letter of the 14th and the brief and reply argument of Mr. Aldrich, which I received this morning. I shall read it as soon as possible. The effect of General Harrison's Ann Arbor speech [expressing anti-imperialistic ideas] has been excellent. It has set a good many people to thinking, who were not inclined to think before. I shall not be at all surprised, however, if the Surpeme Court should decide the cases before them on some comparatively unimportant technical points and thus avoid the great issue. In any event we must continue to struggle.

I do not agree with our friends in Boston that we as anti-imperialists should issue an address to the people now "showing that we are still in the fight." Of course we are, and nobody doubts it. But since the fight is now being carried on by prominent Republicans with great energy and effectiveness, would it not be very poor policy on our part to step forward and divert public attention from them? If we are wise we shall at present let well enough alone, at least so long as the Republican opponents of the imperialistic policy are doing the best that can be done under present circumstances.

I am *very* glad you did not attend the Bryan dinner. Whatever good qualities Bryan may possess, I have always considered him the evil genius of the anti-imperialistic cause. To vote for him was the most distasteful thing I ever did; and I did it, not as if I had believed in the possibility of his election, but because I wanted to make on my part the strongest imaginable protest against the policy of the [McKinley] Administration.

It now seems probable that the Democrats of a good many States will try to shake off the incubus of the Bryan dictatorship by adopting platforms in their State conventions repudiating, directly or indirectly, the obnoxious features of the Kansas City platform. It is highly desirable that this process of deliverance should go on as rapidly and should be encouraged as much as possible. Nothing, it seems to me, could be more unwise for the anti-imperialists to do than to identify themselves with Bryan in any manner under such circumstances.

TO M. W. DILLON

NEW YORK, Oct. 30, 1901.

The slip from the *Daily News* which you have shown me, contains a *gross and wicked misrepresentation* of what I said in my recent speech delivered in Cooper Union. I am quoted as saying:

"The bands of brigands in the mountains of Italy, offering prayers of thanksgiving to the Virgin Mary after a successful loot, are as much a part of the Catholic Church as Tammany Hall is a part of the Democratic party."

I was arguing that Tammany Hall could NOT rightfully be called a part of the Democratic party. I illustrated this by adding: "The brigands of the Abbraggi, offering thanksgiving to the Virgin Mary after a successful loot, are just AS LITTLE a part of the Catholic Church as Tam-

many Hall is a part of the Democratic party." This was the very point of the argument. What I said was therefore not only not a slur upon the Catholic Church, which I would not think of being guilty of; but on the contrary, it was a compliment to the Catholic Church, for I distinctly scouted and repudiated the idea that the brigands of the Abbraggi could be considered a part of the Church. No candid person will read that part of my speech without seeing this at once.

TO EDWARD M. SHEPARD

16 EAST 64TH ST., Nov. 4, 1901.

I cannot tell you how glad I am that the campaign is over.¹ While I had to follow my view of the public interest, I opposed *you* with a bleeding heart; and when I say this, I hope you will not take it as a mere empty figure of speech. I wish you to understand that my warm affection for you issues from this contest undiminished, and I trust that we shall remain friends as before. I write this before the result of the elected, is decided. It goes without saying that, if you are elected, my ardent wishes go with you for your success in the discharge of the awful responsibilities with which your peculiar situation will burden you.

If you should be defeated—which, at any rate, is among the possibilities—let it not dishearten you. I do not believe, with Mr. Hewitt, that a defeat would "end your political life." The political life of a public man of character and ability is never ended so long as he is true to his best self and willing to serve the country, and has something to say worth listening to.

But in case of your defeat you would, I think, even

¹ Mr. Shepard had been the Tammany candidate for Mayor of New York City.

shorten the temporary eclipse by acting upon a suggestion which, I have no doubt, you will pardon your old friend for making. It is that you should at once write a letter to Mr. Low to tell him that you know his and your aims as to what the city government should be and do, to be the same, and that if in the course of his administration he should wish your aid and assistance, you would be most happy to render, in your capacity of a private citizen, whatever service you might be given an opportunity for. Such a declaration, put forth in your strongest and most cordial tones, would, I am sure, go very far to restore your proper relations with those of your friends who may have become somewhat estranged from you.

But my suggestion may be quite superfluous, as in the supposed case you would probably have done of your own motion the thing suggested.

In any event, believe me as ever faithfully your old friend.¹

TO WILLIAM VOCKE

NEW YORK, Dec. 5, 1901.

I regret I cannot be present at the meeting² to which you invite me and must ask you to be content with a few

¹ Their cordial relations increased rather than decreased, as is shown by the following letter:

44 PIERREPONT ST., BROOKLYN, March 16, 1904.

Dear Mr. Schurz: If I am belated, I am none the less earnest, in sending you my admiring and affectionate greetings for your birthday. You ought to have a vast fund of happiness in the knowledge of all you have done, and are doing, and are yet to do, in making better and nobler, and more prosperous too, the lives of your fellow-men.

You are, I hear, off for an outing. Do not, I beg, reduce its helpfulness by answering this note, for I know already what you would write, but believe me always and

Most faithfully yours,

EDWARD M. SHEPARD.

² A pro-Boer mass-meeting in Chicago, Dec. 8, 1901.

words in writing. I am not an Anglophobe. On the contrary, I have always gratefully appreciated and admired the great things achieved by the English people for liberty and civilization. All the more do I deprecate and deplore, not only for the sake of the suffering victims of their power, but also for the sake of the English people themselves, the evil deeds with which the British Government is at present defying the judgment of mankind.

I shall not go into the history of the Boer war, but confine myself to what we now see before us. When the Spanish General Weyler cooped up the families of the insurgent Cubans in his reconcentrado camps and subjected them to indescribable miseries, a wave of hot indignation swept over our country at what we called a barbarous atrocity. When we now see the British engaged in inflicting like miseries upon the old men and the women and children of the Boers in a manner even more cruel and with results even more dreadful and revolting—can we, as just and humane men, call this by any other name?

We are told that the Boers in general are less civilized than many other people. Is that a justification of their treatment? The same might have been said of the Swiss when in olden times those rude mountaineers, the Boers of the Alps, valiantly defended their liberty and independence on the bloody fields of Morgarten, Sempach, Granson and Murten, against the superior civilization of Austria and Burgundy. But the world has long been agreed to call them heroes and to celebrate their deeds in legend and song. What is, morally, the difference between the heroic Swiss of old and the struggling Boers of to-day who are writhing under the heel of an oppressive and overwhelming Power?

But we are asked: "What are you going to do about it?" Whatever—speaking from the point of view of international policy—whatever we may be unable or unwilling

to do, one thing, at least, we certainly may do. We may give voice to our sense of justice and our human sympathies. We may help in manifesting the judgment of civilized mankind upon what is going on so that those responsible for what is being done in South Africa as well as their apologists may understand it. They should be made to know that not only habitual adversaries of England but many of her friends who gladly testify to the true glories of her history, who want their own Governments to maintain with her relations of peace and hearty good-will, and who wish her the fullest measure of happiness and prosperity in all things righteous, witness with shame and abhorrence this spectacle of a great Power that claims to stand in the foremost rank of civilized and liberty-loving nations, slaughtering a little people, men, women and children, because they do what the best in the history of the world have done: hold fast with indomitable spirit to their national independence, and struggle on for the free possession of their homes.

I am one of those who heartily rejoiced at the subsidence in this country of the old and more or less unreasoning prejudice against England, and I have often publicly said so. I witnessed with sincerest satisfaction the disappearance from our popular oratory of the cheap trick of "twisting the British lion's tail," and I hailed with joy the growth of a real friendship between the two nations. But Englishmen should not indulge in any delusion about this: deep down in their hearts the great masses of the American people cherish a profound sympathy for the Boers in their struggles and sufferings. What they condemned when done by the Spaniard in Cuba, they do not approve when done by the British in South Africa. And if there be anything apt to revive the old anti-British feeling in this Republic, it is the terrible spectacle presented by the Boer war.

TO CHAS. FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.


16 EAST 64TH ST., NEW YORK CITY, Feb. 3, 1902.

. . . I have read not only the pages relating to Sumner but the whole of your address¹ with the keenest interest and appreciation. Let me first give you a general impression. The unsophisticated reader having gone through your presentation of the conduct of England during our civil war—a presentation as strong as it is truthful—will be apt, when reading your account of the diplomatic negotiations leading to the Treaty of Washington, to conclude that those negotiations were carried on for the special purpose of helping England out of a hole dug by her own greed and ill-will towards this Republic, and that England was finally let off on terms altogether too easy.

As to Sumner, I find that a certain tone of contempt has crept into what you say of his character and abilities which you have probably not intended. His ideas with regard to the British neutrality-proclamation and, later, with regard to the "hemispheric flag-withdrawal" were at the time shared, the first by pretty much everybody connected with the Government and substantially by the whole North, and the second for some time by the Administration itself. To be sure, you say that yourself. But an impression is left as if he had been the main instigator of those notions, and as if he had been principally responsible for them. He was, indeed, stronger in his expressions than others, and he expressed only what a great many others thought, and what they would have thought had he not spoken.

His breach with Grant, as it stands very distinctly in my recollection, was caused by his refusal to [approve] the San Domingo business, as to which Sumner, as I think, was

¹ The Treaty of Washington, delivered before the N. Y. Hist. Society, Nov. 19, 1901; and published in *Lee at Appomattox and Other Papers*.



altogether right. I remember the debates that took place in the Foreign Relations Committee and in the executive sessions of the Senate. In these debates Sumner was at first entirely respectful to Grant. But Grant insisted that Sumner, at the interview in Sumner's house, had promised to support the San Domingo treaty and then "broken his word." This was a gross misapprehension on the part of Grant, who had simply so misconstrued Sumner's polite expression of generally friendly feeling. I know this, because Sumner told me every word of the conversation the very next day, and he certainly did not lie. Then came no end of tittle-tattle and tale-bearing by persons who sought to ingratiate themselves with Grant, whose sharp sayings about Sumner's "treachery" and what not were also intentionally circulated. Sumner's personal attack on Grant was of a much later date. Nothing could be more unjust than to hold him responsible for that quarrel, the origin of which consisted in nothing but Sumner's perfectly legitimate and for a considerable time certainly respectful opposition to Grant's San Domingo scheme. I remember distinctly that in the Foreign Relations Committee Sumner did not even lead that opposition. During several sessions of that Committee when those matters were under discussion, he maintained as Chairman presiding over the debate an entirely neutral attitude, giving his own opinion only after every other member had had abundant time for consideration and opportunity for expressing himself. In fact, Sumner was so reticent that I became somewhat impatient at his long silence.

His rupture with Fish became final only after the publication of Fish's assault upon him in the dispatch which you have mentioned. And I think Sumner was perfectly right in feeling outraged at this brutal attack upon him in a piece of diplomatic correspondence, and at the man-

ner in which it was spread before the world. I do not know whether such treatment of a Senator by a Secretary of State has any precedent in our history. I doubt it. That this occurrence made further personal intercourse between the Secretary and the Senator impossible, is quite natural. Without it they might probably have gone on conferring, however widely disagreeing. Certainly, the rupture cannot with justice be altogether charged to Sumner's account. On the contrary, the provocation coming from the other side might have ruffled a temper less sensitive than his.

About the Treaty of Washington I had many confidential exchanges of opinion with him. He deplored that it had fallen short of what he called "the ideal solution"—a solution which had been seriously contemplated by the Administration likewise. But when the treaty had become an accomplished fact, only requiring confirmation by the Senate, he supported it for the good things it contained—not because he was flattered and cajoled by the British members of the High Commission, nor because he felt himself "shorn of his power"—which, in fact, he was not nearly as much as you seem to suppose. I think you are mistaken if you believe that Sumner could not have got votes enough in the Senate to defeat the treaty if he had really wished to do so. His power in that body was still very great on such questions, in spite of his removal from his chairmanship; and by a presentation of the case just such as you have given in the first part of your address he might have carried more than one-third of the votes in the Senate, as well as public sentiment throughout the country, which at that period was still very far from friendly to England owing to her well-remembered conduct during our civil war.

But it was Sumner who actually led the debate in favor of the treaty in the executive sessions of the Senate; and

he did this upon the highest order of motives, as I know from my frequent conversations with him at the time. I think I am well warranted in affirming that he was the only man there who had much of real weight to say.

I have already expressed to you my dissent from your opinion that the Administration is always entitled to have a Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and especially its Chairman, in harmony with its views and purposes. The San Domingo treaty made by an aide-de-camp of Grant, a treaty to which even the Secretary of State was at heart opposed, is a case in point. Should the Chairman of the Committee have been removed because he was opposed to that treaty? Should the present Chairman be removed if he were opposed to any of the reciprocity treaties now hanging in the Senate? Should that Chairman understand that he would rightfully forfeit his place if he dared to oppose *any* treaty sent into the Senate by the Administration? Would not that be a state of things utterly obnoxious to our Constitutional scheme of government? What would thus become of the Senate as an independent factor in the treaty-making function?

It was at the time asserted that Sumner had to be removed because he had ceased to be on speaking terms with the Secretary of State. If that in itself were a sufficient cause for such a removal, any Secretary of State might bring about the removal of any Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee simply by offending him so as to make further personal intercourse impossible. As a *general* rule this certainly cannot hold.

As you ask me especially to give you my opinion of your treatment of Sumner, I must repeat what I said at the beginning: that treatment savors of a sort of contempt which you probably, I may say certainly, did not intend to put into it. The reader will be apt to receive the impression that in your view Sumner was a rhetorician full

of inordinate egotism and vanity, inclined to make a fool of himself, and absolutely intolerant of dissent from his extravagant notions. This surely is not the picture you meant to draw. But with such quotations as that of what Richard H. Dana once said, in an irritated state of mind, and of many things you say yourself, it does convey something like that impression; and this impression is but little modified by what you drop in by way of disclaimers. Sumner has been much misjudged by those who did not intimately know him and who formed their opinions of him mainly from hearsay. I did know him intimately. I knew his weak as well as his strong points. I did not win his friendship by "deference." We disagreed on things which he had very much at heart, for instance his civil rights bill. But this did not at all disturb our warm and confidential relations. I was in daily intercourse with him during the critical period you describe. I witnessed in him the working of motives deserving the highest respect, and I must confess, it touches me somewhat painfully when I find them called in question.

I also was well acquainted with the character and the doings of the White-House-crew of that time, which pursued Sumner and which likewise drove out of the Cabinet its best members—Hoar, Cox and Jewell—and came very near making Fish himself resign from sheer disgust.

Pardon the frankness of my criticisms. I have spoken without concealment because I thought that was what you desired.

P. S. I will not detain this letter any longer, and send it off without having copied it. Will you do me the favor of having a copy made by your typewriter, and of sending it to me? You will oblige me. I expect to use it in writing my memoirs.

FROM CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

BOSTON, Feb. 7, 1902.

Thanks for your favor of the 3d, which has reached me at just the right time. I am even now engaged in putting the address you refer to through the press, as part of a volume.

I am greatly obliged to you for calling my attention so frankly to the more important point touched upon in your letter. If my statement in regard to Sumner left the impression of "contempt," or dislike, upon your mind, it certainly conveyed something wholly apart from my design. It is, however, very difficult, in dealing with the foibles of a public man, to do it in such a way as not to give prominence to that part of your [one's] portrayal. Sumner's foibles were very pronounced. I came in forcible contact with them more than once in dealing with him myself; and my father and mother came in such very forcible contact with them as to sever their relations [with him]. From personal experience, I think there was great truth in George William Curtis's incisive remark, that, with Sumner, difference of opinion, on a question in which he was deeply interested, assumed in his mind the aspect of moral turpitude. This it was which led to his break with my father. He actually had the impertinence gravely to inform my mother one day that he *believed* "Mr. Adams meant to be honest." I imagine he was infinitely surprised when he was practically thereupon turned out of the house. Certainly, he never entered it again.

It was exactly the same in his treatment of Dr. Palfrey.

It was the same in his relations with Dana.

Now, as respects General Grant, I believe that, owing to these foibles, as we will call them, on Sumner's part, the antagonism between them was radical. It would have broken out at any time when they chanced to be brought together in close contact. The two men were by nature different, and a clash was inevitable.

It was not so with Fish. If I understand Fish's character correctly, he had a good deal of that Dutch element in him which is now cropping out so strongly in South Africa. He was a quiet and easy-going man; but, when aroused, by being, as he

thought, "put upon," he became very formidable. Neither was it possible to placate him.

This play of character in Grant, Fish, Sumner and Motley, I found immensely interesting in the preparation of my address. It was the thing which gave life and individuality to it. Meanwhile, I certainly had no thought of leaving the impression of a feeling of "contempt" for Sumner. His foibles were more pronounced than those of any other one of the quartette, unless, perchance, Motley. Motley, however, was a much less interesting character. He cut no considerable figure.

I shall, however, in passing the paper through the press now enlarge and qualify in such a way as to remove, if possible, the impression to which you refer. It is not easy; but I admit at once it should be done.

As to the matter of the chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the propriety of the occupant thereof being in accord with the Administration, we do not in reality disagree. It is always easy to state an extreme case. You do it in this instance. Of course, a reasonable difference of opinion is always permissible, and especially in such a case as that in question, between members of the same party. They may occasionally disagree on matters of even first-class moment, and yet that afford no sufficient ground for a change. Therefore, when you speak as you do in your letter, I merely say that those are ordinary cases, not to be taken into consideration. They arise under all conditions.

Meanwhile, I will suggest an extreme case on the other side, and you will at once agree with me. Supposing the Chairman of that Committee was not on speaking terms with either the President or Secretary. Though belonging to the same party, he had a personal feeling, resulting, perhaps, from his being a rival candidate for the Presidency, which led him to desire to thwart the Administration policy at every point, and that he lost no occasion for denouncing it. Matters of foreign policy of the first importance were then sent by the Department of State to the Senate, and there immediately pigeonholed, or so amended as to defeat the purpose for which they were designed. All this is supposable.

Surely, you do not mean to imply that, under such circumstances, if the supporters of the Administration controlled a majority in the Senate, the President could not properly urge on his friends that the Committee in question be so changed as to admit of public business being transacted, and to cause the Administration to have a fair chance to carry out a policy!

The correct rule, of course, lies midway between extremes. It is, as I take it, that, in this particular case above all others, the Administration has a right to ask of its friends, when in control of the Senate, that the Committee in question shall be so constituted as to enable relations consistent with the reasonable transaction of business to exist between the President, the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Committee, to the end that, on crucial questions of policy at least, public interests may not be prejudiced, and the Administration may have a fair show.

I am confident you will concur in this proposition. The alternative is obvious. Public business could not be carried on.

Meanwhile, so far as Sumner is concerned, if he had not been deposed just when he was, the country would have witnessed the extraordinary spectacle of the Chairman of the Committee in question openly going over to the opposition in face of a Senate friendly to the Administration. The case would then have become clear. In any event Sumner was not entitled to be at the head of the Committee after the election of 1872. He had joined the opposition. He belonged, not below the gangway, but on the other side of the House.

He had practically done this at the time he was deposed; and the fact was notorious.

In accordance with your request, I return you a typewritten copy of your letter.

TO J. G. SCHURMAN

NEW YORK, May 8, 1902.

Accept my sincere thanks for the kind sentiments expressed in your letter of the 3d. Be assured, I appreci-

ate them very highly. All the more do I deplore your unwillingness to serve as a member of the committee of which Mr. Charles Francis Adams is the chairman.¹

I am probably not wrong in supposing the main reason for your refusal to be that we should trust President Roosevelt's determination to have a full and unsparing inquiry, and that therefore investigations by private and voluntary agencies are superfluous and will not bring forth results of value.

Now, the committee has not at all been instituted for the purpose of impeaching President Roosevelt's sincerity, or upon the assumption that he will not honestly try to accomplish the proclaimed object. On the contrary, it will rather stand by him and help his efforts. There is reason for supposing that the President has not been well served by his subordinates and that many important things have for a long time been withheld from his knowledge which he ought to have known; and it is very probable that those who thus have misled him in the past, will, for their own salvation, try to do so in the future.

It is a fact, of which I have the best evidence in my hands, that of the things which have startled the country, not a few *have actually been* brought out by those voluntary private agencies which you seem to consider unnecessary and valueless. Without those agencies the members of the Senate Investigating Committee, who really want to investigate, would have groped about in the dark, and those members will declare to you to-day that the services thus rendered are "inestimable." The President in pursuit of the real truth may have occasion to say the same

¹ The purpose of this committee of anti-imperialists was to bring about a thorough official investigation of the alleged cruelties and barbarities—especially such as the "water-cure" torture and "taking no prisoners" (killing all the vanquished)—believed to have been practised by our soldiers. See Schurz to Carnegie, Aug. 2, 1902.

thing. He is, indeed, in great danger of becoming involved in the concealments and falsifications of unscrupulous friends.

To me this work is at this time exceedingly unwelcome. I am old and sometimes feel tired. I wish to devote the rest of my days and of my working strength to the writing of my memoirs, and I am impatient at anything that diverts me from that task. But this is a great and solemn crisis. It calls with a stern and irresistible voice. Recent events have touched me perhaps more keenly than they have touched others. Can you imagine the feelings of a man who all his life has struggled for human liberty and popular government, who for that reason had to flee from his native country, who believed he had found what he sought in this Republic, and thus came to love this Republic even more than the land of his birth, and who at last, at the close of his life, sees that beloved Republic in the clutches of sinister powers which seduce and betray it into an abandonment of its most sacred principles and traditions and push it into policies and practices even worse than those which once he had to flee from?

In such a crisis, I think, we have to do what service we can. The first thing necessary is that we should discover the truth and let the people know it. I cannot give up the hope that when the American people know the truth, they will do what is right and vindicate the true principles and the character of the Republic. To make them know and mind the truth, no effort should be spared.

I am not the leader in this committee business. Mr. Adams conceived the plan and he stands at the head of it as the moving spirit. As you are aware, he is not a reckless enthusiast but rather a very conservative and cautious man. We may be sure that under his guidance nothing rash or sensational will be done. The committee will steadily keep its object in view and serve it in a quiet,

unostentatious and non-partisan way. I said that I greatly deplore your unwillingness to be with us, and I venture to hope that you will still reconsider your decision. If circumstances prevent you from giving time and labor to the work, you might at least aid it with the weight of your name and outspoken sympathy. This would be all the more important as your most excellent writings on the subject have recently attracted so much richly deserved attention.

Pardon my urgency and believe me

Very sincerely yours.

FROM CHARLES F. HOWELL

NEW YORK, May 24, 1902.

We will be greatly obliged if you would favor us with a word or two of advice to college men on the eve of graduation. We reach 100,000 of them; and propose publishing, in our forthcoming commencement issue, brief sentiments of help and suggestion from men who have themselves won name and place. Ten words will answer, *if more are unavailable*. We feel that much inspiration and genuine assistance may thus be rendered these young men at so critical a juncture of their lives.

In compliance, Mr. SCHURZ wrote the following sentences:

Learn to understand and develop the practical workings of society. But, while doing so, never lose sight of the ideals of liberty, right and justice, which must inspire and guide our national life in all its phases, to give it high purpose and true dignity. Be practical men, but never be afraid to be called idealists.

TO ANDREW CARNEGIE

BOLTON LANDING, LAKE GEORGE, N. Y.,

Aug. 2, 1902.

You may have noticed that a part of the imperialistic press, especially the *New York Times*, has received our open letter to President Roosevelt with frantic outcries of rage. This should not astonish us, as the *Times* has frequently proved itself somewhat insane on this subject;—you may perhaps remember that it once denounced your suggestion that you were willing to pay the \$20,000,000 the Philippines cost us in purchase money, out of your own pocket, as a “wicked” proposition. But it would be deplorable if its present vociferations in any way represented the temper of the Administration.

I have a letter from Mr. Oswald Villard of the *Evening Post* in which he says: “Mr. Carnegie has written Horace White that he has received a letter from President Roosevelt in which Roosevelt, he says, is all right on the Philippine question.” I heard something similar from Senator Hoar who wrote me two months ago that President Roosevelt had told him he agreed with him (Hoar) but he could not make any declaration as to the future independence of the Philippines now because Governor Taft was opposed to it, believing that it would stir up unruly ambitions among the natives, etc., which perhaps it would, but it would do that always, and, consequently, independence ought then never to be promised.

Now, if President Roosevelt really means that the Philippines should ultimately have their independence—and we must believe him when he says so—then, it seems to me, the reasons why he should openly and promptly proclaim his faith, infinitely outweigh in importance the reasons which Governor Taft gives for a policy of delay and uncertainty, even if we admit these to be well founded.

Of course I recognize the fact that the President alone

cannot give or even promise the Philippines independence. But what he might do is to declare that he is in favor of independence, and that he will as soon as possible send a message to Congress recommending that Congress pass a joint resolution or an act embodying the explicit pledge that the Philippines shall be treated substantially as Cuba has been treated.

Such a public declaration would undoubtedly have the following effects:

1. It would be received by a large majority of the American people, and even a large majority of the Republican party, with a sense of relief,—indeed with profound satisfaction; for it is certain that the people at large are heartily tired of the Philippine business and wish to be rid of it. Indeed, Senator Hoar wrote me, a considerable number of Republican Senators had privately confessed to him that they regretted very much to have voted for the ratification of the treaty of Paris.

2. It would at once and altogether take the Philippine question out of politics, which would be a great blessing.

3. It would—and it is perhaps the only thing that would—take the sting out of the disgrace that has been brought upon the country by the barbarous cruelties that have happened on our side in the Philippine war. The importance of this point cannot be exaggerated. Only think of it: In the name of the United States, of the Republic sprung from the Declaration of Independence, the Republic of Washington and Lincoln, atrocities have been committed which remind one of Djenquis Khan and Tamerlane; torture has been used to extort testimony just as it was done by the Spanish Inquisition; a system of “concentration” has been carried on quite like that of General Weyler’s,—one of the things which, as we want the world to understand, drove us into the war against Spain. Whenever the Turkish Sultan again indulges himself in

"Armenian atrocities," or the Czar of Russia again "establishes order in Warsaw," they can fall back upon the precedents made by this great Republic and quote it as their justifying example. Thus we have turned back the clock of civilization by centuries. And, to aggravate it all, we have done this, *as the case now stands, in furtherance of a policy of conquest.*

It is useless to try to minimize these things. New evidence of such barbarities is constantly cropping out as officers and soldiers come back from the Philippines. Much of it is in our possession in a more or less available shape, and the case gains a blacker aspect every day.

It is worse than useless to try to conceal, or excuse, or even justify those things, for this can only serve to add to the charge of barbarity the charge of hypocrisy or moral callousness. By the way, I doubt whether the President has with regard to the knowledge and appreciation of those occurrences been faithfully served by his subordinates and advisers.

Now, this Republic can be relieved of the awful burden of this disgrace only by a solemn and emphatic repudiation of the barbarities, by our Government, or, in default thereof, by a solemn and emphatic repudiation of them by the people in the National elections.

The necessity of the second method would be altogether deplorable, and the first method therefore greatly preferable.

President Roosevelt has already done something in that line. His action in the case of General Smith was most praiseworthy. Indeed, in that case he did all he could. Some other malefactors have been punished. But, after all, the punishments meted out by the military courts for offenses of such a character were so light as to be almost farcical. If we are, or appear to be, satisfied with them, it would indicate that as a Nation we regard the killing of

people and the devastation of a country, and the practice of torture as mere peccadillos—offenses more venial than the stealing of a loaf of bread by a beggar.

That the President is not pleased with those sentences I can readily believe. And I fear he has not much reason to be satisfied with the manner in which his promise of a thorough and merciless investigation and exposure of abuses is carried out by his subordinates. He can remedy this, however, by putting a different spirit into those proceedings, although he may have to do so by a change of instruments.

But he certainly *can* do a greater thing than even that. He can, by making the public declaration suggested, initiate a policy which would show that whatever may have been done in the Philippines, was not done to serve the ends of a *selfish war of conquest*—a policy substantially proclaiming to the world that this Republic repudiates the idea of deriving any selfish profit from what has been done in the Philippines. That would go farther than anything else to wash the dreadful stain from our National honor.

And if President Roosevelt makes such a declaration, and makes it in the name of the great fundamental principles of this Republic, it will place his name, as that of the restorer of those principles, immediately in line with those of Washington and Lincoln.

It is a wonderful opportunity that thus presents itself to him. But to secure the full benefit of it he should act soon, in the course of this campaign, while he can act with full freedom. If he waits, and the Congressional elections should go against the Republicans—which at any rate is not altogether impossible—he would, making the same declaration, appear to act under a certain compulsion.

Now, do you not think that the reasons I have given here in favor of such a step, greatly outweigh in importance

the reasons given by Governor Taft in opposition to it?

As you are in correspondence with President Roosevelt, I may assume that you have his ear. He will listen to you. Would you not make a suggestion to him, an impressive one, in the direction here indicated? You might thereby—possibly—render a great service to our dear adopted country; and I may say that the natives do not know *how dear* that country is to adopted citizens like you and me—dearer, perhaps, than to themselves.

As Mr. Adams has informed you, the task has been imposed upon me of making a final and comprehensive report upon the Philippine business. It is a hateful task. I am dreadfully tired of faultfinding, and my heart longs for something great to praise. But if things remain in the present state—I shall again have to do the hard duty.

I hope you are enjoying your summer. I am sure you are. What a handsome thing you did in giving Lord Acton's library to John Morley! You are indeed a happy man.

FRANZ SIGEL¹

The coffin around which we are assembled awakens great memories. I stand here as one of the few surviving contemporaries of our departed friend—a brother in arms of two wars, both wars for high ideals of human rights and liberty. The one was the insurrectionary war in the old Fatherland for national unity and popular government. It is a sad degeneracy of sentiment which of late has accustomed itself scornfully to scoff at that period of the "springtime of peoples" as it was then justly called. The many thousands who then were willing to sacrifice their lives for a great cause certainly need not be ashamed of

¹ Remarks at the funeral services in Melrose Hall, New York City, Aug. 24, 1902.

their idealism, even if they did succumb in the struggle. It has been our fate—a not uncommon fate—to see the seed sown by us bloom and ripen otherwise than we had hoped. The unprejudiced know full well and recognize the fact, that without the national spirit awakened by the commotions of 1848, the great national development which later created the great German Empire would not have been possible.

Thus have many things for which we then strove, although in unforeseen fashion, since become realities; and many others, still more nearly approaching our ideals, will doubtless become realities in the future. Truly, the men of 1848, who fought for high ends, have not fought in vain.

And among those fighters I saw—it is now fifty-three years since—Franz Sigel as one of the leaders on the field. He was in the very bloom of youth. His liberal sentiments had driven him to abandon his lieutenant's place in the regular army, and with all the ardor of his nature he had thrown himself into the movement for national unity and free government. In spite of his youth his recognized military ability soon lifted him to high places of command—and even to the highest, when all hope of victory was gone. With the most praiseworthy self-sacrifice he undertook to lead his hopeless battalions, pressed on all sides by the victorious enemy, to a place of security on foreign soil; and the defeat of his cause left to him the name of a faithful, brave and uncommonly able soldier.

One of the German Forty-eighters, he came to America, not merely to seek for himself as a fugitive a place of refuge, but also because, with many others, he hoped to find here the realization of the ideals which in the old world had inspired him to fight for nationality and freedom. But few years elapsed when the peril of the Republic, brought on by the secession of the slave States, again put the sword in his hand. And that sword he wielded

again for National existence and human rights, this time in his new fatherland.

He was one of the foremost of those who in the critical days of 1861 with Frank Blair and Nathaniel Lyon and the patriotic German-Americans of St. Louis rendered the Republic the inestimable service of saving by a bold stroke that city and the State of Missouri to the Union. And then he went from campaign to campaign, from battlefield to battlefield, rising in rank and renown, until the winged word "fighting with Sigel" became the warcry of many thousands.

And now, under the burden of old age, the grizzled hero has sunk into his grave. The world has not always been just to him under the confusing influence of jealous ambitions. But impartial history will not fail to place his name among the most patriotic and most meritorious defenders of the country. To his glory be it said, he lifted his sword only for the cause of high ideals. It has been my fortune, as one of his subordinates, to see him under the thunder of cannon and in the rain of bullets, with the fire of battle in his eye, but also with the calm gaze of the leader. I have heard the enthusiastic shouts with which his men greeted him on the bloody field. And now I am here, an old friend and brother-in-arms, to lay with you the laurel upon the bier of my old general. His name will forever fill a most honorable place in the history of the Republic—the pride of his German-American compatriots, and a shining example of American citizenship in arms.

TO WHEELER H. PECKHAM

Jan. 23, 1903.

I thank you most sincerely for your kind invitation giving me the privilege of joining you in doing honor to Abram S. Hewitt's memory.

He was a rare man, of whom it can be said that the story of his life, truthfully told, will be a eulogy, and whose death causes a void very hard to fill.

He was a true statesman, a statesman of thought and knowledge and effective energy, of conviction—in legislative, as well as in executive place, a pillar of public integrity and honor, and a builder of good government.

His political ambition reached not merely for distinguished position, but for opportunity to render useful service. He strove not merely to *be* something, but to *do* something.

He was a democrat, believing in the people, and, like Lincoln, in government of, for and by the people. But he never flattered the multitude; neither was he afraid of it.

He would rather be right than be popular. The instinctive dignity of his manhood would never stoop to the mean arts of hypocrisy.

He was a party man, but never a party slave. His supreme allegiance was always to the public good. He had the outspoken courage rather to see his party defeated than the public good suffer.

He was a leader, but such a leader as democracies most need—a leader of opinion, not a mere captain of organization.

Whether impulsive or calmly matured, whether right or wrong, his opinions were his own. They were always so transparently honest and buttressed with reasoning so thoughtful and a character so high that sincere men would differ from his conclusions not only with profound respect for him, but not seldom with mistrust of their own judgment.

His peculiar usefulness on the field of public affairs was that of a practical business man endowed with the philosophic spirit capable of grasping the relation of small to

great things, and the bearing of general principles upon facts.

He was a philanthropist of unbounded generosity and discriminating judgment, giving not only his treasure, but his active care to the objects of his benevolence, and wisely intent upon helping them to help themselves. Uncounted thousands he served in lighting to them the lamp of knowledge, and thus guided them on the path of fruitful work.

He was a conscientious friend of the laboring man, although some of them would not accept his theory, for he not only was just and kind to all employed by him, but he also strove to defend the freedom of all of them, as men and citizens, against what he considered the tyranny of their own organizations.

He was a thoroughly genuine man, magnificently sincere and free from cant; never seeking to appear what he was not; his very foibles, errors and indiscretions springing from a large idealism and a high-spirited, almost impatient, zeal in serving justice and truth and the public good.

And how charmingly human he was with his vivid enthusiasms, his quick and combative temper, his irascible moods—and, behind all this, a soul overflowing with warm sympathies and love of peace and good-will to all men.

And what a great figure he was in his retirement from public office! Indeed, our history shows no finer example of active statesmanship in private station, as the words uttered by that single citizen could not have commanded higher respect and compliance if they had come from a Senate chamber or an Executive chair.

And he enjoyed, as he deserved, the rare fortune that to his last days in old age the light of his mind burned with undiminished brightness, and that his counsel was sought by his fellow-citizens with ever-increasing confidence.

Thus it may be said, that when he died, his head rested upon the pillow of universal affection and esteem, and that the most ambitious among our people may well envy the record of a life so splendid in devotion, usefulness and inspiring example.

TO ERVING WINSLOW

NEW YORK, Jan. 28, 1903.

Yesterday I had a visit from Mr. Cleveland and a long conversation on the subject of imperialism. He warmly sympathizes with our views and will look for some fit occasion to make a pronouncement. He wishes to put forth a practical program "that his party can stick to." I showed him Governor Boutwell's paper which he liked very much. We shall continue to correspond on the subject.

This, of course, is *strictly confidential*. It should not be made public that Mr. Cleveland will before long come out with a statement. He wants to choose his own time and a premature announcement might annoy him.

TO POMEROY BURTON¹

24 EAST 91ST ST., Feb. 5, 1903.

In response to your letter asking me to give you my views about the possibilities of a war with Germany, I have this to say: A war between the United States and Germany would be so awful, so incalculable a calamity that only the most absolute and evident necessity could serve as an excuse for it. Not even the wildest jingo on either side will pretend that such a necessity exists or is in prospect. In fact, there is no real question of difference whatever between the two countries important

¹ Managing Editor, N. Y. *World*.

enough to disturb their ancient friendship. A war between them would therefore not only be criminal, but idiotic—an absurd atrocity, a murderous nonsense. Even to suggest the possibility of such a war under such circumstances and to agitate the public mind by such suggestions is a piece of mischievous recklessness.

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

24 EAST 91ST STR., NEW YORK, Feb. 8, 1903.

Your letter of the 4th enclosing the Welsh correspondence is in my hands. I agree with you in the opinion that at present our committee should remain as much as possible in the background. I suppose you remember the petition for the continuation of the inquiry by the Senate, which had been drawn up by the Anti-Imperialist League of this city, and which I communicated to our committee at its last meeting here. I returned it to its author with our criticism on its opening paragraphs. It has been changed in accordance with that criticism and received the signatures of a considerable number of college presidents and professors and other people of similar standing who had so far not been counted among the aggressive anti-imperialists. I advised our friends here that in my opinion our committee should not appear at all on it. So it has been sent to Mr. Hoar to be presented to the Senate. This, I think, is well as it is.

I have also told Mr. Fiske Warren who is active in a movement to bring Mobini to this country that I did not think our committee should take the lead or identify itself with that matter, but that, if the thing was to be done at all, a separate committee composed of men of comparatively less conspicuous standing in this fight should be formed for that purpose.

The public interest in the general subject seems to

have been rising again since the publication of the reports of Root and Taft about the state of distress in the Philippines. Some time ago there was a large meeting assembled at the Cooper Union, filling the big hall, to listen to speeches on the condition of the Philippines by Dr. Adler, President Schurman and Edward M. Shepard. The meeting was very enthusiastic and seemed to be of one mind. There are similar reports from other parts of the country. I have a good deal of evidence that we anti-imperialists are to-day very much less regarded as "cranks" than we were three months ago. On the whole I may say that the cry of "crank" has no terror for me. I have heard it so often in connection with the anti-slavery movement, the civil-service-reform movement and other things, that I am rather used to it. It may be very fierce sometimes, but it always wears off if the cause provoking it is a good one.

TO SETH LOW

BOLTON LANDING, LAKE GEORGE, May 25, 1903.

I am sincerely sorry I cannot attend the meeting called to express the indignation of American citizens at the horrible atrocities recently committed at Kischinev. I hardly need assure you that I am heartily with you in your purpose.

While those outrages in Russia stand preëminent in their savage cruelty, it should not be forgotten that they only present one of the natural upshots of a widespread movement which in our days has put a peculiarly repulsive blot upon our vaunted civilization.

The persecution and maltreatment of human beings on account of their race or their religious belief is always an offense not only unjust to the victim, but also degrading to the offender. But the persecution and maltreatment

of the Jews as mankind has witnessed it, and is now witnessing it in several countries, has been not only especially barbarous in the ferocity of its excesses, but in a singular degree self-debasing and cowardly in the invention of the reasons adduced for its justification.

The Jews are accused of various offensive qualities and dangerous propensities. If we mean to do them anything like justice, are we not in duty bound to inquire how these qualities and propensities, so far as they may really exist, appear in the light of history?

For centuries the Jews were penned up in their ghettos and otherwise forcibly shut off from the rest of humanity, and then they were gravely accused of being clannish.

For centuries they were in most countries arbitrarily restricted in the right to hold land and to follow various civil callings, and then they were gravely accused of not taking to agriculture and of preferring to trade.

For centuries they had to defend themselves against the lawless rapacity of the powerful and against the wanton hostility of the multitude, being robbed and kicked and cuffed and spit upon like outcasts having no rights and no feelings entitled to respect; and then they were accused of having become crafty and unscrupulous in taking advantage of the opportunities left open to them.

For centuries—and even down to our day—whenever a Jew did anything conspicuously offensive, be it in the way of business unscrupulousness or of social ostentation, the cry has been—and is: “Lo, behold the Jew!” While, when a Christian did the same thing, or even ten times worse, nobody would cry: “Lo, behold the Christian!”

And now, to cap the climax, even in this age of light and progress, and in countries boasting of their mental and moral culture, we hear apostles of anti-Semitism, even persons belonging to the so-called upper classes, insist with accents of profound alarm that if the Jews be

permitted the same rights and privileges as other people, that despised race, forming so infinitesimal a part of the world's population, will surely outwit us all, and rob us of our property, and possess themselves of all the controlling forces of society; and that, therefore, the Jews must be shackled hand and foot with all sorts of legal disabilities, if not exterminated, in order to save Christendom from ignominious enslavement.

Nothing could be more absurd and at the same time more cowardly than such reasoning and such appeals. But it is to agitations inflamed by just this spirit that we owe horrors like those of Kischinev, in beholding which humanity stands aghast. These horrors are only one more revelation of the ulterior tendency of a movement which here and there even assumes the mask of superior respectability. Here is the whole question again brought before the tribunal of the conscience of mankind. May this event serve to put in clearer light the fact that the history of the world exhibits no more monumental record of monstrous injustice than the persecutions inflicted upon the Jews during so many centuries. We may then also hope to see the other fact universally recognized that wherever the Jewish race, with its wonderful vitality and its remarkable productiveness of talent and energy, enjoys the equal protection of just laws and a due appreciation of its self-respect, it will, far from remaining a race of aliens, furnish its full contingent of law-abiding, peaceable, industrious, public-spirited and patriotic citizenship, vying with the best.

TO POMEROY BURTON

BOLTON LANDING, LAKE GEORGE, N. Y.,
June 6, 1903.

I thank you for the copy of Mr. Pulitzer's "Appreciation and Apology" which you have been so kind as to send

me. It is a remarkable paper, and I have read it with far more than ordinary interest. It has a pathetic note in it that touches the heart. To judge from the tenor of it, its author certainly does not expect me to say that I liked everything I read in the *World*, and, in retrospect, we might perhaps agree as to the things not to be liked—while we might also agree as to the occasions on which its editorial page rendered great service on the field of National, State and municipal politics. Thoroughly sound and admirably put is his definition of what is and what is not true democratic and patriotic policy, and there can be no doubt that a newspaper constantly devoted to the advocacy of such principles will deserve well of the Republic. The circumstances under which we live and the problems we have to deal with demand nothing more imperatively than independent journalism—that is, journalism honestly and fearlessly treating public questions on their own merits.

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

BOLTON LANDING, LAKE GEORGE, N. Y.,
Aug. 7, 1903.

Yesterday I had a full talk with Mr. Peabody about the Philippine matter, and he was very favorably impressed. Although the "Southern Education Commission," as he said, engaged his attention as well as his means very much, he was inclined to contribute. He would think the matter over a little and then let me know how far he could go. So I may expect to hear from him very soon, and I shall promptly advise you.

Yes, the interview with General Miles is "mighty interesting reading." It is to be hoped that all these things will become public before long. What a "truthful Elihu" Mr. Root is! Has there ever been so systematic

an effort to deceive the American people and to conceal from them what they have a right to know and ought to know?

I cannot agree with you as to Judge Gray. Do you remember the despatch he wrote from Paris in which he said he was utterly unable to agree to the annexation scheme, and gave the most cogent reasons for rejecting it? And after all this he put his name to the treaty without protest, and then to accept an appointment which looked like—and which all the world regarded as—a reward for his compliance! The man who does such a thing has a weak spot in his character which makes him an uncertain quantity. The assumption that he acted in a diplomatic capacity and had to obey instructions cannot excuse him. As a peace commissioner he had much more freedom of action and was fully authorized to shape his conduct according to his own honest conviction as to what was best for his country. He failed in the great trial. If he should be nominated, it may be good policy to support him, but only as a choice between two evils.

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y., Aug. 30, 1903.

This is one of the occasions on which I wish I were rich myself, which I am not, and which I am ordinarily glad I am not. It is a great pity Welsh is no longer on the ground. He was very efficient in getting money, which I am sorry to say I am not.

I enclose two newspaper clippings on the [George] Gray case, one from the *Springfield Republican*, the other from the *Evening Post*. I have heard the same opinions expressed by several other respectable people. You see, I am not the only stickler for soundness of character in

connection with the Presidential office. When a man speaks of something "binding his conscience," it should mean something.

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y., Sept. 2, 1903.

You misapprehend me if you think that I would rather "bear the ills we have" than accept Gray. The question with me is not as between Gray and the present incumbent, but between Gray and a better Democrat for the nomination—of course not Bryan nor Gorman.

I am sorry to conclude from your letter that you have had losses from the floods in the West. But those who have much can lose much without suffering. I have given up troubling myself about money so long as I have enough for my daily needs, which are modest. I have found this to be the true philosophy of life.

Nov. 15, 1903.

The report on Philippine affairs written by Mr. Doherty is the most instructive and important paper on that subject I have ever read. Mr. Doherty is evidently a keen observer and what he says bears the mark of candor and conscientiousness. The views he opens of the manner in which the Filipinos are treated by the constabulary are startling in the highest degree. As you are aware, I am a Forty-eighter. When I look back upon the things which drove us into revolution in Germany at that period, I can only say that they were as nothing compared with the police-despotism to which the Filipinos are subjected under our flag.

The observations of Mr. Doherty on the administration of justice, on the character of the American population

there and on the aspirations of the Filipinos as to their future are of the highest value. I think this paper ought by all means to be brought to the notice of President Roosevelt. He ought to be made to read the whole of it.

There is one point on which I do not agree with Mr. Doherty. It is his recommendation as to the *plebiscitum* to be taken after the lapse of ten years. The ten years would, in my opinion, be years of nervous unrest and suspense for the Filipinos, and that time would be used by the exploiters for no end of intrigue and machination to prove that the Filipinos are unfit for independence. What the Philippines need is as large a measure of certainty as to the future as can be given them, and that can be accomplished only by a definite promise of independence at as early a day as possible. But this does not affect the facts of the report. Would it not be well to put Mr. Doherty's paper into the hands of Governor Taft before he reaches Washington? He would find in it the candid word of a friend and perhaps some new revelations as to the problems he has to deal with.

TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

24 EAST 91ST ST., NEW YORK, Dec. 29, 1903.

According to your wish I herewith return to you Mr. [James S.] Clarkson's letter, and I thank you sincerely for the kind words you have written me about my paper on the negro question.¹ They were most welcome and, I assure you, I appreciate them very highly. Of the many letters I have received on this occasion, yours was certainly the most gratifying surprise. Now let us hope that my appeal may exercise some influence on the Southern mind.

I thank you also for the explanations you have given

¹ The article on "Can the South Solve the Negro Problem?" which follows.

me of your action on various subjects with regard to which my sympathies have always been, and are now, in point of principle on your side. You are undoubtedly right in saying that the race question in its various phases and effects presents a much more bewildering puzzle than the question of capital and labor—perplexing as that is—because matters of mere interest are accessible to reason and argument, while matters of feeling inflamed by prejudice usually are not. Therefore I deem it so important that the campaign of education against race-antagonism in the South should in the main be undertaken and carried on by Southern men and women who would at once disarm the charge of “foreign” interference with home conditions which will always confront Northern advisers. The deplorable excitement called forth by your comparatively scanty appointments of colored persons in the South is only an exhibition of the unreasonableness and injustice of the race-prejudice and of the spasmodic character of its eruptions, which we have to bear with patience in the hope that gradually the Southern mind may be made to open itself to a perception of the utter absurdity and banefulness of its racial hysterics.

In your letter you refer to the fact that you have occasionally taken the advice of Booker Washington about the appointment to office of colored persons. Pardon me for remarking that, when I found at the time mention of this fact in the newspapers, it caused me some anxiety—not as if I had feared that his advice might not be candid and wise, which it undoubtedly was, but because I thought that Booker Washington was so peculiarly valuable a man and his mission so important and at the same time so delicate that he should most carefully be kept free of all contact with politics—especially that part of politics which has to do with patronage. Do you not think so?

Let me add that, in memory of old times, it does me

good to speak with you on things on which we substantially agree, while it makes me feel more keenly the sorrowful regret that there are other things of fundamental importance on which we differ. But no more of this now. I would only repeat that I thank you heartily for your kind letter; and I say this as one whose course is nearly run, who is retired from the activities of politics, except that he may now and then express in print his opinion on this or that matter of public interest, and to whom it is the greatest pleasure to find something to praise, instead of something to blame.

Wishing you and your family a happy new year, I am,
Sincerely yours.

CAN THE SOUTH SOLVE THE NEGRO PROBLEM?¹

In the recent public discussions of the race problem in the United States, occasional reference has been made to a report submitted by me to President Johnson in 1865. At the request of the President I had visited the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana for the purpose of studying their condition and of laying the results of my observations before him. It may be profitable at the present moment to recall that condition, inasmuch as thus some light may be shed upon the origin and purpose of the so-called reconstruction measures, to which the gravest of the difficulties prevailing in the Southern country are now attributed.

When I set out on that tour of investigation, only three months had elapsed since the close of the civil war. The Confederate soldiers had but recently returned to their homes. They found those homes, wherever touched by military operations, more or less devastated, and, in almost every instance, in a greatly neglected if not dilapidated

¹ *McClure's Magazine*, Jan., 1904.

state. During the civil war the resources of the South had wholly been devoted to the support of the Confederate Government and its armies, and therefore, economically speaking, wasted. The Confederate money in the hands of the Southern people was absolutely worthless. Want and misery stared them in the face. Their sustenance, for the time being, depended on the crops to be raised that summer. Until then the plantations had been cultivated by slave labor. But the slaves had been declared free. During the war a large number of the negroes had still remained on the plantations doing their accustomed work. But the complete discomfiture of the Southern armies made the decree of emancipation effective everywhere. Negro slavery had come to a sudden end, and thus the whole agricultural labor system of the South, the only labor system known and believed in by the Southern people, was entirely upset and made inoperative.

It is not surprising that, mortified by their defeat and chafing under the urgent necessities of their situation, the white people of the South should have been in a desperate state of mind—a state of mind eminently unfitted for calm and judicious reasoning, and especially for the solution of problems calling for equanimity and patience. But for this excited state of mind they would perhaps at once have recognized the fact that the emancipation of the slaves was irrevocable, and that the only sensible and profitable course open to the late master class was to accommodate themselves to the new order of things as best they could and to set the former slaves to work as free laborers, peaceably, in a friendly spirit, and on fair terms. But two things stood in the way. One was a traditional and stubborn prejudice. Wherever on my tour of investigation I tried to discuss with Southern men the immediate problem to be solved, which I did every day, I was constantly met by the assertion, "You cannot

make the negro work without physical compulsion." In the language of my report:

I heard this hundreds of times, heard it wherever I went, heard it in nearly the same words from so many different persons that at last I came to the conclusion that this was the prevailing sentiment among the Southern people. There were exceptions to this rule, but far from enough to affect the rule. In the accompanying documents you will find an abundance of proof in support of this statement. There is hardly a paper relative to the negro question annexed to this report which does not, in some direct or indirect way, corroborate it. Unfortunately, the disorders necessarily growing out of the transition state continually furnished food for argument. I found but few people who were willing to make due allowance for the adverse influence of exceptional circumstances. By a large majority of those I came in contact with, and they mostly belonged to the more intelligent class, every irregularity that occurred was directly charged against the system of free labor. If negroes walked away from the plantations, it was conclusive proof of the incorrigible instability of the negro and the impracticability of free labor. If some individual negro violated the terms of his contract, it proved unanswerably that no negro had or ever would have a just conception of the binding force of a contract, and that this system of free negro labor was bound to be a failure. If some negroes shirked or did not perform their task with sufficient alacrity, it was produced as irrefutable evidence to show that physical compulsion was absolutely indispensable to make the negro work. If negro idlers or refugees crawling about the towns applied to the authorities for subsistence, it was quoted as incontestably establishing the point that the negro was too improvident to take care of himself and must necessarily be consigned to the care of a master. I heard a Georgia planter argue most seriously that one of his negroes had shown himself certainly unfit for freedom because he impudently refused to submit to a whipping. I frequently went into an argument with those putting forth such general assertions, quoting instances in which negro

laborers were working faithfully and to the entire satisfaction of their employers, as the employers themselves informed me. In a majority of cases the reply was that we Northern people did not understand the negro, but that they (the Southerners) did; that, as to the particular instances I quoted, I was probably mistaken; that I had not closely investigated the cases or had been deceived by my informants; that *they knew* the negro would not work without compulsion, and that no one could make them believe he would. Arguments like these naturally finished such discussions. It frequently struck me that persons who conversed about every other subject calmly and sensibly would lose their temper as soon as the negro question was touched.

Of course, the natural impulse of people entertaining such sentiments, and exasperated by their immediate necessities, was to resort to that "physical compulsion" without which, in their opinion, the negro would not work. For this they found, unfortunately, not infrequent occasion in the conduct of a certain number of negroes. In one respect the behavior of the negroes immediately after their emancipation was remarkable. It is probable that some of them had suffered cruel punishments or other harsh treatment while in the condition of slavery; but not one act of vengeance on the part of a negro after emancipation is on record. On the contrary, there were many instances of singularly faithful and self-sacrificing attachment of negroes to their former masters and their families. Neither could they, at that period, be charged with many criminal excesses beyond pig and chicken stealing. But their ideas as to what use they might or should make of their newly won freedom were rather dim and confused. A good many of them, probably indeed a very large majority, remained on the plantations and continued their work under some sort of contract arrangement with their former masters. But other colored

people, a not inconsiderable number, followed the natural impulse of testing the quality of their freedom by walking away from the places on which they had been held to labor, and by wandering to the nearest town or military post "to have a good time" for a while. Still others made contracts with the planters and then broke them with or without cause. All this and much more of the same sort would, under the circumstances, not have appeared surprising to cool and unprejudiced minds, but rather as the inevitable concomitant of so great a revolution as was the sudden liberation from slavery of several millions of human beings. These were comparatively slight disorders which, if kindly and prudently met, would in a great measure soon have been righted. But against these irregular movements, "physical compulsion," without which, in the Southerner's opinion, the negroes would not work at all, was fiercely put in action. Some planters held back their former slaves on their plantations by brute force. Armed bands of white men patrolled the country roads to drive back the negroes wandering about. Dead bodies of murdered negroes were found on and near the highways and by-paths. Gruesome reports came from the hospitals—reports of colored men and women whose ears had been cut off, whose skulls had been broken by blows, whose bodies had been slashed with knives or lacerated with scourges. A number of such cases I had occasion to examine myself. A veritable reign of terror prevailed in many parts of the South. The negro found scant justice in the local courts against the white man. He could look for protection only to the military forces of the United States still garrisoning the "States lately in rebellion" and to the Freedmen's Bureau—that Freedmen's Bureau, the original purpose of which was to act as an intermediary between the planters and the emancipated slaves, the white and the black, to aid them in the making

of equitable contract arrangements, and, generally, in organizing the new free labor system for the benefit of both. It would have been an institution of the greatest value under competent leadership, had not its organization been to some extent invaded by mentally and morally unfit persons. That this imperfect organization and the corresponding failures in its conduct prevented it in so large a measure from accomplishing its object, cannot be too much deplored. For nothing was more needed at that time than an authority standing between the late master and the late slave, commanding and possessing the confidence and respect of both, to aid the emancipated black man in making the best possible use of his unaccustomed freedom, and to aid the white man, to whom free negro labor was a well-nigh inconceivable idea, in meeting the difficulties which partly existed in reality and were partly conjured up by the white man's prejudice and inflamed imagination.

That the Freedmen's Bureau actually did much valuable service in this direction cannot be denied. It did protect many freedmen against violence and prevailed on many others to abstain from breaking their contracts with white men, and to stay at work. It helped in developing the work of education among the blacks which had been started by benevolent Northern people with admirable energy and self-sacrifice during the civil war, wherever the National army controlled any district of country largely peopled by blacks. But the shortcomings of the general management of the Freedmen's Bureau, and the ill-suited qualifications of some of its agents and representatives, greatly impaired that moral authority which was especially required for so comprehensive and delicate a task.

The second great difficulty, and of worse effect even than the partial failure of the Freedmen's Bureau, was the

precipitate course of President Johnson with regard to the reconstruction of the Southern State governments. During the civil war, and even immediately after his election to the Vice-Presidency, Mr. Johnson was one of the fiercest "Rebel-haters." His "loyalty" to the Union was of the most unforgiving, most uncompromising and merciless kind. The burden of his daily talk was that "rebellion was treason and that treason was a crime which must be made odious," that this was to be accomplished by meting out the severest punishment to the instigators and leaders of the rebellion, and that "hanging was not too good for them." There seemed to be reason for apprehending that, if Mr. Johnson should come into power, the victory of the Union armies might be tarnished by relentless severity in the treatment of the vanquished. But no sooner had he actually been raised to power by the assassination of Lincoln, than he began to initiate a policy which, if carried through, would have subjected the "States lately in rebellion" almost instantly and absolutely to the control of the men whom but recently he had denounced as fit for the gallows.

In June, 1865, he issued a proclamation concerning the reorganization of the State government of North Carolina, some provisions of which were judged by many friends of the Administration as somewhat hasty. Letters expressing that opinion were received by the President, and similar criticism appeared in several of the most important newspapers. It was at that time that the President surprised me with the request that I should investigate the conditions prevailing in the Gulf States for him. In the conversations preceding my departure for the South he designated his North Carolina proclamation, not as the expression of a fixed plan definitely determined upon, but as an "experiment." Before going further, he "would wait and see" how the proposed method of reconstruction

might work practically. But he did not wait and see. He caused it to be generally understood that the "States lately in rebellion" would speedily be reconstructed, their people, meaning the white people, to elect their legislatures and executive as well as judicial officers, as before the war. When asked by the provisional governor of Mississippi, and other Southern men, for permission to organize the local militia, he readily gave his consent; whereupon the provisional governor of Mississippi forthwith called upon "the young men of the State who had so distinguished themselves for gallantry"—meaning of course Confederate soldiers—to respond promptly to this call. The result was that efforts were made to reorganize county patrols which "had already been in existence, and had to be disbanded on account of their hostility to Northern people and freedmen."

The known attitude of President Johnson concerning the speedy reconstruction of the "States lately in rebellion" produced an effect that might easily have been foreseen. The white people of the South might have accommodated themselves in good faith to the introduction of free labor in the place of slavery, in spite of their prejudices and their traditional habits of life, had that introduction been presented to them as a stern and inexorable necessity. A good many of the difficulties standing in its way would have been overcome had the white people become convinced that there was absolutely nothing else to do. But when they heard that the President was willing, and even eager, without delay to put the entire management of their internal affairs into their hands again, they saw the way open for a sweeping reaction against the emancipation policy. The temptation was irresistible. The conviction that the negro would not work without physical compulsion grew stronger among them than ever. A little over two months after the close of the war, one of

the provisional governors admitted that the people in his State still indulged in the lingering hope that slavery might yet be preserved. That lingering hope now spread visibly. In public argument the emancipation proclamation was by hot-headed extremists denounced as unconstitutional and of no force, and this denunciation was frantically applauded by large multitudes. Although the necessity of accepting the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution was generally recognized, it was hoped that it could effectively be neutralized by State and municipal action. Various parishes in Louisiana and municipal bodies in other States adopted ordinances of which provisions like the following, constantly recurring, were characteristic:

No negro or freedman shall be allowed to come within the limits of the town without special permission from his employer, specifying the object of his visit and the time necessary for the accomplishment of the same. Whoever shall violate this provision shall suffer imprisonment and two days' work in the public streets or shall pay a fine of \$2.50.

Every negro is required to be in the regular service of some white person or former owner, who shall be responsible for the conduct of said negro. But said employer or former owner may permit said negro to hire his own time by special permission in writing, which permit shall not extend over seven days at any one time. Any negro violating the provisions of this section shall be fined \$5 for each offense or in default of the payment thereof shall be forced to work five days on the public road or suffer corporal punishment as hereinafter provided.

No public meetings or congregations of negroes shall be allowed after sunset, but such public meetings and congregations may be held between the hours of sunrise and sunset, by the special permission in writing of the Captain of patrol within whose beat such meetings should take place. This prohibition, however, is not intended to prevent negroes from the usual church services conducted by white ministers and

priests. (Fine for violating this provision \$5, or five days' work on the public road or corporal punishment.)

No negro shall be permitted to preach, exhort or otherwise declaim to congregations of colored people without special permission in writing from the president of the Police Jury. (Fine \$10 or ten days' work or corporal punishment.)

No negro shall sell, barter or exchange any article of merchandise without the special written permission of his employer, specifying the articles of sale or barter or traffic. (Fine \$1 for each offense, forfeiture of said articles, or work on the public road or corporal punishment.)

All the foregoing provisions shall apply to negroes of both sexes.

It shall be the duty of every citizen to act as a police officer for the detection of offenses and the apprehension of offenders who shall be immediately handed over to the proper captain or chief of patrol.

The aforesaid penalties shall be summarily enforced, and it shall be the duty of the captains and chief of patrol to see that the aforesaid ordinances are promptly executed.

Evidently the condition of the person laboring under such ordinances would be, if not slavery in terms, something closely akin to it. Under such a regime the negro, if only temporarily the slave of an individual owner, would always have been the slave of the white people at large. When, as was provided in some of the ordinances, "every citizen," meaning, of course, every white man, was authorized and commanded "to act as a police officer for the detection of such offenses and the apprehension of such offenders," and when such "penalties were to be summarily enforced," and it was put in the power and made the duty of captains and chiefs of patrol to see that the aforesaid ordinances were promptly executed, the freedman in name was little, if at all, better than a slave in fact.

The men who designed and formulated such ordinances, which in a somewhat changed form reappeared in the

enactments of Southern legislatures, hoped, of course, that they would be permitted to carry them out, and they believed they saw in President Johnson's attitude excellent reason for that hope. It was not surprising that under such circumstances acts of violence against freedmen multiplied, that the patrols or "militia companies" became more active in capturing stray negroes and that the reign of terror grew more and more like that of the old slavery times. The only influence which to some extent restrained this violent reactionary movement consisted in the continual presence of the Federal troops, who, at that time, were governed by the orders of the War Department under Secretary Edwin M. Stanton. The protection of the freedmen by the Federal forces was, of course, submitted to by the whites, but in most cases sullenly and with an important mental reservation. With the same mental reservation—a reservation not at all concealed but openly avowed—several things were submitted to, the acceptance of which was known to be necessary in order to bring about the restoration of the Southern States to full control of their local affairs.

On this point I said in my report to President Johnson:

When speaking of popular demonstrations in the South in favor of submission to the Government, I stated that the principal and almost the only argument used, was that they found themselves in a situation in which they could do no better. It was the same thing with regard to the abolition of slavery. If abolition was publicly acquiesced in, whether in popular meetings or in State conventions, it was on the ground of necessity—not infrequently with the significant addition that, as soon as they had once more control of their own State affairs, they would settle the labor question to suit themselves, whatever they might have to submit to for the present. Not only did I find this to be the common talk among the people, but the same sentiment was openly avowed by public men in speech

and print. Some declarations of that kind, made by persons of great prominence, have passed into the newspapers and are undoubtedly known to you. I append to this report a specimen, not as something particularly remarkable, but in order to present the current sentiment as expressed in the language of a candidate for a seat in the State convention of Mississippi. It is a card addressed to the voters of Wilkinson County, Mississippi, by General W. L. Brandon. The General complains of having been called an "unconditional emancipationist, an abolitionist." He indignantly repels the charge and avows himself a good pro-slavery man. "But, fellow-citizens," says he, "what I may in common with you have to submit to, is a very different thing. Slavery has been taken from us; the power that has already practically abolished it threatens totally and forever to abolish it. But does it follow that I am in favor of this thing? By no means. My honest conviction is, we must accept the situation as it is, until we can get control once more of our own State affairs. We cannot do otherwise to get our place again in the Union, and occupy a position, exert an influence, that will protect us against greater evils which threaten us. I must, as any other man who votes or holds an office, submit for the time to evils I cannot remedy." General Brandon has only put in print what, as my observations lead me to believe, a majority of the people say even in more emphatic language; and the deliberations of several legislatures in that part of the country show what it means.

The same expectation served also to embarrass and impede the efforts made for the education of the freedmen. Aside from several honorable exceptions, I found the popular prejudice against negro education almost as bitter as it had been when slavery still existed. Hundreds of times I heard the old assertion repeated that "learning will spoil the negro for work," and that "negro education would be the ruin of the South," and in innumerable instances I discovered symptoms of the amazing notion that "the elevation of the blacks would be the degradation

of the whites." The consequence of all this was that, in a large number of places, negro schools could be established and maintained only under the immediate protection of the Federal troops, and that, once the military garrisons were withdrawn, schoolhouses would be set on fire and the teachers driven off. This opposition to negro schools, too, received a strong impulse from the expectation so much encouraged by President Johnson, that the late slave States would soon again be in unrestricted control of their home affairs, and that negro education, being an impediment in the way of reestablishment of an order of things nearly akin to slavery, would then again be done away with.

Such was the condition of things in the late Confederate States shortly after the civil war. In investigating it at the request of President Johnson, I honestly endeavored to see things as they were; I neglected no source of information open to me; I talked with all classes of people and improved every opportunity to observe with my own eyes. And when I reported to the President, I took care rather to understate than to overcolor my facts and conclusions, and as much as possible to let my authorities speak for themselves.

To recapitulate: The white people of the South were harassed by pressing necessities, and most of them in a troubled and greatly excited state of mind. The emancipation of the slaves had destroyed the traditional labor system upon which they had depended. Free negro labor was still inconceivable to them. There were exceptions, but, as a rule, their ardent, and, in a certain sense, not unnatural, desire was to resist its introduction and to save or restore as much of the slave labor system as possible. The Government of the Union was in duty and honor bound to maintain the emancipation of the slaves, and to introduce free labor. The solution of such a prob-

lem would have been extremely difficult under any circumstances. It was in this case especially complicated by the partial failure of the Freedmen's Bureau, and still more by the decided encouragement given to the reactionary tendency prevailing among the Southern whites, by the attitude of President Johnson which permitted the Southern whites to expect that they would soon have the power to reestablish something similar to slave labor.

There was, no doubt, a general and sincere desire among the Northern people to restore the "States lately in rebellion" to their Constitutional functions as soon as this could be done with safety to the freedom of the emancipated slaves and the effective introduction of the free labor system in those States. The maintenance of the freedom of the emancipated blacks and the establishment of an order of things in which their rights would be safe were universally recognized as binding duties.

Those in power, mindful of that duty, saw a clear alternative before them: either the "States lately in rebellion" had to be kept under military rule until the Southern whites would have so accustomed themselves to the new order of things that the rights of the freedmen and the development of free labor would no longer require military protection, or the freedmen had to be endowed with a certain measure of political power so that they might be enabled to protect themselves in the enjoyment of their rights.

As to the first horn of the dilemma, the continuation of military rule in the South was difficult and highly objectionable for several reasons. The troops still occupying the Southern States consisted largely of war volunteers, many of whom, since the real war was over, were anxious, and claimed the right, to go home. But the protection of the rights of the freedmen and the introduction of the free labor system required the presence of a great many

garrisons, to be scattered all over the Southern country, and therefore a large number of soldiers. Moreover, the maintenance of military government in the South for an indefinite time would have been extremely undesirable, even if the necessary number of soldiers could have been ever so easily procured—for the reason that military rule as such is on general principles in the highest degree uncongenial to the spirit of our free institutions; and for the additional reason that the exercise of extraordinary powers by military garrisons in a conquered country is very apt to bring forth grave abuses, and that garrison life of just that kind, under just such circumstances, is eminently calculated to exercise a very demoralizing influence upon soldiers, especially upon volunteer soldiers, after a victorious campaign. It seemed therefore highly expedient that the necessity of indefinitely continuing military rule in the South be obviated in some way.

On the other hand, to enable the freedmen to protect themselves by the exercise of a certain measure of political power, was a problem hardly less perplexing. This could be done only by putting into their hands the ballot as a defensive weapon. That the great mass of the negroes would not use the ballot intelligently and with conscientious care was indeed apprehended by every thoughtful person. That it would have been vastly preferable to introduce colored suffrage gradually, and perhaps dependent upon certain qualifications, if that had been practicable by Federal action, was also admitted by many, if not most, of those who were in favor of making the negro a voter. But while it was foreseen that the exercise of suffrage by the bulk of the negroes in the South might bring forth unwelcome results, it was thought that those results might in the long run prove not as deplorable as would be those to be expected from an indefinite continuation of military rule; that the Southern people might

see fit to subject the suffrage in their States to suitable qualifications equally applicable to whites and blacks; that the negro voters might be guided by wise leadership; and finally that, whatever might happen, this escape from the perplexing dilemma was after all the most in consonance with our principles of democratic government—a government the blessings of which cannot be had without the risk of its bringing forth concomitant troubles.

I am convinced that this statement fairly represents the line of reasoning prevalent among thinking men in the North who at that time favored negro suffrage. To judge from certain of their public utterances, it is now believed by many Southern men that negro suffrage was imposed upon the South from motives of hatred or vindictiveness. Nothing could be farther from the truth. There was indeed here and there some fierce language indulged in, the war passions not having completely subsided. It is also true that the reckless policy and the intemperate utterances of President Johnson had made the anti-slavery men in the country and the Republican majority in Congress suspect that their cause had been betrayed by the President, and that the most trenchant measures were necessary to baffle that treachery. And thus one of the most intricate problems of our history became involved in a passionate political fray, well apt to heat men's minds and to make many of them reckless of consequences. But I can confidently affirm—and I had at the time very large opportunities for personal observation—that the serious and influential men favoring negro suffrage were not controlled by any feeling of hatred or vindictiveness but by the sober consideration that the legitimate results of the war—among them, in the first line, the abolition of slavery and the establishment of free labor in the South—were in very serious danger of being rendered practically inoperative, if not entirely annulled, by the reactionary movement in

the South, and that the grant of the ballot to the negroes would be, all things considered, the most democratic as well as the most practicable means to thwart such a reaction.

It has since, in view of the fact that negro suffrage did not give good government to the South and did not secure the negro himself in the safe enjoyment of his rights, been asserted and widely accepted that the endowment of the recently liberated slaves with the suffrage was the worst mistake that could have been committed under the circumstances. I am far from denying that negro suffrage, as first exercised, brought on great scandals in the State and municipal governments in the South, and that it did not succeed in securing the negro in his rights; but it must not be forgotten that negro suffrage was resorted to in a situation so complicated that whatever might have been done to solve the most pressing problems would have appeared a colossal mistake in the light of subsequent developments. Would it have been better to leave the "States lately in rebellion" immediately after the war entirely to themselves? No one well acquainted with the drift of things in the South at that period will have the slightest doubt that such a policy, in spite of the acceptance of the Thirteenth Amendment, would have resulted in the substantial reënslavement of the freedmen, with incalculable troubles to follow. Would it have been better to keep the South under military rule until the free labor problem in the late slave States should have been satisfactorily solved? It is very questionable whether an indefinite continuation of military rule would not have resulted in abuses, and more or less permanent evils, so great that the latter-day critic might, quite pertinently, ask: "Why did not the statesmen of those times obviate the necessity of continuing military rule by granting to the freedmen the necessary political power to protect themselves?"

It should be remembered that so tremendous a social revolution as the sudden transformation of almost the whole laboring force of a large country from slaves into free men could never have been effected quite smoothly without producing hot conflicts of antagonistic interests and feelings, and without giving birth to problems seeming for a time almost impossible of solution. The troubles brought upon us by so sweeping a change as the sudden abolition of slavery were, after all, the common fate of humanity under like circumstances. It is only a question of more or less, and we have, perhaps, not more than our inevitable share.

The introduction of negro suffrage in the South took place under peculiarly unfavorable circumstances. The evils apt to follow the injection of such a mass of ignorance as an active element into the body politic might have been greatly mitigated had the colored voters fallen under conscientious and wise leadership. No greater misfortune could have happened than that this leadership was actually seized in several Southern States by unscrupulous adventurers, most of whom had come from the North to exploit the confusion prevailing in the Southern country for their personal profit, while also some Southern men of similar character and purpose followed their example. I do not, indeed, mean to say that all the Republican leaders in the South belonged to that class, for there were very honorable and patriotic men among them. But in some of the States the demagogues and rascals were the most successful in pressing to the front and in obtaining the control of affairs. Then followed the so-called carpet-bag governments—a mimicry of legislation by negroes, some of whom were moderately educated, while some were mere plantation hands, led by a set of cunning rogues who were bent upon filling their pockets quickly. It is difficult to exaggerate the extravagances, corrupt

practices and downright robberies perpetrated under those governments.

That the Southern whites, especially those who had any material stake in their communities, should not have been willing long to tolerate such shameful and ruinous misrule, is not at all surprising. But that statesmen of good character and high position in the National Government should have been willing systematically to sustain that misrule, is a fact which the historian will find it difficult to explain, unless he accepts the theory that selfish party spirit will sometimes seduce public men in approving, or even doing, on the political field, things from which they would shrink with disgust in private life. It is true that the opposition to the carpet-bag governments in the South took a lawless character and brought forth a large number of bloody outrages. But while duly striving to repress those outrages, the Administration and the Republican majority in Congress should not have forgotten that the provocation for the violent opposition to carpet-bag misrule was such as would hardly have been withstood by any spirited people on earth, and that the disorder could not possibly be allayed so long as that rapacious misrule continued by its excesses to provoke it. But party spirit did seem to forget this. Expecting to keep the Southern States under Republican control and thus to fortify the Republican majorities in Congress and in the Electoral College, the party leaders in power insisted upon supporting the carpet-bag governments, even by military interference, to an extent now hardly credible, and upon continuing the system of political disabilities by which those who had occupied certain positions under the Confederate Government were excluded from the suffrage as well as from eligibility to office, while the negro was endowed with the ballot and made eligible to political positions. It is hardly necessary to say to-day that the true policy in the

public interest would have been to accompany the introduction of negro suffrage with a general amnesty admitting to political activity and position that element which no doubt represented the best intelligence of the South, and at that time, also, the most conciliatory impulses. It is doubtful whether excessive party spirit has ever in our history played a more mischievous part than it did in this instance.

When, in 1877, the Hayes Administration came into power, the controlling influence of that party spirit was at an end. The Administration called some of the most prominent and highly respected Southern leaders into conference to secure their influence for the protection of the emancipated negroes in the enjoyment of their rights, while the countenance of the National authority was withdrawn from the carpet-bag governments. The Southern leaders, thus consulted, promised their best endeavors, whereupon the Federal troops were removed from the South and the carpet-bag governments quickly disappeared one after another. I have no doubt the Southern leaders in question had given their promise in perfect good faith, and have honestly exerted themselves to stem in their respective States the movements hostile to the rights of the freedmen. But their influence was not strong enough to resist the prevailing current. Indeed, the bloody outrages ceased in a great measure. But the efforts to overcome or nullify the negro vote by illegitimate means did not cease. The rudest form of force was supplanted by artifice. Tissue ballots, puzzling arrangements of the ballot boxes and all possible devices human ingenuity can invent were resorted to for this purpose, and with great success.

Early in 1885, after the election of Mr. Cleveland to the Presidency, I visited the South again. The negroes had been told, and very many of them had believed it, that

the election of a Democratic President would be immediately followed by the restoration of slavery. When month after month had passed after the dreaded event without any startling commotion of that kind, the apprehension subsided and some intelligent colored men conceived the idea that it would be the best policy for their race in the South to divide the colored vote between the two political parties and thus to win friends and protectors on both sides. At the same time a fresh breeze of industrial enterprise and development was blowing in the South, encouraging the hope that the growing up of new economic interests would bring forth new political alignments, and thus gradually loosen the so far rigid adherence of the Southern whites to one party organization. This would, of course, have facilitated the division of the negro vote. By such agencies many troubles in the internal condition of the South might have been allayed and the way to a final solution of the puzzling and dangerous problem prepared, had not the race-antipathy overshadowed almost all political thought among the Southern whites. With a majority of them—apparently a large majority—the desire not merely to control or reduce in strength but entirely to suppress the colored vote seemed to overrule every other consideration, and to this end, they finally resorted to the adoption of provisions in some of their State constitutions by which in various indirect ways the grant of the suffrage to the negro was to be made substantially inoperative, without in terms directly disfranchising the negro as such altogether. The colored people were thus effectively stripped of the political power by the exercise of which they had been expected to protect their own rights.

That the suppression of the negro franchise by direct or indirect means is in contravention of the spirit and intent of the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States hardly admits of doubt. The evident intent of the Constitution is that the colored people shall have the right of suffrage on an equal footing with the white people. The intent of the provisions of the State constitutions in question, as avowed by many Southern men, is that the colored people shall not vote. However plausibly it may be demonstrated by ingenious argument that the provisions in the State constitutions are not in conflict with the National Constitution, or that, if they are, their purpose could be effectively thwarted by judicial decisions—yet it remains true that by many, if not by all, of their authors they were expressly designed to defeat the universally known and recognized intent of a provision of the National Constitution.

Can it be said by way of moral justification that the colored people have deserved to be deprived of their rights as a punishment for something they have done? It is an undisputed matter of history that they came to this country not of their own volition, that they were not intruders, but that they were brought here by force to serve the selfishness of white men; that they did such service as slaves patiently and submissively for two and a half centuries; that even during a war which was waged, incidentally if not directly, for their deliverance, a large majority of them faithfully continued to serve their masters while these were fighting to keep them in slavery; that they were emancipated, not by any insurrectionary act of theirs, but by the act of the Government; that when, after their emancipation, they confronted their old masters as free men, they did not, so far as known, commit a single act of vengeance for cruelties they may have suffered while in slavery; that the right of suffrage was given to them, not in obedience to any irresistible urgency on their part, but by the National power wielded by white men, to enable the emancipated colored people to protect their

own rights; and that when their exercise of the suffrage brought forth in some States foolish extravagances and corrupt government it was again principally owing to the leadership of white men, who worked themselves into their confidence and, for their own profit, led them astray.

The only plausible reason given for that curtailment of their rights is that it is not in the interest of the Southern whites to permit the blacks to vote. I will not discuss here the moral aspect of the question, whether "A" may deprive "B" of his rights if "A" thinks it in his own interest to do so, and the further question, whether the general admission of such a principle would not banish justice from the earth and eventually carry human society back into barbarism. I will rather discuss the question whether under existing circumstances it would really be the true interest of the Southern whites generally to disfranchise the colored people.

Here I encounter the objection that this is not a question for me, or any other Northern man, to discuss; that the Southern whites understand their own interests best, and that, more especially, they know best how to deal with the negro. I cannot accept this without serious qualification. Undoubtedly there are in the South men who understand their own and their neighbors' interests best; but there are others who do not understand those interests at all, and whose opinions in several important historic instances have overruled the opinions of those who did. I remember cases in which a large and controlling majority of the Southern whites made grievous mistakes as to the true interests of the South—cases in which they would have acted most wisely had they accepted the advice of well-meaning outsiders, whom, in the excitement of the moment, they repelled as impudently intrusive critics, and whom they even put down as their enemies. I have seen the time when it was the belief of an apparently

overwhelming majority of the Southern whites that the "peculiar institution" of slavery was an economic, moral, social and political blessing, while, in fact, slavery as the predominant interest, making everything else subordinate to itself, weighed down, like an incubus, industry, commercial enterprise, popular education—everything that constitutes progressive civilization. I remember the time when an apparently irresistible sentiment drove the Southern whites into a reckless war for the purpose of founding an independent empire on the corner-stone of slavery, while sober judgment would have told them that their resources were unequal to the task, and that, even if they had proved themselves equal, an empire so founded could not possibly have stood against the civilization of the age. I have heard them, after the war, insist, with an almost unanimous voice, that they knew the negro better than anybody else did and that "the negro would not work without physical compulsion." Subsequent developments have proved that in this respect their judgment was glaringly at fault; and here is that proof: In 1860 the cotton crop, raised by slave labor under the system of "physical compulsion," was 4,861,000 bales. In 1898 the cotton crop was 11,216,000 bales, and in 1899, 11,256,000 bales. A portion of these crops was, no doubt, cultivated by whites. But it will hardly be denied that by far the larger part was raised by negro labor, while a considerable portion of the colored people did not work on cotton plantations; and the crops in 1898 and 1899 were raised while the negro, as a rule, did not labor under physical compulsion. It is thus conclusively demonstrated by undisputed fact that the Southern whites who after the close of the war almost unanimously insisted that the "negro would not work without physical compulsion" were signally wrong as to what means must be used "to make the negro work." The list of such mistakes

of judgment might be largely extended. After such proofs of the fallibility of the Southern mind on vital points as to the interest of the South, and the negro question in particular, Northern men may be pardoned if they hesitate to accept the doctrine that the Southern whites as a rule "know all about" that problem, that their treatment of it stands above criticism, and that, therefore, Northern men should abstain from discussing the question whether it would really be the true interest of the Southern whites under present circumstances to disfranchise the colored people generally. We may, therefore, fairly discuss the matter, especially as it has a National bearing.

Negro suffrage is plausibly objected to on the ground that the great bulk of the colored population of the South are very ignorant. This is true. But the same is true of a large portion of the white population. If the suffrage is dangerous in the hands of certain voters on account of their ignorance, it is as dangerous in the hands of ignorant whites as in the hands of ignorant blacks. To remedy this, two things might be done: to establish an educational test for admission to the suffrage, excluding illiterates; and, secondly, to provide for systems of public instruction so as gradually to do away with illiteracy, subjecting whites and blacks alike to the same restrictions and opening to them the same opportunities. This would be easily assented to by the Southern whites if the real or the principal objection to negro suffrage consisted in the ignorance of the black men. It is also said "that education unfits the negro for work." This is true in so far as it makes many negroes unwilling to devote themselves to the ordinary plantation labor, encouraging them to look for work more congenial to their abilities and tastes, and sometimes even seducing them to live upon their wits without work. But the same, then, is true in regard to white men. The increasing disinclination of young white persons to

walk behind the plow or to attend to the milking of cows in the solitude of farm life, and the spreading among them of the desire to enjoy a pleasanter existence and to do easier and finer work in the cities, which we observe all around us in the North, with no little anxiety as to what it may at last lead to, is no doubt largely attributable to the natural effects of popular education. But if here, at the North, the question were asked whether for this reason popular education should be restricted to the end of increasing the fitness and taste for farm work among our people, there would hardly be an audible voice of assent.

That the evil of ignorance as an active element on the political field presents a more serious and complicated problem in the South than in the North cannot be denied, for the mass of ignorance precipitated into the body politic by the enfranchisement of the blacks is so much greater there than here. But most significant and of evil augury is the fact that with many of the Southern whites a well-educated colored voter is as objectionable as an ignorant one, or even more objectionable, simply on account of his color. It is, therefore, not mere dread of ignorance in the voting body that arouses the Southern whites against the colored voters. It is race-antagonism, and that race-antagonism presents a problem more complicated and perplexing than most others, because it is apt to be unreasoning. It creates violent impulses which refuse to be argued with. One of the worst effects the predominance of the slavery interest produced upon the public mind in the old days consisted in the despotic virulence with which in the South it suppressed the freedom of inquiry and discussion with regard to a matter which in the highest degree concerned the welfare of the Southern people. The expression of any opinion hostile to slavery was fiercely resented as an attack upon an institution which must not be touched, a sort of sacrilegious attempt

to subvert the very foundations of Southern society. Had the same freedom of inquiry and discussion prevailed in the South which prevailed in other parts of the country, the civil war would probably have been prevented. The race-antipathy now heating the Southern mind threatens again to curtail the freedom of inquiry and discussion there—perhaps not to the same extent, but sufficiently to produce infinite mischief by preventing an open-minded consideration of one of the most important interests.

To those who, among the passionate cries of the moment, have preserved the pride of independent opinion, the following view of the present situation may commend itself for serious reflection: The colored people, originally brought here by force, are here to stay. The scheme to transport them back to Africa is absolutely idle. If adopted, its execution would be found practically impossible. To transport ten millions of negroes across the sea would require ten thousand voyages of ships carrying one thousand passengers each. The bulk of the colored population will remain in the South, where the climate is more congenial to them and where they can more profitably devote themselves to productive work. It would be a great economic embarrassment to the South if that working force disappeared from its fields. Under the fundamental law of the country they are no longer slaves but free men. They have the aspirations of free men. According to the intent of the same fundamental law, they are also citizens and voters. Whether it would or would not have been wiser to emancipate them gradually and to withhold the right of voting from them, or to introduce them by degrees into the body of voters, is no longer the question. Regrettable as this may be, we have to face actual circumstances. The fact we have to deal with is that by the recognized intent of the National Constitution

they are as much entitled to the right of suffrage as white men are. It has been suggested that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the National Constitution, embodying the provisions referred to, be done away with by further amendment; but leaving aside the question whether as a matter of right this should be done, I doubt whether a single well-informed man can be found in the country who thinks it possible that the required three-fourths of the States will ever consent to such a repeal. To discuss the visionary colonization scheme or the equally impossible repeal of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments means, therefore, not only to squander time and breath, but to divert the popular mind from the true problem and from the real possibilities of its solution. It must, to start with, be taken as a certainty that the negroes will stay here and that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments will stand, and if they are to be made inoperative at all, it must be by means of a sort of tricky stratagem in flagrant violation of the spirit of the Constitution. Such stratagems are usually not approved by conscientious persons and they cannot be resorted to by a people without a mischievous lowering of the standard of public morals and an impairment of self-respect.

This is evidently a political and social condition which cannot continue to exist without constant and most unwholesome irritation and restlessness. Such as it is, it cannot possibly be permanent. The colored people will be incessantly disturbed by the feeling that they are unjustly deprived of their legal rights and have become the victims of tyrannical oppression. The most thoughtful and self-respecting among the whites will be ashamed of that state of things, and dissatisfied with themselves for tolerating it. The reckless among the white population, the element most subject to the passions fomented and stirred by a race-antipathy, and most responsive

to the catch-phrases of the demagogue, will understand it as a justification of all the things done to put down the negro and as an incitement to further steps along the same line.

And here is the crucial point: *There will be a movement either in the direction of reducing the negro to a permanent condition of serfdom—the condition of the mere plantation hand, “alongside of the mule,” practically without any rights of citizenship—or a movement in the direction of recognizing him as a citizen in the true sense of the term. One or the other will prevail.*

That there are in the South strenuous advocates of the establishment of some sort of semi-slavery cannot be denied. Governor Vardaman, of Mississippi, is their representative and most logical statesman. His extreme utterances are greeted by many as the bugle-blasts of a great leader. We constantly read articles in Southern newspapers and reports of public speeches made by Southern men which bear a striking resemblance to the pro-slavery arguments I remember to have heard before the civil war, and they are brought forth with the same passionate heat and dogmatic assurance to which we were then accustomed—the same assertion of the negro's predestination for serfdom; the same certainty that he will not work without “physical compulsion”; the same contemptuous rejection of negro education as a thing that will only unfit him for work; the same prediction that the elevation of the negro will be the degradation of the whites; the same angry demand that any advocacy of the negro's rights should be put down in the South as an attack upon the safety of Southern society and as treason to the Southern cause. I invite those who indulge in that sort of speech to consider what the success of their endeavors would lead to.

In the first place, they should not forget that to keep a

race in slavery that had been in that condition for many generations, as was done before the civil war, is one thing, comparatively easy; but that to reduce that race again to slavery, or something like it, after it has been free for half a century, is quite another thing—nobody knows how difficult and dangerous.

In the second place, they should not forget that the slavery question of old was not merely one of morals and human rights, but that it had a most important bearing upon the character of democratic government as well as upon economic interests and general progress and prosperity. Some of us remember vividly how, in *ante bellum* days, the Southern people smarted under the feeling of their commercial and industrial inferiority to the North; how they held conventions and conferences to consult about the means by which they might be relieved of their "abject and disgraceful dependence"—about factories to be built on Southern soil, about commercial connections to be established with the outside world, about steamships to run between Southern ports and those of foreign countries, and so on, and how, in spite of all those schemes and spasmodic efforts, the inferiority of the South remained substantially the same. The main reason of the failure was that the Southern people would not touch the principal cause of their inferiority. Above all else they idolized and cared for their "peculiar institution" of slavery. They were nervously anxious to avoid doing or even saying anything that might directly or indirectly endanger that "peculiar institution," and it was this nervous anxiety which made them suspicious of every new idea or aspiration that might in some direct or indirect way have shaken the social and political order based upon slavery—especially suspicious of anything apt, directly or indirectly, to make the laboring force of the country more intelligent and thereby more ambitious. Nothing can have a more

benumbing effect upon the active energies of a people than such a tendency. I am far from saying that the South would have rivalled the North in productive activity and progress had slavery not existed. Climatic conditions would have prevented that; but surely the difference between the two sections of the country would have been far less. We have heard much from Southern men since the close of the civil war of the substantial benefits the abolition of slavery has conferred upon the South—of the impetus it has given to the spirit of enterprise in the opening and the exploitation of natural resources, the building up of industries, the enlargement of means of communication and the development of other agencies of civilization. All this is recognized to be owing to the removal—the partial removal at least—of the incubus of that “peculiar institution” which stupefied everything. And now the reactionists are striving again to burden the Southern people with another “peculiar institution,” closely akin to its predecessor in character, as it will be in its inevitable effects if fully adopted by the Southern people—that is, if the bulk of the laboring class is again to be kept in stupid subjection, without the hope of advancement and without the ambition of progress. For, as the old pro-slavery man was on principle hostile to general negro education, so the present advocate of semi-slavery is perfectly logical in his contempt for the general instruction of the colored people and in his desire to do away with the negro school. What the reactionist really wants is a negro just fit for the task of a plantation hand and for little, if anything, more, and with no ambition for anything beyond. Therefore, quite logically, the reactionist abhors the educated negro. In fact the political or social recognition of the educated negro is especially objectionable to him for the simple reason that it would be an encouragement of higher aspirations among

the colored people generally. The reactionist wishes to keep the colored people, that is, the great mass of the laboring force in the South, as ignorant as possible, to the end of keeping it as submissive and obedient as possible. As formerly the people of the South were the slaves of slavery, so they are now to be made the victims of their failure to abolish slavery altogether.

And now imagine the moral, intellectual and economic condition of a community whose principal and most anxious—I might say hysteric—care is the solution of the paramount problem “how to keep the nigger down”—that is, to reduce a large part of its laboring population to stolid brutishness—and that community in competition with other communities all around which are energetically intent upon lifting up their laboring forces to the highest attainable degree of intelligence, ambition and efficiency.

This is not all. The reactionist fiercely insists that the South “must be let alone” in dealing with the negro. This was the cry of the pro-slavery men of the old *ante bellum* time. But the American people outside of the South took a lively interest in the matter, and finally the South was not left alone. If the reactionists should now succeed in reëstablishing something like slavery in the shape of peonage or any other shape, they can hardly hope to be “let alone.” Although there is at present little inclination among the people of the North to meddle politically with Southern difficulties, they will hardly witness such a relapse into the vicious old system with indifference. They will hardly accept that doctrine of non-intervention which insists, as Abraham Lincoln expressed it, “that when A makes B his slave, C shall not interfere.” I think I risk little in predicting that the reactionists are in this respect preparing new trouble for the South, and that only their failure can prevent that trouble.

Thus it may be said without exaggeration that by striving to keep up in the Southern States a condition of things which cannot fail to bring forth constant irritation and unrest; which threatens to burden the South with another "peculiar institution" by making the bulk of its laboring force again a clog to progressive development—and to put the South once more in a position provokingly offensive to the moral sense and the enlightened spirit of the world outside—the reactionists are the worst enemies the Southern people have to fear.

As to the outlook, there are signs pointing in different ways. The applause called forth by such virulent pronouncements as those by Governor Vardaman, and the growls with which some Southern newspapers and agitators receive the united efforts of high-minded Southern and Northern men to advance education in the Southern States among both races, as well as the political appeals made to a reckless race-prejudice, are evidence that the reactionary spirit is a strong power with many Southern people. How far that spirit may go in its practical ventures was shown in the Alabama peonage cases, which disclosed a degree of unscrupulous greed, and an atrocious disregard of the most elementary principles of justice and humanity. And what has been proven creates the apprehension that there is still more of the same kind behind.

On the other hand, the fact that the united efforts for education in the South, which I mentioned, are heartily and effectively supported not only by a large number of Southern men of high standing in society, but by some in important political office in the Southern States, and by a large portion of the Southern press; and the further facts that the crimes committed in the peonages cases were disclosed by Southern officers of the law, that the indictments were found by Southern grand juries, that verdicts of guilty were pronounced by Southern petit juries, that

sentence was passed by a Southern judge in language the dignity and moral feeling of which could hardly have been more elevated, and that the exposure of those crimes evoked among the people of the South many demonstrations of righteous wrath at such villainies—all these things and others of the same kind are symptoms of moral forces at work which, if well organized and directed, will be strong enough effectually to curb the reactionary spirit, and gradually to establish in the South, with regard to the negro problem, an order of things founded on right and justice, delivering Southern society of the constant irritations and alarms springing from wrongful and untenable conditions, giving it a much needed rest in the assurances of righteousness and animating it with a new spirit of progress.

No doubt the most essential work will have to be done in and by the South itself. And it can be. There are in the South a great many enlightened and high-minded men and women eminently fit for it. Let them get together and organize for the task of preparing the public mind in the South by a systematic campaign of education, for a solution of the problem in harmony with our free institutions. It may be a long and arduous campaign for them, but certainly a patriotic, meritorious and hopeful one. They will have to fight traditional notions and prejudices of extraordinary stubbornness, but they will also have generous impulses and sound common-sense to appeal to. They will not indulge in the delusion that they can ignore or altogether obliterate the existing race-antipathy, but they can effectively combat every effort to cultivate and inflame it. They will be able to show that it is the interest of the South, as it is that of the North, not to degrade the laboring force, but to elevate it by making it more intelligent and capable, and that if we mean thus to elevate it and to make it more efficient, we

must not kill its ambitions, but stimulate those ambitions by opening to them all possible opportunities. Their example will demonstrate that no man debases himself by lifting up his neighbor from ever so low a level.

They will also be able to show that, even supposing the average negro not to be able to reach the level of the average white man, the negro may reach a much higher level than he now occupies, and that, for his own good as well as the good of society, he should be brought up to as high a level as he can reach; and further, that the negro race has not only, since emancipation, accumulated an astonishing amount of property—nearly \$800,000,000 worth in farms, houses and various business establishments—but has also produced not a few eminent men, eminent in literature, in medicine, in law, in mathematics, in theology, in educational work, in art, in mechanics—exceptional colored men, to be sure, but eminent men are exceptional in any race—who have achieved their successes under conditions so difficult and disheartening as to encourage the belief that they might have accomplished much more, and that many more such men would have come forth, had their environment been more just and the opportunities more favorable.

They would be able to banish the preposterous bugbear of "social equality" which frightens so many otherwise sensible persons in spite of the evident truth of Abraham Lincoln's famous saying that if he respected and advocated the just rights of the black man it did not follow that he must therefore take a black woman for his wife.

They might at the same time puncture those curious exaggerations of that dread of "social equality" which exhibit themselves in such childish follies as the attempt to make a heroine out of a silly hotel chambermaid who thought she did a proud thing in refusing to make Booker T. Washington's bed.

They may expose to the proper pathological light the hysterics which seemed to unsettle the minds of a great many people when the President greeted at his table the same distinguished citizen, who had already been received by Queen Victoria at tea at Windsor Castle, and who is known and admired throughout the civilized world as a man of extraordinary merit, but whose presence at the President's board was frantically denounced as an insult to every white citizen of this Republic, and as a dangerous blow at American civilization.

They may with great effect describe how civilized mankind would have laughed at the American gentleman who might have refused to sit at table with Alexandre Dumas, the elder, one of the greatest novelists of all ages and a most charming conversationalist and companion, for the reason that Dumas's grandmother had been a negress and Dumas himself must therefore be sternly excluded from polite society as a "nigger."

To the lofty people who, for fear of compromising their own dignity, scorn to address a colored man as Mr. or a colored woman as Mrs. or Miss, they would give something to think of by reminding them of the stateliest gentleman ever produced by America, a man universally revered, a Virginian, who, when a negress, and a slave, too, had dedicated to him some complimentary verses, wrote her an elaborate and gravely polite letter of thanks, addressing her as "Miss Phyllis" and subscribing himself "with great respect, your obedient humble servant, George Washington."

They will appeal to Southern chivalry, a sentiment which does not consist merely in the impulse to rush with knightly ardor to the rescue of well-born ladies in distress, but rather in a constant readiness to embrace the cause of right and justice in behalf of the lowliest as well as the highest, in defense of the weak against the strong, and this

all the more willingly as the lowliest stand most in need of knightly help; and as in the service of justice the spirit of chivalry will shine all the more brightly, the harder the task and the more unselfish the effort.

In this way such a body of high-minded and enlightened Southerners may gradually succeed in convincing even many of the most prejudiced of their people, that white ignorance and lawlessness are just as bad and dangerous as black ignorance and lawlessness; that black patriotism, integrity, ability, industry, usefulness, good citizenship and public spirit are just as good and as much entitled to respect and reward as capabilities and virtues of the same name among whites; that the rights of the white man under the Constitution are no more sacred than those of the black man; that neither white nor black can override the rights of the other without eventually endangering his own; and that the negro question can finally be settled so as to stay settled only on the basis of the fundamental law of the land as it stands, by fair observance of that law and not by any tricky circumvention of it. Such a campaign for truth and justice, carried on by the high-minded and enlightened Southerners without any party spirit—rather favoring the view that whites as well as blacks should divide their votes according to their inclinations between different political parties—will promise the desired result in the same measure as it is carried on with gentle, patient and persuasive dignity, but also with that unflinching courage which is, above all things, needed to assert that most important freedom:—the freedom of inquiry and discussion against traditional and deep-rooted prejudice—a courage which can be daunted neither by the hootings of the mob nor by the supercilious jeers of fashionable society, but goes steadily on doing its work with indomitable tenacity of purpose.

These suggestions are submitted for candid considera-

tion, as pointing out one of the ways in which the South may solve the most difficult of her problems entirely by her own efforts; and thus reach the only solution that will stand in accord with the fundamental principles of democratic government.

Will it be said that what I offer is more a diagnosis than a definite remedy? It may appear so. But this is one of the problems which defy complete solution and can only be rendered less troublesome. It can certainly not be quickly and conclusively solved by drastic legislative treatment, which might rather prove apt to irritate than to cure. What is done by legislation can usually be undone by legislation, and is therefore liable to become subject to the chances of party warfare. The slow process of propitiating public sentiment, while trying our patience, promises after all the most durable results.

TO HERBERT WELSH

NEW YORK, April 16, 1904.

I am glad to know that you approve of the principles maintained and the policy advocated in my *McClure* article on the "Race Question." It is one of the most difficult problems we have to deal with and, as you are well aware, there is nothing harder to reason with than prejudice. The reception my article received in the South has been such as might have been expected: the constant iteration and reiteration of the assertion that the Southern people know better how to treat the negro and how to solve whatever problems may be connected with him than Northern people ever can. At the same time I have succeeded in stirring up discussion of the question in the Southern papers in an unusual degree and have thus given, possibly, a new impulse to the education

movement. I have in order to enjoy the milder air of the South, after having been abed with bronchial catarrh for several weeks, spent some time at Hampton and studied more closely the working of that institution. I am happy to say that my experience has been exceedingly satisfactory. The school is doing the best kind of work and exercising the healthiest kind of influence. What I saw there has been a real inspiration to me, and it is a hopeful thing that similar institutions—most of them, to be sure, on a smaller scale—are springing up in various parts of the South.

I think that the men interested in Southern education—I mean especially those living and active in the South—are gradually coming to the conclusion that the two things, education and suffrage, must go together, and that the movement against suffrage is logically a movement against education, as strikingly exemplified in the case of Governor Vardaman of Mississippi. Mr. Murphy of Alabama whom you probably know, and whom I look upon as one of the sincerest advocates of education, has just published a book which is full of powerful argument. The leaven is working and, I have no doubt, good results will follow; but even in the best case we shall have to be patient.

As to the Philippine matter, there has been a paper in circulation asking the two political campaigns to pronounce in favor of Philippine independence. The success of that paper has been beyond all expectation. It has been signed by dozens of college presidents with President Eliot of Harvard at the head, scores of professors, ever so many Episcopalian bishops and clergymen, Cardinal Gibbons, several Catholic archbishops and bishops and no end of prominent private citizens. I suppose it will be ignored by the Republican National Convention, but I shall not be surprised if it would encourage the Democratic Convention to put forth some energetic pronounce-

ment. Cleveland has published a very strong paper against imperialism and, as far as I can see, among the Democratic leaders the sentiment prevails. The Administration seems to have become somewhat alarmed at this new demonstration and is sending Secretary Taft around to make speeches in which he tries to convince people that independence ought not to be promised to the Filipinos, and that at any rate it should not come in less than something like one hundred and fifty years. These speeches are not without effect, for Secretary Taft enjoys general esteem as a sincere man and is believed by many people to understand the Philippine question better than anybody else, but the feeling in favor of independence seems to have been growing and spreading of late and developing into a great force. The efforts he has made to induce capitalists to invest money in the Philippines have so far been unavailing.

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TO ROLLO OGDEN¹

BOLTON LANDING, May 26, 1904.

Thanks for your kind letter. I am very glad to learn that Mr. Parker is in favor of the Philippine independence resolution. Did he say anything with regard to civil service reform?

Yes, I have a suggestion to make. Do you not think that President Roosevelt's letter to the Cuba dinner, in which he assumes police power over the whole American continent, deserves more attention than the press has so far given it? I have seen your paragraph about it, which was very good. But does not the matter call for the heaviest artillery? Of all of Roosevelt's pronouncements this seems to me the most alarming. It is almost

¹ Editor of the N. Y. *Evening Post* and the *Nation*.

bad enough to be regarded as a symptom of an unbalanced mind. And to think of this man being in a place of power in which he can bring on war at any time! I think a vigorous effort should be put forth by the press to make the conservative mind of the country understand the real significance of this Rooseveltiade.

TO ALTON B. PARKER¹

BOLTON LANDING, July 11, 1904.

Not as a partisan but as an independent I feel bound to express to you my sincere respect. The principles and opinions you are known to hold as to the currency, imperialism, the tariff and the civil service strongly commend themselves to men of my way of thinking. But if, as an independent, I was in doubt for what candidate my duty commanded me to vote, your action on the terms of your nomination has solved that doubt. It has rendered to the Republic a double service of incalculable value. No candid man will deny that it has finally removed the gold question from the reach of party controversy, and thus relieved the business world of an element of peculiarly unhealthy agitation,—a relief so evident that any attempt to continue that agitation artificially must now be condemned by every good citizen as hardly less than criminal.

And secondly, your manly declaration that you would accept the offered nomination for the Presidency only in harmony with your sense of public duty has set up before the American people one of the standards of moral courage and civic virtue of which our public life stands most urgently in need. The higher you lift those standards, the higher you will rise in the esteem and confidence of

¹ Democratic nominee for the Presidency.

your countrymen, and the more surely they will hold you worthy of their highest trust.

Wishing you all the success you so well deserve,

I am sincerely yours.

TO LOUIS R. EHRICH

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y., July 14, 1904.

Mr. Roosevelt was approached before the Republican Convention by the signers of the great petition through Governor Crane of Massachusetts. The response was the insolent Philippine paragraph in the Republican platform which was, no doubt, drawn by Lodge with the consent of Roosevelt. It means the keeping of the Philippines for military reasons. All you might get out of Roosevelt now would at best be a vague equivocal statement to deceive the people into false hopes. Moreover, those who approach him now would be in great danger of appearing to promise support to Roosevelt's candidacy in case their request is in any sense granted.

As to Parker, I do not agree with you. He has done two immense services to the country. But for his prompt and vigorous declaration, the silver specter would still disturb the minds of people, or, at least, it would be used for that purpose. He has killed it so dead that it will trouble this generation no more. This is a very great thing.

Secondly, no matter what his antecedents and his associations may have been, his attitude has given the country a new inspiration which is of inestimable value. The people have again something of a moral nature to be proud of. If Parker is elected he will know that he owed his election to the prestige acquired by what is popularly understood to have been an act of uncommon

moral courage, of manly independence and of civic virtue. He would have to be an excessively dull man not to understand that this was, and will remain, the principal element of his strength, and this can hardly fail to have a most healthy influence upon his Administration. I therefore think that the fullest recognition of the moral value of his act on the part of the Independents is just and wise, and I have, for these reasons, expressed my personal appreciation of it as promptly as possible.

TO ERVING WINSLOW

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y., July 29, 1904.

I am sorry I cannot attend your meeting on August 1st. The American people of to-day—indeed, almost all that have not sunk their moral natures in the grossest selfishness of commercialism—glory with just pride in the fact that this Republic, after having driven the Spanish Power out of Cuba, has faithfully aided the Cuban people in establishing a free and independent commonwealth of their own.

The day will come—and I think it is near—when the American people will, with equal unanimity, frankly deplore that dark page of their history which records the other fact that, instead of treating the Philippines as we have treated Cuba, we turned our arms against the Filipinos, who were, and are now, almost universally recognized to have been our allies in the war against Spain, in order to beat down their efforts for independence and to make them our subjects. I am confident that the day of the general revival of the true national pride would already have come had not the excessive party spirit stood in the way, which so frequently induces men to permit their reason and their conscience to be overruled by the command of party discipline.

How right I am in this assumption has recently been proved by the astonishing demonstration of the best representatives of the intelligence and the moral sense of the country—churchmen from the highest rank to the lowest, presidents and professors of universities and colleges, judges, members of all the learned professions, prominent citizens of all callings—a demonstration of a quality unmatched in the history of this country urgently demanding of the great political parties that they should pronounce themselves in favor of treating the Philippines as Cuba has been treated. There is not the slightest doubt that, were the pressure of partisanship removed, such a demand would upon its own merits to-day be joined by an overwhelming majority of the American people.

And what has been the response of those in power and of the ruling party? The member of the Government having the Philippine business in charge simply tells those high and low dignitaries of the churches, those presidents and professors of colleges, those judges and members of the learned professions and other prominent citizens to hush; that they should not presume to discuss Philippine independence; that in fact Philippine independence should not be discussed at all by the people; that the Government should be let alone to deal with it.

This is a significant spectacle. We call ours a democratic government. Democratic government is essentially a government by free discussion. As soon as it ceases to be a government by free discussion it ceases to be democratic government. And what kind of subject is this that we are told we must not discuss? Is it not a question involving the very principles upon which this Republic rests? Does it not involve the justice and general morality of our dealings with foreign peoples? Does it not involve in the largest sense our character as a

nation? And this is the thing which we are told by a member of our Government—a government of which free discussion is the very life—we must not discuss? By its fruits you shall know it. This is one of the fine fruits of our policy of imperialism—it is time to take heed.

And what response has the Republican platform made? That we have suppressed insurrection—that is, we have drowned in blood the efforts of the Filipinos for independence; that we have given the Philippines more security and better administration than they ever had—that is, that American absolutism is better than Spanish absolutism; and that the possession of the Philippines had made military operations in China easier for us—which implies that it may be of use for further military enterprises. But not a word for Philippine independence.

And what does the President say in his speech of acceptance? He simply repeats the promises often made of enlarged local self-government in the Philippines under American dominion, but he, too, cautions against the discussion of the subject of independence, as if it were the forbidden fruit, not to be touched.

What does all this mean? Does it mean that it is the settled purpose of the ruling influences in the Republican party to keep the Philippines in practically permanent subjection to this Republic? Probably it does. But if it means that the question of Philippine independence should be kept open indefinitely, the practical effect will be the same unwholesome, disquieting, dangerous uncertainty. The Republicans must know, and do know, that the treatment of the Philippines upon the principles applied to Cuba is the only solution of the problem in harmony with the fundamental principles of our government; the only one that is just and right; the only one fitting the true greatness of this Nation; the only one that will satisfy the Filipinos as well as our own people; the

only one that will really strengthen us by making free-men and friends out of discontented and, at heart, hostile subjects. But this they will not promise.

With a sense of relief we may turn to the Democratic party which, with a leader at its head deserving and possessing the confidence and respect of the people, meets us with the frank and ringing declaration that "we ought to do for the Filipinos what we have already done for the Cubans, and that it is our duty to make that promise now and to set the Filipinos upon their feet, free and independent, to work out their own destiny." This is the voice of right, of justice, of genuine Americanism and of true statesmanship. The sooner and the more triumphantly it prevails the prouder every patriotic American will be of his country.

TO ALTON B. PARKER

BOLTON LANDING, Aug. 1, 1904.

Permit me to congratulate you upon your very wise decision not to make a dinner speech at Chicago and to abstain from stump speaking during the campaign. I am sure your attitude in this respect meets with general commendation.

I hope you will not consider it presumptuous on my part if I venture to submit a suggestion to you. I do it at the instance of my civil service reform friends. They are anxious that you should, in your speech and letter of acceptance, give as strong an endorsement to the civil service plank of the Democratic platform as your judgment may allow. I think myself that such an endorsement would make a very good impression upon the independent voters, especially if coupled with some reference to your former utterances upon that subject which some time ago I saw quoted in the *New York Times*.

TO HORACE WHITE

My dear Horace: This is to congratulate you on your seventieth birthday [August 10, 1904]. What sort of landmark the seventieth birthday in one's life is, I know from personal experience. It is true, as Bismarck once said to me, the first seventy years of a man's life are the best. But those who have made good use of the first seventy may hope heartily to enjoy some years of the second series. And I am sure you richly deserve that enjoyment. We have known one another now for well-nigh fifty years and I can say in all soberness, without the slightest exaggeration, that I have never known a truer gentleman, a trustier friend, and an unofficial statesman and public teacher who wore his high eminence with a deeper feeling of responsibility and greater modesty, than you. I love you like a brother, and it is with this warmth of feeling that I wish you many more birthdays in health and happiness. I am, my dear Horace,

Ever faithfully yours,

C. SCHURZ.

FROM HORACE WHITE

WHITEFACE, ESSEX CO., N. Y., Aug. 10, 1904.

My dear Schurz: It is true that I have reached my seventieth birthday. It is true, too, as Bismarck said to you, that the first seventy years of a man's life are the best. But best of all is it to receive on one's seventieth anniversary a letter like yours.

Among the many kind greetings that have been sent to me yours is the one which comes nearest to my heart. It is also the one which my family most highly prize. I thank you for it, and I give you in return the full measure of affection which revolving years have ever strengthened and consecrated between us.

Yours fraternally,

HORACE WHITE.

FROM ALTON B. PARKER

ESOPUS, N. Y., Aug. 29, 1904.

It is of the first importance that the addresses of Secretary Hay and Mr. Root be answered at once by a man of intellectual strength, character and position. It is a great favor to ask of you, but as no one fills all the requirements so well, I make bold to ask you to do it.

TO ALTON B. PARKER

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y., Aug. 31, 1904.

Thanks for your kind letter of August 29th. The orations of Secretary Hay and Mr. Root have been before the public for some time, and, although fine productions, will now drop out of notice when the campaign gets lively. Judging from my campaign experience I doubt whether it is good policy to answer such speeches formally and thus to attract attention to them again. It is better policy, in my opinion, to find out the vulnerable points of the other side and to attack them aggressively.

I am sorry I cannot make any speeches in this campaign, but I intend to write some things which I hope will produce some effect. I shall then take up the weak points in Hay's and Root's speeches incidentally.

One of the most important things now is that the Democrats of this State should make a nomination for the governorship that would give a high character and tone to the campaign, as, for instance, the nomination of Mr. Shepard would. Without a nomination of that quality the chances of success will be slim, unless the Republicans do a more stupid thing than we have reason to expect.

PARKER VS. ROOSEVELT

An Open Letter to the Independent Voter.

BOLTON LANDING, September, 1904.

JAMES W. PRYOR, Esq., General Secretary Parker Independent Clubs.

Dear Sir: I have received many invitations to address public meetings in the present election campaign, with which, I regret to say, I am unable to comply. But I have put on paper an expression of my views on some of the subjects at present under public discussion, and this I submit to you for such use as you may see fit to make of it.

Fifty years of political study and experience in this country have convinced me that if the American people mean to preserve the blessings of their free institutions, they must always keep in view certain truths.

The government of this Republic must be a government of law, not a government of adventure.

It must be a government for the general benefit, not a government of favor for the promotion of special interests.

It must be a government not permanently controlled by one political party, but by different parties alternating in the possession of power.

There never was a political party in a democracy, however virtuous it may have been at the start, that was not by long possession of power more or less corrupted and made arrogant and arbitrary.

The things most dangerous to this Republic are excessive party spirit, corruption and false patriotism, which is another name for national vanity, or greed under the guise of national pride.

The party spirit which regards party success not merely as a means to a higher end, but as the end itself, and which puts abject obedience to party behest above the

moral law and the dictates of conscience, will, if it prevails, inevitably destroy the vitality of free institutions.

Whatever induces people to look to the Government for favors to advance their material fortunes, instead of relying upon their own independent energies, will tend to deteriorate the popular character.

Of all agencies of corruption, the farthest reaching and the most generally demoralizing is a system of policy by which the Government deals out benefits of pecuniary value to special interests, those favored interests then to support by pecuniary aid the party controlling the Government. This is corruption organized on a national scale.

A democracy working through universal suffrage cannot have too many conservative influences of high authority to guide popular sentiments and to protect it against misleading seductions. In this Republic the highest conservative influence consists in the traditional veneration by the people of the principles which justified our existence as an independent nation, and of the ideals for the gradual realization of which the Republic was founded. In the same measure that we lose this conservative influence of that tradition, the Republic will become a prey to disorderly passions, unprincipled greed and reckless demagoguery.

The idea that a nation in its dealings with other nations is not bound by the moral code recognized between man and man, is in the highest degree dangerous to a democracy, because it insidiously confuses the popular conscience as to moral standards or obligations in all things.

Worship of wealth, of force, of power or of mere success, whether right or wrong, is in a democracy one of the most malignant distempers of the popular mind—one of the most prolific sources of anti-democratic tendencies.

In a democracy, not only constitutional principles, but also constitutional forms should be observed with particular conscientiousness; for laxity in the respect for constitutional forms will soon lead to disregard of constitutional principles, and then to arbitrary rule.

Nothing can be more seductive, demoralizing and perilous in a democracy than the adoption of the idea that the end justifies the means.

The degree of economy in public expenditures may be taken as the barometer of honesty in the public service. A lavish administration will always run into corruption.

These truisms—trite commonplaces you may call them—will be accepted by almost everybody in theory. They are but too recklessly overlooked in political practice, and can, therefore, not too often be recalled to popular attention. I, for one, deem it my duty as a citizen to keep them clearly in view when choosing between parties and candidates in casting my vote.

Having started out in public activity with the Republican party in the earliest days of its youth, I remained its enthusiastic adherent so long as it was the party of liberty and human rights—as it proudly called itself, “the party of moral ideas.” It is now something very different. It is more and more becoming a party owned by rich men who want to become, through it, still richer. While many of its leading men treat the principles of the Declaration of Independence—once its Magna Charta—with supercilious contempt, as antiquated nursery rhymes, the party speaks with rapture about our material prosperity and our growing wealth, boasts of them as the product of its policies and parades them as its main title to continued popular confidence and support.

The boast that the great advances of this country in wealth and prosperity were owing to the Republican policy of high protection is simply a slander on the

American people. Our natural resources are so immense and the energy and ingenuity of American labor so exceptionally productive, that owing to the combination of these two tremendous factors the American people were bound to prosper and to grow rapidly in wealth under—or in spite of—any economic policy. The more I study the history of our economic development the more I become convinced that this country would have by this time been just as rich and prosperous as it is, had that development been permitted to take its natural course without any artificial protection. It would be healthier, too, as the human body is healthier when brought up, not on medicinal stimulants, but upon natural food. The economic activities would in some respects probably have taken different directions. The distribution of the product and accumulated wealth would probably have been different, too, and very likely more wholesome. People would have relied more upon their own energies and less upon the Government to make them rich. But, in my opinion at least, the aggregate production of wealth and the general state of popular prosperity would not have been less.

But, whether you agree with me in this academic view or not, upon one point, I am sure, I cannot fail to have the assent of every candid man: The idea that this country, of all known countries, the richest in natural resources, with its labor, the most intelligent, energetic and productive labor in the world, should need the highest protective tariff ever enacted in any civilized country to make our industries go and to save our people from ruin and starvation, is so wildly preposterous that I do not understand how any self-respecting man can utter it. And yet that is what we have—the highest protective tariff of any civilized country—a tariff which would have made Hamilton and Henry Clay stare in blank amaze-

ment. And this mere statement brands as equally preposterous the other audacious pretence—to the iteration of which, I regret to say, the President has recently again lent himself—that this tariff is needed, or that it is one of its main purposes, simply to offset, in favor of the American laboring man, the difference between American and foreign wages. No subterfuge could be more shameless. I will not go into detail. Let any intelligent man study the schedules of our tariff, and what will he find? He will look in vain for many protected industries that were satisfied with the comparative pittance of an offset for the difference between American and foreign wage scales, or, which is another thing, between American and foreign labor cost in manufactured goods. But he will find many a tariff rate that makes out of a method of raising revenue a monstrous machinery of extortion. He will find plenty of evidence to show him that when a large part of our tariff is denounced as “robbery,” the word may be rude, but not unjust, and that the tariff, by levying tribute upon the people, is promoting the unwholesome fungus growth of colossal private fortunes. And yet the economic aspect of the tariff question seems to me less ominous than its moral and political bearing.

It is indeed time that the American people should open their eyes to the meaning of these notorious facts: “A large number of manufacturing establishments, as well as their allied interests, receive from the Government favors or benefits of great money value in the shape of protective tariff legislation. The political party which, when in power, confers those benefits of great money value, turns to the interests so benefited for pecuniary aid to support it in its efforts to keep itself in power, or to regain power if it had temporarily lost it. The protected interests give to the political party that pecuniary

aid, of course, on the understanding that they continue to receive the old or greater favors of money value from the Government through the instrumentality of the political party in question. I know there are people who find this reciprocal arrangement perfectly natural and unobjectionable. They ask whether it is not quite proper that they should contribute money to keep in power the party which gives them laws enabling them to make more money, or that the party which they thus support with money should give them legislation to reimburse them with a profit. The question so put carries its answer with it. The very fact that some people call such a proceeding natural and unobjectionable only shows how that practice has confounded their moral principles. For what else is it than purchasing with money legislation that will give the purchaser more money? What else is it than corruption in the grossest and largest form? What else than a system of government based upon corruption? John Bright, one of the warmest friends this Republic ever had in England, and one of the best of men, once wisely said: "There is nothing in public affairs that tends more to make men dishonest than the system of protection. It was so in this country before our free trade era; it is so now in the United States."

This political lewdness has already so much debauched the public mind that the corrupt business is done openly, without shame. The fact is notorious that the Republican party organization before every National election "fries the fat" out of its beneficiaries, with the understanding that the beneficiaries will be protected in the enjoyment of their benefits, if the yield of the frying process is satisfactory, and if not, not. The upshot is a combination of bribery and blackmail, carried on with hardly any concealment. In this very election campaign it has been the common talk how the protected interests

and their affiliations—such as some of the Trusts and rich financial firms—are urged to make another money investment in the Republican party, with the prospect of a lucrative return.

The effect of such practices, raised to the dignity of a system, upon our public life is obvious. The "use of money in elections" is an old complaint which has troubled many a patriotic heart. But a generation ago the evil was a trifle compared with what it is now. The amount of money now needed by the Republican party for running a National campaign is enormous, and constantly increasing. I say "needed," for as the constituencies have become accustomed to a lavish flow of money in the political market, and as the appetite grows with eating, the baneful evil grows in virulence from election to election. And this appalling spreading of the old abuse is distinctly owing to that economic policy which required a national system of corruption, methodically organized on the grandest of scales, to enable the beneficiaries of government favor to secure themselves in the enjoyment of their benefits. Nor is it hazardous to predict that this evil will grow and grow, and bring forth still more direful results, unless we put a stop to that economic policy.

Here I may be asked whether there is not also corruption in places where the Opposition, the Democratic party, rules. Unquestionably there is altogether too much of it. But that corruption is local, sporadic, subject to be attacked and put down by the action of local sentiment. But as it must be recognized to be, it is not inherent in a system of national policy. It is not entrenched in immensely powerful interests upheld by the Government. It has brought forth nothing like the condition of things existing in that state in which the worship of the fetich of the protective tariff seems almost

to have altogether overruled the moral law, and which by an observant writer of great ability has with terrible force been described as "corrupt and contented." Thus Democratic corruption, however noxious, can be reached and overcome by local forces. The Republican corruption, as organized by the combination of protected interests on a national scale, can never be overcome so long as the policy of high protection prevails.

This corruption will be all the more firmly rooted as the protective policy more and more develops its tendency to strengthen on the political field the power of wealth as such. We all have observed that of late years the appearance of very rich men in political positions has become strikingly frequent. Nothing could be farther from me than to object to the participation of rich men in politics if their wealth is coupled with strong public spirit and ability. On the contrary, I heartily welcome it. But what I do observe with apprehension is the preference given by political organizations to rich men for no other reason than that they are rich; to the money "barrel" because it can feed a machine or float a candidate; to the filling of places of influence and authority with rich men (or their agents) who are naturally bent upon serving first of all their own interests. This is the way to build up a plutocracy—as it would be in our case, not a plutocracy of old and settled wealth possibly sharing with the true aristocracy a sense of honorable obligation to the community, but the worst sort of plutocrats—a plutocracy sharply looking to the profitableness of its political investments—a plutocracy "on the make." Of this kind of plutocracy our protective tariff policy has already given us a smart beginning, and may a kind fate save us from the full development of it!

Do I expect the Democratic party, if successful, promptly to repress the evils of the protective policy?

I see at present no other instrumentality by which that work can be put in practical motion, and I do, indeed, expect the Democratic party in partial possession of the Government—the Republican Senate being in any event for a season in a position to obstruct changes in the tariff laws—to uncover to the eyes of the whole people the iniquities of the system, to avail itself of every legal possibility to relieve its rigors, and thus to start the reformatory movement with vigor and in an enlightened spirit—in one word, to prepare the field for the final overthrow of that stronghold of corruption and tyrannical rapacity. Do not the Republicans by implication admit the wrongfulness of the system by holding out a vague promise of reform? Yes, partial reform “by its friends.” What does that mean? Do we not know that every revision of the tariff “by its friends” has resulted, if in anything, not in a reduction, but in a raising of tariff duties, thus increasing the evil instead of lessening it? Let us not deceive ourselves. If this abuse is to be undone, the power must be put into the hands of those who mean to undo it, not in the hands of its beneficiaries or their agents, who mean to preserve it. To this end the Republican party must be defeated.

It deserves defeat for another reason no less weighty. The Republican party stands no longer, as it once did, for the great ideal of a democracy embodying the principles of the Declaration of Independence and presenting the example of a mighty people under a government not only free and peaceable at home, but also true to its principles in the just and generous treatment of other peoples, great and small—an example inspiring others with love of liberty, respect for human rights and confidence in democratic institutions. Its ideal is now a great “world power,” governing foreign lands and alien populations by arbitrary rule, and asserting its position

among the other powers of the world by the number of its battleships. In the world abroad those struggling for free government no longer look to this Republic for encouragement by sympathy, example and teaching; the question asked, not without misgiving, is rather, how far the lust of conquest and the impulse of adventurous ambition will carry this great American Republic in its new career. Should not true American patriotism grieve to witness the degradation?

Not many years ago the American people enjoyed a proud and inestimable privilege which enabled us to look down upon the greatest nations of the world with condescending sympathy. It was that while those nations were groaning under the burden of vast and costly armaments, believed by them to be indispensable for their safety, the American people was the only one happily exempt from such a necessity—the only one that could, and did, employ its resources of men and means with a sense of full security for the physical, mental and moral betterment of its country and the inhabitants thereof, instead of sinking them in the building up and maintenance of enormous and unproductive war establishments. We were, indeed, the envy of the whole world.

The best minds of other nations exerted—and still exert—themselves to discover ways to bring about gradually a general disarmament, but are met by the objection that while disarmament would indeed be a blessing devoutly to be wished, England must have the biggest war-fleet in the world to prevent the calamity of being blockaded and starved in her insular position; that France must maintain the largest possible armament on account of the possible hostility of her neighbor, Germany, and that Germany must have the same because of her being hedged in by powerful and possibly hostile neighbors. But for these and other similarly plausible

reasons, the demand for an effectual reduction of burdens caused by the great armaments would become soon so overwhelming in the old world that no government could resist it.

And now, while European nations moan under their burdens, and vainly sigh to lighten them, we, who for the better part of a century have been the envy of the world for enjoying the blessed privilege of not bearing such a burden, throw away that inestimable blessing as if it were not worth consideration. Nobody objects to our keeping a little army, with its appurtenances, as a nucleus for larger organizations in case of necessity, and a smart and efficient little navy to perform our part of the police of the seas. But we are told that we must have a much larger army than we had twenty years ago, and especially a much bigger navy—aye, as the present Secretary of the Navy tells us, we must have the biggest navy in the world. Indeed, we are actually engaged in building a navy which, if the building goes on at the present rate, will soon burden the American people with a load of naval expenses heavier than that under which any other nation is groaning. Our navy cost us this year and last year about one hundred millions. Considering that, owing to the rapid progress of invention in our days, the modern ship of war, originally built at enormous cost, is apt to become antiquated before it is long in service, and that the navy to be good for anything must be kept “up to date,” the annual expense, even in time of peace, is more liable to increase than to grow less. Our expenditures in times of peace for war armaments actually threaten to become larger and the pecuniary burdens heavier than those of any European state.

What reason is there for this? The United States are not, like England, a little island that might be starved by a blockade, and require, therefore, a large navy for

defence. We have not, like Germany and France, powerful neighbors whose hostility might become dangerous. In both these respects we are perfectly safe. Or is there lurking anywhere else in the world a hostile power whose attack we might have to fear? Where is it? Where is the cloud of possible war that might oblige us to watch for our safety armed to the teeth? Where is the danger that forces us to shoulder the fearful burdens under which the backs of European nations are bending, and which nobody but a fool would bear unless constrained by necessity?

But we are told that we must have a large armament to protect our foreign commerce. Must we? When and where was it that our foreign commerce ever suffered for want of a large navy? Before our civil war we had a merchant fleet, and an ocean carrying-trade rivaling that of any nation of the world, while our fleet of war-ships was infinitesimal. Was our foreign commerce ever seriously molested for want of armed protection? Our export trade is constantly growing. We are successfully competing in foreign markets with other nations—notably with England. England is very largely our superior in battleships and guns. Is it our war-fleet that enables us to compete with her so successfully in the foreign market, or is it not rather the fact that our peaceable industries furnish some articles cheaper and better than hers?

Or is it true, as we are told, that we need a great armament to “uphold the Monroe Doctrine”? The Monroe Doctrine is now more than three-quarters of a century old. Has it ever been violated because we did not defend it with big guns? The only attempt against it was the invasion of Mexico by the French Emperor, Louis Napoleon, during our civil war. Nothing can be more certain than that but for our civil war Louis Napoleon would never have dared to touch the American continent,

and that, when from that civil war our Union issued with confirmed assurance of its permanence, it required not the army we had at that time, but a mere nod of Uncle Sam's head, to make the French Emperor take to his heels. Does any one doubt it? The close of our civil war and the disbandment of our forces were followed by a long revival of peace, during which we were substantially without army and navy. Did any old-world Power make any attempt to break through the Monroe Doctrine, although they were armed and we were not? Nay, it was during that very period when the strongest and proudest sea power of the world, Great Britain, submitted to that terrible humiliation of her pride, the *Alabama* settlement, rather than run into a serious quarrel with the restored Union. Nor did any other power show the least disposition to risk such a quarrel, although some of them may have disliked our Monroe Doctrine, or this Republic generally, ever so much.

And why did they not? For the simple reason, among others, that, although they were armed and we were not, they all knew that they—not one of them—could afford to risk a serious quarrel with the United States. They all knew, and know now, that this is a country of very great wealth, and practically inexhaustible resources in men and means; that the Americans are a people not only strong in numbers, but of exceptional ingenuity, energy and enterprise, and of a patriotic spirit that shuns no sacrifice; that this Republic, on its continental fastness, is impregnable, if not substantially unassailable; that a strong and daring enemy might perhaps, at the beginning of a war, at best succeed in scratching our edges, but no more; that such a war, in the worst case for us, would be a long one, but, owing to our immense staying power, at last a hopeless one for our enemy, as to the final result; that by such a war the resources of our old-world enemy

would be taxed to the utmost, and that meanwhile he would, being to his whole capacity engaged with us, be at the mercy of his possibly hostile neighbors at home. This, leaving all other considerations aside, is the reason why no old-world Power will think of going to war with us, unless kicked into it by some absolutely unendurable provocation on our part. They will, on the contrary, readily, even with alacrity, concede to us every right that we can justly claim, every demand that we can decently make, to secure our good-will. Have we not of late years, at times with some astonishment, witnessed the spectacle of some of them fairly running a race for our friendship? And now we must have no end of battleships, at whatever cost, to protect the Monroe Doctrine against them!

But—as we are told without ceasing—we are now a great world-power, and as a great world-power we are bound to have a great navy. Of all the humbugs of the day—and there are many—the aberration that this Republic has but recently issued as a great world-power from our Spanish war is perhaps the most audacious. What is a world-power? A power whose voice is listened to in the councils of nations with respect and deference, and which by word or act exercises an important influence in the development of the great affairs of mankind. It was perhaps half a hundred years ago when Richard Cobden called this Republic the greatest power on earth. At that time we did not think of having a great army or navy. This power was not first revealed by the fights around Santiago. By its very birth this Republic gave a mighty impulse to liberal movements in the old world. In its early childhood it put its strong hand upon the piratical practices of the Barbary States, although our war-fleet hardly counted among the navies of Europe. About the middle of the last century it took a leading part in

the abolition of the Danish Sound dues. In the second half of the last century it opened Japan to the world. Throughout all this time it made very valuable additions to the recognized rules of international law. All this with only a few regiments on land and a few frigates on the sea. Have we given worthier evidence of being a great world-power since?

Surely I want this Republic to be a great world-power—a greater world-power than it is now, or than it can be made by armies and navies ever so gigantic. The way to accomplish this is simple: Let this Republic present to the world the most encouraging example of a great people governing themselves in liberty, justice and peace, and let its dealings with all other nations, great and small, strong and weak, be so obviously just and fair, so patient and forbearing, so mindful not only of their rights, but also of their self-respect, so free from all arrogance or humiliating assertion of superior strength, that nobody can doubt its generous unselfishness, and that, whenever a mediator is wanted for the adjustment of international differences, this Republic will be looked up to as the natural arbiter. Then it will be in the noblest sense a great world-power—indeed, the grandest world-power mankind has ever known.

How ignoble, how unspeakably vulgar, appears by the side of this conception the idea that the American Republic should assert its position as a great power by swaggering about among the nations of the earth as the big battleship bully, carrying a chip on his shoulder and demanding his rights on the strength of the fist which he shakes under everybody's nose!

The ideal of the great world-power which this Republic should be, as I have described it, is no mere figment of fancy, no mere dream impossible of realization. To accomplish it we have only to return with full sincerity

to the principles and ideals to which this Republic owed its origin. We have only to take again as our guide that solemn admonition—nowadays so thoughtlessly slighted by giddy youths—Washington's Farewell Address, the wisest counsel ever left to his people by a great patriot. We have only to stop thinking of the conquest of other peoples' lands and goods, and aim instead at the conquest of their esteem and confidence, which will be not only a more honorable, but, even commercially speaking, a much more valuable asset in the long run. We have only to convince the world that we do not worship at the shrine of physical force, that barbarous relic of the past; but that we cherish only the moral power of genuine civilization and true progress, which are to open to mankind a happier future. I say this at a moment when the newspapers are filled with reports of the conflict going on in the Far East—one of the most horrible butcheries recorded in history, which, instead of inflaming by its horrors the fighting spirit among nations, should—and, I trust, will—demonstrate to them the downright atrocity, the hideous criminality of war, and the absolute necessity of preventing any resort to it by every means the humane spirit of our civilization can suggest.

No, this ideal I have described is not impossible of realization. Indeed, we actually approached that realization when, in putting an end to Spanish rule in Cuba, we promised that Cuba should not be our conquest, but a self-governing republic, and when, in a great measure at least, we fulfilled that promise. The outside world, which had cynically doubted the sincerity of that promise, pricked up its ears and came very near believing that such an act on our part might really have been inspired by a generous, self-sacrificing desire to liberate another people from despotic rule, without any

selfish scheme in the background. How glorious would it have been had this incipient belief in our disinterested magnanimity been sustained and strengthened by what followed! What a pity that while we kept our promise in point of form by not seizing Cuba, we straightway violated it in spirit by making that Spanish war a war of conquest after all, in which, excepting Cuba, we grabbed for ourselves pretty much everything we could lay our hands on! We went even so far as to present to the world the appalling spectacle of shooting down in the Philippines those who had been our allies in the war against Spain, in order to get possession of their country and to subject them to our arbitrary rule, and we called the process in unctuous phrase "benevolent assimilation." In the war we made upon these late allies hundreds of thousands of them lost their lives, and their homes were burnt and their lands devastated far and wide; and this we pretended to be necessary to keep them from hurting one another in anarchical convulsions which would—as we said, and now say—certainly follow if they were left free. And then we established our colonial system, in which we govern alien and subjected populations by our autocratical rule—foreign rule to them—regulating for them "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," as it may please us, their foreign conquerors, their sovereign lords and masters. And all this while we know, and hardly any one disputes, that almost every man, woman and child in the Philippines at heart hates the foreign ruler and yearns for independence.

Thus the Republican party, which owed its existence to its belief in the Declaration of Independence, has before all the world hauled down that banner of our faith and has hoisted in its stead the flag of conquest and arbitrary dominion over subject populations. I am well aware of the philanthropic cloak in which this

autocratic rule is wrapped—how it is all for the benefit of our subjects, how we intend to make them free and rich and contented, if they behave themselves. It is the talk of autocrats from time immemorial. I will not question the good faith of the rulers of to-day. But the rulers of to-day will not be the rulers of to-morrow or the day after. The fact remains that this is autocracy, that this autocracy is to determine how much freedom and what kind of government the subject is to have, and that it will determine this according to its own changing pleasure and its temporary conception of its own interests. And when the strugglers for free government—or for “government by the consent of the governed,” which is the same thing—look from their fields of endeavor throughout the world to this Republic for example, guidance and encouragement, our Republican leaders will tell them that we have bravely got over that baby talk about the “consent of the governed,” and that we are lustily engaged in exercising arbitrary government, the powers of which are derived from musketry and cannon.

Some time ago a most imposing array of the intelligence and moral sense of the country coming from the universities, the churches, the bench, the bar, the learned professions and other honorable callings petitioned the Republican National Convention that it should declare itself in favor of an early promise of independence to the people of the Philippines. The petition was not deemed worthy of respectful consideration. Ever since the spokesmen of the Republican party, the President at their head, have been busy hunting up reasons for not making that promise. Had they been equally intent upon finding reasons for making it, they would have discovered that it would be no less easy to recognize the independence of the Philippines than it was to recognize the independence of Cuba; that the cry that the

American flag must never be hauled down is a vain and foolish cry, and that the flag was never more glorious than when it was hauled down from Morro Castle at Havana.

Here, then, is what has become of the great Republican party—once the party of liberty and human rights, the party of moral ideas: It has become the advocate and servant of a combination of pecuniary interests, in maintaining a high protective tariff going far beyond its professed objects, despoiling the many for the benefit of a few, and striving to keep itself in power by a system of corruption organized on a national scale. It has by a policy of adventure, conquest and arbitrary rule over subject nations set aside the fundamental principles upon which this Republic was founded, and thus dangerously weakened in our democracy the highest conservative influence—the popular adherence to our traditional doctrines and ideals. It has robbed the American people of the inestimable privilege of being exempt from the burden of enormous armaments under which other nations are groaning, by imposing, without the slightest necessity, similar burdens on our backs. It has thereby not only ceased to countenance and inspirit the efforts made in favor of the direction of general disarmament, but, disquieting other powers by our building a great war-fleet quite superfluous except for aggressive purposes, it is inciting them to follow suit, thus speeding the ruinous race and ranging the American republic among the instigators of a retrogressive tendency hostile to true civilization.

We may now ask ourselves whether the character of the Republican candidate for the Presidency redeems the character of the party. I know President Roosevelt well. I have known him well since, as a very young man, he entered public life, and I have watched his career,

not only with the concern of an interested citizen, but also with the warm sympathy of a personal friend. His exuberant spirits, his bright intelligence, his generous impulses, his gay combativeness and the bubbling vivacity of his contempts and his enthusiasms made him an exceedingly attractive personality; and those who observed the courage and ability with which, as a young member of the New York legislature, he plunged into the fight against existing abuses in the public service and in party management, might well have hoped that he would develop into a dauntless and unselfish, and at the same time a wise, champion of the highest ideals of public morals and of practical statesmanship, whose lead every patriotic citizen could follow with unreserved confidence. And when, after an examination of his later career, conducted with the sympathetic desire to view everything in the most favorable light, I have now to form, for myself, the conclusion that in very important respects those high expectations have been disappointed, and that implicit confidence would be dangerously misplaced, I make that confession with genuine sorrow.

There are two Roosevelts in the field—the ideal, the legendary Roosevelt, as he once appeared, and as many people imagine him still to be; and the real Roosevelt, as he has since developed. There are no doubt many good citizens who think of voting for Roosevelt, having the legendary Roosevelt in mind; but they will do well to consider that, if elected, the real Roosevelt will be President. The legendary Roosevelt was he who not only abhorred and denounced immoral practices in the public concerns, but would never condone them or compromise with them; who from the bottom of his heart hated and despised spoils-politics and spoils politicians, party machines and party bosses; who would have

scorned to countenance them and to associate his interests or endeavors with theirs for his party's advantage; who rather bid defiance to them, and would strain every nerve to fight and utterly annihilate their influence upon our public life—a sort of second St. George, killing the dragon of corruption and other iniquities with his mighty lance. It was, by the way, the same legendary Roosevelt who in his writings rejected the protective tariff system as unjust and injurious, and who condemned a colonial policy involving the acquisition of distant lands and alien populations to be governed by arbitrary rule as incompatible with our fundamental principles and un-American.

After his election to the governorship of New York, and, later, after his accession to the Presidency of the United States, the legendary Roosevelt appeared in strong phrase in his frequent addresses to the public. No governor, and, certainly, no President, has ever more earnestly admonished the people in numberless discourses with untiring iteration and in more emphatic language that, to be good and useful citizens, we must, above all things, conduct ourselves with “honesty, courage and good sense.” There never was a more demonstrative advocate, in speech, of that “militant honesty” which will not only carefully abstain from wrongdoing but will mercilessly denounce and stamp out dishonesty wherever it can be reached. Nobody ever condemned with holier scorn and abhorrence the self-seekers in politics, “those sinister beings who batten on the evils of our political system,” and “the corrupt politician who is the real and dangerous foe,” and that “dreadful thing which consists in condoning misconduct in a public man,” and that “shame” in our politics which “deifies mere success without regard to the moral qualities lying behind it.”

It might surely have been expected of the man whose

righteous impulses were so strong that he could hardly find language emphatic enough to express them—that he would, when in places of authority, never think of countenancing those mean and dangerous creatures, and that he would use his whole power to crush their influence for mischief; that when governor of New York he would leave no rightful means untried to uproot the iniquitous and demoralizing bossdom of Platt in his State; that he would lose no proper opportunity to discountenance Boss Quay of Pennsylvania, who stood for everything that was iniquitous, demoralizing and tyrannical in politics; that he would be anxious to demonstrate his utter disgust with such a creature as Addicks, who has openly invaded a State with his corruption fund to buy a seat in the Senate; that he would at least keep his Cabinet clear of men of questionable political character, and so on.

This might confidently have been expected; but what did we see? As governor of New York Mr. Roosevelt indeed promised a good civil service law and made many good appointments, but he consulted Boss Platt about public matters with a regularity which amounted to a recognition of bossdom as a legitimate institution. Whatever he may have granted or denied to the boss, nothing can be more certain than the fact that when Mr. Roosevelt ceased to be governor of his State, the power of the boss was not shaken in the least, but rather strengthened by Mr. Roosevelt's implied recognition. And this continued while he was President. And there was Quay, the most unscrupulous and despotic boss of them all—called by President Roosevelt his "stanch and loyal friend," but who was also his *influential* friend, for if Quay did not wholly control under President Roosevelt the whole federal patronage in Pennsylvania, he controlled enough to maintain his absolute boss rule over that State entirely

unimpaired—indeed, rather fortified by the prestige of President Roosevelt's friendship.

And there is the unspeakable Addicks, the would-be purchaser of the State of Delaware, whom the legendary Roosevelt would have spewed out of his mouth with such energy that all the world would have been thrilled with his loathing of the unclean thing, but now treated by the real Roosevelt with the gentleness of friendly neutrality, giving his heelers some patronage and his opponents some, so that either may pretend to have his countenance, and that President Roosevelt's apologists have hard work to prove that he is not Addicks' active ally.

And there is Postmaster-General Payne, whose only distinction in public life was that of a lobbyist and a skillful and not over-nice political pipelayer and wire-puller, whose appointment to the control of the great patronage department of the Government, which has the largest field for political dicker, would have fitted the Cabinet of a political schemer in the Presidential chair, but not the Cabinet of the legendary Roosevelt. Mr. Payne showed his true colors when he tried at the start to discredit and to whistle down the inquiry into the corruption festering in his department.

And there is Mr. J. M. Clarkson, whom the legendary Roosevelt once denounced as one of the most obnoxious of spoils politicians in office, and whom the real Roosevelt, when President, made surveyor of the port of New York, an officer having much to do with patronage.

And there is Mr. "Lou" Payn, whom Governor Roosevelt once, for good reason, thrust out of the office of State insurance commissioner, and whom Mr. Elihu Root characterized as a man who for many years had been a stench in the nostrils of the people of the State of New York, and who was recently called to the White

House as President Roosevelt's enemy, but issued from the White House as President Roosevelt's friend and supporter, praising President Roosevelt as a "great politician who had changed wonderfully," and who must and will be reelected.

Here I will stop. The most notorious instances suffice for illustration. It was said of President Cleveland that good citizens "loved him for the enemies he had made." I apprehend it may be said of President Roosevelt that we have to distrust him for the friends he has made. It is an experience as old as the world, that the friendship of good men is freely given when deserved, but that the friendship of the wicked has its price. When we find President Roosevelt in the company of such men we are far from suspecting that he loves such company, and we must not forget that characters of this kind will hang on the skirts of every Administration and offer their services while pursuing their own selfish aims. But I cannot admit what Secretary Taft offers in defence of President Roosevelt, that "were he to ostracize, so far as conference with him is concerned, the members of his party whom the Mugwumps do not approve, he would divide his party, tie his hands and destroy utterly his power for usefulness to the country."

In the first place I must protest against the injustice Mr. Taft does the President by suggesting that only the Mugwumps possess the honesty to disapprove of the Platts and Quays and Paynes, leaving it to be inferred that Mr. Roosevelt does not disapprove of them. In the second place the question is whether the price he pays for the service they render is, as to the public good, not larger than the value of the service he received from them.

Ours being to a large extent a government by party, it is of the highest importance that our party organiza-

tions should as such be true representatives of the principles and opinions cherished by their members, and not mere machines composed in the main of mercenaries, and commanded by bosses for such purposes as they may entertain. The development of the party organization into the machine and of the party leader into the boss has become one of the most dangerous evils threatening the working of our free institutions of government. Just here lies one of the most portentous problems of our political life—a problem from the solution of which it may depend whether this is to remain a democracy of real freemen governing themselves according to their intelligence and moral sense, or a mere battlefield for the contests of various unprincipled and rapacious party despotisms fighting for spoil. Every clear-sighted man knows this, and, no doubt, Mr. Roosevelt does.

To attack this machine-and-boss system in official position requires moral courage. Such courage an ordinary politician in the Presidency may not be expected to possess. But Mr. Roosevelt cannot object if he is judged by the standards he has set up for himself. When a champion enters the lists with so proud a flourish of trumpets about his courage and "militant honesty," it may well be hoped that he will boldly, and at some risk, undertake the task of using the best of his power to stem the growth of an evil which, unless checked, will become fatal to the very life of our democratic government.

Now, what do we see? It is not the slightest exaggeration to say that in boss-and-machine-ridden States the boss-and-machine system flourishes to-day as if Theodore Roosevelt had never been governor of New York or President of the United States. In New York, by a sort of palace revolution, a new boss has displaced the old one, and it is still a question whether the new boss is not the worse of the two. In Pennsylvania, the old

boss having died, the filling of his place by a successor of the same kind is a matter of course. The system itself is exactly the same; it is steadily spreading over other States, and it is growing intrinsically stronger by President Roosevelt's recognition of its power. Pointing at him, the ordinary machine politician may now say, "You talk about the boss and the machine with great disrespect. You want to abolish them. Look at this President. He was the loudest of reformers. He did no end of preaching about 'courage' and 'militant honesty' as the cardinal virtues. No sooner does he get into positions of power than he acts very much like other people in trading with the bosses and the machines. He needs their aid and coöperation, and, instead of fighting their power, he admits and recognizes it. Now, what have you to say?" Yes, what have we to say?

President Roosevelt has done many good things, but certainly none through the aid and coöperation of the bosses and the machines that could compensate for the injury he has done to democratic institutions and good government by the encouragement given by him to the most pernicious element in our political life. It is a serious setback to a reform movement when a conspicuous reformer, placed in a position of power, in any important point fails to conform his action to his professed principles.

We observe a similar lack of mettle in Mr. Roosevelt's attitude concerning the tariff and the Trusts. Whether the early opinions expressed by him adverse to protection were well matured or not, he was, when he became President, undoubtedly and naturally, struck by the idea that it was time to reduce the most exorbitant rates of the Dingley tariff, and, especially, that the aid given by the protective tariff to the Trusts in perfecting their respective monopolies must be withdrawn. He repeat-

edly gave expression to such sentiments, and discussed various methods to accomplish such ends. Indeed, it might have been thought that a bold and unyielding attack upon the monster of monopoly would particularly tempt his chivalrous courage. His Administration did indeed institute legal proceedings, in one case successfully, against monopolistic combinations, but it has, so far, accomplished nothing tangible as to the stopping of the extortions practiced upon the people by the Trusts which—especially the manufacturing Trusts—touch the general public most nearly. These Trusts are not very much afraid of restrictive laws and legal proceedings, for they have almost boundless ingenuity of evasion at their command. What most of them, and indeed the worst of them, really fear is to be deprived of the benefit the tariff gives them in protecting them against foreign competition; and thus aiding them in establishing and maintaining their home monopoly. That firm protectionist, the late John Sherman, freely admitted this, and, although he was a rather timid statesman, he pronounced himself in favor of withdrawing tariff protection from Trust-made articles.

When President Roosevelt publicly professed similar sentiments a significant spectacle presented itself. At once, as the newspapers elaborately reported, political magnates, champions of the high-protective system, swooped down upon him, as was generally believed, to convince him of the politically and otherwise perilous character of such heresy. Whether the stories told were true or not, certain it is that President Roosevelt has become a convert to protectionism of the highest kind, "standing pat" on the tariff as it is, to be revised only "by its friends." The surrender is complete, and this surrender has led Mr. Roosevelt to abandon—no, not only to abandon, but positively to oppose and to denounce

—the policy which of all policies proposed would be surest to hurt the Trusts in their really vulnerable point. And he covers this surrender with an argument which, I regret to say, looks like a subterfuge.

He says in substance that if we withdraw tariff protection from Trust-made articles we shall, indeed, by making their production less profitable, hurt the Trusts, but we shall at the same time hurt, and probably ruin, the smaller establishments which manufacture the same articles in competition with the Trusts; and this must not be done.

But Mr. Roosevelt leaves out of due consideration that the Trust and the small competitor are not the only parties concerned in this business. There is a third party whose interests are infinitely more important. This third party is the general public. The general public suffer from the extortions to which the Trusts have subjected them, and justly demand to be relieved of those extortions. The withdrawal of tariff protection from the Trust-made goods would inevitably force down the extortionate prices, and thus afford that relief, and it is cruelly unjust to deny this boon to the people on the singular ground that by depriving the Trusts of their tyrannical power we might also possibly hurt a comparatively small number of persons competing with them. Thus, by opposing the policy which would be most sure effectually to weaken the Trusts, President Roosevelt has actually arrayed himself on the side of monopoly against the people. He may yet have to learn that in serving high protection he serves a set of hard, grasping, merciless taskmasters, who will make him do things which the legendary Roosevelt never would have dreamed of. I do not think it impossible that even the present Roosevelt, if kept in power, will be driven to rebel against their exactions, and that he may then return to the views and purposes of earlier and better days.

Indeed, I have such faith in the original goodness of his impulses that I deem him capable of abandoning again any of the wrong ways he has lately taken, except one. And there something stands in the way for which he is not responsible: his temperament, which is altogether too strong for his reason. He is a born fighter in the extremest sense. Nobody ever delighted in the joy of the conflict more heartily than he—not only the conflict of mind against mind, but also—and perhaps even more—the conflict of physical force against physical force. Nobody has ever been more earnest and eloquent than he in extolling the glories, the enthusiasm and the morally elevating influences of war. His demand for “strenuosity” was never quite satisfied with the peaceable achievements by the American people in transforming this vast continent from a wilderness into an abode of civilization. Neither would a strenuous but peaceable application of the mental, moral and physical forces of the American people to the solution of their home problems quite content him. No, in the background of his strenuous dreams there lurk always great conflicts somewhere, conflicts of great armies and navies, in which we are to take part and for which we must be prepared. He apprehends that “if we ever grow to regard peace as a permanent condition” the “keen, fearless, virile qualities of heart, mind and body will sink into disuse.” His constant tongue-lashings of the “coward,” the “craven” and the “weakling,” that is, persons who would not fight unless it was quite necessary, had a somewhat boyish sound, but came from his heart. He dropped them only when by too frequent iteration they had fallen into ridicule. Most characteristic was the utterance which as Assistant Secretary of the Navy he addressed to the Naval War College in which he said: “No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumph of war”; and, “Scant atten-

tion is paid to the coward or weakling who babbles for peace." And quite in keeping with such warcries, unprecedented in the mouth of a President of the United States, was, at the equally unprecedented review of the navy near President Roosevelt's country house, the no less unprecedented Presidential utterance: "There are many public servants whom I hold in high esteem, but there are no others whom I hold in quite the esteem I do the officers and enlisted men of the army and navy of the United States." There is an abounding record of similar deliverances made by him when President.

I know that, on the other hand, President Roosevelt has frequently assured us that he is really a friend of peace and that he wants a larger army and a very large navy merely to make peace more secure by their formidable appearance. We are told that, while President, he has, in point of fact, not precipitated us into a war, and that in the Venezuela case—which, however, was not our quarrel—he favored a reference to the Hague Tribunal, thereby strengthening that court of peace—which is true, and for which he recently received from a distinguished foreign statesman a deserved, very proper and very handsome compliment. And meanwhile members of the President's Cabinet go about the country picturing before wondering audiences Mr. Roosevelt as a person as meek and gentle as Mary's little lamb.

It behooves us as American citizens, before performing the solemn duty of giving the republic a new President, to evolve from such conflicting evidence, most of which is given by Mr. Roosevelt himself, a calm and conscientious judgment. In expressing my own opinion, I am sure I do so with a sincere desire not to be unjust to a man possessing so many estimable and attractive qualities, but with the equally sincere desire to serve the best interests of the country. I do not deem President

Roosevelt capable of seeking an opportunity for plunging the country into a foreign war merely to gratify his ambition or to give play to his fighting spirit. But I do think that whenever there are two ways of deciding a matter of controversy—one the slow, patient, diplomatic, peaceable way, and the other the short cut by the use of force—Mr. Roosevelt will be *temperamentally inclined* to choose the short cut, and it will require with him an uncommonly strong effort of self-restraint to resist that inclination, which effort, if made at all, is not always successful.

The Panama affair is a case in point. Well-nigh everybody in this country desired the building of an inter-oceanic canal. Congress passed an act, the so-called Spooner act of June 28, 1902, authorizing the President to negotiate for the acquisition of the property of the Panama Canal Company and for the control of the necessary territory of the republic of Colombia on which that property was situated, and directing the President, if he should fail in making the desired arrangements upon reasonable terms, then to negotiate for the acquisition of the necessary territory in Costa Rica and Nicaragua for the building of the so-called Nicaragua Canal. The President accordingly made a treaty with the republic of Colombia, the so-called Hay-Herran Treaty, which was subject to the approval of the Senate of the republic of Colombia, as well as of our own. Our Senate approved but the Senate of Colombia rejected that treaty. Thereupon, President Roosevelt did not, as the law expressly commanded him, enter into negotiations for the building of the Nicaragua Canal, but, when a so-called "revolution" broke out in the state of Panama, declaring its secession from the republic of Colombia, of which it formed constitutionally a part, just as the States of New York and Pennsylvania form parts of the United States,

President Roosevelt promptly recognized the independence of Panama, not only without waiting to see whether the republic of Colombia was able to suppress the rebellion, but actually preventing her from making the attempt by forbidding her to transport troops to the scene of the conflict in Panama, and enforcing his command by the presence of some of our warships and landing troops. He then made a treaty with the "republic of Panama," providing for the building of the Panama Canal by the United States.

By so acting, President Roosevelt in the first place violated the law directing him, in case of the failure of the negotiation with the republic of Colombia, to negotiate for the building of the Nicaragua Canal. In the second place he trampled under foot the principle for the maintenance of which we sacrificed in four years of bloody civil war nearly a million of human lives and many thousands of millions of dollars—namely, that principle that under a federal constitution like ours—and the existing constitution of Colombia is in this respect very much like ours, perhaps even a little stronger—a State has no right to secede from the Union. Let us hope that the precedent thus recklessly set by President Roosevelt may never come home to roost. In the third place, he not only recognized the right of secession, but he recognized also the independence of the seceded state without giving the federal government the slightest chance to enforce its lawful authority in the rebellious community—in fact, he interfered with a mailed hand to prevent it from doing so, thus committing what was practically an act of war against Colombia. Again, it is worth while to remember that during our civil war we desperately protested against any such conduct on the part of any foreign state, and again we have reason devoutly to express our hope that this precedent so reck-

lessly set by President Roosevelt may not come home to roost.

In the fourth place, in doing all this he flagrantly violated the provisions of a solemn treaty, the treaty of 1846, in which Colombia guarantees to the Government and citizens of the United States free transit across the isthmus from sea to sea, and as compensation for the favors and advantages received, "The United States guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada now has and possesses over the said territory." "Guarantee" is a strong word, and there can be no doubt as to what was "guaranteed" by the United States in this treaty; it was "the rights of sovereignty and property possessed by Colombia over the territory of Panama." This guarantee was glaringly violated by President Roosevelt's coöperation with the rebels of Panama in destroying the sovereignty of Colombia over that territory.

His principal excuse is that we had to keep open the transit across the isthmus, which might easily have been done without excluding Colombian troops from Panama; that the civilization of the age demanded the building of the canal; that the rejection of the Hay-Herran Treaty by Colombia obstructed this work of civilization; that if President Roosevelt had not acted as he did our chances of building the canal "would have been deferred certainly for years, perhaps for a generation or more," for there would have been "ceaseless guerilla warfare and possibly foreign complications." President Roosevelt has a way of picturing to a credulous public horrible things which would have inevitably happened if he had not done what he did, or that certainly will happen unless we let him do what he wishes to do. (So also in the case of the Philippines.)

But this excuse for his conduct in the Panama case is

lamentably futile. In the first place, the cause of civilization is not promoted but hurt when a great Republic like ours breaks its solemn treaties and adopts the nefarious doctrine that the end justifies the means. And secondly, what right has President Roosevelt to say that the building of the canal would have been deferred "perhaps for a generation" if he had not acted as he did? Let us suppose it is true, as has been said, that the republic of Colombia tried to extort from us a higher price for what was asked of her—that she tried to blackmail us by rejecting the Hay-Herran Treaty. Was it not reasonable to expect that after a little further haggling she would yield, if with some more patience we had continued our diplomatic talks with her, convincing her that under no circumstances she would ever get more than we had offered, and especially if we had actually and ostentatiously begun negotiations, in obedience to existing law, about the Nicaragua Canal, thus letting Colombia know that she would have to yield quickly because there was danger for her in delay? Such yielding would, no doubt, have before long been the result. We might thus have had our canal without contemning our own law; without treading under foot principles we had maintained and fought for at a tremendous cost; without setting precedents which we pray may not come back to plague us; without the scandal of breaking a treaty—had we had a President possessing more patience and discretion, and a temperament less given to dramatic vehemence.

We should then have also avoided some other consequences. The governments of other nations have, indeed, promptly recognized the independence of the new republic of Panama after we had substantially created it and stamped it with our authority. Of course, out of deference to this great Republic, they accepted an accomplished fact fathered by it. But we should not

flatter ourselves that so high-handed a proceeding as President Roosevelt's has raised us in their esteem and confidence. They may regard it as smart, very smart, but they will be impressed with the fact that when such a thing is possible similar or even worse things are not impossible. And when President Roosevelt tells the world that in this business "the Administration behaved throughout not only with good faith, but with extraordinary patience and large generosity toward those with whom it dealt," there is undoubtedly much shaking of heads throughout civilized mankind as to American standards of good faith, patience and generosity. In our further dealings with foreign governments we shall no doubt be met with profuse politeness, but also with a watchful eye for good faith, patience and generosity of the same kind.

There is another effect of the President's willful performance which we have serious reason to deplore. It could hardly fail to inflame the distrust of our southern neighbors with regard to our possible designs with regard to them, to such a degree as to create an almost grotesque situation. The Monroe Doctrine, as we desire it to be understood, constitutes this Republic as the protector of their territorial integrity against any aggression on the part of old-world powers. But now we have made them think that we ourselves are more dangerous to them than any of those powers are ever likely to be, and that they rather need protection against us than against them. "El peligro del Norte"—the Northern peril—has become among our southern neighbors a current phrase. The dismemberment of the republic of Colombia and the slicing off from it of a territory which really has become a dependency of the United States serve to them as proof of our sinister schemes, and we must not be surprised if on occasion they should be more inclined

to enter into a combination of foreign powers against us than a combination with us; and if in the matter of commerce their outraged feelings should move them, other things being equal, to trade with any other country more willingly than with the United States.

This apprehension, and the consequent unfriendly sentiment, which comes near making them our bitter enemies at heart, has naturally been intensified by another imprudence of President Roosevelt which in recklessness stands unparalleled in our history. I mean his public pronouncement that this Republic is to be the paramount policeman of the whole American continent. Incredible as it may seem, in a public letter he actually said this:

It is not true that the United States have any land-hunger or entertain any projects as regards any other nations, save such as are for their welfare. All that we desire is to see all neighboring countries stable, orderly and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Brutal wrongdoing or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore this duty, but it remains true that our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. All that we ask of them is that they shall govern themselves well and be prosperous and orderly. Where this is the case they will find only helpfulness from us.

This can mean only that if our southern neighbors act with decency in political and industrial matters, and pay their debts, and keep good order, and are prosperous, and abstain from brutal wrongdoing and other things

loosening the ties of civilized society, we shall let them alone; but if not, we must deem it the duty of this Republic to "interfere" to the end of regulating their conduct. Of course, this Republic is to be the judge as to whether their conduct is sufficiently proper or not. When making this pronouncement, Mr. Roosevelt probably did not remember that there had been States in this Union which repudiated their debts, and that, even while he wrote his letter, there was one, Colorado, in a condition of seriously loosened ties of civilized society, and other States in which the most brutal form of lynching had become a confirmed habit. If President Roosevelt were asked to "interfere" there with a strong hand, he would say that he had no Constitutional power to do so. What power has he to "interfere" in the South American republics when they fail to pay their debts due to other people, or do or permit things loosening the ties of civilized society? And what would he say if a foreign nation presumed to "interfere" with us, if we should so misconduct ourselves, as in some parts of our country has actually been done? He may say that there is a vast difference between our Republic and the South American republics with whom disorder has become the rule, while we may be expected to correct our conduct ourselves. But among those South American republics there are some—such as Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Brazil—which not a great many years ago seemed to be hopelessly given over to unending turbulence, but which since by their own effort have become very respectable and respected members of the family of nations, and which permit us to hope that others may to some extent follow that example without our interference. Indeed, the task thus mapped out for us by Mr. Roosevelt is so unreasonable in itself, so adventurous, fraught with such arbitrary assumptions of power, with so many compli-

cations and with responsibilities so incalculable, that the statesmanship which proposes it may well be thought capable of any eccentricity ever so extravagant. This is felt even by some of the President's political friends, who are heard to say that this letter was really nothing but one of the explosions of "Teddy Roosevelt's bump-tiousness," and should not be taken seriously. I wish I could think so. But it was not a private gentleman who uttered these things in harmless badinage; it was the President of the United States who uttered them, deliberately wrote them down over his signature, to have them communicated to the world on a public occasion. Such public utterances by the President of the United States are very serious business, especially when they touch our relations with foreign nations.

No, this strange letter was not a mere unguarded slip of tongue or pen, portraying only a momentary impulse, a fleeting fancy. It was rather a manifestation of Mr. Roosevelt's real nature. He sees an object which appears to him good or desirable. His impetuous temperament urges him forward to attain this object, and in the rush he is apt to despise anything standing in the way, to forget laws, and treaties, and precedents, and adverse rights and interests, and to regard everybody opposing him as an enemy of the public welfare, if not as his own. He considers the Panama Canal a good thing, and to get it he rushes forward regardless of other obligations and of consequences. He thinks it desirable that the South American republics should be honest, and orderly, and prosperous, and forthwith he proclaims it to be our duty to make them so, in a manner insulting to them and discreditable to his own common-sense. He thinks that the pensions should be raised, and straightway he snatches the matter out of the hands of Congress, which was then considering it, and disposes of it himself

in a manner which many of the best lawyers of the country hold to be flagrantly unconstitutional. Thus he joins to a naturally good heart a "lawless mind," as Professor Nelson has properly called it. Sometimes very little or ill-digested knowledge suffices him to reach the conclusions he desires. In the speeches he delivered in his campaign for the Vice-Presidency he likened the Filipinos fighting for the independence of their country to savage Apaches on the warpath, to be treated accordingly. He is now quite sure that we did not take the Philippines "at will," in face of the historic fact that we might have treated them just as we treated Cuba. He positively asserts that "the voice of the United States would now count for nothing in the Far East if we had abandoned the Philippines and refused to do what was done in "China," while even superficial study of American history would have taught him that the United States opened Japan to the world, and exercised, in Secretary Marcy's, and Caleb Cushing's, and Burlingame's time, great influence in China many decades before the possession of the Philippines was dreamed of. And so I might go on *ad infinitum*.

He is quite sure that in all these things he has been perfectly right. Whoever doubts this may read his letter of acceptance, the most extraordinary document of that kind ever presented to the American people. In self-glorification it is immense. According to it President Roosevelt's Administration has been positively perfect. Those who find fault with it are simply insincere or lamentably deluded. He does not hesitate to attack the motives of his opponents. He is firmly convinced that his policies were the only ones effectively to serve the interests and the honor of the country, which interests and honor absolutely demand that these policies be continued. To prove this his letter here and there twists

facts in a manner which would lead us to call those statements disingenuous, did we not think that he believes them to be true. He stops little short of proclaiming himself the necessary man. There seems to be reason for apprehending that the excessive flattery which has so mercilessly pursued him may have created or strengthened in him the impression that, wielding the powers of the Presidency, he is destined to do something wonderful in the history of the world, that no greater calamity could befall mankind than his defeat in the coming election, that everything apt to promote his chances is good and every adverse influence wicked, and that, therefore, those who decide to vote against him—about one-half of the voters of the United States, more or less—are unpatriotic citizens and bad Americans.

And behind all this there is at work in him his fighting joy, and that worship of force in the concerns of mankind which makes him not only an advocate, but the very embodiment of that gospel of mastery by main strength, which is doing so much to blunt our moral sense, to lower our ethical standards and to disfigure the civilization of our days. Of that tendency which exalts armies and navies as the most potent factors in human affairs, Mr. Roosevelt gives a very characteristic exhibition in his letter of acceptance. Seeking to prove that the rights of American citizens in foreign countries would be safest when entrusted to the care of the Republican party, he said:

It is a striking evidence of our opponents' insincerity in this matter that with their demand for radical action by the State Department they couple a demand for a reduction in our small military establishment. Yet they must know that the heed paid to our protests against ill-treatment of our citizens will be exactly proportionate to the belief in our ability to make these protests effective should the need arise.

This is most startling. Did it never occur to President Roosevelt that by expressing it, he offers a burning insult to the civilized governments of the world? Does he really think that they will respect the rights of our citizens in their dominions only in "exact proportion" to the number of our soldiers and war-ships? Does he think that American citizens abroad would be oppressed without scruple if we had no army and navy? Does he think that foreign governments have no sense of law and justice and humanity in dealing with them? Will they, indeed, listen to our appeals for justice and right only "in proportion" to the number of guns we have ready for action? Or is not this rather another instance showing how in such things not the moral forces of our civilization, but the army and navy, are always uppermost in President Roosevelt's mind?

Here is again his temperament, stronger than his reason. It puts itself irrepressibly in evidence throughout this latest of his public utterances. In it speaks a sovereign contempt of adverse opinion, a dictatorial impatience of restraint, a vehemence of self-assertion, a war-lord tone of assumed authority to which in this Republic we have so far not been accustomed. If this spirit should be encouraged in the coming Presidential election by apparent popular approval, it may bring us some novel experiences of controversy and excitement which it would be eminently wise to avoid.

I do not overlook President Roosevelt's action regarding the reassembling of the Peace Conference at The Hague. It is to be commended and welcomed. But it would be infinitely more valuable and reassuring had he at the same time advocated a reduction of our own armament for war, the magnitude of which is far beyond our requirements for defensive purposes. It is useless to say that "if you would have peace, prepare for war,"

when at an enormous cost you prepare for war while there is not the slightest danger to your peace. What are we to think of a professed peace apostle who constantly clamors for more and more unnecessary war-ships, which look like a threat to the world instead of setting the good example of a reduction of armaments to the actual needs of the country? No wonder some European papers see in his recent action only a clever electioneering play.

President Roosevelt is an exceedingly interesting, picturesque and forcible character, who would have found a most congenial and glorious field of action at the time of the Crusades, but sometimes strangely fails to appreciate the higher moral aims of modern civilization. He is a patriotic man who has done very good service in several ways, and, being still young, is capable of doing much more in various important positions aside from the Presidency. His is a master nature, but this Republic does not want in the Presidency a master—least of all one who cannot master himself. To reëlect him, and thereby to make him understand, as he most certainly would understand it, that the American people are immensely delighted with all he has said and done under the inspiration of his strenuous tendencies, that they simply yearn to have more of it, and that to this end they put into his hand the great power of the Presidency, including the supreme command of the army and a big navy, with all the temptations and possibilities of such power, so that his ambition to regulate the world according to his notions may have full swing—this, I humbly submit, would be so hazardous a venture that clear-headed and sober-minded Americans may well, for their country's sake, shrink from the risk.

The alternative is the election of the Democratic candidate, Judge Parker. I do not indulge in the slightest delusion as to the Democratic party. I know its faults

and shortcomings very well, and I have opposed it often. But I believe that, if put in power, under present circumstances, it can do the country a very important service, partly of a negative, partly of a positive kind. Of course, I do not expect the millennium; but I think we may well expect that it will put a stop to the strenuous pyrotechnics which for some years have distracted us, and bring the Republic back to the sober ways of conscientiously constitutional and legal government; that it will arrest the existing lavishness of public expenditures and introduce a wholesome economy into our government household; that it will thoroughly overhaul the various government departments, which is all the more necessary as the recent investigation of corrupt practices in the postal service have only scratched the surface, and as further investigations by the Republican party "in its own time and its own way" are not promising substantial results; that it will scale down our enormous and unnecessary expenditures for the army and navy to a figure answering the real needs of the country; that it will start a vigorous movement against the extortions and corruptions of our tariff system; and that it will do away with our utterly undemocratic, financially wasteful and politically demoralizing colonial policy, thus restoring to their old dignity the principles upon which this Republic was founded, and reviving the popular reverence for our great traditions which forms the conservative influence so much needed by our democracy—in short, that it will reverse in all these things the principal tendencies of the present Administration. I do not mention the gold question, for the movement against the gold standard, which practically died in the Presidential election of 1896, is now so dead that the desperate and disreputable Republican partisanship, which seeks to frighten timid people, tries in vain to give it a fictitious appearance of

life. I hardly know anything more unscrupulous and shameful than this effort to disturb the confidence of the business world merely for party advantage.

The things I have mentioned the Democratic party in power may reasonably be expected to do; and in doing them it will render a most urgently needed and immensely valuable service to the Republic. I believe also that, in view of the peculiar requirements of the time, the Democrats have chosen an eminently proper man for their candidate. Mr. Parker evidently is by temperament and mental habit, as well as by acquisition of knowledge *par excellence*, a judge; and it seems to me that just now, after all the confusing experiences we have gone through, it is peculiarly desirable that we should have a true judge in the Presidential chair—a man who knows the law; who reveres the law; who will never permit his emotions to make him overlook the law; who will never presume that his will is law, and who will constantly keep in mind that a democracy will drift into chaos as soon as its government ceases to be a government of law.

His conduct has also shown that he is a man of high self-respect. A nomination for the Presidency is a very great honor. But while Mr. Parker may have strongly desired it, he did not run after it. With quiet dignity he waited for it to come to him, and when it came under questionable circumstances, he would not take it at a sacrifice of his conception of duty. His famous dispatch to the St. Louis Convention extorted at first a general shout of admiration even from his political enemies. Only when they perceived the moral prestige it gave him, they began their mean and pitiable partisan efforts to drag that noble deed down to the level of a shabby campaign trick. More highly even than that dispatch I esteem a letter written by Judge Parker previous to his nomination in answer to the urgent request of some

influential friends that he should break his silence. It has been recently published by its recipient, and runs thus:

ALBANY, June 17, 1904.

Dear Sir: You may be right in thinking that an expression of my views is necessary to secure the nomination. If so, let the nomination go. I took the position that I have maintained, first, because I thought it my duty to the court; second, because I do not think the nomination for such an office should be sought. I still believe that I am right, and therefore expect to remain steadfast. Very truly yours,

ALTON B. PARKER.

The modest gentleman who wrote this can be trusted. He will be no man's man. He has the courage not only to resist his opponents, but the higher courage, much more valuable in a President, in obedience to his sense of duty to resist his friends.

The reasons I have here candidly given compel me to believe that the American people will act wisely in making Alton B. Parker their President. I have spoken not as a partisan, but as an independent citizen, who has long been accustomed to regard the good of the country as infinitely more important than the advantage of any party, and who has no interest in political life other than the honor and welfare of the Republic, to which he is profoundly and gratefully devoted.

GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS¹

Among the most inspiring recollections of my life is a scene I witnessed in the Republican National Convention of 1860, which nominated Abraham Lincoln as its candi-

¹ Originally prepared as an address and delivered at the unveiling of the bust of Mr. Curtis in the Lenox Library, New York, Dec. 7, 1903. Revised and reprinted in *McClure's Magazine*, Oct., 1904.

date for the Presidency of the United States. The Convention was about to vote upon the Republican platform reported by the Committee on Resolutions. Then arose the venerable form of Joshua R. Giddings of Ohio, one of the veteran champions of the anti-slavery cause. He confessed himself painfully surprised that the Declaration of Independence had not found a word of recognition in that solemn announcement of the Republican creed, and he moved to amend the platform by inserting in a certain place the words:

That the maintenance of the principle promulgated in the Declaration of Independence and embodied in the Federal Constitution, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure those rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, is essential to the preservation of our republican institutions.

The Convention, impatient, as such assemblages are apt to be at any proposition threatening to delay the despatch of business, heedlessly rejected the amendment. Mr. Giddings, a look of distress upon his face, his white head towering above the crowd, slowly and sadly walked toward the door of the hall.

Suddenly, from among the New York delegation a young man of strikingly beautiful features leaped upon a chair and demanded to be heard. The same noisy demonstration of impatience greeted him. But he would not yield. "Gentlemen," he said in calm tones, "this is a convention of free speech, and I have been given the floor. I have but a few words to say to you, but I shall say them if I stand here until to-morrow morning." Another tumultuous explosion of impatience,

but he did not falter. At last his courage won and silence fell upon the assembly. Then his musical voice rang out like a trumpet call. Was this, he said, the party of freedom met on the borders of the free prairies to advance the cause of liberty and human rights? And would the representatives of that party dare to reject the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence affirming the equality and rights of men? After a few such sentences of almost defiant appeal he renewed the amendment to the platform moved by Mr. Giddings, and with an overwhelming shout of enthusiasm the Convention adopted it.

The young man who did this was George William Curtis. I had never seen him before. After the adjournment of that day's session I went to him to thank him for what he had done. We became friends then and there and remained friends to the day of his death. He was then in the flower of youthful manhood. As he stood there in that Convention, dauntless among the seething multitude, his beautiful face radiant with resolute fervor, his peculiarly melodious voice thrilling with impassioned anxiety of purpose, one might have seen in him an ideal, poetic embodiment of the best of that moral impulse and that lofty enthusiasm which aroused the people of the North to the decisive struggle against slavery. Nor was the impression he made then weakened by closer acquaintance. All those who knew him well, found him not only to possess in ample measure the qualities and the lofty inspirations as the personification of which he had appeared in that memorable scene, but also that his whole being breathed an exquisite refinement of moral and æsthetic sense, of ways of thinking, of manner and speech, which made his friends feel as if he were almost too gentle a being to be exposed to the ordinary rude jostlings and buffetings of public life,

which those of us who were made of rougher clay could well endure.

Nature seemed to have designed him for the republic of letters, and at an early period he gave promise of a literary career of rare distinction. His preparation for that career was, indeed, not such as the reader of his writings and the listener to his speech would suppose it to have been. He had not passed through the classical course of a college or university, although his personality might have been taken to present the very ideal of a university man. It cannot even be said that he had enjoyed the advantage of a methodical and continuous education of any sort. To be sure, he had as a boy something more than the ordinary elementary schooling. But beyond that he did his reading, and gathered his knowledge, and cultivated his abilities very much according to his own individual tastes and his adventitious opportunities.

His father, a prosperous banker, intended him for commercial pursuits and placed him in a mercantile house. But there he learned quickly that commercial pursuits were not for him. Seventeen years old, he joined, for a while, with his brother Burrill, as a boarder, the famous Brook Farm community, that assemblage of fine moral and intellectual enthusiasms, given to the cultivation of somewhat fantastic ideals. There his poetic and at the same time soberly discriminating mind accepted all there was of noble inspiration, but kept aloof from extravagant theories. Then he lived, once more with his brother Burrill, for two years on a farm near Concord, Massachusetts, again studying what he liked—history, languages, literature, art, philosophy—and, meanwhile, enjoying the conversation of Emerson and of the remarkable men that gathered around that sage, and sipping their “transcendentalism” as much as his constantly sober mind could digest and assimilate.

This was all he had in his younger days of what may be called sedentary education. Then his travels began—leisurely roaming through Egypt, Syria, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, France and England—delightful rambles which enriched his imagination, broadened his knowledge of things and men, inspired his artistic instincts, developed the cosmopolitan largeness and justice of his mind, and, giving him much to say and the desire to say it, started him as a productive man of letters. During the four years of travel he described his experiences in the *Courier and Enquirer* and in the *New York Tribune*. But after his return in 1851, he published his *Nile Notes of a Howadji*, and his *Howadji in Syria*, candid, warm-blooded accounts of what he had seen and heard and felt, the honestly picturesque and innocently glowing realism of which seems to have startled some over-fastidious critics. Then he wrote for *Putnam's Magazine* which had among its contributors the foremost American writers of the time. The most notable of his own contributions were that trenchant, although kind-hearted, satire on the follies of the pretentious "society" of those days, the *Potiphar Papers*, then the *Homes of American Authors* and that charmingly fantastic well of thought and sentiment, *Prue and I*. At last, in October, 1853, he sat down in the "Easy Chair" of *Harper's Monthly Magazine*, and ten years later he took charge of the editorial page of *Harper's Weekly*, from which two positions he continued to speak to the American people to the end of his days.

The exuberance of his fancy, his faculty of keen observation, the wide reach of his knowledge, the geniality of his humor, kindly even in his sarcasm, the exquisite purity and refinement of his diction, the loftiness of his principles and the nobility and warmth of his enthusiasms gave his writings a charm all their own, and to the reader

a full measure of unalloyed delight. Eminent as he was as a contributor to American letters, he was far more eminent as a public teacher of the highest order—a teacher who taught, by example as well as precept, lessons inspired by the noblest ideals of virtue and patriotism.

I do not mean to say he confined himself to what might be called literary preaching; for his deep and ardent public spirit called him in early manhood to the sterner tasks imposed upon him by his conception of civic duty. The anti-slavery cause took hold of his whole moral nature and made him an active member of the Republican party of those days. He was one of those who advocated anti-slavery principles when it was dangerous to do so, and who exposed themselves not only to partisan reviling in speech and press, but to physical violence in facing infuriated mobs. It was the moral courage of his convictions which kept him calm and resolute on a platform in Philadelphia, when clubs and brickbats were used to answer the anti-slavery argument.

But his political career was in some respects essentially different from that of most men of ability and ambition, who devote themselves to the service of the public. While he unceasingly labored with pen and speech for what he thought right and just and honorable, not selecting for himself, like a fastidious dilettante, only the dainty part of the work, but plunging personally into the rough encounter with the partisan opponent as well as, on his own side, with the professional politician in primary, caucus and convention, he declined for himself those rewards which even a perfectly legitimate personal ambition might have coveted. Although a man of his brilliant abilities, splendid working force and charming personality might easily have risen to high places of distinction and power, he sought for himself nothing but the station and the opportunities of the simple public-

spirited citizen, looking for his own recompense only to the good that might be accomplished for his country and mankind. He declined the high honor of the mission to England, a post in which his exceptionally fine qualities would have shone to the utmost advantage, but he accepted the comparatively humble chairmanship of the Civil Service Commission, because there he hoped to do a work which strongly appealed to his sense of patriotic duty.

After the abolition of slavery the reform of the civil service was the cause dearest to his heart. In the brutal barbarism of the spoils system and the far-reaching demoralization of our political life springing from it, he saw not only a grave danger to our free institutions, but also a dishonor to the American name. The scandalous abuse not only alarmed him as a statesman, but it also wounded his pride as an American citizen. He threw the whole enthusiasm and energy of his nature into the struggle against it. At the head of a small body of men of the same faith he led in the struggle. He had to combat the greed of the professional politicians who drew from the patronage their means of livelihood, and the hostility of more aspiring public men, who found a well-drilled organization of mercenary henchmen necessary for their maintenance in power. He had to overcome also the lethargy of the public mind, which inertly adhered to long established custom. It seemed to be an almost hopeless contest, and disappointment followed disappointment.

But he joined to the enthusiasm of the idealist the tough tenacity of purpose which is inspired by true conviction. After every failure he patiently resumed the Sisyphean task of heaving the stone uphill, until at last it found a lodgment. Congress, as well as some State legislatures, enacted laws rescuing a large part of the

public service from the curse of spoils-politics. But this was only a beginning; and with unflagging watchfulness and zeal he endeavored to fortify the positions won and to push on the advance.

Without injustice to others, whose part in the work cannot be overlooked, it may well be said that Curtis, by his wide knowledge and experience, his ripe and calm judgment, his gentle temper and his scarcely asserted but easily acknowledged authority, was most perfectly fitted for that essential task of leadership in such a cause—the task of reconciling the diversities of opinion, and of harmonizing, stimulating and directing the zeal and the efforts of others laboring for the same object. He was not only the president of the National Civil Service Reform League, reëlected from year to year without any question, as a matter of course, but he was also to the day of his death, more than any other person, the intellectual head, the guiding force and the constant moral inspiration of the civil service reform movement. The addresses he delivered at the annual meetings of the League were like mile-stones in the progress of the work, and as he reported to the country what had been done and what was still to be done, and why and wherefore, enlightening the public mind and cheering on his fellow laborers, the spoils politicians had to listen with respect and wonder—unwilling perhaps—to the voice of a devotion, the perfect unselfishness of which nobody could doubt, and of a quiet energy which no obstacle and no failure could dismay, and which, slowly but steadily, drove them from one entrenchment to another.

The civil service reform movement, acting upon the public mind, without resort to any of the contrivances of party machinery, by a perfectly intellectual and moral influence, and by compelling by such means the spoils politician to surrender from his stubborn grasp one

after another of his fields of prey, is one of the most remarkable and cheering proofs of the power of an enlightened public opinion in our time. And of that intellectual and moral influence George William Curtis was the fairest exponent and representative. While the successes won are still incomplete and not uncontested, yet the eyes of the leader closed upon a vastly improved public sentiment and upon results which cannot be undone; and when, at some future day, the reform of the civil service in the widest sense is an accomplished fact, as it surely will be, the American people, while justly recognizing the merits of others, will gratefully remember George William Curtis as one of the bravest pioneers and champions, and as the true hero of that great achievement.

He was a warm and faithful party man so long as the objects pursued by his party were such as not to offend his conscience. He broke with his party when he became convinced that its conduct made it an instrument of evil to the country. It was not upon a mere quick impulse, or with a light heart, that he took the decisive step. The party which had fought the great battle against slavery was very dear to him. In it he had formed associations to which he was most warmly attached and which it gave him the keenest pangs of pain to sever. Only the stern voice of duty could move him to give up all this. How much he sacrificed, and how much more he risked, when in 1884 he declared himself against a Republican candidate for the Presidency, only those know who stood nearest to him.

No conspicuous member of a party can turn away from it without exposing himself to bitter censure and vituperation. This was also his lot. It seems to be extremely difficult to the ordinary partisan mind to understand how a man of conscience may abandon his

party allegiance in order to maintain his allegiance to his principles and his convictions of right. To the common run of party politicians fidelity to the organization is the highest of political virtues, even when it involves faithlessness to a great cause, and he denounces severance from the organization as a sort of felony, even when it is demanded by fidelity to the faith always professed. No doubt Curtis felt keenly the obloquy that was poured upon him. But he had at least the high satisfaction of receiving from his very opponents a rare tribute to the nobility of his character. Even the most wanton ebullitions of an exasperated party spirit hardly ever went so far as seriously to impugn the purity of his motives.

He was the finest type of the independent in politics. While fully recognizing the usefulness and even the necessity of political parties in a government like ours, he never forgot that a party is, after all, only a means to an end, and not an end itself. He considered and discussed questions of public interest on their own merits—for this is the true essence of conscientious independence. He carefully weighed in his judgment the question, the success of which party or candidate would be most beneficial to the public good, and then awarded his support or opposition according to the conviction so formed, unawed by power or popular clamor, and unbiased by favor or personal friendship—and in all this there was no man more dutifully respecting the constituted authorities, or more kindly heeding the opinions of others, or more loyal as a friend to his friends.

But however strenuous his political activity in the public arena may have been from time to time, it did not interrupt his editorial work. He steadily continued his tranquil and genial talks in the "Easy Chair" of *Harper's Magazine*—talks which were in good part called forth by

passing occurrences and roamed over almost every field of human interest. And even now, when the happenings or conditions which occasioned them have long been forgotten, or live only in dim reminiscence, the "Easy Chair" papers can still be read with delightful enjoyment as entertaining literature, full as they are of animated pictures of life, of instructive suggestions or keen judgments, and, without obtrusive moralizing, of elevating sentiment.

And as the political editor and leading writer of *Harper's Weekly* he unceasingly spoke to the untold thousands of his countrymen all over the land; and all those thousands felt that every word he said to them was the truth as understood by an honest intellect and a great heart; that he always endeavored to discover the truth by conscientious inquiry and careful consideration; that every praise bestowed and every censure he pronounced on any public man or any political party, was dictated by the most scrupulous desire to be just; that his very denunciations were tempered with charity; and that every advice he gave was prompted by the most unselfish zeal for the honor and true greatness of the Republic and the elevation and happiness of the people. They had, even when their opinions differed from his, instinctive confidence in the purity of the source from which the utterances flowed; they knew that in that source there was nothing of greed, nothing of envy, nothing of vain pride of opinion—nothing but an ardent love of his country, and of liberty and justice, and a profound devotion to the highest ideals of human civilization.

But however effective his regular journalistic communion with the public was, the most valuable and impressive of his teachings were contained in that grand series of orations and occasional addresses which not only placed him in the first rank of the great orators of

his time, but also constitute his finest contributions to American literature—addresses and orations delivered at college commencements, alumni reunions, the unveiling of monuments, memorial services in honor of statesmen or soldiers, or men of letters, or public meetings held to shape, or express or stimulate popular sentiment on some matter of great public concern. Nothing could surpass the splendid architecture of their argument and the wealth and chaste beauty of their ornamentation. In what gorgeous colors he would paint the glories of his country! How he would revel in the memories of the heroic birth of the Republic and in extolling the grand and eternal significance of the principles which constituted its reason of being and its promise to all mankind! With what lofty sternness he would castigate those whose mean spirit failed to appreciate those principles! How vividly he would make to gleam and radiate the virtues and high aims and achievements of the great men who were the subjects of his eulogy! How magnificently his noble manhood and his American citizen's pride shone forth when he defined to the youth of his generation the nature of true patriotism—a patriotism that embraced all the human kind and had its source in the purest moral sense and in the profoundest and most courageous convictions of right and duty in the service of the highest ideals!

We shall know the character and the principles of the man best when we let him speak for himself in his own language. Listen to these words he uttered to the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard, addressing them on "The American Doctrine of Liberty":

The real patriot in this country is *he* who sees most clearly what the nation *ought* to desire, who does what he can by plain and brave speech to influence it to that desire, and

then urges and supports the laws which express it. But as public opinion is necessarily so powerful with us, we fear and flatter it, and so pamper it into a tyrant. How the country teems with conspicuous men, scholars, orators, politicians, divines, advocates—public teachers all, whose speeches, sermons, letters, votes, actions, are a prolonged, incessant falsehood and sophism; a soft and shallow wooing of the Public Alexander and the Public Cromwell, telling him that he has no crook in his neck and no wart on his nose. How many of our public men and famous orators have said not what they thought, but rather what they supposed we wanted to hear? In a system like ours, where almost every man has a vote, and votes as he chooses, public opinion is really the government. Whoever panders to it, is training a tyrant for our master. Whoever enlightens it, lifts the people toward peace and prosperity.

To teach the people what they OUGHT to desire, that is the office of patriotic leadership.

He pursued this subject with the intensest earnestness.

Patriotism [he said to the graduating class of Union College], patriotism is like the family instinct. In the child it is a blind devotion; in the man an intelligent love. The patriot perceives the claim made upon his country by the circumstances and time of her growth and power, and how God is to be served by using both opportunities of helping mankind. Therefore his country's honor is as dear to him as his own, and he would as soon lie and steal himself as assist or excuse his country in a crime. Right and wrong, justice and crime, exist independently of our country. A public wrong is not a private right for any citizen. The citizen is a man bound to know and do the right, and the nation is but an aggregation of citizens. If a man shouts: "My country, by whatever means extended and bounded, my country right or wrong," he merely utters words such as those might be of the thief who steals in the street, or of the trader who swears falsely

at the Custom House, both of them chuckling: "My fortune, however acquired!"

Remember [he said on another occasion], remember that the greatness of our country is not in the greatness of its (material) achievements, but in its promise—a promise that cannot be fulfilled without that sovereign moral sense, without a sensitive moral conscience. Commercial prosperity is only a curse if it be not subservient to moral and intellectual progress, and our prosperity will conquer us if we do not conquer our prosperity. Our commercial success tends to make us all cowards; but we have got to make up our minds in this country whether we believe in the power and goodness of God as sincerely as we undoubtedly do in the dexterity of the devil, that we may shape our national life accordingly, and not be praying now to good God, and now to good devil, and wondering which is going to carry us off after all. The whole of patriotism seems to consist at the present moment in the maintenance of this public moral tone. No voice of self-glorification, no complacent congratulation that we are the greatest, wisest and best of nations will help our greatness and goodness in the smallest degree. Are we satisfied that America should have no other excuse for independent national existence than a superior facility of money-making? Why, if we are unfaithful as a nation, though our population were to double in a year, and the roar and rush of our vast machinery were to silence the music of the spheres, and our wealth were enough to buy all the world, our population could not bully history, nor all our riches bribe the eternal justice not to write upon us: "Ichabod, Ichabod, thy glory is departed." But I am not here to counsel you to despair and head-shakings. I am here to-day to say that this country which you are to inherit, and for which you are to be responsible, needs only an enlightened patriotism to fulfil all its mission and justify the dreams of its youth.

Equally high was his conception of government.

The object of government [he said in an address on the duty of the American scholar], the object of government

is human liberty. Laws restrain the encroachment of the individual upon society in order that all individuals may be secured the freest play of their powers. This is because the end of society is the improvement of the individual and the development of the race. Liberty is, therefore, the condition of human progress, and consequently that is the best government which gives to men the largest liberty, and constantly modifies itself in the interest of freedom.

And further in his oration on patriotism:

Our government was established confessedly in obedience to this sentiment of human liberty. And your duty as patriots is to understand clearly that by all its antecedents your country is consecrated to the cause of freedom; that it was discovered when the great principle of human liberty was about to be organized in institutions; that it was settled by men who were exiled by reason of their loyalty to that principle; that it separated from its mother country because that principle had been assailed; that it began its peculiar existence by formally declaring its faith in human freedom and equality; and, therefore, that whatever in its government policy tends to destroy that freedom and equality is Anti-American and unpatriotic, because America and Liberty are inseparable ideas.

Listen to his thoughts upon the relation of the citizen to his party—and he said this when he was still a party man of regular standing:

The most plausible suspicion of the permanence of the American Government is founded in the belief that party spirit cannot be restrained. The first object of concerted political action is the highest welfare of the country. But the conditions of party association are such that the means are constantly and easily substituted for the end. The sophistry is subtle and seductive. Holding the ascendancy of his party essential to the national welfare, the zealous partisan merges patriotism in party. He insists that not to

sustain the party is to betray the country; and against all honest doubt and reasonable hesitation and reluctance he vehemently urges that quibbles of conscience must be sacrificed to the public good; that wise and practical men will not be squeamish; that every soldier in the army cannot indulge his whims; and that if the majority may justly prevail in determining the government, it must not be questioned in the control of a party. This spirit adds moral coercion to sophistry. It denounces as a traitor him who protests against party tyranny, and it makes unflinching adherence to what is called regular party action, the condition of the gratification of honorable political ambition. Because a man who sympathizes with the party aims refuses to vote for a thief, this spirit scorns him as a rat and a renegade. Because he holds to principle and law against party expediency and dictation, he is proclaimed as the betrayer of his country, justice and humanity. Because he tranquilly insists upon deciding for himself when he must dissent from his party, he is reviled as a popinjay and visionary fool. Seeking with honest purpose only the welfare of his country, the hot air around him hums with the cry of "the grand old party," "the traditions of the party," "loyalty to the party," "future of the party," "servants of the party" and he sees and hears the gorged and portly money changers in the temple usurping the very divinity of God. Young hearts, be not dismayed. If ever any one of you shall be the man so denounced, do not forget that your own individual convictions are the whips of small cords which God has put into your hands to expel the blasphemers. Perfect party discipline is the most dangerous weapon of party spirit, for it is the abdication of individual judgment; it is the application to political parties of the Jesuit principle of implicit obedience. It is for you (the academic youth) to help break this withering spell. When you are angrily told that, if you erect your individual judgment against the regular party behest, you make representative government impossible by refusing to accept its conditions, hold fast by your conscience and let the party go. The remedy for the constant excess of party spirit

lies, and lies alone, in the courageous independence of the individual citizen.

And with what words of fire he addressed the representatives of the press, he himself being a working journalist:

I need not be told that an editor may be an honest partisan. We all probably belong to a party not alone in great emergencies of the state, but upon general principles and tendencies of government we must all take sides. Naturally the army in whose ranks we march becomes identified with the cause. Its colors, its music, its battlecries, become those of the cause itself. So a man comes to confound his party with his country, and to be wholly partisan seems to him to be only patriotic. Associated with illustrious achievements for his country and for mankind, the party name becomes as sweet to his ear and heart as, after famous victories, the name of his regiment to a soldier. But this is only the romantic and poetic aspect of one of the greatest perils to popular government. We liken a party to an army, and the phrases of an election are military terms. But an army is not a cause; it is merely an agency. A party is not a principle and an end; it is only a means. It is the abject servility which is bred by the military spirit that has made a standing army the standing threat of liberty. As the servility of the military spirit is a standing peril of liberty, so the servility of party spirit is the standing peril of popular government. The servility to party spirit is the abdication of that moral leadership of opinion which is the great function of the political press. It is a subserviency which destroys the independence of the paper; but it does not save the party. There is not a party in the history of this country which has been utterly overthrown, that might not have survived long and victoriously, if its press had been courageously independent. The press submits to be led by party leaders, while its duty is to lead leaders. They dare to disgrace their party, to expose it to humiliation and defeat, because they count upon the slavery of the party press. The press is never a more benefi-

cent power than when it disappoints this malignant expectation and shows the country that, while loyal to a party and its policy, it is more loyal to honor and patriotism. This is the independence of the press. It is not non-partisanship nor impotent neutrality. It is not the free lance of an Italian bravo or soldier of fortune at the disposal of the master who pays the best. It is not the unprincipled indifference which cries to-day "good Lord" and to-morrow "good devil" as the Lord or the devil seems to be prevailing. Nor is it a daily guess how the wind is going to blow, and a dexterous conformity to what it believes to be public opinion. No paper and no man who fears to be in the minority has the power to create a majority. It is the unquailing advocacy of its own principles when it stands alone, and honorable support when a party proclaims them; it is scorn of falsehood and baseness and bribery in sustaining them; it is manly justice to opponents and unsparing exposure of offenders and offenses which, disgracing the party, tend to weaken and destroy it; it is austere allegiance to high ideals of public virtue and perfect reliance upon the ultimate justice of the people—it is all this which makes an independent press the greatest power in Christendom.

And as he taught the sanctity of conscience as against party, so he taught the sanctity of conscience as against the majority.

In a Republic [he said in an address on the leadership of educated men], as the majority must control action, the majority constantly tends to usurp control of opinion. Its decree is accepted as the standard of right and wrong. To differ is grotesque and eccentric. To protest is preposterous. To defy is incendiary and revolutionary. But just here interposes educated intelligence and asserts the worth of self-reliance and the power of the individual conscience. And, further, it is educated citizenship which, while defining the rightful limitation of the power of the majority, is most loyal to its legitimate authority, and foremost always in

rescuing it from the treachery of political peddlers and parasites.

The highest praise he bestowed on James Russell Lowell in his magnificent eulogy, was in these words, which he might have spoken of himself:

Literature was his pursuit, but patriotism was his passion. His love of country was that of a lover for his mistress. He resented the least imputation upon his ideal America, and nothing was finer than his instinctive scorn for the pinch-beck patriotism which brags and boasts and swaggers, insisting that bigness is greatness, and vulgarity, simplicity and the will of the majority the moral law.

As portrayed by his own utterances this was George William Curtis as a public character and a public teacher—the ideal party man—for he always strove to the utmost to hold his party true to its highest aims; and the ideal independent, being true to his principles, his convictions of right and the commands of his conscience even against the behests of his party. And as he was the ideal party man and the ideal independent, so he might well have been called the finest type of the American gentleman.

He was intensely proud of his country without ever being boastful. He would have stood in the company of kings without embarrassment, but also without making any demonstrative display of his feeling himself at ease. He was not ashamed of not being rich. Indeed, he took good care not to *become* rich, by voluntarily assuming and laboriously working to pay off obligations of friends and associates, to which he could never have been legally held, and for which only a most susceptible sense of honor could detect any sort of responsibility on his part. He possessed that true politeness which consists in an

instinctive regard for the feelings of others and springs from genuine kindness of heart. His exquisite refinement of taste and manner had not the slightest tinge of affectation or superciliousness. No coarse utterance ever crossed his lips because no coarse thought or sentiment ever crossed his soul. He made his inferiors feel at home in his presence by gladly recognizing their merits without the faintest air of condescending superiority. He was a distinguished man in the most distinguished society, moving in it with unpretending naturalness, and appearing only what he really was. When we think of the men whom we would point out as models to our youth at home, or whom we would like to have looked upon as representative American gentlemen by the world abroad, George William Curtis will surely be selected as one of the first.

What his pure, gentle, lovable and loving nature was to those standing nearest to him, no words can express. If his personal friends speak of him only in the language of eulogy, it is because it will sound like eulogy when they speak of him only the sober truth as they understand and feel it. He was, indeed, one of those rare human beings in whom the eye of criticism detects nothing that friendship would care to conceal; and it may well be said that nobody ever came into contact with him without being better and happier for it.

It is a saddening thought that the melody of his eloquent voice will never be heard again, and that his ennobling presence is gone from among us forever. We have to console ourselves with the certainty that much of his work will endure, that the inspiration of his teaching and example will live and that his memory will be tenderly cherished and remain highly honored as that of a benefactor of mankind and one of the noblest citizens of our Republic.

TO MILES LEWIS PECK

NEW YORK, Nov. 3, 1904.

I thank you for your communication of October 26th. I have received similar letters in the course of almost every political campaign, but they were uniformly anonymous. Yours is the first one of which the author was proud enough to sign it with his name. This deserves recognition, and entitles it to an answer.

Your demand that I should leave this country on account of my political disagreement with Mr. Miles Lewis Peck is unkind. I have lived in this country over fifty-two years, and as, to judge from your letter, you are still young, it may be that I was one of those voters, of whom you speak as the "rulers of this country," before you were born. I have become attached to it. During that half century I have also tried to serve it, in peace and war, not to your satisfaction, perhaps, but as best I could. And now to be turned out of it because I do not agree politically with Mr. Miles Lewis Peck of Bristol, Ct., is little short of cruel.

But the rule you lay down is also unreasonable. In justice you will have to apply it, as well as to me, to all other persons in the same predicament. You will then, supposing you to be in the majority, send all those who differ from you politically out of the country—the foreign born to their native lands, and the native born to the homes of their ancestors. But it is probable—I may say certain—that the remaining majority would also divide into parties. You, being always of the majority party, would then, according to your rule, read the new minority

"BRISTOL, CONN., Oct. 26, 1904.

"Dear Sir: Your printed letter is at hand. Conditions here seem very unsatisfactory to you. I wonder you do not return to your native land. That I think is the best way for those who do not like the views of the rulers of this country—the voters. Yours respectfully,

"MILES LEWIS PECK."

party out of the country. Now you will see that this operation, many times repeated, might at last leave Mr. Miles Lewis Peck of Bristol, Ct., on the ground, lonesome and forlorn, in desolate self-appreciation.

But it may also happen to you to find yourself sometime accidentally in the minority of the voters, and then, according to your rules, you would also be sent out of our beloved country, to the home of your forefathers. This, no doubt, would be very distasteful to you, and, I assure you, you would have my sincere sympathy. It would show you, however, how unstatesmanlike your theory is.

Let us agree, then, that it is, after all, best for us to respect one another's right as good Americans to differ politically, and that this country is large enough to hold both Mr. Miles Lewis Peck of Bristol, Ct., and his humble fellow-citizen,

CARL SCHURZ.

TO CHANDLER P. ANDERSON

24 EAST 91ST STREET, DEC. 12, 1904.

I am very sorry I cannot comply with your kind invitation summoning me to speak at the meeting to be held in behalf of the cause of international arbitration. The appeals of that cause to the intelligence and moral sense of mankind have of late been so effectual as to put to shame the dreary pessimism which has so long stood in its way. For what else is it than downright pessimism—dull, dismal and mischievous pessimism—which, having no faith in the elevating influences of progressive civilization, insists that there always will and must be wars, and plenty of them, to satisfy the combative and brutish impulses of human nature or to keep up the virility of the human race; pessimism which, with a cynical affectation of superior wisdom, sneers at the advocates of peace as sentimental

and weak-minded dreamers; which not many years ago belittled international arbitration as a feeble contrivance applicable only to petty bickerings about trifles, but not to really dangerous disputes among nations; which scoffed at the idea of a permanent international peace tribunal as a "barren ideality," because it would have no power behind it to enforce its decisions or awards; and which incessantly conjures up imaginary dangers to our safety, to prove the necessity of constant preparation for war, and of keeping up, to this end, vast and costly armaments even in time of peace!

How does this pessimism stand in the light of day? It is true, war has not yet been abolished. But who will deny that the number of wars has grown less from century to century, and that many and many troubles, which at earlier periods would surely have led to war, have been peaceably composed? Who will deny that the abhorrence of war as the cruel scourge of mankind and as an odious relic of barbarism is growing more universal in civilized society every day, and that the terrible conflict now going on in the Far East has immensely intensified that abhorrence and bids fair to serve as a tremendous warning example for all time?

And now behold international arbitration, not many decades ago rarely resorted to as a doubtful experiment, become practically the "fashion" of the time, as an English statesman recently expressed it.

Behold the Hague Court of Peace, suddenly risen into practical activity as by enchantment, and turning the ridicule upon those superwise pessimists who but yesterday, as it were, pronounced such a permanent international tribunal an impossibility dreamed of only by fantastic visionaries!

Behold the prompt reference to that tribunal of such a case as the bloody attack by Russian war-ships upon

British fishermen, which at a time not long past would have been very likely to set the guns of the interested Powers booming against each other without much ceremony—a case which even at this day some sincere friends of peace would have hesitated to class among those clearly fit for arbitration.

Truly, the pessimists who believe in war-ships and heavy battalions and not in the moral forces as the most potential factors in human affairs, have been strikingly belied by palpable events. The cause of peace has in its progress outstripped the forecast even of some of its leaders. We may well have faith in the enlightened intelligence and the moral sense of mankind, and in the ennobling tendencies of advancing civilization.

Indeed, there should be no doubt—and I trust there is none—of the speedy confirmation by the United States Senate of the arbitration treaties between this Republic and various Powers which are now pending before that body. There should be no doubt of it even if those treaties were less timidly limited in scope than they are. Let us have faith then—as we well may—that the day will come, and that our children, if not we ourselves, will see it, when the reference of any international dispute to the Hague Tribunal will seem as natural, as much a matter of course, as in private life the reference of a dispute about property to a court of justice is now; when any nation going to war without the extremest necessity, generally recognized, will stand dishonored in the estimation of civilized mankind, and when the spectacle of so-called “armed peace”—a spectacle which would seem ludicrous were it not so sorrowful—each Government watching with nervous anxiety every other Government that may add another battleship or battalion to its armed force, then following suit with hysterical haste, thus continuing and stimulating the ruinous competition and heaping burden after burden

upon the necks of suffering peoples—will be a thing of the past to be looked back upon by a wiser generation with curious wonder at the sort of statesmanship which carried on and encouraged so wasteful and oppressive a policy, and at the patience of the peoples that so long tolerated it.

Let us hope that this Republic which, as its history proves, is so singularly blessed with entire exemption from danger of attack or hostile interference, and therefore peculiarly fitted for leadership in this movement toward a higher civilization, will never be unmindful of the duty imposed upon it by this glorious mission.

TO ROBERT ERSKINE ELY

24 EAST 91ST STREET, Jan. 22, 1905.

Your letter of the 20th inst., inviting me to become a member of the advisory council of the New York Society of the Friends of Russian freedom is in my hands. I hardly need to assure you that all my sympathies are with the cause of Russian freedom. I also hold in the highest esteem the ladies and gentlemen you mention as being at the head of the Society. If now, before joining them in their work, which I should consider it an honor to do, I express the wish to be a little more minutely informed as to the persons or committees or associations with whom they are in correspondence, and upon whose advice they depend, and so on, it is because in my younger days I had a good deal of personal experience of such matters, which taught me that the efforts of such societies as yours, although inspired by the best intentions and the most laudable enthusiasms and the greatest conscientiousness, may occasionally do more harm than good, unless conducted with very great circumspection.

I should therefore be glad to have a conversation with

you or, if inconvenient to you, with some other well informed officer of the Society at such time as you may choose. I have no office down town. Would it be asking too much if I invited you to visit me here? If you are willing to do so, you will oblige me by notifying me beforehand of your coming so that mishaps be avoided.

TO MOORFIELD STOREY

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y., May 28, 1905.

My dear Friend: Many thanks for your letter of the 24th. It has done me good to hear from you. I am very sorry I cannot promise you to "address the Massachusetts Reform Club next October," for it is altogether too uncertain whether I shall be able to do so. My health is at present satisfactory enough, but it is unsteady, and my doctor tells me that the delivery of long speeches is one of the exertions and excitements I ought to avoid.

I think you have done well in accepting the presidency of the Anti-Imperialist League, for I am sure you will keep it within the lines of real usefulness. It is undoubtedly true that the people generally are very tired of the possession of the Philippines. The trouble is, they are so tired of it that they lose all interest in the matter and let those in power do with it what they please. You are unquestionably right in thinking that Taft wants to hold the islands because he is in love with his own work and plans. But Roosevelt wants to hold them too, for military reasons, which are uppermost in his mind.

I am not so sure that Roosevelt will break the Republican party wide open. I believe that there are two things he has really at heart. One is to add to the Navy as many war-ships as he can get—and this is probably the overruling passion. And the other is to prevent the splitting of the Republican party if he can. To this cause he will

sacrifice any of his "policies" so-called, concerning the tariff, the trusts and the railroads; and this will be all the easier to him, as with regard to those things he has no convictions, nor even clear opinions. And no pride of moral courage will stand in his way. He shrinks from no moral self-humiliation.

It seems to me even more probable that the Republican party will be split by the force of antagonisms springing from present economic conditions, in spite of Roosevelt's self-abasing efforts to hold it together. But no matter how it happens if only it happens at all.

TO CHARLES SPRAGUE SMITH

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y., June 29, 1905.

I regret very much that I cannot attend your meeting next Wednesday night. I am heartily with you as to the object the meeting is to serve. The enthusiastic uprising of the popular conscience and of civic pride against corrupt ring-rule in Philadelphia is among the most hopeful signs of the times—perhaps the most hopeful of all. Of course Mayor Weaver, in his brave fight against the rapacious despotism, and the good people who stand by him with so much energy deserve all possible praise and encouragement from every true American. But the people in their righteous wrath should not forget that the thieving machine-politicians are not the only culprits to be held up to public loathing and execration. Many of them are simply poor wretches who hardly know better. Fully as guilty and even guiltier, are the "highly respectable" receivers of the stolen goods, the instigators and principal beneficiaries of the public robbery, who use the corrupt politicians as their tools in plundering the city or the State or the Nation; who, in order to fill their own pockets, contrive to debauch legislatures and executive

officers; who, if they can, will buy up the bar and the bench to protect them from the exposures and punishments they deserve; who try, and sometimes quite successfully too, by an unscrupulous use of their power, to terrorize the whole business community into compliance, if not complicity, with their misdoings, and who then, posing as models of virtue and high respectability, call this "business." These are the most dangerous pests of society in our days, and they should be duly unmasked and pilloried as such.

TO EDWARD ATKINSON

BOLTON LANDING, July 31, 1905.

Your letter was a most agreeable surprise to me after so long a time of suspended communication. More agreeable than all else is the assurance it gives me that you are steadily at work and like it. I too am regularly active, writing my memoirs, but I am not sure that I like work as much as I did in younger years. Still I keep at it and have to be satisfied with that.

I do not know whether "the tide has turned on protectionism." That there is a widespread desire for the reduction of tariff rates, is undoubtedly true. That this desire is likely to increase in strength is also true. But it will have to grow much stronger if it is to break the dominant power of protectionism in the Republican party or the adherence of the masses to that party. Roosevelt might have done, and might still do, much toward that end, if he had the moral courage to take the protection bull by the horns. But that courage, it seems, he does not possess. There are two things he has, I believe, really at heart: to build up a very strong Navy, and to keep the power of the Republican party intact. To these two objects, I apprehend, he is inclined to sacrifice everything

else. And his personal popularity is immense, and likely to remain so unless he makes some very outrageous mistake. Ordinary mistakes will hurt him little, for he is one of the lucky persons who have captured the popular imagination to such an extent that the people will forgive them almost everything.

The "moral wave" that is now sweeping over the country may do much good; but it is still doubtful whether it will open the popular mind to the fact that protectionism is a more prolific breeder of corruption than anything else.

Whether I shall be able to open the next season of the Massachusetts Reform Club, I cannot now say. I have pretty much given up public speaking, partly for physical reasons. I am very much disinclined to make promises reaching far ahead, for it is too uncertain whether I shall be able to redeem them at the appointed time.

I heartily wish you a pleasant journey in Europe and that it may do you good, and I hope that after your return we may soon meet once more.

TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y., Sept. 6, 1905.

Now that the flood of congratulations that have been pouring in upon you from all points of the compass has somewhat subsided, I venture to add mine, and I hope you will accept it in the spirit in which it is offered. Just because I have opposed you, I feel all the more bound to felicitate you upon an exploit which has so greatly added to the prestige of our Republic and conferred such imperishable honor upon your name. I cannot refrain from saying to you that I regard your interposition between Japan and Russia as one of the most meritorious and brilliant achievements of our age, not only bold and noble

in conception, but most admirable for the exquisite skill and tact with which it was carried through. Had it been less successful, it would not have been less deserving. The true mission and the immense moral influence of this Republic as the great peace Power of the world have never been so strikingly and beneficently demonstrated as they have been demonstrated by you, with a wisdom and energy which command the highest appreciation and gratitude of every good American and every true friend of humanity.

The honors you have won might indeed be thought sufficient to satisfy any man's ambition, but I hope you will pardon me if I venture to add a word in behalf of another service to be rendered to mankind which would be equal, if not superior, in value to the ending of the war between Russia and Japan. I mean the gradual diminution of the oppressive burdens imposed upon the nations of the world by armed peace. These burdens are constantly growing and threaten to grow indefinitely. You will remember that the desire to lighten just this incubus was the original impulse from which the Hague Tribunal sprung. I know you have the further development of the usefulness of that Tribunal much at heart. Indeed, you have already done much to strengthen its position, to enlarge the sphere of its activity and to enhance its prestige. Nothing, I should think, would more strongly appeal to your desire to do the greatest possible service to humanity than the opportunity to promote the original purpose of the Hague movement by helping to relieve mankind of one of its most grievous oppressions.

I am well aware of the obstacles standing in the way of any effort looking to the gradual disarmament of the Powers—pride, jealousy, suspicion, traditional ways of thinking and what not. These obstacles are certainly very formidable, but I know also that if, to-day there is

any man in the world that can give a strong impetus, a real propulsive force to such a movement, you are that man. Your position is unique. I cannot remember any head of a state in history who could exercise so powerful and persuasive an influence not only upon foreign peoples, but upon foreign Governments, as you now can, not by armies and navies, but by your extraordinary record as a peacemaker, by the universal confidence in the unselfishness of your purposes in international dealings and by the character of the great Republic you represent. The very fact that you are well known to have zealously urged the construction of a great war-fleet for the United States (and of all countries ours is financially the ablest to build up and maintain such a fleet) and the consequent self-denial which your leadership in a movement for gradual disarmament would involve, would give to that leadership a peculiar moral force in the struggle with obstacles which to the ordinary mind under ordinary circumstances might seem insuperable.

I hope you will not look upon this letter as a presumptuous intrusion. Old as I am, with at best only a few years before me, I see an exceptional opportunity for an inestimable and much needed benefaction to be conferred upon mankind; I see a man in a position of almost unexampled moral power peculiarly fitted to become a most potent, if not the decisive, factor in an effort to accomplish that benefaction; and I see reason to apprehend that, for a long time to come, there will not be another man similarly fitted by nature or by circumstance. I may, therefore, be pardoned if, carried away by the ardent wish still to witness in my day at least a hopeful beginning of so great and beneficent a work, I submit these suggestions to you while your well-earned laurels as a champion of the world's peace are still fresh.

FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

OYSTER BAY, N. Y., Sept. 8, 1905.

Personal.

I thank you for your congratulations. As to what you say about disarmament—which I suppose is the rough equivalent of “the gradual diminution of the oppressive burdens imposed upon the world by armed peace”—I am not clear either what can be done or what ought to be done. If I had been known as one of the conventional type of peace advocates I could have done nothing whatever in bringing about peace now, I would be powerless in the future to accomplish anything, and I would not have been able to help confer the boons upon Cuba, the Philippines, Porto Rico and Panama, brought about by our action therein. If the Japanese had not armed during the last twenty years, this would indeed be a sorrowful century for Japan. If this country had not fought the Spanish war; if we had failed to take the action we did about Panama, all mankind would have been the loser. While the Turks were butchering the Armenians the European Powers kept the peace and thereby added a burden of infamy to the nineteenth century, for in keeping that peace a greater number of lives were lost than in any European war since the days of Napoleon, and these lives were those of women and children as well as of men; while the moral degradation, the brutality inflicted and endured, the aggregate of hideous wrong done, surpassed that of any war of which we have record in modern times.

Until people get it firmly fixed in their minds that peace is valuable chiefly as a means to righteousness, and that it can only be considered as an end when it also coincides with righteousness, we can do only a limited amount to advance its coming on this earth. There is, of course, no analogy at present between international law and private or municipal law, because there is no sanction of force for the former while there is for the latter. Inside our own nation the law-abiding man does not have to arm himself against the lawless simply because there is some armed force—the police, the sheriff's

posse, the national guard, the regulars—which can be called out to enforce the laws. At present there is no similar international force to call on, and I do not as yet see how it could at present be created. Hitherto, peace has often come only because some strong and on the whole just Power has by armed force, or the threat of armed force, put a stop to disorder. In a very interesting French book the other day I was reading of how the Mediterranean was freed from pirates only by the “*pax Britannica*,” established by England’s naval force. The hopeless and hideous bloodshed and wickedness of Algiers and Turkestan were stopped, and only could be stopped, when civilized nations in the shape of Russia and France took possession of them. The same was true of Burma and the Malay states, as well as Egypt, with regard to England. Peace has come only as the sequel to the armed interference of a civilized Power which, relatively to its opponent, was a just and beneficent Power. If England had disarmed to the point of being unable to conquer the Soudan and protect Egypt, so that the Mahdists had established their supremacy in northeastern Africa, the result would have been a horrible and bloody calamity to mankind. It was only the growth of the European Powers in military efficiency that freed eastern Europe from the dreadful scourge of the Tartar and partially freed it from the dreadful scourge of the Turk. Unjust war is dreadful; a just war may be the highest duty. To have the best nations, the free and civilized nations, disarm and leave the despotisms and barbarisms with great military force, would be a calamity compared to which the calamities caused by all the wars of the nineteenth century would be trivial. Yet it is not easy to see how we can by international agreement state exactly which Power ceases to be free and civilized and which comes near the line of barbarism or despotism. For example, I suppose it would be very difficult to get Russia and Japan to come to a common agreement on this point; and there are at least some citizens of other nations, not to speak of their Governments, whom it would also be hard to get together.

This does not in the least mean that it is hopeless to make

the effort. It may be that some scheme will be developed. America, fortunately, can cordially assist in such an effort, for no one in his senses would suggest out disarmament; and though we should continue to perfect our small Navy and our minute Army, I do not think it necessary to increase the number of our ships—at any rate as things look now—nor the number of our soldiers. Of course our Navy must be kept up to the highest point of efficiency, and the replacing of old and worthless vessels by first-class new ones may involve an increase in the personnel; but not enough to interfere with our action along the lines you have suggested. But before I would know how to advocate such action, save in some such way as commending it to the attention of the Hague Tribunal, I would have to have a feasible and rational plan of action presented.

P. S. It seems to me that a general stop in the increase of the war navies of the world *might* be a good thing; but I would not like to speak too positively offhand. Of course it is only in continental Europe that the armies are too large; and before advocating action as regards them I should have to weigh matters carefully—including by the way such a matter as the Turkish army. At any rate nothing useful can be done unless with the clear recognition that we put peace second to righteousness.¹

TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y., Sept. 14, 1905.

I thank you sincerely for your kind letter of the 8th inst., and hope you will pardon me for a few remarks to remove certain misunderstandings to which my letter of the 6th may have given rise.

¹ To a letter of April 30, 1896, to Mr. Schurz, Mr. Roosevelt, when Police Commissioner, jocosely added the following:

"P. S. Some time I wish another chance to discuss war and peace with you, oh Major-General, Cabinet Minister, Senator and Historian! I only hope all of you international arbitration people don't finally bring us literally to the Chinese level."

When speaking of "gradual disarmament," I did not mean to say that all the armies and navies of the world should be dismissed. This I would advise just as little as I would advise the dismissal of the police force of the city of New York necessary for the maintenance of public order and the enforcement of the law. I meant only that the movement to be set on foot should have as its object to put a limit to the excessive and constantly growing armaments which are becoming so oppressive to the nations of the world. I meant, substantially, that which was aimed at by the public pronouncement of the Russian Czar, resulting in the establishment of the Hague Tribunal, and which far from being a mere fanciful conception of idealists has long occupied, and now occupies the minds of some of the best thinkers of Europe, as well as America, as a most important problem of our age.

Neither do I deny that there have been wars which were useful to humanity in promoting progress, or in establishing justice, while at the same time I believe that there have also been many wars which were not only unnecessary in every sense, and therefore criminal, but which distinctly made for injustice, tyranny and demoralization. This, however, is beside the question we discuss.

Admitting all you say of the Armenian atrocities, have we not to face the fact that the Powers stood by, without lifting a hand, although they were armed to the teeth? And does not this fact go far to show that they raised and maintained their vast and burdensome armaments not against the hosts of unrighteousness, but against one another—or at least because of fear, suspicion or jealousy of one another? If they had nothing [else] in view than to prevent or punish transgressions by barbarians or to remove obstructions offered by them to the world's progress, a comparatively very small force would be required, for those barbarians are really very weak, not

only singly, but in the aggregate. But, in fact, this is the spectacle we witness: For one reason or another Power A builds some new war-ships or adds a few battalions to its Army. Instantly Powers B and C and D take the alarm and hasten to make the same or greater additions to their forces so that Power A may not have any advantage in point of armament; whereupon Power A, becoming suspicious of what Powers B, C and D are doing, thinks a further augmentation of its forces necessary, which then has again the same effect on Powers B, C and D. This goes so far that even when this Republic, which ought not to be suspected of meaning harm to anybody, adds new war-ships to its Navy, the fact is used abroad as a strong argument to prove the necessity of strengthening the navies of other Powers. Thus the mad race goes on, and even this Republic, as appears from plenty of public utterances abroad, is being artfully turned into an agency stimulating it.

That the bringing about of an international agreement to stop this wasteful and cruel competition will be very difficult I readily admit. That it will be very difficult even at this moment to frame definite propositions for such an agreement is equally true. But we should be slow to put it down as an impossibility. Several great things have been actually accomplished in our time the possibility of which would have been seriously questioned by able and candid men not many decades ago. The establishment of the Hague Tribunal is one of them. The readiness with which arbitration is resorted to, the large number of international differences settled by arbitration and the constant enlargement of its scope is another. Your successful interposition between Russia and Japan is another. You say in your letter: "There is of course no analogy between international law and private or municipal law, because there is no sanction of force for the

former, while there is for the latter—and I do not as yet see how it could at present be created.” Even in this respect recent events have opened a prospect of new possibilities. I mean the united action of the Powers in China occasioned by the Boxer troubles. This concert of action was indeed called forth by a peculiar situation, and the contrivance was crude and imperfect, and it worked in some respects very unsatisfactorily. But at any rate it points out what may be done. And then, in addition to all this, we have now the extraordinary moral influence which, owing to your singular achievement, you can exercise, and which may prove capable of producing unexpected results. We should, therefore, not be discouraged by the difficulties in our way, however great they appear.

You say: “But before I would know how to advocate such action, *save in such way as commending it to the attention of the Hague Tribunal*, I would have to have a feasible and rational plan of action presented.” To be sure, it would be well to *have* such a plan, if possible. But I submit to your judgment whether it would be necessary to have it, and to present it to the Hague Conference you have called, at the start of proceedings. Would it not be sufficient to get the representatives of the Powers together, to recommend impressively to them, as you suggest, the serious consideration of the subject, and then to leave it to them to evolve a definite plan from their discussion, which, of course, would not exclude the presentation of a plan on your part in the course of that discussion, made in the light thrown by the discussion upon the subject? When you set out to bring about peace between Japan and Russia, you did not present to them a definite plan of settlement, but you simply got them together to discuss the settlement among themselves, and I suppose you guided them with wise counsel when they struck formida-

ble difficulties or so-called impossibilities—and thus you achieved your glorious result. I know the parallel is by no means perfect, but it is at least suggestive of what might be done. You, of all men in the world, can, as you now stand, stir up a public opinion in favor of this course, which the objectors might find it hard to resist. The obstructions may even turn out to be less than we now imagine. You say: "I suppose it would be very difficult to get Russia and Japan to come to a common agreement on this point." May it not be that Russia and Japan in their state of financial exhaustion might greet such an agreement as a happy line of escape from great embarrassments? Besides, the Russian Czar stands solemnly committed to this idea by his own public declarations made some years ago.

Truly, here is an opportunity—perhaps the grandest of the age—for rendering a supreme service to mankind, worthy of the noblest ambition. You may well be envied for having it in your grasp.¹

TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y., Sept. 21, 1905.

I was exceedingly glad to find in your letter of September 18th an assurance that your active sympathy may be looked for in the matter of gradual disarmament. You will build up a monumental record in history.

Your interview with Baron Rosen was indeed comical enough. It shows to what straits the luckless Czar, after the terrible breakdown of his military absolutism, is reduced in trying to recover some of his prestige. What poor comedians some of those high potentates are! As if any one person in the world would now believe the Czar to be the true initiator of the Conference! Of course, his

¹ Col. Roosevelt properly refused permission to publish his answer to this letter.

pretension to that effect is received with an ironical smile all round. The way you treated the matter was, I think, exactly right. It will entitle you in the Conference, and before the world generally, to all the more consideration. The real leadership will easily fall to you as it should, and I trust you will take it resolutely. *Quod bonum, felix, faustumque sit.*

TO GREEN B. RAUM

NEW YORK CITY, Nov. 29, 1905.

I have received your letter of November 20th¹ and beg to say in reply that during the last ten or fifteen years I have been approached on this same subject from various quarters two or three times with the same proposition, but have felt myself compelled to decline it. While we were serving in the volunteer army we were well paid. The Government has imposed upon the taxpayers an enormous financial burden by an uncommonly generous pension system. I do not feel that I can, consistently with my well settled opinions, seek to increase that burden for my own benefit beyond the understood conditions under which I entered the service.

I am very far from desiring to reflect upon the attitude of those of my esteemed old comrades who are engaged in the movement of which your letter gives me knowledge. I only wish quietly to adhere to the views concerning this matter which I have always held.

TO ENOS CLARKE

NEW YORK CITY, Jan. 11, 1906.

Pardon me for not having answered your very kind letter of December 19th more promptly, and also that I

¹ A circular designed to enlist in the army of pension-seekers veterans not already enjoying the Government's bounty.

have to dictate my answer to you now; but owing to the consequences of the accident¹ I met with some time ago, writing with the pen gives me a headache and I have therefore to abstain from it as much as possible.

What you say about the death and burial of our dear friend, Dr. Preetorius, I feel with you, as you may well imagine. Ours was one of the most intimate and firmest friendships I have ever known. I should certainly have been in St. Louis to join the throng that accompanied him to his grave and to do the last honors to him, had it been possible. The best I could do was to send my son to represent me, and I hope he did so worthily. He cannot have expressed too warmly the message of affection he carried.

I agree with you perfectly that Nicolay and Hay did not give the Germans of St. Louis who, under the leadership of such men as Dr. Preetorius, rendered the country such eminent service in 1861, all the credit that they deserved. Many books have been written which were deficient in that respect.

I am glad to learn that you will soon pass through New York on your way to Bermuda. I hope that on that occasion you will not fail to drop in at 24 East 91st Street; you know you will be most heartily welcome.

Your supposition that I am no longer troubled by the printer's boy calling for copy is unfortunately not correct. My Memoirs are finished as far as my youth in Europe is concerned. I have also completed the second volume which reaches down to the close of the war, but I am still at work at the third and last, which includes my time in the Senate and Cabinet and what followed. I am now

¹ Early in Dec., 1905, as he was getting out of a street-car it suddenly started and caused him a violent fall, his head striking the pavement. After a few weeks he was able to resume his literary work, to some extent, but he never fully recovered from the shock.

describing the Presidential campaign of 1868 and then shall come to my fight with Drake at Jefferson City in the winter of 1868 to 1869. I wish I could have the files of the [St. Louis] *Globe-Democrat* or of the *Republican* of those days to guide my memory. I have only some clippings from newspapers describing, rather meagerly, what happened at Jefferson City, but nothing more. I wonder whether you cut anything from the papers at that time. If not, my memory will have to help me out.

Hoping to see you here before long, I am

Cordially yours.

TO ERVING WINSLOW

HOTEL BONAIR, AUGUSTA, GA., Feb. 20, 1906.

Here I am again in pursuit of health. I have been seriously considering what I, or any of us old anti-imperialists, might write for the Filipino paper in California that would be of any real use to the Filipinos themselves or to anybody else. Might we tell them to hold fast to the idea of independence? It has always been our contention that the Filipinos were unanimously for independence, and would remain so, *without* being confirmed in their faith by us. This has been always, and is now, one of our principal points. Would it be wise now to do anything that might make it appear as if we had reason not to believe in our own contention? Will it not be much wiser to let those young men go on by themselves and to avoid the appearance as if they were in our leading-strings and as if they needed pushing from this quarter?

As Mr. Storey in his most excellent address has clearly shown, there is a public opinion in favor of Philippine independence outside of our ranks, which will finally accomplish our object. It will move slowly and try our patience. But we shall hardly be able to accelerate it,

at least not in its present stage, by unnecessarily interfering in the name of the old anti-imperialism. I do not mean that we should be entirely silent. We may speak again on important occasions when our talk will have a chance to tell, coming out in strong volume instead of little squibs which cannot have any effect.

FROM EX-PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

STUART, FLA., Mar. 21, 1906.

I want you to know how gratefully I appreciate the generous and cheering words contained in your letter congratulating me on my sixty-ninth birthday.

I deem myself to be especially fortunate in this manifestation of your continued confidence and good-will.

TO — (UNKNOWN)¹

AUGUSTA, GA., Apr. 8, 1906.

Your letter enclosing the printed call which until now was unknown to me has reached me. It is a matter of course that every proper effort to guard against any disturbance [of] the existing peaceable and friendly relations between the United States and Germany has my sincerest and warmest sympathy. The friendship between the United States and Germany is as old as this Republic itself. It has remained unbroken because it was demanded by all considerations of interest, of civilization and of international good-will. And it is as much so to-day as ever before. There is between the two nations not the slightest occasion for discord. To provoke such a discord without the most imperative cause would be a crime as well as an absurdity—a criminal absurdity as well as a foolish crime.

¹ The careful draft of this letter does not contain the name of the person to whom it was addressed.

I am well aware that here as well as abroad voices are sometimes heard which represent as probable such a discord and even an armed conflict between the two nations. Those are the voices of people who call such a conflict probable because they desire it; and they desire it because thereby the profession of arms would gain in importance, or because they regard a war as an especially attractive and entertaining sport. I do not hesitate to say that whoever wishes a war without the most commanding necessity belongs to an era of barbarism but not to the civilized society of this century.

Therefore I consider a war between the United States and Germany as eminently improbable—indeed as impossible, unless it spring from one of those sudden irritations or angry impulses which sometimes may for a moment put a people as well as an individual into a more or less irresponsible condition of mind, but which pass away innocuous if in some manner they are kept from precipitate action. To prevent the breaking out of such headlong conflicts nothing is more effective than the institution of arbitration systems that stand in the way of precipitate actions and demand quiet reflection. In this way a proper arbitration treaty might serve to preserve the two nations from such an accident which would be an unspeakably lamentable misfortune not only for Americans of German blood but for all American citizens of whatever origin.

That the President will favor such a treaty may be assumed; but whether, after the last position taken by the Senate, this treaty would have an immediate prospect of confirmation by that body, I do not undertake to judge. At any rate any proper movement in this direction is a work of merit.

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
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
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
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
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